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THE TATTVA-KAUMUDI

(*Vācaspati Mis'ra's Commentary on the Sāṁkhya–Kārikā*)

Translated into English and containing

A SYNOPSIS OF THE CARDINAL DOCTRINES OF THE SĀṀKHYA PHILOSOPHY

BY

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and with

AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL NOTES

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INTRODUCTION

I. *The Origin of Philosophical Enquiry*

In this world, the end of all activity is happiness. Nobody even in his imagination likes to suffer pain even for a moment. Even those who commit suicide do so only when they are sorely disgusted with the pains inherent in Saṁsāra. Truly has it been said by our elders, "Every one desists from pain; every one desires happiness." But what happiness is cannot be very well explained by those who lack philosophical insight. The enjoyment of sense-objects which people resort to as 'pleasure' day and night and for which they put forth their utmost effort is considered by philosophers as entirely undesirable, mixed as it is always with pain. So the wise leave all worldly enjoyments even as one does honey mixed with poison and seek the highest end of human existence which alone leads to final and absolute happiness; and after they have attained it for themselves, they are moved with pity for the creatures quivering in the well of miseries and for their good they apply themselves to the propagation of the truth attained. Thus do the wise explain the Origin of Philosophical Enquiry.

II. *The Significance of Sāṁkhya Philosophy*

Of all the philosophical systems, Sāṁkhya has been considered by all to be the most ancient. Nobody can gainsay the fact that this occupies a prominent place in all the S'āstras, since this is either supported or controverted by every philosophical system. Therefore, the importance of this S'āstra is recognised by all the systems. S'aṅkarācārya says—"The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedānta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-

difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sūtras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhāna doctrine." (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 289). So also in the Mahābhārata we read—"There is no knowledge like that of Sāṁkhya, no power like that of Yoga. You should have no doubt as to Sāṁkhya being the highest knowledge." (S'ānti. 316, 2).

Though the use of the word *Sāṁkhya* is found first of all in the S'vet. Up.—तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगाधिगम्यं etc., (VI, 13), yet Sāṁkhya reflections are found even in the Ṛgveda and the other Upaniṣads. This proves the antiquity of this S'āstra. This will be made clear in detail further on.

Sāṁkhya is derived from the word *saṁkhyā*. The word *saṁkhyā* is used in the sense of thinking and counting. Cf. "चर्चा संख्या विचारणा" (Amara I. V. 3) Thinking may be with reference to basic principles or knowledge of Self. Counting refers to the twenty-four principles and *as'akti*, *atuṣṭi*, etc. The double implication of the word has been set forth by Vijñānabhikṣu in his preface to Sāṁkhya-pravacanabhāṣya, by a quotation from the Mbh.—

"संख्यां प्रकुर्वते चैव प्रकृतिं च प्रचक्षते ।
तत्त्वानि च चतुर्विंशत्तेन सांख्यं प्रकीर्तितम् ॥"

So, *Sāṁkhya* means knowledge of Self through right discrimination. Garbe is of opinion that the word *Sāṁkhya* was originally used in the sense of counting, and it was then applied to the system of Kapila which enumerates the 25 principles. (For details and the opinion of Jacobi, see S. P., p. 189, 2n and pp. 190-191). Jayacandra S'armā says with regard to *Sāṁkhya* in *Saṁskṛta-Candrikā*, a magazine which became defunct long ago, that the Sāṁkhya is tawny, with deep-brown face, and has a big belly. He has a rosary in his hand and a staff, and keeps long nails and hair. (Ādipurāṇa quoted. VII of 1821 *S'aka*, Vol. 1 and 2, p. 8). Really

speaking, since the word *Kapila* stands both for a particular colour and for the founder of Sāṁkhya Philosophy, therefore, owing to the similarity of word the writer of the Purāṇa has indulged in conjectures of his own. It appears that the writer of the Purāṇa at the time of writing happened to see some sage with tawny face and corpulent body and was led to describe his form and colour.

Some scholars, seeing the rejection of Īśvara in the Sāṁkhya-system, have maintained that it is *vedaviruddha* or opposed to S'ruti (S. S., p. 21 f.; S. P., 13 ff.). S'aṅkarācārya also, seeing that Sāṁkhya is opposed to *advaita*, avers that Sāṁkhya is not rooted in the S'rutis.

" Although there are many Smṛtis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the Sāṁkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sāṁkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (S've. Up. VI, 13). ...., we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude is not to be attained by the knowledge of Sāṁkhya Smṛti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice." (S. B. E., XXXIV, pp. 297–8). In deciding also the *vaidika* or the *non-vaidika* character of Sāṁkhya, the great S'aṅkara says—" The scriptural passage which the pūrvapakṣin has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (*i. e.*, of some Kapila) as are contrary to scriptures, for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, *viz.*, the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname of Vāsudeva." (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 294).

Similarly others have also maintained the opposition of Sāṁkhya to S'ruti. Truly speaking, Sāṁkhya could be divided into two—one *ses'vara*, the other *nirīs'vara*. Let the theists not take the *nirīs'vara-Sāṁkhya*, propounded in the Kārikā, etc., as rooted in S'ruti, but who can take exception to the *vaidika* character of the *ses'vara-Sāṁkhya* as propounded in the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas ? For instance, we come accross '*yathā-s'rutinidars'ana* as a synonym of Sāṁkhya in —

एतानि नव सर्गाणि तत्त्वानि च नराधिप ।
चतुर्विंशतिरुक्तानि यथाश्रुतिनिदर्शनात् ॥
(Mbh., S'ānti., 310, 25)

In the 313th chapter of S'āntiparvan, in the section describing the intrinsic, extrinsic and super-natural aspects of the *vibhūtis* of *Prakṛti* many synonyms of the upholders of Sāṁkhya are met with; *e. g*, ब्राह्मणास्तत्त्वदर्शिनः (*v.* 1) तत्त्वार्थदर्शिनः, (2) योगप्रदर्शिनः, (3) संख्यानदर्शिनः, (4) योगानिदर्शिनः, (5) यथाश्रुतिनिदर्शिनः, (6, 7, 8 and 9) तत्त्वबुद्धिविशारदाः, (10) यथाशास्त्रविशारदाः, (11) तत्त्वनिदर्शिनः, (12) यथावदभिदर्शिनः, (13). Here the word '*Yathās'rutinidars'inaḥ*' being repeated four times establishes the *vaidika* character of theistic Sāṁkhya. Moreover, even the atheistic Sāṁkhya is *vaidika* in character, inasmuch as the traditional categories have been borrowed from Upaniṣads, etc. [Jacobi takes the atheistic Sāṁkhya as older, and believes that there has been an attempt for the synthesis of the theistic and the atheistic Sāṁkhyas in the later Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and portions of the Mahābhārata. *vide*—Ent. Gott p. 32]. Therefore, from the presence of the names of the *ācāryas* of Sāṁkhya in the offering to Ṛṣis, it may be fairly guessed that in olden times, even the most staunch theists undertook the study of Sāṁkhya. (S. S., p. 22). This could not have been possible if Sāṁkhya was not founded on S'rutis.

III. Germs of Sāṁkhya in the Vedas, etc.

The presence of Sāṁkhya categories in the S'rutis in a germinal form corroborates the former guess. We do not mean to say that the principles of Sāṁkhya in their detail are to be sought in the Vedas and Upaniṣads as propounded by Sāṁkhya–Kārikā. That would be as ridiculous as trying to find out the great banyan tree in its minute seed. *Tamas* described in the Ṛgveda (X. 129, 3) "तम आसीत्तमसा गूळ्हमग्रेऽप्रकेतं" etc., assumed later on the form of the Unmanifest. This very S'ruti, showing the dissolution of the elements and the elemental world in its cause, the darkness, points to *satkāryavāda*. Sāyaṇa also favours this interpretation in his *bhāṣya* on this verse. Giving this very interpretation elsewhere, the Veda even explains *Aja* (the unborn) as the name of *Pradhāna*—

तमिद्गर्भं प्रथमं दध्र आपो यत्र देवाः समगच्छन्त विश्वे ।
अजस्य नाभावध्येकमर्पितं यस्मिन् विश्वानि भुवनानि तस्थुः ॥

(Ṛgveda, X. 82, 6)

Chronologically, Jacobi has divided the Upaniṣads into four divisions on account of their variety, their origin in different times, and their subject-matter (Ent. Gott. p. 6 and 19; H. I. P. I, p. 28 ff; I. P. I., p. 141 ff.).

1. *The most ancient* : as, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Taittirīya, Aitareya and Kauṣītaki.

2, *Ancient* : as, Kāṭhaka, Īs'a, S'vetās'vatara, Muṇḍaka and Mahānārāyaṇa.

3. *Modern* : as, Pras'na, Maitrāyaṇī and Māṇḍūkya.

4. *Most modern* : the many Atharvaṇa Upaniṣads.

Among the most ancient ones, in the Br. Up., the Puruṣa is declared to be only a seer, not a doer, devoid of activity in as much as he is without any association with anything (in

reality) as in "स वा एष एतस्मिन् संप्रसादे रत्वा चरित्वा दृष्ट्वैव........ असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुष इत्येवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य" (IV. 3, 15 ff). The word *mahat* is indicative of the Sāṁkhya word *Buddhi* in "स यथा सैन्धव......यतो यतस्त्वाददीत लवणमेवैवं वा अर इदं महद्भूतमनन्तमपारं विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय etc." (Bṛ. Up. II. 4, 12). The term *Vijñānaghana* expounds the intelligent nature of *Buddhi*. [Jacobi says that it is very surprising how Sāṁkhya attributes unconsciousness to *Buddhi* which is by nature intelligence. *vide*, Ent. Gott. p. 32. In this connection, consult also the *Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya* on the Gautama-Sūtra "बुद्धिरुपलब्धिर्ज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम्" (I. 15).]

In the Ch. Up. (VI, 2, 1) having first introduced the theory of *satkāryavāda* in "सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्" the S'ruti in the same *mantra* mentions the *pūrva-pakṣa* of *asat-kāryavāda* in "तद्धैक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं तस्मादसतः सज्जायत". It then advances in the next *mantra satkāryavāda* that is, (सतः सज्जायते), as a contradiction of the previous statement, *e. g.*, "कुतस्तु खलु सोम्यैवं स्यादिति होवाच कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति, सत्त्वेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्" (VI. 2, 2). Here the difference from S'āṅkara-Vedānta is that it accepts the aggregate of effects as *real* and not *unreal* like *māyā*. It maintains that this aggregate of effects exists as a reality in the cause. Thus it clearly expounds *satkāryavāda*. The cause has been signified as real. This has also been indicated in the *mantra* यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्" (Ch. Up. VI. 1, 4). Thus arose the *Pariṇāmavāda* of the Sāṁkhyas (Ent. Gott., p. 14). From this reality or existence were produced fire, earth, etc. The expounding of three forms of these objects in "यदग्ने रोहितं रूपं तेजसस्तद्रूपं, यच्छुक्लं तदपां, यत्कृष्णं तदन्नस्यापागादग्नेरग्नित्वं वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं त्रीणि रूपाणीत्येव सत्यम्" (Ch. Up., VI 4, 1) is only an earlier form of the *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. The redness of fire indicates *Rajas*. Just as

red colour colours cloth, etc., so *Rajas* colours *citta*, because of its property of activity. Even so, the whiteness of water indicates *Sattva*, because white water has the property of purifying things. *Sattva* also purifies the mind with knowledge. The dark colour of *anna*=Earth is an indication of *Tamas*. The dark colour covers everything. Even so, the insentient *Tamas* covers the knowledge born of *Sattva*. [See, Bāla, p. 3. What has been propounded by Sūryanārāyaṇa Sāstri in contradiction of this will be found in the Introduction, S. N. S.]. This very thing is propounded in the *mantra* "अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णाम्" (S'v. Up. IV 5; Mahānārāyaṇa Up., p. 141, Īśādi). The *trivṛtkaraṇa* (trebling) *S'ruti* found in the (Ch. Up. VI. 4 and 5) also corroborates this opinion. We also see that the word *trivṛta* has been used in the sense of the three Attributes in "तमेकनेमिं त्रिवृतम् etc." (S'v. Up. I, 4) also. There the three-foldness of grain, etc., has been indicated by the gross, the medium and the small sizes. It appears that the three-foldness of the Attributes has also been used similarly. Jacobi has also accepted this (Ent. Gott., p. 32).

The Sāṁkhya categories are clearly stated in the later Upaniṣads, *e. g.*, in Kaṭha "मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्बुद्धेरात्मा महान् परः (III, 10). *Mahat* is the synonym of *Ahaṅkāra*. Similarly we find *Avyakta* and *Puruṣa* in "महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः । पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ॥" (*Ibid*, III, 11), Prof. Radhakrishnan believes that the indifference and inactivity of *Puruṣa* have been indicated in "द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते । तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति अनश्नन्न्यो अभिचाकशीति ॥" in the Muṇḍaka Up. (III, 1) [I. P. I, 259, 1 n].

It is a well-known fact that S'vetās'vatara is essentially a Sāṁkhya Upaniṣad. It abounds in the Sāṁkhya categories. For instance in this alone, the words *Sāṁkhya* and *Kapila* have been used for the first time. "तत्कारणं सांख्य-

योगाधिगम्यम् " (VI. 13), "ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे " (V. 2). In this connection, we shall show later that there is a good deal of controversy about the word *Kapila*. It is again in this Upaniṣad that the words *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *jña* are found, *e. g.*, "संयुक्तमेतत्क्षरमक्षरं च व्यक्ताव्यक्तं भरते विश्वमीशः etc." (I. 8); also "ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजावीशानीशावजा ह्येका etc. " (I. 9). *vide* also the Mbh. "अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः " (III. 30. 88. This whole verse is quoted in the Gauḍa. on the 61st Kārikā). Similarly, the use of the words *Pradhāna*, *Prakṛti* and *guṇa* is also found here, *e. g.* "क्षरं प्रधानम् " (I, 10), "मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् " (IV, 10), "देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढाम् " (I, 13), etc. Also, *the mantra* "तमेकनेमिं त्रिवृतं षोडशान्तं शतार्धारं विंशतिप्रत्यराभिः । अष्टकैः षड्भिर्विश्वरूपैकपाशं त्रिमार्गभेदं द्विनिमित्तैकमोहम् ॥ " (S'v. Up. I, 4) propounds the categories of Sāṁkhya. The word *trivṛta* refers to the three *guṇas*, the word *ṣoḍas'ānta* refers to sixteen *vikāras*, the word *s'atārdhāra* points to the fifty varieties of *pratyaya-sarga*. Keith's doubt about the Sāṁkhya character of this verse will not bear examination (S. S. p. 11). He has given up the reasonable interpretation and says, "The worth of such identifications must be regarded as uncertain and no conclusive evidence is afforded by them, as plays on numbers are much affected by the Brahmanical schools." But he has not given any different interpretation himself and is, therefore, open to the charge of leaving the present and the relevant in favour of the absent and the irrelevant.

But simply on the basis of the presence of a few technical terms of Sāṁkhya, we should not conclude that a particular Upaniṣad propounds Sāṁkhya doctrines. For instance, in places like "मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् " (S'v. Up. IV, 10) though there is a technical term of Sāṁkhya, yet it appears that it is only supporting the Vedānta doctrine. Therefore, seeing that Sāṁkhya comes closely after Vedānta in these Upaniṣadas, Jacobi declares that there cannot be

any two opinions among scholars with regard to the fact that the rise of the Sāṁkhya and Yoga systems lies between the most ancient and the ancient Upaniṣads. (Ent. Gott. p. 21).

Among the modern Upaniṣads, the mention of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* by name, the exposition of the five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements and reference to the Sāṁkhya categories of *kṣetrajña*, *saṁkalpa*, *adhyavasāya*, *abhimāna* and *liṅga* clearly show that these Upaniṣads come after the formulation of the Sāṁkhya system. As—"तमो वा इदमेकमास, तत्पश्चात्तत्परेणेरितं विषमत्वं प्रयात्येतद्वै रजसो रूपं..............सोंऽशोऽयं यश्चेतनमात्रः प्रतिपुरुषं क्षेत्रज्ञः संकल्पाध्यवसायाभिमानलिंगः प्रजापतिः etc." (Maitrāyaṇī, Up. IV, 5), "पञ्चतन्मात्राणि भूतशब्देनोच्यन्ते पंचमहाभूतानि भूतशब्देनोच्यन्ते etc. (Ibid III,2), "पृथिवी च पृथिवीमात्रा चापश्चापोमात्राः etc. (Pr. up IV. 8) and so on.

In the Mbh, and the Purāṇas, we find Sāṁkhya philosophy fully reflected. At one place we find the mention of the five gross elements, the twenty-four categories in their manifested or unmanifested character and the three *guṇas* (Mbh. III, 209, 16–21; 211, 4). The distinction between *Prakṛti*, and *Puruṣa* has been extensively expounded in S'āntiparvan (285, 33–40). Here the word *sattva* stands for *Prakṛti* and not *Brahman*. But Keith, seeing that *sattva* was used as the subject of comparison of a spider, erroneously maintains that *sattva* is referring to *Brahman* (S. S., p. 17). It will be clear from the two verses quoted below that his explanation is erroneous, since it is opposed to the context :—" सृजते हि गुणान् सत्त्वं क्षेत्रज्ञः परिपश्यति । सम्प्रयोगस्तयोरेष सत्त्वक्षेत्रज्ञयोर्ध्रुवः ॥ ३७ ॥ स्वभावसिद्धमेवैतद्यदिमान् सृजते गुणान् । ऊर्णनाभिर्यथा सूत्रं विज्ञेयास्तन्तुवद् गुणाः ॥ ३८ ॥ ". We find a reference in the Mbh. of Sāṁkhya knowledge being called *Vais'eṣika* which was imparted to Janaka by Pañcaśikha of Parāśara *gotra*, *e. g.*, " यस्माच्चैतन्मया प्राप्तं ज्ञानं वैशेषिकं पुरा " (S'ānti. 330, 23*a*). There again, three paths of emancipation have been described. We find there from the

context that leaving aside the paths of mere knowledge or action, Sāṁkhya lays down a third kind of path, *viz.*, a combination of knowledge and action. S'ānti, 320, 38—40. In this connection, *vide* my article, P. O. C., Lahore, II, 1027 *f*).

In the dialogue between Janaka and Sulabhā, the latter uses the word *Sāṁkhya* in the sense of a particular kind of a sentence,—"**सौक्ष्म्यं सांख्यक्रमौ चोभौ निर्णयः सप्रयोजनः। पञ्चैतान्यर्थजातानि वाक्यमित्युच्यते नृप॥ दोषाणां च गुणानां च प्रमाणं प्रविभागतः। कंचिदर्थमभिप्रेत्य सा संख्येत्युपधार्यताम्॥**" (S'ānti. 320, 79 and 82). But at one place in the Mbh., thirty qualities of a body have been metioned. This classification of qualities is not met with in the Sāṁkhya philosophy *e. g.*, (1) *S'abda*, (2) *Spars'a*, (3) *Rasa*, (4) *Rūpa*, (5) *Gandha*, (6–10) the five senses, (11) *Manas*, (12) *Buddhi*, (13) *Sattva*, (14) *Ahaṁ-kartā*, (15) *Sāmagrya*, (16) *Saṅghāta*, (17) *Prakṛti*, (18) *Vyakti*, (19) *Dvandvayoga*, (20) *Kāla*, (21–25) the five gross elements, (26) *Sadbhāvayoga*, (27) *Asadbhāvayoga*, (28) *Vidhi*, (29) *S'ukra* and (30) *Bala* (S'ānti. 320, 97–112). So it has been said :—"**विंशतिर्दशचैवं हि गुणाः संख्यानतः स्मृताः। समग्रा यत्र वर्तन्ते तच्छरीरमिति स्मृतम्॥**" (ibid, 112). There, the eight-fold varieties of *Prakṛti* and sixteen varities of modifications have been described in the 310th chapter of the same *parvan*. Again, the nine kinds of creation mentioned there are not found in Sāṁkhya books. They are as given below :—

(1) The creation of *mahat* from *avyakta*, (2) from *mahat* there is the creation of *ahaṁkāra*, (3) from the latter of *manas*, (4) from it, that of the five gross elements, (5) from these, that of five attributes, (6) from these, that of five senses, (7) from these, that of "connected with the senses (*aindriyaka*)," (8) from this, that of the upper and oblique varieties and (9) from the oblique, there is the creation of the lower variety. Thus, there is mutual discrepancy in the doctrines expounded in the Mbh. The categories taught by Pañcas'ikha in S'ānti. 219, are nowhere obtained in the

Sāṁkhya. A teaching of this very teacher, quite different from that mentioned above, is found in 321, 96–112 of the S'ānti. In the 274th chapter, the doctrines expounded by Devala are different from every other. But even in the midst of divergent expositions of Sāṁkhya doctrines, all agree with regard to the exposition of *Brahman* or Īs'vara. Even though the plurality of *puruṣas* has been accepted, *Brahman* has been described as the basis of all. (*vide*— "बहूनां पुरुषाणां स यथैका योनिरुच्यते," S'ānti 350. 26). Āsuri, having taught Sāṁkhya to Pañcas'ikha, got merged in *Brahman*— "यत्तदेकाक्षरं ब्रह्म नानारूपं प्रदृश्यते । आसुरिर्मण्डले तस्मिन् प्रतिपेदे तदव्ययम् ॥" (S'ānti, 218, 13).

In the Bhagavadgītā also, we do not find atheism among the Sāṁkhyas. Rather we find the antiquity and dualism of Sāṁkhya propounded in it (Tilak's Gītārahasya, Hindi translation by Sapre, p. 514, 1917 edn.). Kapila, the pioneer of Sāṁkhya philosophy has been described by Lord Kṛṣṇa as an example of his own glory; *e. g.* "सिद्धानां कपिलो मुनिः" (Bh. G. X, 26). Here the Sāṁkhya path without *karman* is only a synomym of *Jñāna*. Therefore S'aṅkarācārya explains the word *kṛtānta* as "कृतमिति कर्मोच्यते । तस्यान्तः परिसमाप्तिर्यत्र स कृतान्तः कर्मान्त इत्येतत् ॥" (Bh. G. XVIII, 13). S'aṅkarācārya explains the word *guṇasaṁkhyāna* (Bh. G. XVIII, 19) as the system of Kapila the subject-matter of which is the exposition of the three *guṇas*, *viz*. *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*.

Again in the 3rd chapter of Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Sāṁkhya doctrines in detail tend to propound devotion to Viṣṇu. Among the Purāṇas also, the various traditional schools interpret Sāṁkhya doctrines in their own way (see V. P. VI. 5, 2–8; VI. 4, 35 Sk. P. Prabhāsa-khaṇḍa, 18, 13–15 ; Brah. P. ch. 213 ff).

In the Manu-smṛti also which is contemporary with the Mbh. (S. S, p. 52) there is a detailed description of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* (XII. 24–52) and reference to the three *pramāṇas* (ibid, 105). But the word Sāṁkhya is not found

in it. Medhātithi, commenting on "आकाशात्तु विकुर्वाणात् सर्वगन्धवहः शुचिः। (I. 76), says—विकुर्वाणादहङ्काराद्दाकाशस्तस्माद्वायुः—, and thus indicates the presence of Sāṁkhya doctrine. In Viṣṇusmṛti, the distinction of Puruṣa from the twenty-four categories, preceded by discrimination, has been clearly described. One of the stanzas (XX, 25) of this Smṛti very closely corresponds with the comment on the second Kārikā by Gauḍapāda (S. S. p. 52). In the S'aṅkha-saṁhitā we find twenty-five categories, but *Puruṣa* is identified with *Viṣṇu* (VII 21–25). Yājñavalkya Smṛti has also been influenced by Sāṁkhya, *e. g.* बुद्धेरुत्पत्तिरव्यक्तात्ततोऽहङ्कारसम्भवः। तन्मात्रादीन्यहङ्काराद्देकोत्तरगुणानि च॥" (III, 179 ff.). We have already said that the Sāṁkhya categories expounded in these books give prominence to Īs'vara (See also Bh. Com. pp. 183–4, where Belvalkar points out five stages of the evolution of Sāṁkhya doctrines.)

IV. Sāṁkhya Teachers

Names of twenty-six Sāṁkhya teachers are met with in the Smṛtis, the Mbh., the Kārikās, etc. They are as follows:–

(1) Kapila, (2) Āsuri, (3) Pañcas'ikha, (4) Vindhyavāsa, or Vindhyavāsaka or Vindhyavāsin, (5) Vārṣagaṇya, (6) Jaigīṣavya, (7) Voḍhu, (8) Asitadevala or Devala, (9) Sanaka, (10) Sanandana, (11) Sanātana, (12) Sanatkumāra, (13) Bhṛgu, (14) S'ukra, (15) Kās'yapa, (16) Parās'ara, (17) Garga or Gārgya, (18) Gautama, (19) Nārada, (20) Ārṣṭiṣeṇa (21) Agastya, (22) Pulastya, (23) Hārīta, (24) Ulūka, (25) Vālmīki and (26) S'uka.

1. Kapila

Mentioned in the S'v. Up. (5, 2) for the first time, Kapila is known everywhere as the founder of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. Many people think that he was not a historical personage. But Garbe, criticising the views of Max-Müller and Colebrooke, believes that the traditionally handed down name of Kapila cannot be regarded as fictitious; there is

another support in the name of the town Kapilavastu of the Budhists (S. Y., 2, § 3). Keith, on the other hand, opines that Kapila was not a historical person as he is found identified with *Agni* or *Viṣṇu* or *S'iva*, and is, therefore, another name for *Hiraṇyagarbha* (S. S. 9, In; Mbh. S'ānti. 339, 66–67; 342. 92–93). Kaviraja Gopinatha also agrees with this opinion as expressed by him in the introduction to Jayamaṅgalā published by me (p. 3). Bālarāma Udāsīna, in his footnotes to Yogabhāṣya 1. 25; "आदिविद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय कारुण्याद्भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच ।" says :—

"(1) आदिविद्वान्=सर्गादावाविर्भूतो हिरण्यगर्भः स्वयंभूः, निर्माणचित्तं =योगबलेन स्वनिर्मितं चित्तमधिष्ठाय=स्वांशेन प्रविश्य कपिलाख्यपरमर्षिर्भूत्वा कारुण्याज्जिज्ञासवे आसुरये तन्त्रं प्रोवाचेत्यर्थः ॥ (2) 'ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्बिभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत्' इति श्रुत्या कपिलस्य जायमानस्य ज्ञानप्राप्तिः श्रूयते ॥ (3) पञ्चमे कपिलो नाम सिद्धेशः कालविप्लुतम् । प्रोवाचासुरये सांख्यं तत्त्वग्रामविनिर्णयम् । (Bhāgavata Purāṇa, I. 3. II). इति स्मृतौ पञ्चमावतारत्वोक्तेर्विष्णोरवतारः कपिल इति भावः । 'अग्निः स कपिलो नाम सांख्यशास्त्रप्रवर्तकः' इति महाभारतं तु कल्पभेदेन नेयम् । कल्पभेदेनैव च कपिलो ब्रह्मपुत्र इति स्मर्यते ॥ (4) भास्कराचार्यप्रभृतयस्तु 'ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं' इति कपिलपदेनापि हिरण्यगर्भ एव गृह्यते ॥ 'यो ब्रह्माणं' इत्यादिबहुपूर्वोत्तरमन्त्रसंवादादित्याहुः॥" (Ch. S. S. p. 62).

From a quotation in the Baudhāyana (2, 6, 30), we learn that an *asura* Kapila divided the four ās'ramas. There is another Kapila also who wrote a Kapilasmṛti dealing with the *s'rāddha*, *vivāha*, *prāyas'citta* ceremonies (H. Dh. I, pp. 25, 525). S'aṅkarācārya also thinks that the Kapila of Sāṁkhya is different from the Vedic Kapila (Br. S. Bhāsya II, 1, 1). Ānandagiri, commenting on this says that the Vedic Kapila is that one who reduced the sixty-thousand sons of Sagara to ashes. He is quite different from the Sāṁkhya teacher. But we find in the Padmapurāṇa that one Kapila *alias* Vāsudeva taught the Sāṁkhya doctrines to Brahman, Bhṛgu, etc., supported by the Vedas; another Kapila taught (the Sāṁkhya) as opposed to all the Vedic tenets (quoted in N. B. S., II 1, 1,

p. 4). But according to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (3. 25. 1) Vāsudeva himself was born as Kapila from the womb of Devahūti कपिलस्तत्त्वसंख्याता भगवानात्ममायया । जातः स्वयमजः साक्षादात्मप्रज्ञप्तये नृणाम् ॥ "

Thus, we find no strong proof for believing Kapila a historical person.

2. Āsuri

There is a difference of opinion also with regard to the reality of Āsuri, the first disciple of Kapila. Kaviraja Gopinatha thinks him to be a historical person (Jay., Int., p. 3). But Garbe and Keith are opposed to this view (S. S. pp. 47-48; S. Y. pp. 2-3 : Garbe adds that if Āsuri is really historical then he is different from his namesake mentioned in the S'atapatha-Brāhmaṇa). The two interesting accounts as to how Kapila taught Āsuri are found in the Jayamaṅgalā and the Māṭharavṛtti. In the Mbh., Āsuri is made the teacher of Pañcas'ikha " तत्र पञ्चशिखो नाम कापिलेयो महामुनिः ।... आसुरेः प्रथमं शिष्यं etc. " (S'ānti, 218. 6. 10). We find only one quotation ascribed to Āsuri, *viz.* " विविक्ते दृक्परिणतौ बुद्धौ भोगोऽस्य कथ्यते । प्रतिबिम्बोदयः स्वच्छो यथा चन्द्रमसोऽम्भसि ॥" in the commentary of Haribhadra on the Ṣaḍdars'anasamuccaya (p. 36).

3. Pañcas'ikha

Pañcas'ikha, the disciple of Āsuri is found quoted in the following works :

A. Y. Bh.—

(अ) " एकमेव दर्शनं ख्यातिरेव दर्शनम् " [१. ४] । (आ) " आदिविद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय कारुण्याद्भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच " । [१. २५] (इ) " तमणुमात्रमात्मानमनुविद्याऽस्मीत्येवं तावत्संप्रजानीते " [१. ३६]। (उ) " व्यक्तमव्यक्तं वा सत्त्वमात्मत्वेनाभिप्रतीत्य तस्य सम्पदमनुनन्दत्यात्मसम्पदं मन्वानस्तस्य व्यापदमनुशोचत्यात्मव्यापदं मन्वानः स सर्वोऽप्रतिबुद्धः " [२. ५]। (ऊ) " बुद्धितः परं

पुरुषमाकारशीलविद्यादिभिर्विभक्तमपश्यन् कुर्यात्तत्रात्मबुद्धिं मोहेन" [२.६] (ऋ) "स्यात् स्वल्पः सङ्करः सपरिहारः सप्रत्यवमर्षः। कुशलस्य नापकर्षायालम् कस्मात्, कुशलं हि मे बह्वन्यदस्ति यत्रायमावापं गतः स्वर्गेऽप्यपकर्षमल्पं करिष्यति" [२, १३]। (ॠ) "रूपातिशया वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च परस्परेण विरुध्यन्ते, सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते" [३. १३]। (ऌ) "तुल्यदेशश्रवणानामेकदेशश्रुतित्वं भवति" [३. ४१.]॥

Vyāsa does not give the name of Pañcas'ikha, but it is Vācaspati who says so.

B. S. Sū.—

(ए) "आधेयशक्तियोगः पञ्चशिखः" [५. ३२]। (ऐ) "अविवेकनिमित्तो वा पञ्चशिखः [६. ६८]"

C. S. S. B.—

(ओ) "सत्त्वं नाम प्रसादलाघवाभिष्वङ्गप्रीतितितिक्षासन्तोषादिरूपानन्तभेदं समासतः सुखात्मकम्, एवं रजोऽपि शोकादिनानाभेदं समासतो दुःखात्मकम्, एवं तमोऽपि निद्रादिनानाभेदं समासतो मोहात्मकम्" १. १२७]।

D. Bhāmatī.—

(औ) "तत्संयोगहेतुविवर्जनात्स्यादयमात्यन्तिको दुःखप्रतीकारः" [ब्रह्मसूत्र, २. २. १०].

E. Gauḍa. (Kār. 1) and Māṭh. (Kār. 22)—

(क) "पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो यत्र कुत्राश्रमे रतः। जटी मुण्डी शिखी वापि मुच्यते नात्र संशयः॥"

This verse is ascribed to Pañcas'ikha by Bhāvāgaṇes'a in his Tattvayāthārthyadīpana and by Haribhadrasūri in S'āstravārtasamuccaya (see Int. to Māṭharavṛtti). Bhāvāgaṇes'a was the disciple of Vijñānabhikṣu and flourished in the 17th century A.D. The time of Haribhadrasūri is about 725 A.D.

F. Bāla.—

(ख) "उभयथा चास्य प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानव्यवहारं लभते ।" (p. 153).

We find no account of this Pañcas'ikha born in the family of Parās'ara (Mbh. S'anti. 320, 23). All the quotations ascribed to him are in prose except the "E". It is just possible that he wrote a prose treatise. According to Garbe Pañcas'ikha flourished in the first century A.D. (S. Y. p. 3). Vyāsa, the author of the Yogabhāṣya, flourished in the 4th century A.D. (I. P. II, 342). It is possible that the writings of Pañcas'ikha were very common in the 4th century A.D., and, therefore, Vyāsa did not give his name while quoting. As Vācaspati frequently mentions his name, we can safely infer that the writings of Pañcas'ikha were known to him. Was it the Commentary on the Samāsasūtras which fell into the hands of Vācaspati? Vijñanabhikṣu refers to Pañcas'ikha as the author of a commentary on the Samāsasūtras or the Tattvasamāsa; Bhāvāganes'a also says the same thing: "समाससूत्राण्यालम्ब्य व्याख्यां पञ्चशिखस्य च ।" (Int. to Māṭh. p. 2). According to Chinese tradition, Pañcas'ikha is the author of Ṣaṣṭitantra (S. S. 48). But this account is not to be believed, as is proved by many writers. Vācaspati, on the other hand, thinks that Ṣaṣṭitantra is a book on Yogaśāstra and its author was Vārṣagaṇya (see Tattv. V. on Y. S. IV. 13; and Bhāmatī on Brahmasūtra II. 1, 3). Kaviraja Gopinatha is of opinion that Vācaspati never saw the Ṣaṣṭitantra (Jay. Int. pp. 4–7). But, according to the late M. M. P. Rāmāvatāra S'armā, Vācaspati knew Ṣaṣṭitantra (Bāla. p. 226). That this Pañcaśikha is different from his namesake in the Mahābhārata is evident from their views; he is different from Gandhabba Pañcas'ikha also (S. S., pp. 48, 51).

4. Vindhyavāsa

The view that Vindyavāsa is to be identified with Īśvarakṛṣṇa is not sound (Jay. Int. pp. 6–7). We find one quotation

from him in the Rājamārtaṇḍa of Bhoja: "सत्त्वतप्यत्वमेव पुरुषतप्यत्वम्. (Y. S. IV 23). Medhātithi also quotes his opinion in his Bhāṣya on Manu I. 55: "सांख्या हि केचिन्नान्तराभवमिच्छन्ति विन्ध्यवासप्रभृतयः।". This seems to be derived from the S'lokavārtika : "अन्तराभवदेहस्तु निषिद्धो विन्ध्यवासिना।" (p. 704). Also in the Saḍdarśanasamuccaya we find a quotation from him : "पुरुषोऽविकृतात्मैव स्वनिर्भासमचेतनम्। मनः करोति सांनिध्यादुपाधेः स्फटिको यथा॥" (p. 36). Vallālasena, king of Bengal (12th century A.D.), has given a list of works which he consulted while compiling his Adbhutasāgara. There we find a work of a certain Sāṁkhya teacher named Vindhyavāsin (H. Dh. I, 341, 793n). This proves that the work of Vindhyavāsin was available as late as the 12th century A.D. Tanusukharāma, in his introduction to the Māṭharavṛtti (Ch. S. S.), has established an identity between Vindhyavāsin and Vyāḍi on the basis of quotations from the Trikāṇḍaśeṣa, the Haimakośa and the Saṁyamināmamālā. He says: स च भगवतो वर्षस्य शिष्यो नन्दसमकालीनः (•Kathāsaritsāgara, I. 2) पाणिनिसूत्राणां संग्रहाख्यटीकायाः कस्यचित् कोशस्य कर्ता, दाक्षायणेः पतञ्जलेरपि पुरोगामी सांख्ययोगाचार्यश्च ॥" (p. 3). This leads us to suppose that Vindhyavāsin *alias* Vyāḍi, flourished in the 4th century B.C. According to a Chinese tradition Vindhyavāsin wrote a Sāṁkhya work called Hiraṇyasaptati (Bh. Com. p. 175). According to Dr Belvalkar, Hiraṇyasaptati is a commentary on the Sāṁkhyakārikā (ibid 177). But Kaviraja Gopinatha says : "The Anuyogadvārasūtra of the Jainas preserves a list of Brahmanical works, which contains the name of Kanagasattari (Kanaksaptati), which I take to be equivalent to the Suvarṇasaptati or Hiraṇyasaptati, the name of Sāṁkhya-saptati familiar in China." (Jay. Int. p. 7, 12n). But it must be noted here that along with the Kanagasattari, we find Māḍhara also in the list of the Anuyogadvārasūtra. If Māḍhara stands for the Māṭharavṛtti then it is impossible to conclude that Anuyogadvārasūtra was written in the 1st

century A.D. (F. O. Schrader in a letter to me from Kiel, March 1, 1927). In the Māṭharavṛtti we find : " यथा दर्पणाभात्र आभासहानौ " a quotation from the Hastāmalakastotra which is of the age of S'aṅkarācārya (*i. e.* 780–812 A.D., See Int., Māṭh., p. 5). Therefore, it is wrong to decide the age of Vindhyavāsa or Īs'varakṛṣṇa on the basis of the Kanagasattari. And, if Vyāḍi *alias* Vindhyavāsin, is the author of the Hiraṇyasaptati, then the latter is certainly different from the Sāṁkhykārikā, and Vindhyavāsin is different from Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Otherwise the date of Īśvarkṛṣṇa will have to be pushed back to the 4th century B. C. Therefore, it is safe to conclude, as Keith also says, that there are more than one Vindhyavāsins and that their dates are uncertain (S. S., 79 in; also, Karma., p. 59).

5. Vārṣagaṇya

We are as uncertain about Vārṣagaṇya as about the former teachers of Sāṁkhya. We find two quotations from him in the Vyāsabhāṣya: (1) " मूर्तिव्यवधिजातिभेदाभावान्नास्ति मूलपृथक्त्वं इति वार्षगण्यः। " (III 53, (2) " गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति। यत्तु दृष्टिपथं प्राप्तं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम्॥ " (Ibid. IV, 13) Vācaspati thinks that the latter quotation is taken from the Ṣaṣṭitantra. This very verse is quoted by Vācaspati in his Bhāmatī with the remarks : " अत एव योगशास्त्रं व्युत्पादयिता आह स्म भगवान् वार्षगण्यः। " (on the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, II 1, 3). Another quotation from Vārṣagaṇya, " 'पञ्चपर्वा अविद्या' इत्याह स्म भगवान् वार्षगण्यः। " is found in the Tatt. K. (on Kārikā 47). The quotation—" पुरुषाधिष्ठितं प्रधानं प्रवर्तते। " found in the Gauḍ., and the Māṭh. (Kārikā 17), is ascribed to Vārṣagaṇya by Keith (S. S. 73, 3n). All these lead us to the conclusion that the Chinese tradition ascribing the authorship of the Ṣaṣṭitantra to Pañcaśikha is not trustworthy. There is also considerable doubt as to Vārṣagaṇya being the author of the Ṣaṣṭitantra (Jay. Int. pp. 4–6; Hiriyanna: " Ṣaṣṭitantra and Vārṣagaṇya ",

Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, April–June, 1929, pp. 107–112). This has been discussed in detail below.

6. Jaigīṣavya

According to the Kūrmapurāṇa, Jaigīṣavya was a class-fellow of Pañcas'ikha (S, S. 51). This Jaigīṣavya is quoted as an authority on Yoga (Y. Bh., II. 55 and III. 18). Vācaspati also refers to him in his Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭikā as the author of Dhāraṇās'āstra (on Nyāyasūtra III. 2. 43). But, according to the Buddhacarita (12. 67), Arāḍakalāma refers to Jaigīṣavya, Janaka and Parās'ara as persons who obtained salvation through Sāṁkhya (Jay., Int. p. 2, 2n.) In the present state of our knowledge, we can say nothing more about Jaigīṣavya.

7. Voḍhu

Voḍhu is also familiar by name alone. We have not come across any of his writings or quotations. In the list of the names of the sages pronounced in the Ṛṣitarpaṇa, we find the name of Voḍhu after that of Āsuri, and before that of Pañcas'ikha. The opinion of Weber that it is the Brahmanised form of Buddha's name, is quite untenable (see S. Y. p. 6). Keith has, however, discovered Voḍhu's name before that of Āsuri in one of the *paris'iṣṭas* of the Atharvaveda (S. S. 51).

8. Devala

We find a dialogue between Asitadevala and Nārada in the Mahābhārata (S'ānti., Ch., 274). There we find eight kinds of *bhūtas* (*bhāva*, *abhāva*, *kāla*, *pṛthhvī*, *āpas*, *vāyu*, *ākās'a* and *tejas*); and *kāla* impelled by *bhāva* creating all the five elements, *viz.*, earth, air, water, wind and glow. The senses themselves are not the knowers but produce knowledge for the *kṣetrajña*. Higher than the senses is *citta*, higher than the latter is *manas*, higher than it is *buddhi* and the highest of all is *puruṣa*. The ear, the skin, the eye

the nose, the tongue, the *citta*, the *manas* and the *buddhi* are the eight instruments of knowledge, etc. It is said there : पुण्यपापक्षयार्थं हि सांख्यज्ञानं विधीयते । तत्क्षये ह्यस्य पश्यन्ति ब्रह्म-भावे परां गतिम् ॥ " (Verse 39). Thus we see that this dialogue deals with theistic Sāṁkhya. The quotations from Devala, as found in the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-smṛti, resemble the Tattvasamāsa very much (See Yājña-valkyasmṛti, Ānandāśrama, Edn. II, pp. 986–7). Kane, in his H. Dh. Vol. I, p. 121, says that Devala was a contemporary of the Smṛtikāras, *viz*., Bṛhaspati and Kātyāyana. And the age of Kātyāyana according to him is between the 4th and 6th centuries A.D. (see p. 218). But Udayavīraśāstri says that as Devala is frequently alluded to in the Mahābhārata, his age must be determined by the age of the epic in its present form. The Mahābhārata according to western scholars (says Mr. S'āstri), assumed its present form by the 2nd century B.C. (P. O. C. Lahore, II p. 865). But according to Prof. Winternitz, the epic assumed its present form by the 4th century A.D. (See H. I. L. I. pp. 465–475). Devala does not seem to be much older than Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The theory to the contrary does not seem to be convincing. It is based on the following quotation from the Māṭharvṛtti : "कापिलादासुरिणा प्राप्तमिदं ज्ञानं ततः पञ्चशिखेन तस्मात् भार्गव-उलूक-वाल्मीकि-हारीत-देवल प्रभृतीनागतम् ", (p. 84), where the word *prabhṛti* is taken to indicate a wide gap between Devala and Īśvarakṛṣṇa. But the traditional list found in the Māṭharavṛtti does not tally with any other such list. Therefore, Māṭhara's quotation can only establish Devala's priority to Īśvarakṛṣṇa and nothing else.

9–26. **Sanaka**, *etc.*

Gauḍapāda (on Kār. I), quotes a verse and a half in which he enumerates the names of the seven sons of Brahman. They are : Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana, Āsuri, Kapila, Voḍhu and Pañcaśikha. But in the Mahābhārata, the list is different (S'ānti. 340, 67–69), *viz*., Sana, Sanatsujāta, Sanaka,

Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, Kapila and Sanātana. Unfortunately we find no information about Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, Sana, Sanatsujāta and Sanatkumāra, except a reference to Sanandanācārya in लिङ्गशरीरनिमित्तक इति सनन्दनाचार्यः । (S. Su. VI, 69). There is a reference to a Sanatkumāra, author of some Smṛti, in the Nirṇayasindhu and the Tristhalīsetu (H., Dh., I, 656). Similarly we find Bhṛgu, S'ukra, Kāśyapa, Parās'ara, Garga, Gautama, Nārada, Ārṣṭiṣeṇa, Agastya, Pulastya and Hārīta mentioned as writers of Smṛtis (Ibid, index). The dialogue between Parās'ara and Janaka named the Parās'ara-gītā, and found in the Mahābhārata (S'ānti., Chs., 290–299), deals with the duties of the *varṇas* and *ās'ramas* and has no vestige of Sāṁkhya teaching in it. It is just possible that Parās'ara came to be regarded as a teacher of Sāṁkhya because he happened to be born in the same family as Pañcas'ikha (Mbh., S'ānti., 320–23). Ulūka is a synonym for Kaus'ika. In the Chinese translation of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā, Īs'varakṛṣṇa is referred to as born in the Kaus'ika family (Jay. Int p. 2. 2n). We know absolutely nothing of Vālmīki and S'uka as teachers of Sāṁkhya.

V. Standard Works on Sāṁkhya

A. Available :—

Of the standard works on Sāṁkhya, only three are available. They are "Sāṁkhya–Sūtras", "Tattva-samāsa" and "Sāṁkhya–Kārikā".

Some scholars are of opinion that S. Sū. are not written by Kapila. The reason is that we find many passages from other works in them. For example, "आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात् " (Br. S, IV. 1, 1)=S. Sū., IV. 3; "वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः " (Y. S., II. 46)=S. Sū., III 34 and VI. 24. Again, in the *sūtras* establishing the authority of the Vedas (S. Sū., V. 40–51), the influence of the Vedānta is clearly visible. Again, we find many passages from Sāṁkhya–Krāikā, quoted in the

Sūtras. Mādhavācārya of the 14th century A.D., quotes from the Kārikās and not Sūtras in his S. D. S. The oldest commentator on the Sūtras is Aniruddha who flourished in about 1500 A.D. Therefore, the Sūtras must have come into existence between 1380 and 1450 A.D. (See S. Y., pp. 8–9). Moreover, the commentator on the *Sarvopakāriṇī*, a commentory on the Samāsa-Sūtra, opines that Kapila, the author of " Sāṁkhya-Sūtras " is different from Kapila, the author of Samāsa-Sūtra (Ch., S. S., No. 246, pp. 93–94). But as the author of the S. D. S. does not quote from the Tattva-samāsa even, so the antiquity of the latter also is doubtful. And if the author of the S. Sū., is Kapila, then how did he quote Pañcas'ika, etc., who were his grand-disciples and who, therefore, must have flourished much later (See S. Sū., VI. 68–69)?

But Udayavīra S'āstri has tried to prove that Kapila himself is the author of the S. Sū., in his article " Antiquity of the Sāṁkhya Sūtras " (P. C. C., Lahore, II, pp. 855-882). He is of opinion that several *sūtras* have been interpolated in the original of Kapila. For example, in the I chapter, the *sūtras* 20-54 are interpolated, because the 19th *sūtra* is literally the same as the 55th *sūtra*, and because the 53rd and 54th *sūtras* are identical with the 15th and 16th *sūtras*. And as we find the names of *Srughna* and *Pāṭaliputra* in these interpolated *sūtras*, the interpolation must have been made when these towns were famous (from 4th century B. C., to the 5th century A.D.). The *sūtras* 79, 80 and 84-115 of the V chapter are also interpolations; the interpolation of these (84-115) is obvious as they discuss the principles opposed to Sāṁkhya Philosophy.

Thus Mr. S'āstri thinks that 68 *sūtras* are interpolated. I, on the other hand, think that the entire book was written by some later writer and therein some interpolations might have been made. Mr. S'āstri does not give any weighty or conclusive argument in support of his thesis. On the other

hand, when S'aṅkarācārya and others quote from Sāṁkhya-Kārikā only, there is no doubt that the *Sūtras* did not exist in their time. Had the S. Sū., been existent, then S'aṅkarācārya and others would not have deliberately left aside the composition of a *ṛṣi* and quoted from the work of an ordinary mortal like Is'varkṛṣṇa

Mr. S'āstri further tries to prove that V. Bh., and others have borrowed from the S. Sū. His contention is :—

(1) "प्राङ्निष्पत्तेर्निष्पत्तिधर्मकं नाऽसत् उपादाननियमात् = कस्यचिदुत्पत्तये किंचिदुपादेयम्" (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. I, 48)—here उपादाननियमात् is borrowed from "उपादाननियमात्" (S. Sū., I, 115). This very *sūtra* has been quoted again by Vātsyāyana in his gloss on the next N. S., *viz.*, "यत्पुनरुक्तं—प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यं नाऽसत् उपादाननियमात् इति". Here the insertion of the word इति shows that it is a quotation from some other work. That other work is S. Sū.

To this we reply—If the word इति is a sure sign of quotation from another work then why did not Vātsyāyana put it after "उपादाननियमात्" in the first passage (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. I, 48) quoted above ? And as regards the presence of इति in the second passage, it should be noted that this word is not connected with only "उपादाननियमात्" but the whole passage, *viz.*,—"प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यं नासत् उपादाननियमात्." Here Vātsyāyana merely repeats his own words with slight change. Therefore, it does not show that V. Bh. has borrowed from the S. Sū., rather, it may be just the reverse.

(2) In the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti (Prāyas'cittādhyāya, *v.* 109), we find quotations from Devala which resemble the *sūtras* in S. Sū. very much. Therefore, Devala must have borrowed them from the S. Sū.

Mr. S'āstri starts here on the presumption of the priority of the S. Sū., to Devala, a fact which he has to prove.

(3) Patañjali, in his Mahābhāṣya, lays down the six causes of non-perception thus—"षड्भिः प्रकारैः सतां भावानामनु-

पलब्धिर्भवति — अतिसन्निकर्षादतिविप्रकर्षान्मूर्त्यन्तरव्यवधानात्तमसावृतत्वादिन्द्रियदौर्बल्यादतिप्रमाणादिति ॥" On this, Kaiyyaṭa says in his gloss Pradīpa—इतरो विद्यमानस्यापि लिङ्गस्य सौक्ष्म्यमनुपलब्धिकारणं दर्शयितुमाह-षड्भिरिति ।"—According to Kaiyyaṭa, Patañjali here quotes from some other work. It seems that he took this view from "सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धि:" (S. Sū., I. 109) and "कार्यदर्शनात्तदुपलब्धे:" (S. Sū., I, 110). Moreover, we find only five causes of non-perception in the S. Sū., but in the Mahābhāṣya, there are six causes of non-perception and in the Sāṁkhya-Kārika, there are eight. Therefore, the S. Sū. are the oldest of these three. Moreover, the passage of Kaiyyaṭa *viz.*, "सदपि लिङ्गं सूक्ष्मत्वात् प्रत्यक्षेणाशक्यं ग्रहीतुं, तत्कृतकार्यदर्शनादनुमीयते ।" seems to be based on the two *sūtras* quoted above.

In reply to Mr. S'astri's arguments, the following may be stated. In the first place, the word इति is not a necessary and sure sign of quotation from some other work or author. Here, the word इति denotes conclusion of his remarks. How can one deny the possibility of these remarks being Patañjali's own? In the second place if, depending upon the word इतर used by Kaiyyaṭa, it is even admitted that Patañjali quotes the actual words of another, what is there to prove that it is the S. Sū., wherefrom, he borrowed? It is most probable that he borrowed the view from some other work. (See H. I. P., I, 218–219). Again, there is nothing to oblige Kaiyyaṭa, who flourished in the 13th century A.D. (H. S. L., p. 431), to borrow from the S. Sū. He might have borrowed from the Sāṁkhya-Kārikā. Moreover, the causes of non-perception as given by Patañjali tally more with those in the Sāṁkhya-Kārikā than in the S. Sū.

(4) The following *sūtras* agree verbatim with the Kārikās (*a*) "हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम्" (S. Sū., I. 124 = Kār., 10). (*b*) "सात्त्विकमेकादशकं प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात्" (S. Sū., II. 18 = Kār., 25). (*c*) "सामान्यकरणवृत्ति: प्राणाद्या वायव: पञ्च" (S. Sū., II. 31 = Kār. 29). In (*a*) and (*b*) we find different readings.

Avyāpi in (*a*) has not been commented upon by Aniruddha. The word *pravartate* in (*b*) is not found in the Ms. in Mr. S'āstri's possession.

The arguments of Mr. S'āstri do not stand a close examination. If Aniruddha did not comment upon the word *avyāpi*, then it alone does not mean that the word did not exist formerly. Moreover, Vijñānabhikṣu has commented upon this word. Again, what is there to prove that the Ms. in Mr. S'āstri's possession is the oldest and the only correct Ms., whose one reading should decide so important a question as the authorship of Kapila. In his zeal to disprove the theory that "the Sūtras were composed on the basis of the Kārikās," Mr. S'āstri says that if we change the order of words in "सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च" and read it as "सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्याः पञ्च वायवः" we attain *anuṣṭubh* metre in place of *āryā*. But this flight of imagination, *viz*., changing the reading itself, is too much to be swallowed even by ordinary people. Therefore, Mr. S'āstri has failed to disprove that the S. Sū. are based upon the Kārikās.

There is a tradition that Paramārtha translated the Kārikās into Chinese in 557–569 A.D., (Bh., Com., pp. 175–178). According to Paramārtha, Buddhamitra the teacher of Vasubandhu, was vanquished in debate by Vindhyavāsa, the Sāṁkhya-teacher; Vindhyavāsa died before Vasubandhu. Thus, Vindhyavāsa and Vasubandhu were contemporaries. There is another tradition, according to which Vindhyavāsa was a contemporary of king Bālāditya and pupil of Vārṣagaṇya. A third tradition tells us that the pupil of Vārṣagaṇya composed Hiraṇyasaptati. But all these traditions should be taken as having no historical value. Otherwise, if Vindhyavāsa, the author of Hiraṇyasaptati and Īśvarkṛṣṇa, the author of Sāṁkhya-Kārikā are both identified then it would lead to a historical confusion, as stated above. [Das Gupta also thinks Īs'varkṛṣṇa and Vindhyavāsa as two

different persons, see H. I. P., I, 218, 3n]. The only definite conclusion that we can arrive at is that Īs'varakṛṣṇa is older than Vasubandhu [in 300 A.D., see V. A. Smith: *Early History of India*, 3rd edn., pp. 328–334; also Kalipada Bhattacharya : "Some Problems of Sāṁkhya Philosophy and Sāṁkhya Literature", I. H. Q., Sept., 1932, pp. 519–520. According to Bhattacharya Īs'varkṛṣṇa flourished in the 1st century A.D.] and flourished in the second or the third century A.D. The remark of Svapnes'vara, identifying Īs'varakṛṣṇa with Kālidāsa, should be rejected as mistaken (See I. P., II, 255, 1n.).

The work of Īs'varakṛṣṇa had 70 verses in it. But now, finding the *bhāṣya* of Gauḍapada running upto the 69th verse only and finding that the verses following the 69th have nothing of Sāṁkhya in them, it is believed that one of these verses is missing. The question has been discussed in detail in the foot-note to 61st Kārikā. Mr. S. S. Pathak has also attacked this problem (see, "The Problem of the Sāṁkhya-Kārikās", I. A., Vol. LII, 1923, pp. 177–181). He says—(1) In the 72nd Kārikā we read the phrase "परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि" which means "free from the opinions of others". This goes against the Kārikā found by the late B. G. Tilak. as the latter expounds the opinions of others in the shape of God, Soul, Time, or Nature being the causes of Creation.—To this we reply : In the Kārikā of Mr. Tilak, the opinion of others has been merely *referred to* and not *expounded*. The phrase परवादविवर्जिता: means the exclusion of *the expounding* of others' opinions and not the exclusion of mere reference even. Otherwise, "दृष्टवदानुश्रविक: स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्त:" would also be open to fault, for, here there is *no exclusion* of the opinion of the Mīmāṁsakas. (2) Īs'varakṛṣṇa has summarised the work of Pañcas'ikha in his own '*āryās*'. Now in the Ṣaṣṭitantra, there is a mention of five alternative opinions (*viz.*, making one of *Brahman*, *Puruṣa S'akti*, *Niyati*. and *Kāla*, the cause of creation) which are to be rejected. But in this

Kārikā of Tilak, we find only four. There is nothing to represent S'akti—To this we reply: Is'varakṛṣṇa has summarised the work of Pañcas'ikha. But in the first place, it is not as yet definite that Ṣaṣṭitantra is the work of Pañcas'ikha. Secondly, even if it were so, yet it is not binding upon Is'varkṛṣṇa to give every detail in his summary. The other points raised by Mr. Pathak are covered by the footnote alluded to above.

B. **Unavailable.**

(1) *Ṣaṣṭitantra.* Something has already been said with regard to the controversy of regarding Pañcas'ikha or Vārṣagaṇya as the author of Ṣaṣṭitantra. Here, the question is examined further. Following are the references to Ṣaṣṭitantra in Jay.

(*a*) "तेषु च षष्टितन्त्रादिख्यातेष्विति । विस्तरत्वात् षष्टितन्त्रस्य संक्षिप्तरुचिसत्त्वानुग्रहार्थं सप्ततिकारम्भः ।" (p. 1). (*b*) "'त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम्' इति षष्टितन्त्रे व्याख्यातम्। पूर्ववत्, शेषवत्, सामान्यतोदृष्टमिति ।" (p. 7). (*c*) "एते षष्टि [:] पदार्थाः। तदर्थं शास्त्रं षष्टितन्त्रमुच्यते ।" (p. 56). (*d*) "'तेन' इति। पञ्चशिखेन मुनिना बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम्। षष्टितन्त्राख्यं षष्टिखण्डं कृतमिति। तत्रैव हि षष्टिरर्था व्याख्याताः ।" (p. 68). (*e*) "ननु च षष्टितन्त्रमेवास्तु किं सप्तत्येति ।" (p. 69). (*f*) "अत्र षष्टितन्त्रे बहवोऽर्थाः तेऽत्र नोक्ता इत्याह ।" (p. 69).

From the above passages, Prof. Hiriyanna infers the following facts (See—"Ṣaṣṭitantra and Vārṣagaṇya", J. O R., April–June, 1929, pp. 107–112).—(*a*) Ṣaṣṭitantra has 60 parts, (*b*) its author is Pañcas'ikha and (*c*) it deals with 60 topics, and is, therefore, called "Saṣṭitantra". Vārṣagaṇya is not its author, as others think. As regard the verse—

गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति ।
यत्तु दृष्टिपथं यातं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम् ॥

which is quoted in Y. Bh., and Bhāmatī, Vācaspati alludes it to Ṣaṣṭitantra in Tatt. V., and to Vārṣagaṇya in Bhāmatī. On the basis of these two references, people have come to

the conclusion that Vārṣagaṇya is the author of Ṣaṣṭitantra. But the reading in the Y. Bh. is मायेव सुतुच्छकम्, while as the reading in the Bhāmatī is मायैव सुतुच्छकम्. The reading cannot have been deliberately altered by Vācaspati, for a scholar of his reputation would not commit such a crime. On the other hand, from the opinions of Vārṣagaṇya as found quoted in Buddhistic works, it seems that he altered the reading. Moreover, from Bhāskara's remark, *viz.*, "कपिलमहर्षिप्रणीतषष्टितन्त्राख्यस्मृते:" (on Br. S., II, 1, 1), we can infer that Kapila was the author of a Ṣaṣṭitantra. (See also P. O. C., Lahore, II, p. 882, where Mr. S'āstri states Ṣaṣṭitantra is the real *Sāṁkhya-dars'ana* written by Kapila. Mr. Bhattacharya also holds this view. See I. H. Q., Sept., 1932, p. 518). This old Ṣaṣṭitantra of Kapila has been enlarged by Pañcas'ikha in his Ṣaṣṭitantra.

To this we reply—One should not put implicit faith in commentators when they refer to the names of writers. For example, we see that Bhaṭṭa-Utpala, in his commentary on Bṛhat-Saṁhitā, quotes the verses (22–30) from Sāṁkhya-Kārikā, preceded by the remark "तथाह कपिलाचार्य:". As regards the alteration of मायेव into मायैव, if it is considered impossible in the case of Vācaspati, it should be still more impossible in the case of Vārṣagaṇya whom Vācaspati refers to with great reverence as भगवान् वार्षगण्य:. The opinion of Vārṣagaṇya, as quoted in the Buddhist work Abhidharma-kos'a (*viz.*, nothing new comes into existence, nor anything born is ever destroyed; that what is existent, is ever existent; that what is non-existent can never become existent) is simply a statement of the *sat-kārya* theory. It is futile to read from it the difference between the theories of modification according to Sāṁkhya and Yoga, as Mr. Hiriyanna does. His arguments can be valid only when it is admitted that Vārṣagaṇya altered मायेव into मायैव. But that requires proof.

Therefore, the question of authorship of Saṣṭitantra is still undecided.

(2) *Rājavārtika.* In the Tatt. K., we find the following three verses from Rājavārtika—

“ प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता ।
पारार्थ्यं च तथाऽनैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ॥
शेषवृत्तिरकर्तृत्वं मौलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ।
विपर्ययः पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः ॥
करणानामसामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।
इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टभिः सह सिद्धिभिः ” ॥

The first verse is quoted also in the Sarvopakāriṇī (Ch. S. S., No. 246, p. 100). These sixty categories resemble the sixty categories treated of in the Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā (Jay., int., p. 5; S. S., pp. 70–73). It is impossible to determine the authorship of Rājavārtika. Garbe thinks Bhoja is the author (S. Y. p. 7). These *maulikārthas* are enumerated with slight variations in Jay., Māṭh., Sāṁkhya-tattva-vivecana (Ch., S. S., No. 245, p. 22), Tattva-yāthārthya-dīpana (ibid, p. 80) and Tattva-samāsa-sūtra-vṛtti (ibid, p. 135).

A SYNOPSIS OF THE CARDINAL DOCTRINES OF THE SĀṀKHYA PHILOSOPHY

BY

Gangānātha Jhā

The lucid writing of Vācaspati Miśra does not stand in need of much in the shape of an Introduction. But under the cover of this title, I propose to give a brief synopsis of the cardinal doctrines of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy, in the hope that a reading of this *resumé* would prepare the mind of the student for the reception of the abstruse truths, in which the Tattvakaumudī abounds. Any corrections or suggestions for alteration, &c., will be most gratefully received.

To begin with, the Sāṁkhya lays down a fourfold division of categories based on their respective causal and productive efficiency. This division is into—(1) Productive—(2) Productive—and—Produced—(3) Produced—(4) Neither—Productive—nor Produced. This classification includes all the twenty-five Principles—called Tattvas,—Prakṛti or Nature being the purely *productive*, since the Sāṁkhyas allow of no other purely productive agency. The *Productive—and—produced* are the other Principles—Buddhi, &c. These partake of the nature of both;—thus Buddhi is *productive* in as much as out of it evolves Ahaṁkāra, and it is *produced* in as much as it itself evolves out of Prakṛti. The purely non-productive Principles are the eleven sense-organs and the five material substances. These are purely *non-productive* because none of these can give birth to a substance essentially different from themselves. The Puruṣa (Spirit) is *neither productive nor produced*. In fact it is without attributes. All accessories are the effects of the Guṇas, and the Spirit is by its very nature free from these and as such without any accessories.

Having thus classified the various principles, we now turn to the consideration of the various principles separately.

First of all then we must examine the nature of the all-powerful productive agent of the Sāṁkhyas or, more properly, the productive force of the Universe. How is this force constituted? It is made up of the three Guṇas—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; and when Nature is in its quiescent state, lying dormant, these three attributes are in equilibrium. When occasion presents itself, *i. e.* when the Adṛṣṭa of the Spirits waiting to be born acts upon Nature, the equilibrium is disturbed, and it is this disturbance that gives rise to the various kinds of Products. The diversity of Products is thus rendered explicable. As already mentioned, all accessories are due to the predominance of one or other of the three Guṇas—the predominance of Sattva giving rise to the kind of Product in which that attribute predominates, and so forth.

The three attributes—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas,—have respectively the character of Happiness, Unhappiness and Delusion; and have their operations characterised respectively by enlightenment, activity and inertia; and are so constituted that the one always operates through the suppression of the other, and at the same time depending upon this latter. To explain this contrariety of properties—The universe would be in an unceasing round of activity, if the only operating force were Rajas; in order to provide against this, Nature provides herself with a restraining agency in the shape of Tamas which by its nature is inert. The character of the objects of the universe is thus determined in accordance with the excess of one or the other of these attributes. Again, if there were no enlightening agency in the shape of Sattva, Nature would be nothing better than a mass of blind force acting in a haphazard manner.

Here an objector comes forward and says—"How can the Attributes, endowed as they are with mutually counteracting

properties, cooperate and bring about such a grand and stupendous structure as our Universe?"

The answer is that it is a very common fact that two or more substances, though mutually contradictory, do cooperate towards a single end;—*e. g.* the wick and the oil—both taken separately are as much against the action of one another as towards fire, but when they are together they help to enliven the fire. In the same manner, though the Attributes are mutually counteractive, yet when combined, they act towards a single end, supplying each other's deficiencies.

The necessity of postulating three different forces is further supported by another reason. We see that in Nature there are three distinct properties—of 'happiness', 'unhappiness' and 'delusion'. All other properties are reducible under these three heads. Again we find that these are properties so much opposed to one another that all could never be the product of a single cause. Thus it is necessary to postulate three different forces or constituent elements of Nature, to which severally we could trace the three distinct properties. To these three constituents of Nature we give the names—Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. We find in the universe the above three properties, and as all the properties of the Product must be a direct resultant of a like property in its cause, we arrive at the conclusion that the cause of the Universe—Nature—musr be imbued with the three Attributes.

So much for the action of the Guṇas. We now turn our attention towards the all-important Prakṛti, Nature—the Key-stone of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy.

What, then, is this Prakṛti, Nature? Does it stand for the Theistic God? Or for the Bauddha "Sensations"? Or does it correspond to the Vedāntic "Māyā"? To all this we reply—It is all these, and It is none of these. It resembles the Vedāntic Māyā in as much as it is the one root of the Uni-

verse. It is not the God; since it is said to be without intelligence, mere dead Matter equipped with certain potentialities due to the Guṇas. In short, Prakṛti is the one rootless Root of the Universe (objective as well as subjective) imbued with the three Attributes and evolving through these, every kind of entity—save the *Puruṣa*, Spirit.

The next point that we have to consider is—How do the Sāṁkhyas prove the existence, the rootlessness, and eternality of this Prakṛti? Is it necessary to postulate such a rootless root, itself unmanifested, and yet manifesting all objective and subjective entities? Proofs of this are given at length in all works on the Sāṁkhya Philosophy, and it will not be altogether out of place here briefly to sum them up. But before we take up this, it is necessary to explain the Sāṁkhya doctrine of *causality*, the point on which rests the whole fabric of the system. What then is the cause and how is it related to the effect ? Cause is defined as a substance in which the effect subsists in a latent form. Thus the effect must be said to be eternally existent—primarily in a latent condition, in the cause, and latterly manifesting itself and then commonly recognized as the *effect*. How to prove that the effect has been lying latent in the cause and has not been newly produced by the cause ?

Firstly.–What is a nonentity can never be made an entity.—That is to say—that which has never existed can never be brought into existence. What remains to be done by the operation of the cause is the manifestation of the effect—that is to say, its manifestation as the effect of the particular cause. And this kind of manifestation we find in the production of oil from the different oil-seeds wherein it has been hitherto lying latent.

Secondly.—We find that the effect is always in one way or the other related to the cause. Now, this relation would not be possible if the effect were a nonentity ;

for a nonentity can have no relations. If the relation of the effect with the cause were not necessary then every effect would be possible from every cause. Since in that case there would be no restrictive qualification which would confine the operation of particular causes to particular effects. This would lead to an absurdity.

Thirdly.—We cannot deny causal efficiency. Now what does this efficiency consist in? It cannot be anything other than the existence in the cause of the effect in a latent condition. For the difference of seeds, as cause of oil, from sand, lies merely in the fact that it is only in the seeds and not in the sand, that the oil subsists.

Fourthly.—The effect is non-different from the cause; and the latter being an entity, the latter must be so also. To take an example, the cloth is non-different from the threads composing it; because it is neither heavier than the latter, nor is any other relation than that of inherence possible between the two; and it is only between two different things that any other relation as that of conjunction, etc., is possible. Nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads. The difference of properties and actions cannot establish any difference. For though a single thread cannot do what is done by the cloth, yet this latter is nothing more than a collection of threads; and we see that what a single man cannot do, can be done very well by a number of them together; *e. g.*, a single man cannot carry a palanquin, which work can be performed by a number of men together. Thus then we see that the effect is nothing more than the developed cause; and the latter again is merely an undeveloped effect. This identity of cause and effect has been thus explained by Sir William Hamilton also, who says—"When we are aware of something which begins to be, we are by the necessity of our intelligence, constrained to believe that it has a cause. But what does the expression, *that it has a cause,* signify?

If we analyse our thought, we shall find that it simply means, that as we cannot conceive any new existence to commence, therefore, all that now is seen to arise under a new appearance had previously an existence under a prior form. We are utterly unable to realise in thought the possibility of the complement of existence either increased or diminished. We are unable, on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something—or on the other something becoming nothing.... There is thus conceived an absolute tautology between the effect and its causes. We think the cause to contain all that is contained in the effect; the effect to contain nothing which was not contained in the cause."

—*Lectures on Metaphysics*—XXXIX.

Having thus proved the existence of the effect in the cause, the Sāṁkhyas employ this fact in proving the existence of their Prakṛti, Nature. The effect being only a developed cause, in which it has been lying latent, all entities must have their unmanifested condition in their cause. That is to say, the elements lie in Ahaṁkāra which lies in Buddhi. Now if we go on expanding this series we would be landed in a *regressus ad infinitum.* In order to avoid this we must postulate the existence of a principle which must be uncaused and which must be the final substratum of the undeveloped state of all other entities. Thus we have a causeless cause which must be by its very nature unmanifested, the final cause of all;—and to this the Sāṁkhyas give the names "Pradhāna," "Prakṛti", "Avyakta." (Nature).

Secondly, we find that all entities—from Buddhi downwards—are limited and are the development of some further ultimate Principle—and this latter is Prakṛti.

Having thus proved the Existence of Nature the Sāṁkhya proceeds to define its properties as well as those of its Products, and to explain wherein lies their difference.

In order to do this they first of all consider the properties of the Manifested Entities—the effects of Prakṛti. These are *caused*, and as a necessary consequence of this—*transitory*, *limited*, *mobile*, *many*, *dependent* (on the activity of the Prakṛti), *made up of parts*; these are the characteristics where the Prakṛti differs from the Manifested Entities, Buddhi and the rest. For, as already explained, the Prakṛti is the *uncaused* root of the Universe, and as such, must be *eternal*. And as all Universe is the result of Its evolution, It must be *all-pervading*; as a necessary consequence of this it is immoveable *i. e.*, it cannot *move*, in the sense of going from one place to another. And further, since it is all-prevading it must be *one*. It is *independent*—depending only on the activity of its own constituent Guṇas.

These are the points of difference. Those of agreement are, that Prakṛti as well as the manifested entities are the resultants of the various actions and interactions of the three Guṇas. Secondly, being without intelligence, both must be without discrimination, since discrimination proceeds from intelligence. Thirdly, both these present objects for the enjoyment of the Spirit. Fourthly, since they are without intelligence, they can never be the observers, they must always remain the observed, and as such *common*. That is to say, every object that is observed is so observed, not differently by different individuals, but is a common object of observation by all, and it is *common* in that sense. Fifthly, they are without intelligence—the only Principle endowed with intelligence being the Spirit. Sixthly, they are prolific, *i. e.*, endowed with evolutionary potency. The Spirits are without this.

These in brief, are the points of agreement and difference between Prakṛti on one hand and its Products on the other.

Now we must consider the nature of the *Spirits* and see what the Sāṁkhyas have to say as to their existence, number and properties. But before we proceed with this, we must

first see if it is necessary to have a distinct principle in the shape of innumerable Spirits. And on this score, the first reason that presents itself is the fact that we have not yet got any principle that will supply the factor of intelligence, sentience. Intelligence cannot belong to the Buddhi, the Cosmic Mind, for it is material, being the product of Prakṛti which is essentially insentient and what is absent in the cause cannot manifest itself in the product. So we must have a distinct *Principle of Sentience.*

Secondly.—We see in our everyday life that all that is composite is for the use of another, as a bed, a chair, &c. And we have seen before that all the entities from Prakṛti downwards are *composites.* Though this sounds a little absurd as regards Prakṛti, Buddhi and Ahaṁkāra, yet we must not forget that the body of these apparently immaterial entities is made up of the three Guṇas which are as material as anything. Such being the case, we must postulate the existence of an incorporeal entity. And this is Puruṣa, the Spirit, and as we have not yet had an intelligent principle, we attribute intelligence to this incorporeal Spirit. This Spirit cannot be *composite* because it is devoid of the three Attributes, as it is only what is made up of the Guṇas that is found to be *composite.*

Thirdly.—We have in daily life found that whatever is naturally connected with either pleasure, pain or delusion, is supervised by something else; and we have also seen that all the entities from Prakṛti downwards are made up of the three Guṇas, and as such necessarily affected by pleasure, pain and delusion; so these must have a supervisor. And in order to escape *a regressus ad infinitum* this supervisor must be himself unaffected in his essence by pleasure, etc.; and as such must be something over and above Prakṛti. And this is Puruṣa, the Spirit.

Fourthly.—Prakṛti and the rest are objects of enjoyment and as such they necessitate the existence of an *enjoyer* who again must not be an *object* himself. And the enjoyer must be an intelligent entity. For a non-intelligent principle being devoid of consciousness can never be the *enjoyer*. This again must be something not made up of pleasure, etc. This can never be the case with Buddhi and the rest.—These latter being made up as they are of the three Guṇas which are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be the *enjoyer* of these ; for that will involve the absurdity of self-contradictory action—one made up of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be pleased or pained ; for each of these is contradictory to the one or other phase of the constitution of Buddhi. So we must have an enjoyer over and above Prakṛti and the rest. And this is Spirit.

Fifthly and lastly.—All systems of Philosophy, and all the great men of the past we find striving after final Release. Now this is not possible for Prakṛti or Buddhi. For these latter are, by their constitution, made up of pain and as such can never be released from this. So the object of final Release must be one who has neither pleasure nor pain nor delusion for its constituent element; and such an entity is the Spirit alone.

We have thus shown the necessity of postulating a distinct entity in the shape of Puruṣa, over and above Prakṛti.

The next thing, we have to consider is—What is this Puruṣa?—How is it constituted?—What are its properties? —What its aim?—and finally, how and when does it attain final Release? We must take each of these questions one by one.

(1) What is Puruṣa? It is not the thinking principle, since thinking belongs to the *mind*. Nor is it the determining principle, since that is allotted to Buddhi. The character of the Spirit is unique. It is none of these, and yet

it is the necessary factor in all these. It is the principal agent of all functions, mental as well as material. It is the agent who feels, thinks and wills. Without it no functions would be possible, specially *consciousness*. In short, Spirit is the source of intelligence, and as such, the necessary factor in every function of the mind—feeling, intellecting and willing.

(2) How is this Spirit constituted? As a matter of fact the Spirit is constituted of intelligence or sentience pure and simple, and is free from every other qualification and encumbrance.

(3) What are its properties? These are thus enunciated: it is *free from the three attributes, possessed of discriminative faculties, non-objective, singular, intelligent and non-productive*. If the Spirit were not naturally free from the action of the Attributes, no liberation from metempsychosis would be possible. Since pain constitutes the very nature of the Attributes and as such cannot possibly be separated from it. And thus no liberation being possible, there would be no necessity for enquiries to which the various systems of philosophy are devoted. And lastly, if the Spirit were not equipped with discriminative faculties, it could never attain the discriminative wisdom arrived at by the philosophical systems, which would thus become purposeless.

Next as to the aims of the Spirit. It has been laid down that the Spirit mistakes the fluctuations of the Attributes constituting Nature, to be His own; and thus comes to be affected by pleasure, pain, etc.,—which in reality do not touch him,—under the influence of the different kinds of delusions—the modifications of Buddhi. Now the one all-absorbing aim of every Spirit is the attainment of that wisdom which would help him to discriminate between Himself and the fluctuations of the Attributes, and thus see the pleasure and pain caused by these in their true light and be no longer affected by them.

The next question that presents itself to us is—how does Puruṣa attain to this wisdom and thence to final emancipation? This wisdom arises from a constant study of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy, when the Attribute of Sattva is paramount in one's constitution and the others have almost ceased to exist. The Puruṣa then sees Nature and its constituents in their true light and finds out His mistake and so shakes off all mistaken preconceptions about self, and thus becomes free from the self-imposed bonds of Buddhi, and finally retires from metempsychosis and attains final Beatitude.

Having thus said all that we had to say about Prakṛti and Puruṣa we must look a little into the details of the process of creation.

We have already said that Prakṛti is the rootless Root of the Universe. From this Prakṛti emanates Buddhi, to which the technical name of *Mahat* or the Great Principle is given, it is the Cosmic Mind. From this Buddhi, proceeds *Ahaṁkāra* or the I-principle. From this again emanate the eleven, senses and the five subtle elements of sound, odour, taste, colour and touch. And from these latter five, proceed the five gross substances—Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ākās'a. First in this scale comes *Buddhi*. This is defined as the principle of *adhyavasāya*. This term literally means "ascertainment" and in explaining this term, the writers exemplify it as the determination that "this is to be done by me." It would thus appear that the functions of this principle are the same as those attributed by Western psychologists to *will*. But the Sāṁkhya *Buddhi* is not mere *will*. It is Will and Intellect combined. For in the opinion of the majority of Western psychologists—specially of those belonging to the Kantian School—"Intellect contemplates the circumstances calling for action and provides the rule of conduct: Will controls the disposition in harmony with the dictates of intelligence." The Sāṁkhyas attribute both these functions

to their *Buddhi.* That Buddhi resembles *will,* is further made clearer by the properties assigned to it, by the Sāṁkhyas. These proporties are Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power. As we have said already, *will* decides the course of action and as such the virtuousness or otherwise of actions must belong to this principle alone. Again we find that *wisdom* is described as both restrictive and directive and so to attribute the property of wisdom to Buddhi is to give it the dual character of Intellect and Will. Dispassion and Power again must belong to the principle that decides on a certain course of action and in this too we find Buddhi cognate with *Intellect* and *Will* combined. We have, therefore, called it the *Cosmic Mind.*

The principle that we have to consider next is that of Egoism, the I-principle. It is the principle to which all notions of the "I" are due. It corresponds with Kant's "*apperception*" and Hamilton's "self-consciousness:" that is to say, the notion of self in every form of consciousness : The idea that "*I* have the conciousness," "*I* feel, etc." As immediate effects of this I-principle we have the eleven sense-organs and the five subtle elements. The eleven sense-organs consist of the five intellectual (subjective) senses—the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin,—and the five of action (objective) *viz.*—the hands, the feet, speech, the excretory organ and the organ of generation. The eleventh sense is Manas, (individual mind). The five subtle rudimentary elements are those of odour, touch, taste, colour and sound. From these latter again proceed the five gross substances—Earth, Air, Water, Fire and Ākāśa; and these have the subtle rudimentary elements for their essential properties.

Before proceeding any further we must consider the nature of the eleventh sense-organ, the *mind* or the reflective *principle.* Here first of all we must consider why we should call *mind* a 'sense' at all? The answer is not far

to seek. The Sāṁkhyas define *sense* as the immediate effect of the I-principle under the influence of the Sattva Attribute; and this differentia we find in Mind as well as in the ten organs generally accepted as *senses*. What are the functions of this eleventh sense? *Manas*, mind, is the only faculty that partakes of the nature of both kinds of senses—the objective and the subjective. If it were not so, none of the senses would act, for it is only when these are influenced by the operation of the mind that they act towards their various objects. It would not be quite accurate to say that the senses do not act. Act they do, but these operations are not taken cognizance of by the agent, and as such having their actions purposeless, they may, for all intents and purposes, be said to be without action. The function of this principle, Mind, is technically called in *Sāṁkhya* "reflection." When we first look upon an object the first impressions in connection therewith are indefinite and without qualifications (निर्विकल्प). This indefinite and vague impression is soon rendered definite; and this definiteness and the different qualifications are imparted to it by the "reflection" of the Mind. This process follows so quickly that one can scarcely mark the process and thinks that the first impression he has had was all along definite, just as he latterly comes to perceive it.

The next question that is started is—whence proceeds the action of the senses? If their action were eternal then the creation would never cease. If not eternal, what is it that causes the operations to begin? The reply given is that all these organs have a certain sort of eagerness for the fulfilment of each other's actions; and this anxiety leads to the functioning of each of them. There is no external impetus save that of the purpose—experience and subsequent discriminative wisdom and hence emancipation—of the Puruṣa, Spirit. If there were no functioning of the different emana-

tions of Prakṛti, the Spirit would be at a loss to discriminate between himself and the inanimate Prakṛti. The only impetus from without is thus supplied to the senses by the purpose of the Spirit, and thenceforward they are led on in their active path by their own inherent eagerness.

Altogether then we see that there are thirteen organs—three internal, Buddhi, Ahaṁkāra and Manas, and the ten external—the ordinary ten sense-organs. Of these the latter operate only in the present time, whereas the former act with regard to the past, present and future. Of the external organs, the five subjective senses operate towards subtle as well as gross substances, whereas the objective ones operate only towards gross ones.

Of the thirteen organs, the palm of supremacy is given to the internal ones, since these are applicable to all kinde of substances; and another cause of supremacy we have already noted—*viz.*, the one with regard to time. Of thess internal organs again Budhhi is supreme, since the principles of Egoism and Reflection operate towards their objects and then present these experiences to the Buddhi, which finally presents them with its own additions and alterations to the discriminating eye of the Spirit. Thus we find that Buddhi is the chief agent of the Spirit and brings about all his worldly enjoyment finally leading to His discrimination of self from the emanations of Prakṛti, and thence to final liberation. Thus of all the organs, Buddhi is supreme.

Having thus described the organs, we turn our attention towards the gross substances. These are of three kinds—Subtle, Parent-born and the 'Great' substances. Of these the first is eternal, and the second and the third are fading and transient.

This "subtle body" of the Sāṁkhyas is born before the visible body and lasts till dissolution; and till then it remains the 'body' of the Spirit in all its incarnations during

that cycle. If this were not so, the actions of one incarnation could not react upon the Spirit in the next, for the Spirit itself cannot be affected by either good or evil, and as such could not be affected by the actions of one incarnation in another. For the actions were done by the body and the organs of the former incarnation and these dying with the Body, wherein would the traces of the former actions be left? So we must postulate the existence of a substratum in the form of the "Linga-S'arīra", the subtle Body, which is equipped with subtile counterparts of all the sensory and motor organs. This Linga-S'arīra is imprinted with all the effects of the actions of the Spirit. And since this subtle body follows the Spirit in all its subsequent incarnations, it is but natural that the fruits of past actions should affect the Spirit ;—though the Spirit cannot be affected, yet so long as he has not attained to discriminative wisdom, he thinks all the affections of Buddhi to be his own. This subtle body thus must have traces of virtue and vice on itself so as to bring out their effects in a future incarnation. It acts also as the substratum of the different organs which are subtile in their nature, and as such could not subsist without a subtile substratum.

Let us now see how the Sāṁkhyas treat of the idea of means and consequences of actions. By means of virtue the Spirit ascends to higher regions; Vice leads the other way; Emancipation results from discriminative wisdom. This wisdom consists of deep insight into the character of Spirit and Nature, and consequent intelligent perception of the difference between the two—from which results the Spirit's perception of His own true nature, which is above the operation of the three Attributes, though so long He has been labouring under the self-imposed imaginary thraldom of the Attributes. No sooner has this perception been gained than the Spirit casts off His self-imposed chains and becomes free

from the Attributes, and thereby attains to His proper state, which is one of pure uninterrupted and unmixed sentience. By mere dispassion is gained a state of absorption into the subtler elements of Nature. A Spirit thus transformed enjoys for a time a state of unintelligent rest, and is born again under the same restrictions and with the same bondage as before the absorption. If, on the other hand, the Spirit is under the influence of attachments proceeding from the attribute of Rajas it falls into the stingy darkness of metempsychosis from which it can be freed only by the divine ray of wisdom. We are all labouring under this category.

The Sāṁkhyas have further entered into a very elaborate enunciation of the various manifestations of Buddhi dividing them into no less than fifty forms. These are made up of five kinds of *impediments*, twenty-eight of *incapacity* (resulting from the disability of the organs), nine of *contentment* and eight of *perfection*. Of these, again there are 62 forms of impediment alone.

So much for '*mental*' creation. The 'material' creation comprises the eight kinds of divine celestial beings, the five of the lower animals, and one, the human kind. The various grades of creation are attributed to the excess or otherwise of one of the Attributes. Thus the Attribute of Sattva predominates among divine beings, that of Rajas among human beings, and that of Tamas in all lower creation.

All this elaborate process of creation is begun by Nature solely for the sake of the Spirit's emancipation from the miseries of metempsychosis—miseries inevitable to Him when born in a body. Nature is described as a benevolent benefactress, not caring for any return of services from the Spirit, and working for His emancipation out of her own sweet will, till He comes to perceive her true character; when She retires from the scence like an actress who has

played her part and never again returns to the same Spirit, the spectator. Thus then in reality all bonds and pains are only supposed by the Spirit to be His own. By His very nature He is free from all fluctuations, in as much as He is above the Attributes, whose effect these fluctuations are. After the attainment of discriminative wisdom, the Spirit steers clear of all notions of egoism, and attains to His own natural spiritual condition. But the body continues for a time on account of the impulse previously imparted to it. And the attainment of wisdom having put a stop to the operation of all such agents as virtue, etc.,—the operation of which is a necessary cause of rebirth—the body falls, and the Spirit regains His true character, and attains to absolute and eternal beatitude, never to return to the cycles of metempsychosis.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Bāla.	=	Bālarāma's Comm. on Sāṁkhya Tattva-kaumudī, Bombay, 1929.
Bh. Com.	=	Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume.
Bh. G.	=	Bhagavadgītā.
Br. up.	=	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.
Br. S.	=	Brahma-Sūtras.
Brah. P.	=	Brahma Purāṇa.
Ch. S. S.	=	Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series (Benares).
Ch. Up.	=	Chāndogya Upaniṣad.
Davies.	=	Hindu Philosophy : The Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Īśwara Krishṇa, by John Davies. Trübner's Oriental Series, London, 1881.
Ent. Gott.	=	Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern and deren Beweise, von H. Jacobi, Bonn, 1923.
Gauḍa.	=	Gauḍapādabhāṣya.
H. I. L.	=	History of Indian Literature, Vol. I., by M Winternitz.
H. I. P.	=	History of Indian Philosophy by Das Gupta.
H. Dh.	=	History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol. I., by P. V. Kane, Poona, 1930.
H. S. L.	=	History of Sanskrit Literature, by Macdonell.
I. A.	=	Indian Antiquary.
I. H. Q.	=	Indian Historical Quarterly, edited by N. Law, Calcutta.
I. P.	=	Indian Philosophy by S. Radhakrishanan.

Iśadi.	=	ईशाद्यष्टोत्तरशतोपनिषदः, निर्णयसागर edn.
Jay.	=	Jayamaṅgalā, a Comm., on Sāṁkhya-Kārikā, edited by H. Sarmā, Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 19.
J. O. R.	=	Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.
Karma.	=	Karmamīmāṁsā by Keith (Heritage of India Series.)
Māṭh.	=	Māṭharavṛtti (Ch. S. S., No. 296).
Mbh.	=	Mahābhārata, P. C. Roy's edn. Calcutta, 1810 Saka era.
N. B. S.	=	Notes on Brahma-Sūtras, II, 1 and 2 by S. K. Belvalkar, Oriental Book Agency Poona, 1923.
N. S.	=	Nyāya-Sūtras.
Pr. Up.	=	Praśna Upaniṣad.
P. O. C.	=	Proceedings of the Oriental Conference.
S. N. S.	=	The Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, University of Madras, 1930.
Sovani.	=	A critical study of Sāṁkhya System on the line of Sāṁkhya Kārikā, Sāṁkhya-Sūtra and their Commentaries, by V. V. Sovani, M. A., (The Allahabad University Studies, Vol. VII, Art Section, Allahabad, 1931).
S. S.	=	Sāṁkhya System by Keith (Heritage of India Series).
S. P.	=	Sāṁkhya Philosophie von R. Garbe, 2nd edn., Leipzig, 1917.
S. Sū.	=	Sāṁkhya Sūtras of Kapila.
S. S. B.	=	Sāṁkhya-Sūtra-Bhāṣya of Vijñānabhikṣu.
S. B. E.	=	Sacred Books of the East.
Sk. P.	=	Skanda Purāṇa.

S. Y.	=	Sāṁkhya und Yoga, von R. Garbe, Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie and Altertumskunde, 1896.
S. D. S.	=	Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha, B. O. R. I., Poona.
Śv. Up.	=	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.
Tatt. K.	=	Vācaspati's Tattva-Kaumudī on Sāṁkhya-Kārikā.
Tatt. V.	=	Vācaspati's Tattva-Vaiśāradī on Yoga-Bhāṣya.
Tatt. Sk.	=	The Sāṁkhya-Kārikā, Studied in the light of its Chinese version, by M. Takakusu; rendered from the French into English, by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras, 1933.
Y. Bh.	=	Vyāsa's Bhāṣya on the Yoga-Sūtras of Patañjali.
Y. S.	=	Yoga-Sūtras of Patañjali.
V. Bh.	=	Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya on the Nyāya-Sūtras.
V. P.	=	Viṣṇu Purāṇa.
Wilson	=	The Sāṁkhya Kārikā with Colebrooke's translation and Comments by H. H. Wilson, published by Tookaram Tattya, Bombay, 1887.

तत्त्वकौमुदी.

(सांख्य.)

(१) मङ्गलाचरणम् ॥

अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां नमामः ।
अजा ये तां जुषमाणां भजन्ते जहत्येनां भुक्तभोगां नुमस्तान् ॥ १ ॥

कपिलाय महामुनये मुनये शिष्याय तस्य चासुरये ।
पञ्चशिखाय तथेश्वरकृष्णायैतान्नमस्यामः ॥ २ ॥

(२) शास्त्रविषयक-जिज्ञासाकरणम् ॥

इह खलु प्रतिपित्सितमर्थं प्रतिपादयन् प्रतिपादयिता ऽवधेयवचनो भवति प्रेक्षावताम् । अप्रतिपित्सितमर्थं तु प्रतिपादयन् ' नायं लौकिको नापि परीक्षक ' इति प्रेक्षावद्भिरुन्मत्तवदुपेक्ष्येत । स चैषां प्रतिपित्सितो ऽर्थो यो ज्ञातः सन् परमपुरुषार्थाय कल्पते । इति प्रारिप्सितशास्त्रविषयज्ञानस्य परमपुरुषार्थसाधनहेतुत्वात् तद्विषयजिज्ञासामवतारयति–

दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदपघातके हेतौ ।
दृष्टे सा ऽपार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततो ऽभावात् ॥ १ ॥

(३) शास्त्रविषयक-जिज्ञासाया आवश्यकत्वशङ्का ॥

"दुःख–" इति । एवं हि शास्त्रविषयो न जिज्ञास्येत, यदि दुःखं नाम जगति न स्यात्, सद्वा न जिहासितम्, जिहासितं वा अशक्यसमुच्छेदम् । (अशक्यसमुच्छेदता च द्वेधा, दुःखस्य नित्यत्वात्, तदुच्छेदोपायापरिज्ञानाद्वा) । शक्यसमुच्छेदत्वेऽपि च शास्त्रविषयस्य ज्ञानस्यानुपायभूतत्वाद्वा, सुकरस्योपायान्तरस्य सद्भावाद्वा ॥

तत्र न तावद्दुःखन्नास्ति नाप्यजिहासितमित्युक्तम्—" दुखत्रयाभिघातात् " इति । दुःखानां त्रयं दुःखत्रयम् । तत् खलु आध्यात्मिकम्, आधिभौतिकम्, आधिदैविकञ्च । तत्राध्यात्मिकम् द्विविधम्, शारीरं मानसं च । शारीरं वातपित्तश्लेष्मणां वैषम्यनिमित्तम्, मानसं कामक्रोधलोभमोहभयेर्ष्याविषादविषयविशेषादर्शननिबन्धनम्। सर्वञ्चैतदान्तरिकोपायसाध्यत्वादाध्यात्मिकं दुःखम् । बाह्योपायसाध्यं दुःखं द्वेधा, आधिभौतिकम्, आधिदैविकञ्च । तत्राधिभौतिकं मानुषपशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृपस्थावरनिमित्तम्, आधिदैविकं तु यक्षराक्षसविनायकग्रहाद्यावेशनिबन्धनम्। तदेतत् प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयं दुःखं रजःपरिणामभेदो न शक्यते प्रत्याख्यातुम् । तदनेन दुःखत्रयेणान्तःकरणवर्तिना चेतनाशक्तेः प्रतिकूलवेदनीयतयाऽभिसम्बन्धोऽभिघात इति । एतावता प्रतिकूलवेदनीयत्वं जिहासाहेतुरुक्तः । यद्यपि न सन्निरुध्यते दुःखम्, तथापि तदभिभवः शक्यः कर्तुमित्युपरिष्टादुपपादयिष्यते । तस्मादुपपन्नम्, " तदपघातके हेतौ " इति। तस्य दुःखत्रयस्य अपघातकः तदपघातकः[1]। उपसर्जनस्यापि[2] बुद्ध्या सन्निकृष्टस्य 'तदा[3]' परामर्शः। अपघातकश्च हेतुः शास्त्रप्रतिपाद्यो, नान्य इत्याशयः ॥

(४) त्रयाणां दुःखानां व्युत्पादनम्, तदस्तित्वसाधनंच ॥

अत्र शङ्कते—" दृष्टे सा ऽपार्था चेत् " इति । अयमर्थः । अस्तु तर्हि दुःखत्रयम्, जिहासितं च तद्भवतु, भवतु च तच्छक्यहानम, सहतां च शास्त्रगम्य उपायस्तदुच्छेत्तुम् । तथा ऽप्यत्र प्रेक्षावतां जिज्ञासा न युक्ता, दृष्टस्यैवोपायस्य तदुच्छेदकस्य सुकरस्य विद्यमानत्वात् , तत्त्वज्ञानस्य तु अनेकजन्माभ्यासपरम्परायाससाध्यतयाऽतिदुष्करत्वात् । तथा च लौकिकानामाभाणकः,

(५) सुकरस्य दृष्टस्योपायस्य सत्त्वे शास्त्र विषयकजिज्ञासाया वैय्यर्थ्यापत्तिः॥

'अत्के[4] चेन्मधु विन्देत किमर्थं पर्वतं व्रजेत् ।
इष्टस्यार्थस्य संसिद्धौ को विद्वान् यत्नमाचरेत्' इति ।

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१. अनागतसूक्ष्मदुःखनिवृत्तौ तात्पर्यमिति केचित्। २ समासगौणावयवस्य । ३. समासस्थतत्पदेन । ४. 'अत' सातत्यगमने–इत्यस्माद्धातोर्निष्पन्नोऽयं शब्दः–अतोऽस्य स्वरूपम् 'अत्क' इति। अर्थश्चास्य 'यस्मिन्स्थाने सततं गच्छन्ति लोका' इति ।

सन्ति चोपायाः शतशः शारीरदुःखप्रतीकारायेषत्करा भिषजां वैररुपदिष्टाः। मानसस्यापि सन्तापस्य प्रतीकाराय मनोज्ञस्त्रीपानभोजनविलेपनवस्त्रालङ्कारादिविषयसम्प्राप्तिरुपायः सुकरः। एवमाधिभौतिकस्यापि दुःखस्य नीतिशास्त्राभ्यासकुशलतानिरत्ययस्थानाध्यासनादिः प्रतीकारहेतुरीषत्करः। तथा ऽऽधिदैविकस्यापि मणिमन्त्रौषधाद्युपयोगः सुकरः प्रतीकारोपाय इति॥

निराकरोति—"न" इति। कुतः? "एकान्तात्यन्ततो ऽभावात्"।

(६) वैयर्थ्यापत्तिनिराकरणम्–परिगणितोपायेभ्य आत्यन्तिकैकान्तिकदुःखनिवृत्तेरदर्शनम्॥

"एकान्तो" दुःखनिवृत्तेरवश्यम्भावः; "अत्यन्तो" निवृत्तस्य दुःखस्य पुनरनुत्पादः, तयोः एकान्तात्यन्तयोरभावः "एकान्तात्यन्ततो ऽभावः"। षष्ठीस्थाने सार्वविभक्तिकस्तसिः। एतदुक्तं भवति, यथाविधि रसायनादिकामिनीनीतिशास्त्राभ्यासमन्त्राद्युपाययोगे ऽपि तस्य तस्याध्यात्मिकादेर्दुःखस्य निवृत्तेरदर्शनात् अनैकान्तिकत्वम्, निवृत्तस्यापि पुनरुत्पत्तिदर्शनात् अनात्यन्तिकत्वम्, इति सुकरोऽपि ऐकान्तिकात्यन्तिकदुःखनिवृत्तेर्न दृष्ट उपाय इति ना ऽपार्था जिज्ञासेत्यर्थः॥

(७) दुःखापघातकीर्तनम् मङ्गलमेव॥

यद्यपि दुःखममङ्गलम्, तथाऽपि तत्परिहारार्थत्वेन तदपघातो मङ्गलमेवेति युक्तं शास्त्रादौ तत्कीर्तनमिति॥ १॥

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(८) वैदिकस्य दुःखापकघातकस्य सुकरस्य सत्त्वे शास्त्रविषयाजिज्ञासायाः पुनर्वैयर्थ्यापत्तिः॥

स्यादेतत्[1]। मा भूद्दृष्ट उपायः, वैदिकस्तु ज्योतिष्टोमादिः संवत्सरपर्यन्तः कर्मकलापस्तापत्रयमेकान्तमत्यन्तञ्चापनेष्यति। श्रुतिश्च, "स्वर्गकामो यजेत" इति। स्वर्गश्च—

"यन्न दुःखेन सम्भिन्नं न च ग्रस्तमनन्तरम्।
अभिलाषोपनीतं च तत् सुखं स्वःपदास्पदम्" इति।

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१. एतत् (वक्ष्यमाणम्, आशङ्कितम्) स्यात्–इति ग्रन्थकारोक्तिः। अथवा–एतत् (भवतोक्तम्) स्यात् (भवतु), स्वीकृतमस्माभिरिति शङ्काकृदुक्तिः। उभयथाऽपि युज्यते।

दुःखविरोधी सुखविशेषश्च स्वर्गः। स च स्वशक्त्या समूलघातमपहन्ति दुःखम्। न चैष क्षयी। तथा हि श्रूयते–" अपाम सोममममृता अभूम " इति [अथर्वशिरस् ३]। तत्क्षये कुतोऽस्यामृतत्वसम्भवः? तस्माद्वैदिकस्योपायस्य तापत्रयप्रतीकारहेतोर्मुहूर्तयामाहोरात्रमाससंवत्सरनिर्वर्तनीयस्यानेकजन्मपरम्परायाससम्पादनीयात् विवेकज्ञानात् ईषत्करत्वात् पुनरपि व्यर्था जिज्ञासा इत्याशङ्क्याह—

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः, स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः।
तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात्॥ २॥

(९) वैदिकानामप्युपायानां दृष्टोपायैस्सह तुल्यत्वम्॥

" दृष्ट–" इति। गुरुपाठादनुश्रूयते इत्यनुश्रवो, वेदः। एतदुक्तं भवति–' श्रूयत एव परं न केनापि क्रियत ' इति। तत्र भव आनुश्रविकः, तत्र प्राप्तो ज्ञात इति यावत्। आनुश्रविकोऽपि कर्मकलापो दृष्टेन तुल्यो वर्तते, ऐकान्तिकात्यन्तिकदुःखत्रयप्रतीकारानुपायत्वस्योभयत्रापि तुल्यत्वात्। यद्यपि च " आनुश्रविक " इति सामान्याभिधानं, तथापि कर्मकलापाभिप्रायं द्रष्टव्यम्, विवेकज्ञानस्याप्यानुश्रविकत्वात्। तथा च श्रूयते—" आत्मा वा ऽरे ज्ञातव्यः प्रकृतितो विवेक्तव्यः " [बृहदारण्यक, २।४।५], " न स पुनरावर्तते न स पुनरावर्तते " [छान्दोग्य ८।१५] इति॥

(१०) दृष्टवैदिकयोरुपाययोःअविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तत्वम् तुल्यम्॥

अस्यां प्रतिज्ञायां हेतुमाह–" स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः " इति। " अविशुद्धिः " सोमादियागस्य पशुबीजादिवधसाधनता[1]। यथाऽऽह स्म भगवान् पञ्चशिखाचार्यः–" स्वल्पसङ्करः सपरिहारः सप्रत्यवमर्षः " इति। ' स्वल्पसङ्करो ' ज्योतिष्टोमादिजन्मनः प्रधानापूर्वस्य स्वल्पेन पशुहिंसादिजन्मना ऽनर्थहेतुना ऽपूर्वेण सङ्करः। ' सपरिहारः, ' कियता ऽपि प्रायश्चित्तेन परिहर्तुं शक्यः। अथ च प्रमादतः प्रायश्चित्तमपि नाचरितं, प्रधानकर्मविपाकसमये स पच्यते। तथा ऽपि यावदसावनर्थं सूते तावत् प्रत्यवमर्षेण (सहिष्णुतया) सह वर्तत इति

१. अङ्गवैगुण्यं च।

"सप्रत्यमवर्षः"। मृष्यन्ते हि पुण्यसम्भारोपनीतस्वर्गसुधामहाह्रदावगाहिनः कुशलाः पापमात्रोपसादितां दुःखवह्निकणिकाम् ॥

(११) याज्ञिकहिंसाया अप्यनर्थहेतुत्वसाधनम् ॥

न च—"मा हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि" इति सामान्यशास्त्रं विशेषशास्त्रेण "अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत" इत्यनेन बाध्यत— इति युक्तम्, विरोधाभावात्। विरोधे हि बलीयसा दुर्बलं बाध्यते। न चेहास्ति कश्चिद्विरोधः, भिन्नविषयत्वात्। तथा हि—"मा हिंस्यात्" इति निषेधेन हिंसाया अनर्थहेतुभावो ज्ञाप्यते, न त्वक्रत्वर्थत्वमपि, 'अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत" इत्यनेन वाक्येन च पशुहिंसायाः क्रत्वर्थत्वमुच्यते, नानर्थहेतुत्वाभावः, तथा सति वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात्[1]। न चानर्थहेतुत्वक्रतूपकारकत्वयोः कश्चिद्विरोधोऽस्ति। हिंसा हि पुरुषस्य दोषमावक्ष्यति, क्रतोश्चोपकरिष्यतीति ॥

(१२) वैदिकोपायस्य सातिशयत्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥

क्षयातिशयौ च फलगतावप्युपाय उपचरितौ। क्षयित्वं च स्वर्गादेः सत्त्वे सति कार्यत्वादनुमितम्। ज्योतिष्टोमादयः स्वर्गमात्रस्य साधनम्, वाजपेयादयस्तु स्वाराज्यस्येत्यतिशययुक्तत्वम्। परसम्पदुत्कर्षो हि हीनसम्पदं पुरुषं दुःखाकरोति ॥

(१३) अमृतत्वश्रुतिविरोधपरिहारः-अमृतत्वस्य चिरस्थेम्न उपलक्षकत्वात्॥

"अपाम सोममसृता अभूम" इति चामृतत्वाभिधानम् चिरस्थेमानमुपलक्षयति। यदाहुः—"आभूतसम्प्लवं स्थानममृतत्वं हि भाष्यते" इति (विष्णुपुराणे)॥ अत एव च श्रुतिः—"न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैकेनामृतत्वमानशुः। परेण नाकं निहितं गुहायां विभ्राजते यद्यतयो विशन्ति" इति [महानारायण १०।५]। तथा "कर्मणा मृत्युमृषयो निषेदुः प्रजावन्तो द्रविणमीहमानाः। तथा परे ऋषयो ये मनीषिणः परं कर्मभ्यो ऽमृतत्वमानशुः" इति च ॥

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१. विधेयद्वयापत्तेः। हिंसा यागसाधिका अनर्थशून्या चेति वाक्यभेदः।

(१४) लौकिकवैदिकोपायेभ्यः शास्त्रविषयज्ञानस्य श्रेयस्त्वप्रदर्शनम्॥

तदेतत् सर्वमभिप्रेत्याह—"तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान्, व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात्" इति। तस्मात् (आनुश्रविकात् दुःखापघातकोपायात् सोमपानादेरविशुद्धात् अनित्यसातिशयफलात्) विपरीतः विशुद्धः हिंसादिसङ्कराभावात्, नित्यनिरतिशयफलः, असकृत् पुनरावृत्तिश्रुतेः। न च कार्यत्वेनानित्यता[1] फलस्य युक्ता, भावरूपस्य कार्यस्य तथाभावात्, दुःखप्रध्वंसनस्य तु कार्यस्यापि तद्वैपरीत्यात्[2]। न च दुःखान्तरोत्पादः, कारणाप्रवृत्तौ कार्यस्यानुत्पादात्, विवेकज्ञानोपजननपर्यन्तत्वाच्च कारणप्रवृत्तेः। एतच्चोपरिष्टादुपपादयिष्यते[3]॥

(१५) "तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान्" इत्यस्याक्षरार्थः॥

अक्षरार्थस्तु—तस्मात् (आनुश्रविकात् दुःखापघातकात् हेतोः) विपरीतः (सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययः साक्षात्कारो) दुःखापघातको हेतुः, अत एव श्रेयान्। आनुश्रविको हि वेदविहितत्वात् मात्रया दुःखापघातकत्वाच्च प्रशस्यः। सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययोऽपि प्रशस्यः। तदनयोः प्रशस्ययोर्मध्ये सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययः श्रेयान्॥

(१६) शास्त्रविषयस्य दुःखापघातकस्य तत्त्वज्ञानस्योत्पत्तिप्रदर्शनम्॥

कुतः पुनरस्योत्पत्तिरित्यत आह—"व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात्" इति। व्यक्तं च अव्यक्तं च ज्ञश्च व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञाः, तेषां विज्ञानम् विवेकेन ज्ञानम्, व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानम्। व्यक्तज्ञानपूर्वकमव्यक्तस्य तत्कारणस्य ज्ञानम्। तयोश्च[4] पारार्थ्येनात्मा परो ज्ञायते, इति ज्ञानक्रमेणाभिधानम्। एतदुक्तं भवति—श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणेभ्यो व्यक्तादीन् विवेकेन श्रुत्वा, शास्त्रयुक्त्या च व्यवस्थाप्य दीर्घकालादरनैरन्तर्यसत्कारसेवितात् भावनामयात् विज्ञानादिति। तथा च वक्ष्यति—

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१ अनित्यत्वात्। २ अभावरूपत्वात्। ३ (६६) कारिकायाम्। ४ व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः परार्थत्वेन। व्यक्ताव्यक्ते अचेतने कस्यचिच्चेतनस्यार्थाय वर्तेते स च चेतन आत्मेत्यादिक्रमेण।

"एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।
अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम्" इति [कारिका, ६४] ॥ २ ॥

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(१७) शास्त्रार्थसंक्षेपः– प्रकृति–प्रकृतिविकृति–विकृत्यनुभयरूपक्रमेण ॥–

तदेवं प्रेक्षावदपेक्षितार्थत्वेन शास्त्रारम्भं समाधाय शास्त्रमारभमाणः श्रोतृबुद्धिसमवधानाय तदर्थं संक्षेपतः प्रतिजानीते–

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तु विकारो, न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥

"मूल–" इति। संक्षेपतो हि शास्त्रार्थस्य चतस्रो विधाः । कश्चिदर्थः प्रकृतिरेव, कश्चिदर्थो विकृतिरेव, कश्चित्प्रकृतिविकृतिः, कश्चिदनुभयरूपः ।

(१८) प्रकृतिकथनम् ॥

तत्र का प्रकृतिरित्युक्तम्–"मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः" इति। प्रकरोतीति प्रकृतिः प्रधानम्, सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था, सा अविकृतिः, प्रकृतिरेवेत्यर्थः । कुत इत्युक्तम्–, "मूलेति" मूलञ्चासौ प्रकृतिश्चेति मूलप्रकृतिः । विश्वस्य कार्यसंघातस्य सा मूलम्, न त्वस्या मूलान्तरमस्ति, अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । न चानवस्थायां प्रमाणमस्तीति भावः ॥

(१९) प्रकृतिविकृतिकथनम् ॥

कतमाः पुनः प्रकृतिविकृतयः, कियत्यश्चेत्यत उक्तम्–"महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त" इति। प्रकृतयश्च विकृतयश्च ता इति "प्रकृतिविकृतयः", सप्त। तथा हि महत्तत्त्वम् अहङ्कारस्य प्रकृतिः, विकृतिश्च मूलप्रकृतेः। एवमहङ्कारतत्त्वं तन्मात्राणामिन्द्रियाणां च प्रकृतिः, विकृतिश्च महतः । एवं पञ्चतन्मात्राणि तत्त्वानि भूतानामाकाशादीनां प्रकृतयो विकृतयश्चाहङ्कारस्य ॥

(२०) विकृतिकथनम् ॥

अथ का विकृतिरेव, कियती चेत्यत उक्तम्–"षोडशकस्तु विकारः" इति। षोडशसंख्यापरिमितो गणः षोडशकः । 'तु' शब्दोऽवधारणे भिन्नक्रमः–पञ्चमहाभूतानि एकादश इन्द्रियाणीति षोडशको गणो विकार एव, न प्रकृतिरिति । यद्यपि पृथिव्यादीनां गोघटवृक्षादयो विकाराः, एवन्तद्विकारभेदानां पयोबीजादीनां दध्यङ्कुरादयः, तथाऽपि गवादयो बीजादयो वा न पृथिव्यादि-

भ्यस्तत्त्वान्तरम् । तत्त्वान्तरोपादानत्वं च प्रकृतित्वमिहाभिप्रेतम्, इति न दोषः । सर्वेषां गोघटादीनां स्थूलतेन्द्रियग्राह्यता च समेति न तत्त्वान्तरम् ॥

(२१) अनुभयरूपकथनम् ॥ अनुभयरूपमाह–" न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः " इति । एतत् सर्वमुपरिष्टादुपपादयिष्यते ॥ ३ ॥

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(२२) प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥ तमिममर्थं प्रामाणिकं कर्तुमभिमताः प्रमाणभेदा लक्षणीयाः । न च सामान्यलक्षणमन्तरेण शक्यते विशेषलक्षणम् कर्तुम् । इति प्रमाणसामान्यं तावल्लक्षयति–

दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च, सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।
त्रिविधम्प्रमाणमिष्टं, प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥ ४ ॥

" प्रमाणमिष्टम् " इति । अत्र—च ' प्रमाणम् ' इति समाख्या लक्ष्यपदम् । तन्निर्वचनं च लक्षणम् । प्रमीयतेऽनेनेति निर्वचनात्

(२३) प्रमाणपदस्य-निर्वचनम् ॥ प्रमां प्रति करणत्वमवगम्यते । तच्चासन्दिग्धाविपरीतानधिगतविषया चित्तवृत्तिः । बोधश्च पौरुषेयः फलम् प्रमा, तत्साधनम् प्रमाणमिति । एतेन संशयविपर्ययस्मृतिसाधनेष्वप्रमाणेष्वप्रसङ्गः ॥

संख्याविप्रतिपत्तिं निराकरोति—" त्रिविधम् " इति । तिस्रो विधा यस्य प्रमाणसामान्यस्य तत् त्रिविधम्, न न्यूनम्,

(२४) प्रमाणसंख्या ॥ नाप्यधिकमित्यर्थः । विशेषलक्षणानन्तरञ्चैतदुपपादयिष्यामः ॥

कतमाः पुनस्तास्तिस्रो विधा इत्यत आह—" दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनम् " इति । एतच्च लौकिकप्रमाणाभिप्रायम्, लोकव्युत्पादना-

(२५) प्रमाणत्रय-परिगणनम् ॥ र्थत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य, तस्यैवात्राधिकारात् । आर्षं तु विज्ञानं योगिनामूर्ध्वस्रोतसां न लोकव्युत्पादनायालमिति सदपि नाभिहितम्, अनधिकारात् ॥

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१ नैयायिकानामनुव्यवसायः–घटज्ञाने " घटमहं जानमीति "–पुरुषगतः ।

(२६) प्रमाणसंख्याऽऽधिक्यशङ्का, तत्परिहारश्च ॥

स्यादेतत्—मा भून्न्यूनम्, अधिकं तु कस्मान्न भवति ? सङ्गिरन्ते हि प्रतिवादिन उपमानादीन्यपि प्रमाणानि, इत्यत आह—" सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् " इति। एष्वेव दृष्टानुमानाप्तवचनेषु सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां सिद्धत्वात्, अन्तर्भावादित्यर्थः। एतच्चोपपादयिष्यत इत्युक्तम् ॥

(२७) प्रमेयवर्णनात् प्रागेव प्रमाणनिर्वचनस्यावश्यकत्वम् ॥

अथ प्रमेयव्युत्पादनाय प्रवृत्तं शास्त्रं कस्मात् प्रमाणं सामान्यतो विशेषतश्च लक्षयति? इत्यत आह—" प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि " इति । सिद्धिः प्रतीतिः ॥

(२८) कारिकापाठक्रमपरिवर्तनहेतुः ॥

सेयमार्या ऽर्थक्रमानुरोधेन पाठक्रममनादृत्यैव व्याख्याता ॥ ४ ॥

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(२९) प्रमाणानां विशेषलक्षणम् ॥

सम्प्रति प्रमाणविशेषलक्षणावसरे प्रत्यक्षस्य सर्वप्रमाणेषु ज्येष्ठत्वात् तदधीनत्वाच्चानुमानादीनाम्, सर्ववादिनामविप्रतिपत्तेश्च, तदेव तावल्लक्षयति—

प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टं, त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।
तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्, आप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनं तु ॥ ५ ॥

" प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम् " इति । अत्र " दृष्टम् " इति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः, परिशिष्टं तु लक्षणम् । समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदो लक्षणार्थः ॥

(३०) प्रत्यक्षलक्षणावयवार्थः ॥

अवयवार्थस्तु—विषिण्वन्ति, विषयिणमनुबध्नन्ति, स्वेन रूपेण निरूपणीयं कुर्वन्तीति यावत् =" विषयाः," पृथिव्यादयः सुखादयश्चास्मदादीनाम् अविषयाः तन्मात्रलक्षणाः योगिनामूर्ध्वस्रोतसां च विषयाः । विषयं विषयं प्रति वर्तते इति प्रतिविषयम्=इन्द्रियम् । वृत्तिश्च सन्निकर्षः । अर्थसन्निकृष्टमिन्द्रियमित्यर्थः । तस्मिन् अध्यवसायः, तदाश्रित इत्यर्थः । अध्यवसायश्च बुद्धिव्यापारो ज्ञानम् । उपात्तविषयाणामिन्द्रियाणां वृत्तौ

सत्याम्, बुद्धेस्तमोऽभिभवे सति यः सत्त्वसमुद्रेकः सोऽध्यवसाय[1] इति। वृत्तिरिति ज्ञानमिति चाख्यायते। इदं तावत् प्रमाणम्, [2] अनेन यश्चेतनाशक्तेरनुग्रहस्तत्फलं प्रमाबोधः॥

(३१) ज्ञानानामचेतनत्वम्॥

बुद्धितत्त्वं हि प्राकृतत्वादचेतनम्, इति तदीयो ऽध्यवसायो ऽप्यचेतनो, घटादिवत्। एवं बुद्धितत्त्वस्य सुखादयो ऽपि परिणामभेदा अचेतनाः। पुरुषस्तु सुखाद्यननुषङ्गी चेतनः। सो ऽयं बुद्धितत्त्ववर्तिना ज्ञानसुखादिना तत्प्रतिबिम्बितस्तच्छायापत्त्या ज्ञानसुखादिमानिव भवतीति– चेतनो ऽनुगृह्यते। चितिच्छायापत्त्या ऽचेतना ऽपि बुद्धिस्तदध्यवसायो ऽप्यचेतनश्चेतनवद्भवतीति। तथा च वक्ष्यति—

" तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम्।
गुणकर्तृत्वे ऽपि तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः॥ " इति [कारिका. २०].

(३२) प्रत्यक्षलक्षणान्तर्गतानां शब्दानां व्यावृत्तिः॥

अत्राध्यवसायग्रहणेन संशयं व्यवच्छिनत्ति, संशयस्यानवस्थितग्रहणेनानिश्चितरूपत्वात्। निश्चयो ऽध्यवसाय इति चानर्थान्तरम्। विषयग्रहणेन चासद्विषयं विपर्ययमपाकरोति। प्रतिग्रहणेन चेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षसूचनादनुमानस्मृत्यादयश्च पराकृता भवन्ति॥

(३३) प्रत्यक्षस्य पर्यवसितं लक्षणम्॥

तदेवं समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदकत्वात् " प्रतिविषयाध्यवसाय " इति दृष्टस्य सम्पूर्णं लक्षणम्। तन्त्रान्तरेषु लक्षणान्तराणि तैर्थिकानां न भूषितानि न दूषितानि, विस्तरभयादिति॥

(३४) अनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वसाधनम्॥

नानुमानम्प्रमाणमिति वदता लोकायतिकेनाप्रतिपन्नः सन्दिग्धो विपर्यस्तो वा पुरुषः कथं प्रतिपद्येत? न च पुरुषान्तरगत अज्ञानसंदेहविपर्ययाः शक्या अर्वाग्दृशा प्रत्यक्षेण प्रतिपत्तुम्। नापि प्रमाणान्तरेण, अनभ्युपगमात्। अनवधृताज्ञानसंशयविपर्ययस्तु यं कंचन पुरुषं प्रति वर्तमानो ऽनवधेयवचनतया

१. अयमध्यवसाय एव च प्रत्यक्षमिति शेषः। २. समानार्थकमेवंति।

प्रेक्षावद्भिरुन्मत्तवदुपेक्ष्येत। तदनेनाज्ञानादयः परपुरुषवर्तिनो ऽभिप्रायभेदाद्वचनभेदाद्वा लिङ्गादनुमातव्याः, इत्यकामेनाप्यनुमानप्रमाणमभ्युपेयम् ॥

तत्र प्रत्यक्षकार्यत्वात् अनुमानं प्रत्यक्षानन्तरं लक्षणीयम्। तत्रापि सामान्यलक्षणपूर्वकत्वाद्विशेषलक्षणस्यानुमानसामान्यं तावल्लक्षयति–" तत् लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम् " इति। लिङ्गम् व्याप्यम्। लिङ्गि व्यापकम्। शङ्कितसमारोपितोपाधिनिराकरणेन च स्वभावप्रतिबद्धं व्याप्यम्, येन प्रतिबद्धं तद्व्यापकम्। लिङ्गलिङ्गिग्रहणेन विषयवाचिना विषयिणं प्रत्ययमुपलक्षयति। धूमादिर्व्याप्यो वह्न्यादिर्व्यापक इति यः प्रत्ययस्तत्पूर्वकम्। लिङ्गग्रहणं चावर्तनीयम्। तेन च लिङ्गमस्यास्तीति पक्षधर्मताज्ञानमपि दर्शितम्भवति। तद्व्याप्यव्यापकभावपक्षधर्मताज्ञानपूर्वकमनुमानमित्यनुमानसामान्यं लक्षितम् ॥

(३५) अनुमानस्य सामान्यलक्षणम् ॥

अनुमानविशेषान् तन्त्रान्तरलक्षितान् अभिमतान् स्मारयति– " त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् " इति। तत् सामान्यतो लक्षितमनुमानं विशेषतस्त्रिविधं, पूर्ववत्–शेषवत्–सामान्यतो दृष्टञ्चेति ॥

(३६) अनुमानस्य विशेषलक्षम्–त्रैविध्यम् पूर्ववच्छेषवत्सामान्यतो दृष्टभेदात् ॥

तत्र [1]प्रथमं तावत् द्विविधम्–वीतमवीतं च। अन्वयमुखेन प्रवर्तमानं विधायकं वीतम्, व्यतिरेकमुखेन प्रवर्तमानं निषेधकमवीतम् ॥

(३७) वीतावीतरूपेणानुमानस्य द्वैविध्यम् ॥

तत्रावीतं शेषवत्। शिष्यते परिशिष्यते इति शेषः, स एव विषयतया यस्यास्त्यनुमानज्ञानस्य तच्छेषवत्। यद[2]ाहुः— " प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधे, अन्यत्राप्रसङ्गात् शिष्यमाणे सम्प्रत्ययः परिशेष " इति [वात्स्यायन–न्यायभाष्य १. १. ५.] - अस्य चावीतस्य व्यतिरेकिण उदाहरणमग्रे ऽभिधास्यते ॥

(३८) अवीतनिरूपणम् ॥

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१. एकेन विभागप्रकारेण अनुमानम् द्विविधमिति भावः। २. अत्राहू राघवानन्दतीर्थाः–" सतां सम्मतिमाह यथाहुरिति–गुणत्वात् पृथिव्याश्रयः शब्दः स्यादिति प्रसक्तस्य शब्दस्य न पृथिवीगुणत्वम्, अपाकजविशेषगुणत्वात्, तद्विशेषगुणेन गन्धेन च सहावृत्तित्वात्। एवं निषेधे कृते आकाशादन्यत्र भूम्याद्यष्टस्वप्रसङ्गात्, शिष्यमाणे आकाशे एव शब्दस्य गुणत्वेन सम्यक्प्रत्ययः "– इति ॥

वीतं द्वेधा–पूर्ववत् सामान्यतो दृष्टं च । तत्रैकम् दृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यविषयं[1] यत्तत्पूर्ववत्, पूर्वं प्रसिद्धं, दृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यमिति यावत, तदस्य विषयत्वेनास्त्यनुमानज्ञानस्येति पूर्ववत् । यथा धूमाद्वह्नित्वसामान्यविशेषः पर्वते ऽनुमीयते, तस्य वह्नित्वसामान्यविशेषस्य स्वलक्षणं वह्निविशेषो दृष्टो रसवत्याम् । अपरं च वीतं सामान्यतो दृष्टमदृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यविषयम् । यथेन्द्रियविषयमनुमानम् । अत्र हि रूपादिविज्ञानानां क्रियात्वेन करणवत्त्वमनुमीयते । यद्यपि करणत्वसामान्यस्य छिदादौ वास्यादि स्वलक्षणमुपलब्धम्, तथा ऽपि यज्जातीयं रूपादिज्ञाने करणत्वमनुमीयते तज्जातीयस्य करणस्य न दृष्टं स्वलक्षणं प्रत्यक्षेण । इन्द्रियजातीयं हि तत्करणम्, नचेन्द्रियत्वसामान्यस्य स्वलक्षणमिन्द्रियविशेषः प्रत्यक्षगोचरो ऽर्वाग्दृशाम्, यथा वह्नित्वसामान्यस्य स्वलक्षणं वह्निः । सो ऽयं पूर्ववतः सामान्यतो दृष्टात् सत्यपि वीतत्वेन तुल्यत्वे विशेषः । अत्र च दृष्टं दर्शनम्, सामान्यत इति सामान्यस्य, सार्वविभक्तिकस्तसिल् । अदृष्टस्वलक्षणस्य सामान्यविशेषस्य दर्शनम् सामान्यतो दृष्टमनुमानमित्यर्थः । सर्वं चैतदस्माभिर्न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीकायां व्युत्पादितमिति नेहोक्तं विस्तरभयात् ॥

(३९) वीतनिरूपणम्–तद्द्वैविध्यम् ॥

प्रयोजकवृद्धशब्दश्रवणसमनन्तरं प्रयोज्यवृद्धप्रवृत्तिहेतुज्ञानानुमानपूर्वकत्वाच्छब्दार्थसम्बन्धग्रहणस्य, स्वार्थसम्बन्धज्ञानसहकारिणश्च शब्दस्यार्थप्रत्यायकत्वादनुमानपूर्वकत्वमित्यनुमानानन्तरं शब्दं लक्षयति–"आप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनं तु" इति । आप्तवचनमिति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः, परिशिष्टं लक्षणम् । आप्ता प्राप्ता युक्तेति यावत् । आप्ता चासौ श्रुतिश्चेति 'आप्तश्रुतिः' । श्रुतिः वाक्यजनितं वाक्यार्थज्ञानम् ॥

(४०) शब्दप्रमाणलक्षणम् ॥

तच्च स्वतः प्रमाणम् । अपौरुषेयवेदवाक्यजनितत्वेन सकलदोषाशङ्काविनिर्मुक्तेर्युक्तं भवति । एवं वेदमूलस्मृतीतिहासपुराणवाक्यजनितमपि ज्ञानं युक्तं भवति ॥

(४१) तस्य स्वतःप्रामाण्यम् ॥

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१. दृष्टं स्वलक्षणं यस्य सामान्यस्य–तत् सामान्यं विषयो यस्येति विग्रहः ।

आदिविदुषश्च कपिलस्य कल्पादौ कल्पान्तराधीतश्रुतिस्मरणसम्भवः, सुप्तप्रबुद्धस्येव पूर्वेद्युरवगतानामर्थानामपरेद्युः । तथा चावट्यजगीषव्यसंवादे भगवान् जैगीषव्यो दशमहाकल्पवर्तिजन्मस्मरणमात्मन उवाच " दशसु महाकल्पेषु विपरिवर्तमानेन मया " इत्यादिना ग्रन्थसन्दर्भेण ॥

(४२) कपिलस्य पूर्वजन्माधीतश्रुतिस्मरणम्॥

आप्तग्रहणेनायुक्ताः शाक्यभिक्षुनिर्ग्रन्थकसंसारमोचकादीनामागमाभासाः परिहृता भवन्ति । अयुक्तत्वं चैतेषां विगानात् विच्छिन्नमूलत्वात्प्रमाणविरुद्धार्थाभिधानाच्च कैश्चिदेव म्लेच्छादिभिः पुरुषापसदैः पशुप्रायैः परिग्रहाद्बोद्धव्यम् ।

(४३) आगमाभासनिरूपणम् ॥

'तु' शब्देनानुमानाद्व्यवच्छिनत्ति । वाक्यार्थो हि प्रमेयो, न तु तद्धर्मो वाक्यम्, येन तत्र लिङ्गं भवेत् । न च वाक्यं वाक्यार्थं बोधयत् सम्बन्धग्रहणमपेक्षते, अभिनवकविरचितस्य वाक्यस्यादृष्टपूर्वस्याननुभूतचरवाक्यार्थबोधकत्वादिति॥

(४४) आप्तश्रुतेरनुमानाद्व्यवच्छेदः ॥

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१. अत्राहुर्भारतीयत्यादयः–" कथं ' तु ' शब्देनानुमानाद्व्यवच्छेद आप्तवचनस्येत्यत आह –'वाक्यार्थोहि' इति । नन्वस्तु तावद्वाक्यार्थस्य प्रमेयत्वम्, एतावता कथमनुमानाद् व्यवच्छेदः स्यात्, शब्दस्य तत्कारणत्वात्, यथा धूमेन लिङ्गेन लिङ्गी वह्निर्ज्ञायते तथा वाक्येन लिङ्गेन शब्दार्थलिङ्ग्यनुमानं भवेदित्याशङ्क्याह–' न तु तद्धर्म ' इति । धूमस्य वह्निधर्मत्वात् तल्लिङ्गत्वम्, न तु वाक्यस्य अर्थधर्मत्वम्, येन तल्लिङ्गं वाक्यं स्यादिति यावत्। ननु यद्यपि धूमाग्निवत् वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोर्धर्मधर्मिभावो नास्ति, तथा ऽपि यथा धूमो ऽग्निना सम्बन्धिना सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्ष एव तद्गमकः, तथा वाक्यमपि अर्थेन सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षमेव तद्बोधकमिति घट्टकुट्यामेव प्रभात इति चेत्तत्राह–"न च" इति। औत्पत्तिकसूत्रे जैमिनिना शब्दार्थयोर्नित्यसम्बन्धे साधिते ऽपि शब्दस्यैव वृद्धव्यवहारतः सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षस्यैवावबोधकत्वात्, पदार्थपूर्वकत्वात्तु वाक्यार्थस्य स्वार्थबोधकत्वे सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षा नास्ति । विशिष्टार्थसंप्रत्ययो हि वाक्यार्थः " इति। यदि वाक्यार्थज्ञाने ऽनुमानं स्यात् तर्हि वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोर्व्याप्यव्या-

(४५) शास्त्रान्तरोक्तप्रमाणान्तराणामुक्तेष्वन्तर्भावः ॥

एवं प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणेषु तद्विशेषलक्षणेषु च सत्सु, यानि प्रमाणान्तराण्युपमानादीनि प्रतिवादिभिरभ्युपेयन्ते तान्युक्तलक्षणेष्वेव प्रमाणेष्वन्तर्भवन्ति ॥

(४६) उपमानस्य शब्दे ऽनुमाने चान्तर्भावः ॥

तथा हि–उपमानं तावद्यथा गौस्तथा गवय इति वाक्यम्। तज्जनिता धीरागम एव । यो ऽप्ययं गवयशब्दो गोसदृशस्य वाचक इति प्रत्ययः, सो ऽप्यनुमानमेव । यो हि शब्दो यत्र वृद्धैः प्रयुज्यते, सो ऽसति वृत्त्यन्तरे, तस्य वाचकः, यथा गोशब्दो गोत्वस्य । प्रयुज्यते चैवं गवयशब्दो गोसदृशे, इति तस्यैव वाचक, इति तत् ज्ञानमनुमानमेव । यत्तु गवयस्य चक्षुःसन्निकृष्टस्य गोसादृश्यज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षमेव । अत एव स्मर्यमाणायां गवि, गवयसादृश्यज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । न त्वन्यद्गवि सादृश्यमन्यच्च गवये । भूयोऽवयवसामान्ययोगो हि जात्यन्तरवर्ती जात्यन्तरे सादृश्यमुच्यते । सामान्ययोगश्चैकः । स चेद्गवये प्रत्यक्षो, गव्यपि तथेति नोपमानस्य प्रमेयान्तरमस्ति, यत्र प्रमाणान्तरमुपमानं भवेत्, इति न प्रमाणान्तरमुपमानम् ॥

पकसम्बन्धोऽपेक्षितः स्यात् । न च तथा । तथाहि वाक्यं प्रमाणं वाक्यार्थः प्रमेयः । एवं च वाक्यं वाक्यार्थस्य धर्मो न भवति–यथा भवति धूमो वह्नेर्धर्मः । अतो वाक्यं वाक्यार्थस्य लिंगं न भवतीत्याशयः ।

शाब्दज्ञानं ये ऽनुमाने ऽन्तर्भावयंति तेषां मते–यथा व्याप्तिज्ञानपूर्वकमनुमानं तथैव शब्दार्थसम्बन्धज्ञानपूर्वकं शाब्दं ज्ञानम्। तत्र चेत्थमनुमानस्वरूपम्–यत्र यत्र घटमानयेति शब्दः प्रयुज्यते तत्र तत्र घटानयनं बोध्यते–यथा मम बाल्यावस्थायामुच्चरितोक्तशब्दः–अधुनाऽपि स एव शब्दः प्रयुज्यते–तस्मादधुनापि घटानयनमेव बोध्यत इति ॥ अस्यैव मतस्य परिहारो ऽत्र ग्रन्थे प्रदर्श्यते न च वाक्यमित्यादिना । व्याप्यव्यापकसम्बन्धज्ञानं विना ऽनुमानं नैव प्रसरति । शाब्दज्ञाने त्वेवंविधशब्दार्थसम्बन्धज्ञानपूर्वकत्वं न सार्वत्रिकम्–अभिनवकविरचितवाक्यस्याश्रुतपूर्वत्वात्तत्र तादृशसम्बधज्ञानस्यासम्भवः । तथा च सति पूर्वपक्षिमतेन तत्र शाब्दज्ञानं नैव स्यादिति तात्पर्यम् ॥

(४७) अर्थापत्तेरनुमाने ऽन्तर्भावः ॥

एवमर्थापत्तिरपि न प्रमाणान्तरम्। तथा हि–जीवतश्चैत्रस्य गृहाभावदर्शनेन बहिर्भावस्यादृष्टस्य कल्पनमर्थापत्तिरभिमता वृद्धानाम्। सा ऽप्यनुमानमेव। यदा खल्वव्यापकः सन्नेकत्र नास्ति तदा ऽन्यत्रास्ति। यदा ऽव्यापक एकत्रास्ति तदा ऽन्यत्र नास्तीति सुकरः स्वशरीरे व्याप्तिग्रहः । तथा च सतो गृहाभावदर्शनेन लिङ्गेन बहिर्भावदर्शनमनुमानमेव। न च चैत्रस्य क्वचित्सत्त्वेन गृहाभावः शक्यो ऽपह्नोतुम्, येनासिद्धो गृहाभावो बहिर्भावे न हेतुः स्यात् । न च गृहाभावेन वा सत्त्वमपह्नूयते, येन सत्त्वमेवानुपपद्यमानमात्मानं न बहिरवस्थापयेत्। तथा हि–चैत्रस्य गृहासत्त्वेन सत्त्वमात्रं विरुध्यते, गृहसत्त्वं वा? न तावद्यत्र क्वचन सत्त्वस्यास्ति विरोधो गृहासत्त्वेन, भिन्नविषयत्वात्। "देशसामान्येन[1] गृहविशेषाक्षेपो ऽपि पाक्षिक इति समानविषयतया विरोध" इति चेत्, न, प्रमाणविनिश्चितस्य गृहे ऽसत्त्वस्य पाक्षिकतया सांशयिकेन गृहसत्त्वेन प्रतिक्षेपायोगात्। नापि प्रमाणनिश्चितो गृहाभावः पाक्षिकमस्य गृहसत्त्वं प्रतिक्षिपन् सत्त्वमपि प्रतिक्षेप्तुं सांशयिकत्वं च व्यपनेतुमर्हतीति युक्तम्।

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१. "देशसामान्यप्रविष्टगृहविशेषमादाय समानविषयतया विरोध इति शङ्कते" इति राघवानन्दाः। सत्त्वं हि गृहबहिस्साधारणतया सामान्यप्रवृत्तं विशेषगृहासत्त्वेन विरुद्धमिति शङ्काकृद्भावः । क्वचिदस्तीति कथनेन स्थलविशेषविनिगमनाविरहात् गृहाभावो ऽपि बाध्यते, गृहस्यापि क्वचित्पदे ऽन्तर्भावात्, अतएव गृहसत्त्वेन विरोध इति हृदयम्।

"देशसामान्येनेति" सामान्यस्य साधारणधर्मतया तज्ज्ञानस्य संशयहेतुतया उच्चैस्तरत्वज्ञानेन स्थाणुत्वपुरुषत्वयोरिव गृहबहिर्देशयोराधेयतासम्बन्धेन चैत्रे संशये गृहत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारकज्ञानस्य गृहाभावज्ञानविरोधितया गृहाभावरूपहेतोर्ज्ञानं न सम्भवतीत्यभिप्रायः। शब्दार्थस्तु "देशसामान्येन" देशसामान्यज्ञानेन, "गृहविशेषाक्षेपः" गृहात्मकविशेषसम्बन्धः, "पाक्षिकः" संशयविषयः, "समानविषयतया" गृहाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नतया, "विरोधः" एकसत्त्वे ऽपरासत्त्वनियमः।

"प्रमाणेति" प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रकारकनिश्चयस्यैवाभावधीहेतुतया संशयस्य न विरोधितेत्यभिसन्धिः, अक्षरार्थस्तु स्पष्टः।

गृहावच्छिन्नेन चैत्राभावेन गृहसत्त्वं विरुद्धत्वात् प्रतिक्षिप्यते, न तु सत्त्वमात्रम्, तस्य तत्रौदासीन्यात्। तस्माद्गृहाभावेन लिङ्गेन सिद्धेन सतो बहिर्भावोऽनुमीयत इति युक्तम्। एतेन 'विरुद्धयोः प्रमाणयोर्विषयव्यवस्थयाऽविरोधापादनमर्थापत्तेर्विषय' इति निरस्तम्, अवच्छिन्नानवच्छिन्नयोर्विरोधाभावात्। उदाहरणान्तराणि चार्थापत्तेरेवमेवानुमानेऽन्तर्भावनीयानि। तस्मान्नानुमानात्प्रमाणान्तरमर्थापत्तिरिति सिद्धम्॥

(४८) अभावस्य प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्भावः॥

एवमभावोऽपि प्रत्यक्षमेव। न हि भूतलस्य परिणामविशेषात् कैवल्यलक्षणादन्यो घटाभावो नाम। प्रतिक्षणपरिणामिनो हि सर्व एव भावाः, ऋते चितिशक्तेः। स च परिणामभेद ऐन्द्रियक इति नास्ति प्रत्यक्षानवरुद्धो विषयो यत्राभावाह्वयं प्रमाणान्तरमभ्युपेयेतेति॥

(४९) सम्भवस्यानुमानेऽन्तर्भावः॥

सम्भवस्तु, यथा-खार्यां द्रोणाढकप्रस्थाद्यवगमः। स चानुमानमेव। खारीत्वं हि द्रोणाद्यविनाभूतं प्रतीतम् खार्यां द्रोणादिसत्त्वमवगमयति॥

(५०) ऐतिह्यस्य प्रमाणत्वाभावः॥

यच्चानिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकं प्रवादपारम्पर्यमात्रम्– 'इति होचुर्वृद्धाः,'–इत्यैतिह्यम्, यथा 'इह वटे यक्षः प्रतिवसति' इति, न तत् प्रमाणान्तरम्, अनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकत्वेन सांशयिकत्वात्। आप्तवक्तृकत्वनिश्चये त्वागम एव। इत्युपपन्नम् "त्रिविधम्प्रमाणम्" इति॥ ५॥

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(५१) प्रमाणानां शक्तिनिर्णयः॥

एवं तावद्व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञलक्षणप्रमेयसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रमाणानि लक्षितानि। तत्र व्यक्तं पृथिव्यादि स्वरूपतः पांसुलपादको[1] हालिकोऽपि प्रत्यक्षतः प्रतिपद्यते, पूर्ववता चानुमानेन धूमादिदर्शनात् वह्न्यादीनि चेति, तद्व्युत्पादनाय मन्दप्रयोजनं शास्त्रम् इति दुरधिगममनेन व्युत्पाद्यम्। तत्र यत्प्रमाणं यत्र शक्तम् तदुक्तलक्षणेभ्यः प्रमाणेभ्यो निष्कृष्य दर्शयति—

१. धूलिधूसरचरणः हलवाही, ग्राम्यजन इति यावत्।

[1]सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टात् अतीन्द्रियाणाम्प्रतीतिरनुमानात्।
तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम्॥ ६ ॥

" सामान्यत " इति । ' तु ' शब्दः प्रत्यक्षपूर्ववद्भ्यां विशिनष्टि । सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रधानपुरुषादीनां प्रतीतिः–चितिच्छायापत्तिर्बुद्धेरध्यवसाय इत्यर्थः । उपलक्षणं चैतत्, शेषवदित्यपि द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

(५२) अतीन्द्रियाणां सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानात् प्रतीतिः ॥

तत्किं सर्वेष्वतीन्द्रियेषु सामान्यतोदृष्टमेव प्रवर्तते ? । तथा च यत्र तन्नास्ति, महदाद्यारम्भक्रमे स्वर्गापूर्वदेवतादौ च, तत्र तेषामभावः प्राप्त इत्यत आह– " तस्मादपि " इति । तस्मादित्येतावतैव सिद्धे ' च ' कारेण शेषवदित्यपि समुच्चितम् ॥ ६ ॥

(५३) सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानादसिद्धानामाप्तागमात् सिद्धिः ॥

स्यादेतत्, यथा गगनकुसुमकूर्मरोमशशविषाणादिषु प्रत्यक्षमप्रवर्तमानम् तदभावमवगमयति, एवं प्रधानादिष्वपि । तत्कथं तेषां सामान्यतो दृष्टादिभ्यः सिद्धिरित्यत आह—

(५४) प्रत्यक्षाभावात् प्रधानादीनामभावशङ्का ॥

अतिदूरात् सामीप्यात् इन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात्।
सौक्ष्म्याद्व्यवधानात् अभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ ७॥

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१. यथा कौमुद्यां तथैवेयं कारिका व्याख्याता गौडपादेनाथ जयमङ्गलायाम् ॥ इदमपरमपि व्याख्यानमुपलभ्यते चन्द्रिकायाम्—' सामान्यतः ' साधारणस्य वस्तुजातस्य प्रतीतिः 'दृष्टात्' प्रत्यक्षात् भवति 'अतीन्द्रियाणां' तु प्रतीतिः ' अनुमानात् ' भवति–' तस्मात्' अनुमानात् अपि केचित् पदार्थाः प्रत्येतुं न शक्याः—तेषां प्रतीतिस्तु ' आप्तागमात् ' सिध्यति—इति ॥

"अतिदूरात्" इति । अनुपलब्धिरिति वक्ष्यमाणं सिंहावलोकनन्याये[1] नानुषञ्जनीयम् । यथा उत्पतन् वियति पतत्त्री अतिदूरतया, सन्नपि, प्रत्यक्षेण नोपलभ्यते । सामीप्यादित्यत्रापि अतिरनुवर्तनीयः, यथा लोचनस्थमञ्जनमतिसामीप्यान्न दृश्यते । इन्द्रियघातो ऽन्धत्वबधिरत्वादिः । "मनोऽनवस्थानात्," यथा कामाद्युपहतमनाः स्फीतालोकमध्यवर्तिनमिन्द्रियसन्निकृष्टमर्थं न पश्यति । "सौक्ष्म्यात्," यथेन्द्रियसन्निकृष्टम् परमाण्वादि प्रणिहितमना अपि न पश्यति । "व्यवधानात्," यथा कुड्यादिव्यवहितं राजदारादि न पश्यति । "अभिभवात्," यथा ऽहनि सौरीभिर्भाभिरभिभूतं ग्रहनक्षत्रमण्डलं न पश्यति । "समानाभिहारात्," यथा तोयदविमुक्तानुदबिन्दून् जलाशये न पश्यति ॥

(५५) तन्निरासः, अतिदूरातिसामीप्येन्द्रियघातमनोऽनवस्थानसौक्ष्म्यव्यधानाभिभवसमानाभिहारेभ्यः प्रत्यक्षाभावः ॥

'च' कारो ऽनुक्तसमुच्चयार्थः । तेनानुद्भवो ऽपि संगृहीतः । तद्यथा क्षीराद्यवस्थायां दध्याद्यनुद्भवान्न पश्यति ॥

(५६) अनुद्भवादपि प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिः ॥

एतदुक्तं भवति । न प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिमात्राद्वस्त्वभावो भवति, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । तथा हि गृहाद्विनिर्गतो गृहजनमपश्यंस्तदभावं विनिश्चिनुयात्, न त्वेवम् । अपि तु योग्यप्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तेरयमभावं विनिश्चिनोति । न च प्रधानपुरुषादीनामस्ति प्रत्यक्षयोग्यता, इति न तन्निवृत्तिमात्रात्तदभावनिश्चयो युक्तः प्रामाणिकानाम् इति ॥ ७ ॥

(५७) प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिरेव नाभावस्य कारणम् । अपि तु योग्यप्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिः ॥

कतमत्पुनरेतेषु कारणं प्रधानादीनामनुपलब्धावित्यत आह—

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात्, कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः ।
महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च ॥ ८ ॥

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१. यथा सिंहः पुरतो गत्वा पश्चात् पश्यति तथा ऽग्रिमपदस्य यत्र प्रागतशब्दैः सम्बन्धस्तत्रास्य न्यायस्य प्रवृत्तिरित्यादिकमस्मदीयन्यायलतिकायां द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

"सौक्ष्म्यात्" इति । अथाभावादेव सप्तमरसवदेतेषामनुपलब्धिः कस्मान्न भवतीत्यत आह– "नाभावात्" इति । कुतः ? "कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः" इति । 'तत्' इति प्रधानं परामृशति । पुरुषोपलब्धौ तु प्रमाणं वक्ष्यति, "सङ्घातपरार्थत्वात्" (कारिका १७) इति । दृढतरप्रमाणावधारिते हि प्रत्यक्षमप्रवर्तमानमयोग्यत्वान्न प्रवर्तते इति कल्प्यते । सप्तमस्तु रसो न प्रमाणेनावधारित इति न तत्र प्रत्यक्षस्यायोग्यता शक्या ऽध्यवसितुमित्यभिप्रायः ॥

(५८) प्रधानानुपलब्धौ सौक्ष्म्यम् कारणम् ॥

किं पुनस्तत्कार्यं यतः प्रधानानुमानमित्यत आह–"महदादि तच्च कार्यम्" इति । एतच्च यथा गमकम् तथोपरिष्टादुपपादयिष्यते । तस्य च कार्यस्य विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनी सारूप्यवैरूप्ये आह–" प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च " इति । एते तूपरिष्टाद्विभजनीये इति ॥ ८ ॥

(५९) प्रधानास्तित्वसाधनकारणभूतमहदादिकार्यम् ॥

कार्यात् कारणमात्रं गम्यते । सन्ति चात्र वादिनां विप्रतिपत्तयः । तथा हि केचिदाहुः, ' असतः सत् जायते ' इति, ' एकस्य सतो विवर्तः कार्यजातं न वस्तु सत् ' इत्यपरे, अन्ये तु ' सतः असत् जायते' इति, ' सतः सत् जायते ' इति वृद्धाः ॥

(६०) कार्यकारणसम्बन्धे वादिविप्रतिपत्तयः॥

तत्र पूर्वस्मिन् कल्पत्रये प्रधानं न सिध्यति । सुखदुःखमोहभेदवत्स्वरूपपरिणामशब्दाद्यात्मकं हि जगत् कारणस्य प्रधानस्य प्रधानत्वं सत्त्वरजस्तमस्स्वभावत्वमवगमयति । यदि पुनरसतः सज्जायेत असन्निरुपाख्यं कारणं सुखादिरूपशब्दाद्यात्मकं कथं स्यात्, सदसतोस्तादात्म्यानुपपत्तेः? अथैकस्य सतो विवर्तः शब्दादिप्रपञ्चः, तथा ऽपि सतः सज्जायत इति न स्यात् । न चास्याद्वयस्य प्रपञ्चात्मकत्वम्, अपि त्वप्रपञ्चस्य प्रपञ्चात्मकतया प्रतीतिर्भ्रम एव । येषामपि कणभक्षाक्षचरणादीनां सत एव कारणादसतो जन्म तेषामपि सदसतोरेकत्वानुपपत्तेर्न कार्यात्मकं कारणमिति न तन्मते प्रधानसिद्धिः

(६१) सत्कार्यपक्ष एव प्रधानास्तित्वसाधकः॥

(६२) सत्कार्यप्रतिपादनम् ॥ अतः प्रधानसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रथमं तावत्सत्कार्यं प्रतिजानीते—

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्, कारणभावाच्च सत् कार्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

"असदकरणात्" इति । "सत् कार्यम्"–कारणव्यापारात् प्रागपीति शेषः । तथा च न सिद्धसाधनं नैयायिकतनयैरुद्भावनीयम् । यद्यपि बीजमृत्पिण्डादिप्रध्वंसानन्तरमङ्कुरघटाद्युत्पत्तिरुपलभ्यते, तथा ऽपि न प्रध्वंसस्य कारणत्वम्, अपि तु भावस्यैव बीजाद्यवयवस्य । अभावात्तु भावोत्पत्तौ, तस्य सर्वत्र सुलभत्वात्, सर्वदा सर्वकार्योत्पादप्रसङ्ग इत्यादि न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीकायामस्माभिः प्रतिपादितम् ॥

(६३) बौद्धसिद्धान्तनिरासः ॥

प्रपञ्चप्रत्ययश्चासति बाधके न शक्यो मिथ्येति वदितुम् इति ॥

(६४) वेदान्तमतनिरासः ॥

कणभक्षाक्षचरणमतमवशिष्यते । तत्रेदं प्रतिज्ञातम्, "सत् कार्यम्" इति । अत्र हेतुमाह "असदकरणात्" इति । असत् चेत् कारणव्यापारात् पूर्वं कार्यम्, नास्य सत्त्वं कर्तुं केनापि शक्यम्, नहि नीलं शिल्पिसहस्रेणापि पीतं कर्तुं शक्यते । 'सदसत्त्वे घटस्य धर्मौ' इति चेत्, तथा ऽप्यसति धर्मिणि न तस्य धर्म इति सत्त्वं तदवस्थमेव । तथा च नासत्त्वम्[1], असम्बद्धेनातदात्मना चासत्त्वेन कथमसन् घटः ? तस्मात् कारणव्यापारादूर्ध्वमिव ततः प्रागपि सदेव कार्यमिति । कारणाच्चास्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तिरेवावशिष्यते । सतश्चाभिव्यक्तिरुपपन्ना, यथा पीडनेन तिलेषु तैलस्यावघातेन धान्येषु तण्डुलानां दोहनेन सौरभेयीषु पयसः ।

(६५) न्यायमतनिरासः। असतः करणायोग्यत्वात् सत् कार्यमिति प्रथमो हेतुः (१) ॥

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१. धर्मिणि (घटे) नासत्त्वम् (घटस्य धर्मः) ॥ "असत्त्वं घटे संबद्धं तदात्मकं भवति न वा ? आद्ये असदात्मकस्य घटस्य असत्त्वं धर्मो न स्यात् । सम्बन्धस्य तदात्मकस्य घटसापेक्षत्वात् सत्त्वं स्यात् घटस्येति सत्त्वं तदवस्थमेव । द्वितीयं प्रत्याह—"असम्बद्धेन" इति, तस्यासत्त्वे ऽभ्युपगम्यमाने ऽतिप्रसङ्गः स्यादित्युभयथा ऽपि सत्त्वं घटस्येति" भारतीयत्यादयः ॥

असतः करणे तु न निदर्शनं किञ्चिदस्ति । न खल्वभिव्यज्यमानं चोत्पद्यमानं वा क्वचिदसद्दृष्टम् ॥

इतश्च कारणव्यापरात् प्राक् सदेव कार्यम्–" उपादानग्रहणात् " । उपादानानि कारणानि, तेषां ग्रहणं, कार्येण सम्बन्धः । उपादानैः कार्यस्य सम्बन्धादिति यावत् । एतदुक्तं भवति–कार्येण सम्बद्धं कारणम् कार्यस्य जनकम्, सम्बन्धश्च कार्यस्यासतो न सम्भवति, तस्मादिति ॥

(६६) कार्यकारणसम्बन्धाच्च सत्कार्यमिति द्वितीयो हेतुः (२) ॥

स्यादेतत्–असम्बद्धमेव कार्यं कारणैः कस्मान्न जन्यते? तथा चासदेवोत्पत्स्यत इत्यत आह–" सर्वसम्भवाभावात् " इति । असम्बद्धस्य जन्यत्वे, असम्बद्धत्वाविशेषेण सर्वं कार्यजातं सर्वस्माद्भवेत् । न चैतदस्ति, तस्मान्नासम्बद्धमसम्बद्धेन जन्यते अपि तु सम्बद्धं सम्बद्धेन जन्यत इति । यथाहुः सांख्यवृद्धाः[1]—

(६७) कार्यकारणयोर्नियतसम्बन्धाभावे सर्वकार्यकारणभावविप्लवापत्तिः ॥

" असत्त्वे नास्ति सम्बन्धः कारणैः सत्त्वसङ्गिभिः ।
असम्बद्धस्य चोत्पत्तिमिच्छतो न व्यवस्थितिः " इति ॥

स्यादेतत्–असम्बद्धमपि सत् तदेव करोति यत्र यत् कारणं शक्तम् । शक्तिश्च कार्यदर्शनादवगम्यते । तेन नाव्यवस्थेत्यत आह " शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् " इति । सा शक्तिः शक्तकारणाश्रया सर्वत्र वा स्यात्, शक्ये एव वा? सर्वत्र चेत्तदवस्थैवाव्यवस्था, शक्ये चेत्, कथमसति शक्ये तत्र, इति वक्तव्यम् । शक्तिभेद एव एतादृशो यतः किञ्चिदेव कार्यं जनयेत् न सर्वमिति चेत्, हन्त भोः शक्तिविशेषः कार्यसम्बद्धो वा ऽसम्बद्धो वा? सम्बद्धत्वे नासता सम्बन्धः इति सत् कार्यम् । असम्बद्धत्वे सैवाव्यवस्था, इति सुष्ठूक्तं " शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् " इति ॥

(६८) कारणशक्तेः कार्यपरत्वाच्च सत्कार्यम् (३) ॥

इतश्च सत् कार्यमित्याह—" कारणभावाच्च " । कार्यस्य कारणात्मकत्वात् । नहि कारणाद्भिन्नं कार्यम्, कारणं च सत्, इति कथं तदभिन्नं कार्यमसत् भवेत् ॥

(६९) कारणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्य सत् कार्यम् (४) ॥

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१. पञ्चशिखादयः ।

कार्यस्य कारणाभेदसाधनानि च प्रमाणानि—(१)[1] न पटस्तन्तुभ्यो भिद्यते, तन्तुधर्मत्वात्। इह यत् यतो भिद्यते तत् तस्य धर्मो न भवति, यथा गौरश्वस्य। धर्मश्च पटस्तन्तूनां, तस्मान्नार्थान्तरम्। (२) उपादानोपादेयभावाच्च नार्थान्तरत्वं तन्तुपटयोः। ययोरर्थान्तरत्वम् न तयोरुपादानोपादेयभावः, यथा घटपटयोः। उपादानोपादेयभावश्च तन्तुपटयोः। तस्मान्नार्थान्तरत्वम्। (३) इतश्च नार्थान्तरत्वं तन्तुपटयोः, संयोगाप्राप्त्यभावात्। अर्थान्तरत्वे हि संयोगो दृष्टो यथा कुण्डबदरयोः, अप्राप्तिर्वा यथा हिमवद्विन्ध्ययोः। न चेह संयोगाप्राप्ती, तस्मान्नार्थान्तरत्वमिति। (४) इतश्च पटस्तन्तुभ्यो न भिद्यते, गुरुत्वान्तरकार्याग्रहणात्। इह यत् यस्माद्भिन्नम्, तत् तस्मात् तस्य गुरुत्वान्तरं कार्यं गृह्यते, यथैकपलिकस्य स्वस्तिकस्य गुरुत्वकार्यो ऽवनतिविशेषस्तस्माद् द्विपलिकस्य स्वस्तिकस्य गुरुत्वकार्यो ऽवनतिभेदो ऽधिकः। न च तथा तन्तुगुरुत्वकार्यात् पटगुरुत्वकार्यान्तरं दृश्यते। तस्मादभिन्नस्तन्तुभ्यः पट इति। तान्येतान्यभेदसाधनान्यवीतानि॥

(७०) कार्यकारणाभेदसाधनानि॥

एवमभेदे सिद्धे, तन्तव एव तेन तेन संस्थानभेदेन परिणताः पटो, न तन्तुभ्यो ऽर्थान्तरं पटः। स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधसंबन्धबुद्धिव्यपदेशार्थक्रियाभेदाश्च[2] नैकान्तिकं भेदं साधयितुमर्हन्ति, एकस्मिन्नपि तत्तद्विशेषाविर्भावतिरोभावाभ्यामेतेषामविरोधात्, यथा हि कूर्मस्याङ्गानि कूर्मशरीरे निविशमानानि तिरोभवन्ति, निःसरन्ति चाविर्भवन्ति। न तु कूर्मतस्तदङ्गान्युत्पद्यन्ते प्रध्वंसन्ते वा। एवमेकस्या मृदः सुवर्णस्य वा घटमुकुटादयो विशेषाः निःसरन्त आविर्भवन्त उत्पद्यन्त इत्युच्यन्ते, निविशमानास्तिरोभवन्ति विनश्यन्तीत्युच्यन्ते। न पुनरसतामुत्पादः सतां वा निरोधः। यथाह भगवान् कृष्णद्वैपायनः—

(७१) कार्यकारणयोरभेदात् कारणपरिणामभेद एव कार्यम्। तन्मते विरोधादिपरिहारः॥

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१. व्यतिरेकानुमानानि। २. स्वात्मनि उत्पत्तिविनाशलक्षणविरुद्धक्रिया, इह तन्तुषु पट इति। अत्र तन्तुपटयोः सम्बन्धस्य ज्ञानं भासते तादृशी चोक्तिर्भवति। व्यपदेशः, प्रावरणार्थक्रियाभेदश्च।

"नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः" इति । (भगवद्गीता, २।१६)

यथा कूर्मः स्वावयवेभ्यः सङ्कोचविकासिभ्यो न भिन्नः, एवं घटमुकुटादयो ऽपि मृत्सुवर्णादिभ्यो न भिन्नाः । एवञ्चेह तन्तुषु पट इति व्यपदेशो, यथेह वने तिलका[1] इत्युपपन्नः । न चार्थक्रियाभेदो ऽपि भेदमापादयति, एकस्यापि नानार्थक्रियादर्शनात् । यथैक एव वह्निर्दाहकः पाचकः प्रकाशकश्चेति । नाप्यर्थक्रियाव्यवस्था वस्तुभेदे हेतुः, तेषामेव समस्तव्यस्तानामर्थक्रियाव्यवस्थादर्शनात् । यथा प्रत्येकं विष्टयो वर्त्मदर्शनलक्षणामर्थक्रियां कुर्वन्ति, न तु शिबिकावहनम् । मिलितास्तु शिबिकामुद्वहन्ति, एवं तन्तवः प्रत्येकं प्रावरणमकुर्वाणा अपि मिलिता आविर्भूतपटभावाः प्रावरिष्यन्ति ॥

स्यादेतत्—आविर्भावः पटस्य कारणव्यापारात् प्राक् सन् असन् वा? असंश्चेत् प्राप्तं तर्ह्यसदुत्पादनम् । अथ सन्, कृतं तर्हि कारणव्यापारेण । नहि सति कार्ये कारणव्यापारप्रयोजनं पश्यामः । आविर्भावे चाविर्भावान्तरकल्पने ऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः । तस्मादाविर्भूतपटभावास्तन्तवः क्रियन्त इति रिक्तं वचः ॥

(७२) कार्यस्य कारणपरिणामविशेषत्वे कारणव्यापारस्याप्रयोजकत्वमनवस्थापत्तिश्च ॥

मैवम् । अथासदुत्पद्यत इति मते केयमसदुत्पत्तिः? सती, असती वा? सती चेत्, कृतं तर्हि कारणैः । असती चेत्, दोषस्योभयमते तुल्यत्वम् ॥ तस्या अप्युत्पत्त्यन्तरमित्यनवस्था[2] ॥

(७३) तत्परिहारः ।

अथ[3]—'उत्पत्तिः पटान्नार्थान्तरम्, अपि तु पट एवासौ', तथा ऽपि यावदुक्तं भवति 'पट' इति तावदुक्तं भवति 'उत्पद्यते' इति । ततश्च 'पट' इत्युक्ते, 'उत्पद्यते' इति न वाच्यम्, पौनरुक्त्यात् । 'विनश्यति' इत्यपि न वाच्यम्, उत्पत्तिविनाशयोर्युगपदेकत्र विरोधात् ॥

(७४) पटतदुत्पत्त्योरैक्यशङ्का—तत्परिहारश्च ॥

१. तिलकवृक्षमयवनविषये यथा "इह वने तिलका" इति सङ्गच्छते तथा तन्तुमयपटेऽपीति । २. एवं च शङ्काकृदुद्भावितो दोषः समान एव पक्षद्वये । ततश्च नैकेनापरम्प्रत्युद्भावनीय इति । यथाहुर्ब्रह्मसूत्रकाराः—स्वपक्षदोषाच्चेति— । ३. उक्तानवस्थालक्षणदोषपरिजिहीर्षया पटोत्पत्त्योरैक्यं शङ्कते 'पट एवासौ' ततश्च नानवस्थेति शेषः ॥ तर्हि पर्यायशब्दावेतावित्यभिप्रेत्य परिहरति च ।

तस्मादियं[1] पटोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणसमवायो वा, स्वसत्तासमवायो वा, उभयथा[2]ऽपि नोत्पद्यते, अथ च तदर्थानि कारणानि व्यापार्यन्ते[3]। एवं सत एव पटादेराविर्भावाय कारणापेक्षेत्युपपन्नम् ॥

(७५) पटोत्पत्तौ सत्यामपि कारणव्यापारापेक्षा ॥

न[4] च पटरूपेण कारणानां सम्बन्धः, तद्रूपस्याक्रियात्वात्, क्रियासम्बन्धित्वाच्च कारणानाम्, अन्यथा कारणत्वाभावात् ॥

(७६) कारिकोपसंहारः ॥

तस्मात् सत् कार्यमिति पुष्कलम् ॥ ९ ॥

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१. पटोत्पत्तौ सत्यामपि कारणव्यापारस्य प्रयोजनमित्यभिप्रेत्याह–' तस्मात् ' इति । न्यायमते ऽपि पटोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणभूततन्तुभिरयुतसिद्धा, स्वसत्तामात्रेणायुतसिद्धा वा भवितुमर्हति । उभयथाऽपि तु कारणव्यापारमन्तरेण न पटोत्पत्तिरुपपद्यते । न चाभिव्यक्तेरपि जन्यत्वे सत्कार्यबाधो ऽनवस्था चेत्यादि वाच्यम् । व्यवहारोपयोगितत्तत्कार्याभिव्यक्तेस्तत्तत्कार्यनिष्ठसत्त्वगुणरूपतया नित्यत्वे ऽपि तमसा प्रतिबद्धत्वान्न व्यवहारोपयोगित्वम् । अभिव्यञ्जकसामग्र्या तु तमसः प्रतिबन्धः । उत्तेजकस्याप्युत्तेजनमात्राङ्गीकारान्न सत्कार्यबाधः । कार्यकारणयोर्भेदेऽपि व्यवहारक्षमता कार्यात्मनाभिव्यक्तस्यैव नान्यथा इत्यादि चन्द्रिकायां स्पष्टम् ॥ " उपसंहरति ' तस्मादिति ' उत्पत्त्युत्पत्तेरङ्गीकारे ऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गेनानुत्पन्नाया अप्युत्पत्तेः कारणव्यापारापेक्षित्ववदस्मन्मते ऽपि सत एव घटस्याविर्भावाय कारणव्यापारापेक्षा । घटोत्पत्तिमङ्गीकुर्वाणेन घटे कारणव्यापारापेक्षित्वस्य प्रयोज्यत्वरूपस्यैवादरणीयतयाऽऽविर्भावे एव तदङ्गीकारमात्रेण निर्वाहे कृतमुत्पत्त्यङ्गीकारेण, युक्तं चैतत्, अन्यथोत्पत्तिवादे च कार्यस्यैव कारणसापेक्षतया तस्य च क्रियात्वाभावे क्रियासम्बन्धित्वप्रयुक्तकारकत्वकारणत्वव्यवहारानुपपत्तेः सत्कार्यवाद एव साधीयानित्याशयः " इति केचित् । २. न्यायमते कारणस्य सत्तायाः सकलस्य समवायस्य नित्यत्वादित्याशयः । ' नोत्पद्यते ', अपि तु आविर्भवत्येवेति शेषः । ३. भवन्मतेऽपीति शेषः ॥ ४. ननु ' अस्मत्पक्षे–पटरूपाणि कारणानि कुर्वन्ति इति सदुक्तिस्त्वत्पक्षबाधिका ' इति चेत्, तत्राह " न च " इति । तद्रूपं चानित्यमेवेति भवति तस्योत्पत्तिरिति हृदयम् ।

तदेवं प्रधानसाधनानुगुणं सत् कार्यमुपपाद्य यादृशं तत् प्रधानं साधनीयं

(७७) व्यक्ताव्यक्तसारूप्यवैरूप्ये ॥ तादृशमादर्शयितुं विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनी व्यक्ताव्यक्तसारूप्यवैरूप्ये तावदाह—

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।
सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं, विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

(७८) व्यक्तानां सारूप्यम् । तत्र हेतुमत्त्वम् ॥ (१) "हेतुमत्" इति। व्यक्तं हेतुमत्, हेतुः कारणम्, तद्वत्, यस्य च यो हेतुः तमुपरिष्टाद्वक्ष्यति ॥

(७९) अनित्यत्वम् ॥ (२) "अनित्यम्," विनाशि, तिरोभावीति यावत् ॥

"अव्यापि", सर्वं परिणामिनं न व्याप्नोति । कारणेन हि कार्यमाविष्टम्, न कार्येण कारणम् । न च बुद्ध्यादयः प्रधानं वेविषन्तीत्यव्यापकाः ॥

(८०) अव्यापित्वम् ॥ (३)

"सक्रियम्", परिस्पन्दवत्[1] । यथा हि बुद्ध्यादयः उपात्तमुपात्तं देहं त्यजन्ति देहान्तरं चोपाददत, इति तेषां परिस्पन्दः । शरीरपृथिव्यादीनां च परिस्पन्दः प्रसिद्ध एव ।

(८१) सक्रियत्वम् ॥ (४)

"अनेकम्", प्रतिपुरुषं बुद्ध्यादीनां भेदात् पृथिव्याद्यपि शरीरघटादिभेदेनानेकमेव[2] ॥

(८२) अनेकत्वम् ॥ (५)

"आश्रितम्", स्वकारणमाश्रितम् । बुद्ध्यादिकार्याणामभेदे ऽपि कथञ्चिद्भेदविवक्षया ऽऽश्रयाश्रयिभावः, यथेह वने तिलका इत्युक्तम् ॥

(८३) आश्रितत्वम् ॥ (६)

"लिङ्गम्[3]" प्रधानस्य । यथा चैते बुद्ध्यादयः प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम् तथोपरिष्टाद्वक्ष्यति । प्रधानं तु न प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम् पुरुषस्य लिङ्गम्भवदपीति भावः ॥

(८४) लिङ्गत्वम् ॥ (७)

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१. 'सक्रियम्' अध्यवसायादिरूपनियतक्रियाकारित्वमिति भाष्ये । २. अथवा सर्गभेदेन भिन्नम् । ३. 'लिङ्गयति' अनुमानेन भोक्तारं ज्ञापयतीति लिङ्गम् ।

"सावयम्" अवयवावयविसंयोगसंयोगि । अथ वा अवयवनम्[१] अवयवः, अवयवानामवयविनां मिथः संश्लेषो मिश्रणम् संयोग इति यावत् । अप्राप्तिपूर्विका प्राप्तिः संयोगः । तेन सह वर्तत इति सावयवम् । तथाहि पृथिव्यादयः परस्परं संयुज्यन्ते, एवमन्येऽपि । न तु प्रधानस्य बुद्ध्यादिभिः संयोगः, तादात्म्यात् । नापि सत्त्वरजस्तमसां परस्परं संयोगः, अप्राप्तेरभावात् ॥

(८५) सावयवत्वम् ॥ ८)

"परतन्त्रम्" बुद्ध्यादि । बुद्ध्या स्वकार्येऽहङ्कारे जनयितव्ये प्रकृत्यापूरोऽपेक्ष्यते, अन्यथा क्षीणा सती नालमहङ्कारं जनयितुमिति स्थितिः । एवमहङ्कारादिभिरपि स्वकार्यजनने । इति सर्वः स्वकार्येषु प्रकृत्या पूरमपेक्षते । तेन परां प्रकृतिमपेक्षमाणं कारणमपि स्वकार्यजनने परतन्त्रं व्यक्तम् ॥

(८६) परतन्त्रत्वम् ॥ (९)

"विपरीतमव्यक्तम्"—व्यक्तात् । अहेतुमन्नित्यं व्यापि निष्क्रियम्, [यद्यप्यव्यक्तस्यास्ति परिणामलक्षणा क्रिया तथाऽपि परिस्पन्दो नास्ति ॥] एकमनाश्रितमलिङ्गमनवयवम् स्वतन्त्रमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

(८७) अव्यक्तस्य वैपरीत्यम् ॥

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(८८) व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोस्साधर्म्याणि पुरुषाच्च तयोर्वैधर्म्यम् ॥

तदनेन प्रबन्धेन व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोर्वैधर्म्यमुक्तम् सम्प्रति तयोः साधर्म्यम्, पुरुषाच्च वैधर्म्यम्, आह-

त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनम्प्रसवधर्मि ।
व्यक्तं, तथा प्रधानम्, तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ ११ ॥

(८९) त्रिगुणत्वम् प्रथमम् साधर्म्यम् ॥ (१)

"त्रिगुणम्" इति । त्रयो गुणाः सुखदुःखमोहा अस्येति त्रिगुणम् । तदनेन सुखादीनामात्मगुणत्वम् [२]पराभिमतमपाकृतम् ।

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१. अवयव् + अनट् । २. नैयायिकाद्यभिमतम् ।

"अविवेकि"। यथा प्रधानं न स्वतो विविच्यते, एवम्महदादयो ऽपि न प्रधानात् विविच्यन्ते, तदात्मकत्वात् । अथ वा सम्भूयकारिता ऽत्राविवेकिता । न हि किञ्चिदेकं पर्याप्तम् स्वकार्ये, अपि तु सम्भूय । तत्र नैकस्मात् यस्य कस्यचित् केनचित्सम्भव इति ॥

(९०) अविवेकित्वम् द्वितीयम् ॥ (२)

ये[1] त्वाहुः—'विज्ञानमेव हर्षविषादमोहशब्दाद्यात्मकम्, न पुनरितो ऽन्यस्तद्धर्मा' इति–तान् प्रत्याह–"विषय" इति । 'विषयो' ग्राह्यः, विज्ञानाद्बहिरिति यावत् । अत एव "सामान्यम्" साधारणम्, अनेकैः पुरुषैर्गृहीतमित्यर्थः । विज्ञानाकारत्वे तु, असाधारण्याद्विज्ञानानां वृत्तिरूपाणां, ते ऽप्यसाधारणाः स्युः । विज्ञानं परेण न गृह्यते परबुद्धेरप्रत्यक्षत्वादित्यभिप्रायः । तथा च नर्तकी–भ्रूलताभङ्गे एकस्मिन् बहूनां प्रतिसन्धानं युक्तम् । अन्यथा[2] तन्न स्यात् इति भावः ॥

(९१) विषयत्वम् सामान्यत्वं च तृतीयचतुर्थे (३) (४)

(९२) अचेतनत्वम् पञ्चमम् ॥ (५)

"अचेतनम्"। सर्व एव प्रधानबुद्ध्यादयो ऽचेतनाः, न तु वैनाशिकवत् चैतन्यम्बुद्धेरित्यर्थः ॥

"प्रसवधर्मि"। प्रसवरूपो धर्मो यः सो ऽस्यास्तीति प्रसवधर्मि। [प्रसवधर्मेति वक्तव्ये मत्वर्थीयः प्रसवधर्मस्य नित्ययोगमाख्यातुम्]। स्वरूपविरूपपरिणामाभ्यां न कदाचिदपि वियुज्यत इत्यर्थः ॥

(९३) प्रसवधर्मित्वम् षष्ठम् ॥ (६)

(९४) उक्तव्यक्तधर्माणामव्यक्ते ऽतिदेशः ॥

व्यक्तवृत्तमव्यक्ते ऽतिदिशति, "तथा प्रधानम्" इति । यथा व्यक्तं तथा ऽव्यक्तमित्यर्थः[3] ॥

(९५) व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः पुरुषात् वैधर्म्यम् ॥

ताभ्यां वैधर्म्यं पुरुषस्या ऽऽह—"तद्विपरीतः पुमान्" इति ॥

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१. विज्ञानवादिनो बौद्धाः । २. तेषां विज्ञानाकारत्वे । ३. त्रिगुणत्वादिसाधर्म्यं व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोरिति यावत् ।

स्यादेतत्–अहेतुमत्त्वनित्यत्वादि प्रधानसाधर्म्यमस्ति पुरुषस्य, एवमनेकत्वं व्यक्तसाधर्म्यम्, तत्कथमुच्यते 'तद्विपरीतः पुमान्' इति? अत आह–"तथा च" इति। चकारो ऽप्यर्थः[1]। यद्यप्यहेतुमत्त्वादिकं साधर्म्यम्, तत्राप्यत्रैगुण्यादि वैपरीत्यमस्त्येवेत्यर्थः ॥ ११ ॥

(९६) साधर्म्यं च ॥

त्रिगुणमित्युक्तम्, तत्र के ते त्रयो गुणाः, किं च तदुपलक्षणमित्यत आह—

(९७) गुणनिरूपणम् ॥

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।
अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥

"गुणाः" [परार्थाः] "सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकम्" [कारिका १३] इत्यत्र निर्देक्ष्यन्ते। तदनागतावेक्षणेन तन्त्रयुक्त्या वा प्रीत्यादीनां यथासंख्यं वेदितव्यम् ॥

(९८) गुणानां स्वरूपाणि, सुखदुःखयोः परस्पराभावरूपताव्युदासश्च॥

एतदुक्तं[2] भवति–प्रीतिः सुखम्, प्रीत्यात्मकः सत्त्वगुणः; अप्रीतिर्दुःखम्, अप्रीत्यात्मको रजोगुणः; विषादो मोहः, विषादात्मकस्तमोगुणः इत्यर्थः। ये तु मन्यन्ते "न प्रीतिर्दुःखाभावादतिरिच्यते, एवं दुःखमपि न प्रीत्यभावादन्यदिति," तान् प्रति "आत्म"–ग्रहणम्। नेतरेतराभावाः सुखादयः, अपि तु भावाः, आत्मशब्दस्य भाववचनत्वात्। प्रीतिः आत्मा भावो येषां ते प्रीत्यात्मानः। एवमन्यदपि व्याख्येयम्। भावरूपता चैषामनुभवसिद्धा। परस्पराभावात्मकत्वे तु परस्पराश्रयापत्तेरेकस्याप्यसिद्धेरुभयासिद्धिरिति भावः ॥

(९९) उक्तलक्षणसमन्वयः ॥

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१. च=अपि। २. आर्जवश्रद्धादीनां प्रीतावान्तर्भावः, द्वेषमोहविप्रलम्भभयादीनां चाप्रीतौ।

स्वरूपमेषामुक्त्वा प्रयोजनमाह– " प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः " इति । अत्रापि यथासंख्यमेव । रजः प्रवर्तकत्वात् सर्वत्र लघु सत्त्वं प्रवर्तयेत्, यदि तमसा गुरुणा न नियम्येत । तमोनियतन्तु क्वचिदेव प्रवर्तयतीति भवति तमो नियमार्थम् ॥

(१००) गुणानां प्रयोजनम्-यथासंख्यं प्रकाश-प्रवृत्तिनियमरूपम् ॥

प्रयोजनमुक्त्वा क्रियामाह–" अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च " इति । वृत्तिः क्रिया, सा च प्रत्येकमभिसम्बध्यते । ' अन्योन्याभिभववृत्तयः ' । एषामन्यतमेनार्थवशादुद्भूतेनान्यदभिभूयते । तथा हि सत्त्वं रजस्तमसी अभिभूय शान्तामात्मनो वृत्तिं प्रतिलभते, एवं रजः सत्त्वतमसी अभिभूय घोराम्, एवं तमः सत्त्वरजसी अभिभूय मूढामिति । ' अन्योन्याश्रयवृत्तयः ' । यद्यप्याधाराधेयभावेन नायमर्थो घटते, तथाऽपि यदपेक्षया यस्य क्रिया स तस्याश्रयः । तथा हि, सत्त्वं प्रवृत्तिनियमावाश्रित्य रजस्तमसोः प्रकाशेनोपकरोति, रजः प्रकाशनियमावाश्रित्य प्रवृत्त्येतरयोः, तमः प्रकाशप्रवृत्ती आश्रित्य नियमेनेतरयोरिति । ' अन्योन्यजननवृत्तयः ' । अन्यतमोऽन्यतममपेक्ष्य जनयति । जननं च परिणामः, स च गुणानां सदृशरूपः । अत एव न हेतुमत्त्वम्, तत्त्वान्तरस्य हेतोरसम्भवात्; नाप्यनित्यत्वम्, तत्त्वान्तरे लयाभावात् । ' अन्योन्यमिथुनवृत्तयः ' । अन्योन्यसहचराः, अविनाभाववृत्तय इति यावत् । 'चः' समुच्चये । भवति चात्रागमः–

(१०१) गुणानां क्रियाः, अन्योन्याभिभव-अन्योन्यापेक्षा-अन्योन्यापेक्ष-जनन-अन्योन्यमिथुन-वृत्तिरूपाः ॥

" अन्योन्यमिथुनाः सर्वे सर्वे सर्वत्रगामिनः ।
रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं रजः ॥
तमसश्चापि मिथुने ते सत्त्वरजसी उभे ।
उभयोः सत्त्वरजसोर्मिथुनं तम उच्यते ॥
नैषामादिः सम्प्रयोगो वियोगो वोपलभ्यते " ॥ इति देवी-भागवत–३।८. ॥ १२ ॥

" प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः " इत्युक्तम्, तत्र के ते इत्थम्भूताः कुतश्चेत्यत आह—

(१०२) गुणत्रयनिरूपणम्, तेषां पृथक्स्वभावश्च॥

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।
गुरु वरणकमेव तमः, प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

" सत्त्वम् " इति । सत्त्वमेव लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टम्–सांख्याचार्यैः । तत्र कार्योद्गमने हेतुर्धर्मो लाघवम् गौरवप्रतिद्वन्द्वि यतोऽग्नेरूर्ध्वज्वलनं भवति, तदेव लाघवम् कस्यचित्तिर्यग्गमने हेतुर्भवति, यथा वायोः । एवं करणानां वृत्तिपटुत्वहेतुर्लाघवम्, गुरुत्वे हि मन्दानि स्युरिति सत्त्वस्य प्रकाशात्मकत्वमुक्तम् ॥

(१०३) सत्त्वगुणस्वभावः–लाघवम्,प्रकाशकत्वम् ॥

सत्त्वतमसी स्वयमक्रियतया स्वकार्यप्रवृत्तिं प्रत्यवसीदन्ती रजसोपष्टभ्येते अवसादात् प्रच्याव्य स्वकार्ये उत्साहं प्रयत्नं कार्येते। तदिदमुक्तम्–" उपष्टम्भकं रजः " इति । कस्मादित्यत उक्तम्–" चलम् " इति । तदनेन रजसः प्रवृत्त्यर्थत्वं दर्शितम् ॥

(१०४) रजोगुणस्वभावः-उपष्टम्भकत्वम्, चलत्वम् ॥

रजस्तु चलतया परितस्त्रैगुण्यं चालयेत्, गुरुणाऽऽवृण्वता च तमसा तत्र तत्र प्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्धकेन क्वचिदेव प्रवर्त्यते इति ततस्ततो व्यावृत्त्या तमो नियामकमुक्तम्— " गुरु वरणकमेव तमः " इति । एवकारः प्रत्येकं भिन्नक्रमः सम्बध्यते, सत्त्वमेव, रज एव, तम एवेति ॥

(१०५) तमोगुणस्वभावः–गुरुत्वम् आवरकत्वम् ॥

ननु ' एते परस्परविरोधशीला गुणाः सुन्दोपसुन्दवत् परस्परं ध्वंसन्त इत्येव युक्तम्, [3]प्रागेव त्वेतेषामेकक्रियाकर्तृता'–इत्यत आह––" प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः " इति । दृष्टमेवैतत्, यथा वर्त्तितैले अनलविरोधिनी, अथ मिलिते सहानलेन रूपप्रकाशलक्षणं कार्यं कुरुतः; तथा च वातपित्तश्लेष्माणः परस्परविरोधिनः शरीरधारणलक्षणकार्य-

(१०६) परस्परविरुद्धानामपि गुणानामर्थवशात् सहवृत्तित्वम् ॥

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१. अर्थावभासकमिति यावत् ॥　२. प्रकाशकत्वमिति यावत् ।　३. दूर एव । का कथा परस्परध्वंसकानामेकक्रियाकारिताया इति भावः ।

कारिणः; एवं सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि मिथोविरुद्धान्यप्यनुवर्त्स्यन्ति स्वकार्यं करिष्यन्ति च । " अर्थत " इति पुरुषार्थत इति यावत्, यथा च वक्ष्यति—

" पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित् कार्यते करणम् " इति ॥ [कारिका ३१]

(१०७) सुखदुःखमोहानां परस्परविरुद्धत्वात्तेषां निमित्तरूपेण गुणत्रयस्याऽऽवश्यकत्वम् ॥

अत्र च सुखदुःखमोहाः परस्परविरोधिनः स्वस्वानुरूपाणि सुखदुःखमोहात्मकान्येव निमित्तानि[1] कल्पयन्ति । तेषां च परस्परमभिभाव्याभिभावकभावान्नानात्वम् । तद्यथा एकैव स्त्री रूपयौवनकुलशीलसम्पन्ना स्वामिनं सुखाकरोति; तत्कस्य हेतोः? स्वामिनं प्रति तस्याः सुखरूपसमुद्भवात् । सैव स्त्री सपत्नीर्दुःखाकरोति; तत् कस्य हेतोः? ताः प्रति तस्याः दुःखरूपसमुद्भवात् । एवं पुरुषान्तरं तामविन्दमानं सैव मोहयति; तत् कस्य हेतोः? तम्प्रति तस्याः मोहरूपसमुद्भवात् । अनया च स्त्रिया सर्वे भावा व्याख्याताः । तत्र यत् सुखहेतुः तत् सुखात्मकम् सत्त्वम्, यत् दुःखहेतुः तत् दुःखात्मकं रजः, यन्मोहहेतुस्तन्मोहात्मकं तमः । सुख[2]प्रकाशलाघवानां त्वेकस्मिन् युगपदुद्भूतावविरोधः, सहदर्शनात् । तस्मात्[3] सुखदुःखमोहैरिव विरोधिभिः अविरोधिभिरेकैकगुणवृत्तिभिः सुखप्रकाशलाघवैर्न निमित्तभेदा उन्नीयन्ते । एवं दुःखोपष्टम्भकत्वप्रवर्तकत्वैः, एवं मोहगुरुत्वावरणैः—इति सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यमिति ॥ १३ ॥

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(१०८) अननुभवसिद्धेषु सत्त्वादिष्वविवेकित्वादिगुणासम्भवशङ्का ॥

स्यादेतत्–अनुभूयमानेषु पृथिव्यादिष्वनुभवसिद्धाः भवन्त्वविवेकित्वादयः । ये पुनः सत्त्वादयो नानुभवपथमधिरोहन्ति तेषां कुतस्त्यमविवेकित्वम्, विषयत्वमचेतनत्वम् प्रसवधर्मित्वं च? इत्यत आह—

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१. सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपाणि । २. सत्त्वरजस्तमांसीव सुखदुःखमोहानाम्, सुखप्रकाशलाघवानामपि भिन्नानि निमित्तानि कस्मान्नोक्तानीत्याशङ्क्या ऽह– " सुखेति " । ३. यथा सुखदुःखमोहाः परस्परविरुद्धाः भिन्नानि निमित्तानि सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपाणि कल्पयन्ति–न तथा सुखप्रकाशलाघवादीनामेकैकगुणवृत्तित्वे कश्चिद्विरोधोऽस्ति, येन भिन्नानि निमित्तानि कल्पेरन् इति भावः । अविरोधिनामपि भिन्ननिमित्तकल्पने ऽनवस्थाऽपि ॥

अविवेक्यादेः सिद्धिस्त्रैगुण्यात्तद्विपर्ययाभावात्।
कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

" अविवेक्यादेः " इति। अविवेकित्वमविवेकि—यथा ' द्व्येकयोर्द्विवचनैकवचने ' [पाणिनिसूत्र. १।४।२२] इत्यत्र द्वित्वैकत्वयोरिति अन्यथा द्व्येकेष्विति स्यात्। कुतः पुनरविवेकित्वादेः सिद्धिरित्यत आह—"त्रैगुण्यात्" इति। 'यद्यत् सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं तत्तदविवेकित्वादियोगि यथेदमनुभूयमानं व्यक्तम् '—इति स्फुटत्वादन्वयो नोक्तः। व्यतिरेकमाह[3]—" तद्विपर्ययाभावात् " इति। अविवेक्यादिविपर्यये पुरुषे त्रैगुण्याभावात्। अथ वा व्यक्ताव्यक्तं पक्षीकृत्यान्वयाभावेनावीत एव हेतुस्त्रैगुण्यादिति वक्तव्यः ॥

(१०९) तन्निरासः—गुणत्रयाविवेकित्वसाधनान्वयव्यतिरेकौ ॥

स्यादेतत्—अव्यक्तसिद्धौ सत्यां तस्याविवेकित्वादयो धर्माः सिध्यन्ति। अव्यक्तमेव त्वद्यापि न सिध्यति, तत्कथमविवेकित्वादिसिद्धिरत आह—" कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् " इति। अयमभिसन्धिः—कार्यं हि कारणगुणात्मकं दृष्टम्, यथा तन्त्वादिगुणात्मकं पटादि। तथा महदादिलक्षणेनापि कार्येण सुखदुःखमोहरूपेण स्वकारणगतसुखदुःखमोहात्मना भवितव्यम्। तथा च तत्कारणं सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं प्रधानमव्यक्तं सिद्धम् भवति ॥ १४ ॥

(११०) अव्यक्तसाधनम् ॥

स्यादेतत्—' व्यक्तात् व्यक्तमुत्पद्यते ' इति कणभक्षाक्षिचरणतनयाः ॥ परमाणवो हि व्यक्ताः, तैर्द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण पृथिव्यादिलक्षणं कार्यं व्यक्तमारभ्यते। पृथिव्यादिषु च कारणगुणक्रमेण रूपाद्युत्पत्तिः। तस्मात् व्यक्तात् व्यक्तस्य तद्गुणस्य चोत्पत्तेः कृतमदृष्टचरेणाव्यक्तेनेत्यत आह—

(१११) व्यक्तादेव सर्वकार्यकारणभावोपपत्तेरव्यक्तकारणकल्पनावैयर्थ्यशङ्का ॥

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१. सत्त्वादयोऽविवेकित्वादियोगिनः त्रैगुण्यात् सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वादिति स्वरूपमनुमानस्य। २. पृथिव्यादि। ३. ' यत्राविवेकित्वाभावस्तत्र त्रैगुण्याभाव ' इत्येवंरूपम्।

भेदानां परिमाणात् समन्वयात् शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च।
कारणकार्यविभागादविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य ॥ १५ ॥

"भेदानाम्" इति। भेदानाम् विशेषाणां महदादीनां भूतानां कार्याणां कारणं मूलकारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम्। कुतः? "कारणकार्यविभागादविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य"। कारणे सत् कार्यमिति स्थितम्। तथा च यथा कूर्मशरीरे सन्त्येवाङ्गानि निःसरन्ति विभज्यन्ते—'इदं कूर्मशरीरं, एतान्येतस्याङ्गानि'—इति; एवं निविशमानानि तस्मिन् अव्यक्तीभवन्ति। एवं कारणान्मृत्पिण्डाद्धेमपिण्डाद्वा कार्याणि घटमुकुटादीनि सन्त्येवाविर्भवन्ति विभज्यन्ते। सन्त्येव पृथिव्यादीनि कारणात्तन्मात्रादाविर्भवन्ति विभज्यन्ते, सन्त्येव च तन्मात्राण्यहङ्कारात् कारणात्, सन्नेवाहङ्कारः कारणान्महतः, सन्नेव च महान् परमाव्यक्तात्। सोऽयं कारणात् परमाव्यक्तात् साक्षात् पारम्पर्येणान्वितस्य विश्वस्य कार्यस्य विभागः। प्रतिसर्गे तु मृत्पिण्डं सुवर्णपिण्डं वा घटमुकुटादयो विशन्तोऽव्यक्तीभवन्ति। तत्कारणरूपमेवानभिव्यक्तं कार्यमपेक्ष्याव्यक्तं भवति। एवं पृथिव्यादयस्तन्मात्राणि विशन्तः स्वापेक्षया तन्मात्राण्यव्यक्तयन्ति, एवं तन्मात्राण्यहङ्कारं विशन्त्यहङ्कारमव्यक्तयन्ति, एवमहङ्कारो महान्तमाविशन् महान्तमव्यक्तयति, महान् प्रकृतिं स्वकारणं विशन् प्रकृतिमव्यक्तयति। प्रकृ[1]तेस्तु न क्वचिन्निवेश इति सा सर्वकार्याणामव्यक्तमेव। सोऽयमविभागः प्रकृतौ वैश्वरूप्यस्य नानारूपस्य कार्यस्य [स्वार्थिकः[2] ष्यञ्]। तस्मात् कारणे कार्यस्य सत एव विभागाविभागाभ्यामव्यक्तं कारणमस्ति॥

(११२) तत्परिहारः। अव्यक्तकारणसाधनानि। तत्र कारणकार्ययोर्विभागाविभागाभ्यामव्यक्तसिद्धिरिति प्रथमम् (१)॥

इतश्चाव्यक्तमस्तीत्यत आह—"शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च इति"। कारणशक्तितः कार्यं प्रवर्तत इति सिद्धम्, अशक्तात् कारणात् कार्यस्यानुपपत्तेः, शक्तिश्च कारणगता न [3]कार्यस्याव्यक्तत्वादन्या। न हि सत्कार्यपक्षे कार्यस्याव्यक्तताया अन्यस्यां शक्तौ प्रमाणमस्ति। अयमेव हि सिकताभ्यस्तिलानां तैलोपादानानां भेदो यदेतेष्वेव तैलमस्त्यनागतावस्थं न सिकतास्विति॥

(११३) कारणस्य शक्तिस्तस्मिन् कार्यस्याव्यक्ततया स्थितिरेवेति च द्वितीयम् (२)॥

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१. अनवस्थाभयात्। २. वैश्वरूप्यपदे। ३. कारणे कार्यस्याव्यक्तरूपेण स्थितिरेव तस्य (कारण–) शक्तिरितिभावः॥

स्यादेतत्–शक्तितः प्रवृत्तिः कारणकार्यविभागाविभागौ च महत एव परमाव्यक्तत्वं साधयिष्यतः, कृतं ततः परेणाव्यक्तेनेत्यत आह–"परिमाणात्" इति। परिमितत्वात्, अव्यापित्वादिति यावत्। विवादाध्यासिता महदादिभेदा अव्यक्तकारणवन्तः, परिमितत्वात्, घटादिवत्। घटादयो हि परिमिताः मृदाद्यव्यक्तकारणका दृष्टाः। उक्तमेतद्यथा कार्यस्याव्यक्तावस्था कारणमेवेति, यन्महतः कारणं तत् परमाव्यक्तम्, ततः परतराव्यक्तकल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावात्[1]॥

(११४) महदादिपर्यन्तस्य कार्यजातस्य परिमितत्वाच्चेति तृतीयम् (३)॥

इतश्च विवादाध्यासिता भेदाः अव्यक्तकारणवन्तः—"समन्वयात्[2]"। भिन्नानां समानरूपता समन्वयः। सुखदुःखमोहसमन्विता हि बुद्ध्यादयो ऽध्यवसायादिलक्षणाः प्रतीयन्ते। यानि च यद्रूपसमनुगतानि तानि तत्स्वभावाव्यक्तकारणानि, यथा मृद्धेमपिण्डसमनुगताः घटमुकुटादयो मृद्धेमपिण्डाव्यक्तकारणका इति—कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तं भेदानामिति सिद्धम्॥ १५॥

(११४) समन्वयाच्चेति चतुर्थम् (४)॥

अव्यक्तं साधयित्वा अस्य प्रवृत्तिप्रकारमाह—

कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम्, प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च।
परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात्॥ १६॥

"प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः" इति। प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां सत्त्वं रजस्तमश्च सदृशपरिणामानि भवन्ति। परिणामस्वभावा हि गुणा नापरिणमय्य क्षणमप्यवतिष्ठन्ते। तस्मात् सत्त्वं सत्त्वरूपतया रजो रजोरूपतया तमस्तमोरूपतया प्रतिसर्गावस्थायामपि प्रवर्तते। तदिदमुक्तम् "त्रिगुणतः" इति॥

(११६) प्रकृतेस्त्रिगुणतः प्रवृत्तिः प्रथमा (१)॥

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१. अनवस्थापाताच्च। २. बुद्ध्यादीनामुपचयापचयदर्शनादिति भाष्ये।

प्रवृत्त्यन्तरमाह—" समुदयाच्च " इति । समेत्य उदयः ' समुदयः ' समवायः । समुदयश्च गुणानाम् न गुणप्रधानभावमन्तरेण सम्भवति, न च गुणप्रधानभावो वैषम्यं विना, न च वैषम्यमुपमर्दोपमर्दकभावादृते । इति महदादिभावेन प्रवृत्तिर्द्वितीया ॥

(११७) प्रकृतेस्समुदयात् प्रवृत्तिर्द्वितीया (२) ॥

स्यादेतत्—कथमेकरूपाणां गुणानामनेकरूपा प्रवृत्तिरित्यत आह–" परिणामतः सलिलवत् " इति । यथा हि वारिदविमुक्तमुदकमेकरसमपि तत्तद्भूविकारानासाद्य नारिकेलतालतालीबिल्वचिरबिल्वतिन्दुकामलकप्राचीनामलककपित्थफलरसतया परिणमन्मधुराम्ललवणतिक्तकषायकटुतया विकल्प्यते, एवमेकैकगुणसमुद्भवात् प्रधानगुणाः परिणामभेदान् प्रवर्तयन्ति । तदिदमुक्तम्–" प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् " । एकैकगुणाश्रयेण यो विशेषस्तस्मादित्यर्थः ॥ १६ ॥

(११८) प्रकृतेः प्रवृत्तिः परिणामतो नानाप्रकारा॥

ये तु तौष्टिका अव्यक्तं वा महान्तं वा ऽहङ्कारं वा इन्द्रियाणि वा भूतानि वा ऽऽत्मानमभिमन्यमानास्तान्येवोपासते तान् प्रत्याह—

(११९) पुरुषास्तित्वसाधनम् ॥

संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
पुरुषो ऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात्कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

" संघातपरार्थत्वात् " इति । पुरुषो ऽस्ति, अव्यक्तादेर्व्यतिरिक्तः । कुतः ? " संघातपरार्थत्वात् " । अव्यक्तमहदहङ्कारादयः परार्थाः, संघातत्वात्, शयनासनाभ्यङ्गादिवत्, सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतया ऽव्यक्तादयः सर्वे संघाता[1]:॥

(१२०) संघातानां परार्थत्वादिति प्रथमसाधनम् (१) ॥

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१ यदर्थाः सङ्घाताः सोऽत्रिगुणविवेकित्वादियोग्यवश्यं स्यात् । स च पुरुष एव ।

स्यादेतत्–शयनासनादयः संघाताः संहतशरीरार्था दृष्टाः, न त्वात्मानमव्यक्ताद्यतिरिक्तं प्रति परार्थाः। तस्मात् संघातान्तरमेव परं गमयेयुः, त त्वसंहतात्मानम् इत्यत आह—"त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात्[1]" इति। अयमभिप्रायः–संघातान्तरार्थत्वे हि तस्यापि संघातत्वात् तेनापि संघातान्तरार्थेन भवितव्यम्; एवं तेन तेनेत्यनवस्था स्यात्। न च व्यवस्थायां सत्यामनवस्था युक्ता, कल्पनागौरवप्रसङ्गात्। न च 'प्रमाणबलेन कल्पनागौरवमपि मृष्यत' इति युक्तम्, संहतत्वस्य पारार्थ्यमात्रेणान्वयात्। दृष्टान्तदृष्टसर्वधर्मानुरोधेन त्वनुमानमिच्छतः सर्वानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्ग इत्युपपादितं न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीकायामस्माभिः। तस्मादनवस्थाभिया ऽस्यासंघातत्वमिच्छता ऽत्रिगुणत्वं विवेकित्वमविषयत्वमसामान्यत्वं चेतनत्वमप्रसवधर्मित्वञ्चाभ्युपेयम्। त्रिगुणत्वादयो हि धर्माः संहतत्वेन व्याप्ताः। तत्संहतत्वमस्मिन् परे व्यावर्तमानं त्रैगुण्यादि व्यावर्तयति, ब्राह्मणत्वमिव व्यावर्तमानं कठत्वादिकम्। तस्मादाचार्येण 'त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात्' इति वदता ऽसंहतः परो विवक्षितः, स चात्मेति सिद्धम्॥

(१२१) संघातानां संघातान्तरार्थत्वे ऽनवस्था त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययश्च॥

इतश्च परः पुरुषो ऽस्ति–"अधिष्ठानात्", त्रिगुणात्मकानामधिष्ठीयमानत्वात्। यद्यत्सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं तत्सर्वं परेणाधिष्ठीयमानं दृष्टम्, यथा रथादिर्यन्त्रादिभिः। सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं चेदं बुद्ध्यादि, तस्मादेतदपि परेणाधिष्ठातव्यम्। स च परस्त्रैगुण्यादन्य आत्मेति॥

(१२२) त्रिगुणात्मकानामधिष्ठीयमानत्वादिति द्वितीयं साधनम् (२)॥

इतश्चास्ति पुरुषो–"भोक्तृभावात्"। भोक्तृभावेन भोग्ये सुखदुःखे उपलक्षयति। भोग्ये हि सुखदुःखे अनुकूलप्रतिकूलवेदनीये प्रत्यात्ममनुभूयेते। तेनानयोरनुकूलनीयेन प्रतिकूलनीयेन च केनचिदप्यन्येन भवितव्यम्। न चानुकूलनीयाः प्रतिकूलनीया वा बुद्ध्यादयः, तेषां सुखदुःखाद्यात्मक-

(१२३) भोक्तृभावादिति तृतीयम् (३)॥

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१. सुखदुःखादयो भोगाः। अतो भोक्तरि पुरुषे सुखदुःखाद्यात्मकत्वन्न सम्भवति। तस्मात् पुरुषे त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययः॥

त्वेन स्वात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधात् । तस्मात् यो ऽसुखाद्यात्मा सो ऽनुकूलनीयः प्रतिकूलनीयो वा, स चा ऽऽत्मेति ॥

(१२४) भोक्तृभावादित्यस्य द्रष्टृभावादित्यर्थो ऽपि सम्भवति ॥

अन्ये त्वाहुः—भोग्या दृश्या बुद्ध्यादयः । न च द्रष्टारमन्तरेण दृश्यता युक्ता तेषाम् । तस्मादस्ति द्रष्टा दृश्यबुद्ध्याद्यतिरिक्तः, स चा ऽऽत्मेति । भोक्तृभावात् द्रष्टृभावात्, दृश्येन द्रष्टुरनुमानादित्यर्थः । दृश्यत्वं च बुद्ध्यादीनां सुखाद्यात्मकतया पृथिव्यादिवदनुमितम् ॥

(१२५) शास्त्राणां कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेरिति चतुर्थं साधनम्–(४) ॥

इतश्चास्ति पुरुष इत्याह—"कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च" इति । शास्त्राणां महर्षीणां दिव्यलोचनानां च कैवल्यमात्यन्तिकदुःखत्रयप्रशमलक्षणं न बुद्ध्यादीनां सम्भवति । ते हि दुःखाद्यात्मकाः कथं स्वभावाद्वियोजयितुं शक्यन्ते । तदतिरिक्तस्य त्वतदात्मनस्ततो वियोगः शक्यसम्पादः, तस्मात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेरागमानां महाधियां चास्ति बुद्ध्यादिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मेति सिद्धम् ॥ १७ ॥

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(१२६) पुरुषबहुत्वसाधनानि ॥

तदेवं पुरुषास्तित्वं प्रतिपाद्य, स किं सर्वशरीरेष्वेकः किमनेकः प्रतिक्षेत्रमिति संशये, तस्य प्रतिक्षेत्रमनेकत्वमुपपादयति—

जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ १८ ॥

(१२७) जन्ममरणप्रतिनियमादिति प्रथमम् (१) ॥

जननेत्यादिना । "पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धम्" । कस्मात्? "जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमात्" । निकायविशिष्टाभिरपूर्वाभिर्देहेन्द्रियमनो ऽहङ्कारबुद्धिवेदनाभिः पुरुषस्याभिसम्बन्धो जन्म, न तु पुरुषस्य परिणामः, तस्यापरिणामित्वात् । तेषामेव च देहादीनामुपात्तानां परित्यागो मरणम्, नत्वात्मनो विनाशः, तस्य कूटस्थनित्यत्वात् । करणानि बुद्ध्यादीनि त्रयोदश । तेषां जन्ममरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमो व्यवस्था ।

सा खल्वियं सर्वशरीरेष्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे नोपपद्यते। तदा खल्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे जायमाने सर्वे जायेरन्, म्रियमाणे च म्रियेरन्, अन्धादौ चैकस्मिन् सर्व एव अन्धादयो, विचित्ते चैकस्मिन् सर्व एव विचित्ताः स्युरित्यव्यवस्था स्यात्। प्रतिक्षेत्रं तु पुरुषभेदे भवति व्यवस्था। न च 'एकस्यापि पुरुषस्य देहोपादानभेदाद्व्यवस्था' इति युक्तम्, पाणिस्तनाद्युपाधिभेदेनापि जन्ममरणादिव्यवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्। न हि पाणौ वृक्णे, जाते वा स्तनादौ महत्यवयवे युवतिर्मृता जाता वा भवतीति॥

इतश्च प्रतिक्षेत्रं पुरुषभेद इत्याह—"अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च" इति। प्रवृत्तिः प्रयत्नलक्षणा यद्यप्यन्तःकरणवर्तिनी, तथा ऽपि पुरुषे उपचर्यते। तथा च तस्मिन्नेकत्र शरीरे प्रयतमाने, स एव सर्वशरीरेष्वेक इति सर्वत्र प्रयतेत, ततश्च सर्वाण्येव शरीराणि युगपच्चालयेत्। नानात्वे तु नायं दोष इति॥

(१२८) पुरुषाणामयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेरिति द्वितीयम् (२)॥

इतश्च पुरुषभेद इत्याह—"त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव" इति। एवकारो भिन्नक्रमः 'सिद्धम्' इत्यस्यानन्तरं द्रष्टव्य; सिद्धमेव नासिद्धम्। त्रयो गुणास्त्रैगुण्यम्, तस्य विपर्ययो ऽन्यथात्वम्। केचित्खलु सत्त्वनिकायाः सत्त्वबहुलाः, यथोर्ध्वस्रोतसः; केचिद्रजोबहुलाः, यथा मनुष्याः; केचित्तमोबहुलाः, यथा तिर्यग्योनयः। सो ऽयमीदृशस्त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययो ऽन्यथाभावस्तेषु सत्त्वनिकायेषु न भवेत् यद्येकः पुरुषः स्यात्, पुरुषभेदे त्वयमदोष इति॥१८॥

(१२९) त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययादिति तृतीयम् (३)॥

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(१३०) पुरुषधर्माः॥ एवं पुरुषबहुत्वं प्रसाध्य विवेकज्ञानोपयोगितया तस्य धर्मानाह—

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य।
कैवल्यम्माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च॥ १९॥

"तस्माच्च" इति । 'च' शब्दः पुरुषस्य बहुत्वेन सह धर्मान्तराणि समुच्चिनोति । 'विपर्यासादस्मात्' इत्युक्ते त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययादित्यनन्तरोक्तं सम्बध्येत; अतस्तन्निरासाय 'तस्मात्' इत्युक्तम् । अनन्तरोक्तं हि सन्निधानादिदमो विषयो, विप्रकृष्टं च तदः, इति विप्रकृष्टं त्रिगुणमविवेकीत्यादि सम्बध्यते ॥

(१३१) तस्मात्पदस्य सम्बन्धप्रदर्शनम् ॥

तस्मात्त्रिगुणादेर्यो विपर्यासः स पुरुषस्यात्रिगुणत्वं विवेकित्वमविषयत्वमसाधारणत्वं चेतनत्वमप्रसवधर्मित्वञ्च । तत्र चेतनत्वेनाविषयत्वेन च साक्षित्वद्रष्टृत्वे दर्शिते । चेतनो हि द्रष्टा भवति, नाचेतनः; साक्षी च दर्शितविषयो भवति; यस्मै प्रदर्श्यते विषयः स साक्षी, तथा हि लोकेऽर्थिप्रत्यर्थिनौ विवादविषयं साक्षिणे दर्शयतः, एवं प्रकृतिरपि स्वचरितं विषयं पुरुषाय दर्शयतीति पुरुषः साक्षी, न चाचेतनो विषयो वा शक्यो विषयं दर्शयितुम्, इति चतन्यादविषयत्वाच्च भवति साक्षी । अत एव द्रष्टाऽपि भवति ॥

(१३२) अत्रैगुण्यादेः पुरुषस्य साक्षित्वम् द्रष्टृत्वं च ॥

अत्रैगुण्याच्चास्य कैवल्यम् । आत्यन्तिको दुःखत्रयाभावः कैवल्यम् । तच्च तस्य स्वाभाविकादेवात्रैगुण्यात् सुखदुःखमोहरहितत्वात्सिद्धम् ॥

(१३३) कैवल्यम् ॥

अत एवात्रैगुण्यान्माध्यस्थ्यम् । सुखी हि सुखेन तृप्यन् दुःखी हि दुःखं द्विषन् मध्यस्थो न भवति । तदुभयरहितस्तु मध्यस्थ इत्युदासीन इति चाख्यायते । विवेकित्वादप्रसवधर्मित्वाच्चाकर्तेति सिद्धम् ॥ १९ ॥

(१३४) माध्यस्थ्यम्, अकर्तृत्वं च ॥

स्यादेतत्—प्रमाणेन कर्तव्यमर्थमवगम्य 'चेतनोऽहं चिकीर्षन् करोमि' इति कृतिचैतन्ययोः सामानाधिकरण्यमनुभवसिद्धम्; तदेतस्मिन्मते नावकल्पते, चेतनस्याकर्तृत्वात् कर्तुश्चाचैतन्यात् इत्यत आह—

(१३५) चैतन्यकर्तृत्वयोर्वैयधिकरण्यापत्तिशङ्का ॥

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तेव[1] भवत्युदासीनः ॥ २० ॥

“ तस्मात् ” इति । यतश्चैतन्यकर्तृत्वे भिन्नाधिकरणे युक्तितः सिद्धे, तस्मात् भ्रान्तिरियमित्यर्थः । ‘ लिङ्गम् ’ महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तं वक्ष्यति । भ्रान्तिबीजम् तत्संयोगः तत्सन्निधानम् । अतिरोहितार्थमन्यत्[2] ॥ २० ॥

(१३६) इष्टापत्तिः । सामानाधिकरण्यज्ञानं भ्रान्तिविलसितम् ॥

‘ तत्संयोगात् ’ इत्युक्तम्, न च भिन्नयोः संयोगो ऽपेक्षां विना, न चेयमुपकार्योपकारकभावं विनेत्यपेक्षाहेतुमुपकारमाह—

(१३७) पुरुषप्रधानयोः संयोगे शङ्का ॥

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि[3] संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥ २१ ॥

“ पुरुषस्य ” इति । प्रधानस्येति कर्मणि षष्ठी । प्रधानस्य सर्वकारणस्य यद्दर्शनं पुरुषेण तदर्थम् । तदनेन भोग्यता प्रधानस्य दर्शिता । ततश्च भोग्यं प्रधानं भोक्तारमन्तेण न सम्भवतीति युक्ता ऽस्य भोक्त्रपेक्षा ॥

(१३८) प्रधानस्य पुरुषापेक्षा–भोक्त्रपेक्षा ॥

“ पुरुषस्यापेक्षां दर्शयति–“ पुरुषस्य कैवल्यार्थम् ” इति । तथाहि भोग्येन प्रधानेन सम्भिन्नः पुरुषस्तद्गतं दुःखत्रयं स्वात्मन्यभिमन्यमानः कैवल्यम् प्रार्थयते । तच्च सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिनिबन्धनम् । न च सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिः प्रधानमन्तरेणेति कैवल्यार्थं पुरुषः प्रधानमपेक्षते अनादित्वाच्च संयोगपरम्पराया भोगाय संयुक्तो ऽपि कैवल्याय पुनः संयुज्यत इति युक्तम् ॥

(१३९) कैवल्यार्थं पुरुषस्य प्रधानापेक्षा ॥

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१. गुणानां कर्तृत्वे उदासीनोऽपि पुरुषः कर्तेव भवति । न च स तत्त्वतः कर्तेत्येवकाराभिप्रायः । २. कारिकास्थाः पदार्थाः स्पष्टा एवेत्यर्थः । ३. पुरुषो निष्क्रियत्वात् ‘ पङ्गुः, ’ प्रधानमचेतनत्वात् ‘ अन्धम् ’ ।

ननु भवत्वनयोः संयोगो, महदादिसर्गस्तु कुत इत्यत आह—" तत्कृतः सर्गः " इति । संयोगो हि न महदादिसर्गमन्तरेण भोगाय कैवल्याय च पर्याप्त इति संयोग एव भोगापवर्गार्थं सर्गं करोतीत्यर्थः ॥ २१ ॥

(१४१) भोगापवर्गार्थमेव महदादिसर्गस्यावश्यकत्वम् ॥

सर्गक्रममाह—

प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः ।
तस्मादपि षोडशकात्पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥

(१४१) प्रकृतेर्महानित्यादिः सर्गक्रमः ॥

" प्रकृतेः " इति । प्रकृतिरव्यक्तम् । महदहङ्कारौ वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणौ । एकादशेन्द्रियाणि वक्ष्यमाणानि, तन्मात्राणि च पञ्च, सोऽयं षोडशसंख्यापरिमितो गणः षोडशकः । तस्मादपि षोडशकादपकृष्टेभ्यः पञ्चभ्यस्तन्मात्रेभ्यः पञ्च भूतान्याकाशादीनि ॥

(१४२) तन्मात्रेभ्यो गुणक्रमेण भूतसर्गः ॥

तत्र शब्दतन्मात्रादाकाशं शब्दगुणम्, शब्दतन्मात्रसहितात् स्पर्शतन्मात्राद्वायुः शब्दस्पर्शगुणः, शब्दस्पर्शतन्मात्रसहिताद्रूपतन्मात्रात्तेजः शब्दस्पर्शरूपगुणम्, शब्दस्पर्शरूपतन्मात्रसहिताद्रसतन्मात्रादापः शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगुणाः, शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसतन्मात्रसहिताद्गन्धतन्मात्राच्छब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धगुणा पृथिवी, जायत इत्यर्थः ॥ २२ ॥

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(१४३) बुद्धिलक्षणप्रस्तावः ॥

अव्यक्तं सामान्यतो लक्षितम् " तद्विपरीतमव्यक्तम् " (कारिका १०) इत्यनेन; विशेषतश्च " सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकम् " (कारिका १३) इत्यनेन । व्यक्तमपि सामान्यतो लक्षितम् "हेतुमत्" (कारिका १०) इत्यादिना । सम्प्रति विवेकज्ञानोपयोगितया व्यक्तविशेषं बुद्धिं लक्षयति—

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् ।
सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥

"अध्यवसाय" इति । 'अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः' क्रियाक्रियावतोरभेदविवक्षया । सर्वो व्यवहर्ता ऽऽलोच्य मत्वा ऽहमत्राधिकृत इत्यभिमत्य कर्तव्यमेतन्मयेत्यध्यवस्यति, ततश्च प्रवर्तत इति लोकसिद्धम् । तत्र यो ऽयं कर्तव्यमिति विनिश्चयश्चितिसन्निधानादापन्नचैतन्याया बुद्धेः सो ऽध्यवसायः, बुद्धेरसाधारणो व्यापारः; तदभेदा बुद्धिः । स च बुद्धेर्लक्षणम् समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदकत्वात् ॥

(१४४) बुद्धेर्लक्षणम् अध्यवसाय इति ॥

तदेवं बुद्धिं लक्षयित्वा विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनस्तस्या धर्मान्सात्त्विकतामसानाह— "धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं, तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम्" इति । धर्मो ऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसहेतुः, तत्र यागदानाद्यनुष्ठानजनितो धर्मो ऽभ्युदयहेतुः, अष्टाङ्गयोगानुष्ठानजनितश्च निःश्रेयसहेतुः । गुणपुरुषान्यताख्यातिर्ज्ञानम् । विरागो वैराग्यम् रागाभावः ॥

(१४५) बुद्धेः सात्त्विका धर्माः धर्मज्ञानविरागैश्वर्याभिधानाः । तत्र धर्मज्ञानवैराग्याणां निरूपणम् ॥

तस्य—यतमानसंज्ञा व्यतिरेकसंज्ञा एकेन्द्रियसंज्ञा वशीकारसंज्ञा—इति चतस्रः संज्ञाः । रागादयः कषायाश्चित्तवर्तिनः, तैरिन्द्रियाणि यथास्वं विषयेषु प्रवर्त्यन्ते । तन्मा ऽत्र प्रवर्तिपत विषयेष्विन्द्रियाणीति तत्परिपाचनायारम्भः प्रयत्नो यतमानसंज्ञा । परिपाचने चानुष्ठीयमाने केचित्कषायाः पक्वाः, पक्ष्यन्ते च केचित्, तत्रैवं पूर्वापरीभावे सति पक्ष्यमाणेभ्यः कषायेभ्यः पक्वानां व्यतिरेकेणावधारणं व्यतिरेकसंज्ञा । इन्द्रियप्रवृत्त्यसमर्थतया पक्वानामौत्सुक्यमात्रेण मनसि व्यवस्थापनमेकेन्द्रियसंज्ञा । औत्सुक्यमात्रस्यापि निवृत्तिरुपस्थितेष्वपि दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयेषु, या संज्ञात्रयात् पराचीना सा वशीकारसंज्ञा । यामत्र-भगवान् पतञ्जलिर्वर्णयाञ्चकार—"दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम्" इति [योगसूत्र–१।१५] । सो ऽयं बुद्धिधर्मो, विराग इति ॥

(१४६) विरागस्य यतमानव्यतिरेकैकेन्द्रियवशीकाररूपाश्चतस्रः संज्ञाः ॥

ऐश्वर्यमपि बुद्धिधर्मो, यतोऽणिमादिप्रादुर्भावः। (१) अत्राणिमाऽणुभावो, यतः शिलामपि प्रविशति। (२) लघिमा लघुभावः, यतः सूर्यमरीचीनालम्ब्य सूर्यलोकं यति। (३) गरिमा गुरुभावः, यतो गुरुर्भवति। (४) महिमा महतो भावः, यतो महान् भवति। (५) प्राप्तिः, यतोऽङ्गुल्यग्रेण स्पृशति चन्द्रमसम्। (६) प्राकाम्यमिच्छानभिघातो यतो, भूमावुन्मज्जति निमज्जति च यथोदके। (७) वशित्वम्, यतो भूतभौतिकं वशीभवत्यवश्यम्। ईशित्वम् यतो भूतभौतिकानां प्रभवस्थितिमीष्टे। (८) यच्च कामावसायित्वम् सा सत्यसङ्कल्पता, येन यथाऽस्य सङ्कल्पो भवति भूतेषु तथैव भूतानि भवन्ति। अन्येषां मनुष्याणां निश्चयाः निश्चेतव्यमनुविधीयन्ते, योगिनस्तु निश्चेतव्याः पदार्थाः निश्चयम्। इति चत्वारः सात्त्विका बुद्धिधर्माः॥

(१४७) ऐश्वर्यरूनिपणे अष्टसिद्धिंनिरूपणम्॥

(१४८) बुद्धेस्तामसा धर्मा अधर्मादयः॥

तामसास्तु तद्विपरीता बुद्धिधर्माः। अधर्माज्ञानावैराग्यानैश्वर्याभिधानाश्चत्वार इत्यर्थः॥ २३॥

अहङ्कारस्य लक्षणमाह—

अभिमानोऽहङ्कारः, तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः।
एकादशकश्च गणस्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव॥ २४॥

"अभिमान" इति। 'अभिमानोऽहङ्कारः'। यत् खल्वालोचितम्मतं च तत्र 'अहमधिकृतः', 'शक्तः खल्वहमत्र', 'मदर्था एवामी विषयाः', 'मत्तो नान्योऽत्राकृधितः कश्चिदस्ति', 'अतोऽहमस्मि' इति योऽभिमानः सोऽसाधारणव्यापारत्वादहङ्कारः। तमुपजीव्य हि बुद्धिरध्यवस्यति—'कर्तव्यमेतन्मया' इति निश्चयं करोति॥

(१४९) अहङ्कारस्य लक्षणम्॥

तस्य कार्यभेदमाह—"तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः" इति। प्रकारद्वयमाह "एकादशकश्च गणः" इन्द्रियाह्वः, तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव। द्विविध एव सर्गोऽहङ्कारात् न त्वन्य इति 'एव'—कारेणावधारयति॥ २४॥

(१५०) अहङ्कारस्य कार्यभेदाः॥

स्यादेतत्–अहङ्कारादेकरूपात्कारणात्कथं जडप्रकाशकौ गणौ विलक्षणौ भवत इत्यत आह—

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात्।
भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसः, तैजसादुभयम्॥ २५॥

“सात्त्विक” इति। प्रकाशलाघवाभ्यामेकादशक इन्द्रियगणः सात्त्विको वैकृतादहङ्कारात्प्रवर्तते। भूतादेस्त्वहङ्कारात्तामसात्तन्मात्रो गणः प्रवर्तते। कस्मात्? यतः ‘स तामसः’। एतदुक्तम्भवति ‘यद्यप्येको ऽहङ्कारस्तथा ऽपि गुणभेदोद्भवाभिभवाभ्यां भिन्नं कार्यं करोतीति’॥

(१५१) एकरूपस्याप्यहङ्कारस्य गुणभेदाद्विकारभेदाः–सत्त्वादिन्द्रियगणः, तामसात्तन्मात्रगणः॥

ननु यदि सत्त्वतमोभ्यामेव सर्वं कार्यं जन्यते तदा कृतमकिञ्चित्करेण रजसेत्यत आह— “तैजसादुभयम्” इति। तैजसाद्राजसादुभयं गुणद्वयं भवति, यद्यपि रजसो न कार्यान्तरमस्ति तथा ऽपि सत्त्वतमसी स्वयमक्रिये समर्थे अपि न स्वस्वकार्यं कुरुतः; रजस्तु चलतया ते यदा चालयति तदा स्वकार्यं कुरुत इति। तदुभयस्मिन्नपि कार्ये सत्त्वतमसोः क्रियोत्पादनद्वारेणास्ति रजसः कारणत्वमिति न व्यर्थं रज इति॥ २५॥

(१५२) सत्त्वतमसोः प्रवर्तकतया रजसः सार्थकता॥

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१. भाष्यमतेन मनस एवैकस्य सात्त्विकत्वम् इतरेषां दशानां राजसत्त्वमेवेति। २।१८ सूत्रे द्रष्टव्यम्। अहङ्कारतत्त्वं त्रिधा विभक्तम्–‘वैकृत’–‘भूतादि–’ ‘तैजसं–संज्ञाभेदात्’। तदुक्तं गौडपादेन—“सत्त्वेनाभिभूते रजस्तमसी यदा अहंकारे भवतः तदा सो ऽहंकारः सात्त्विकः–तस्य संज्ञा कृता ‘वैकृत’ इति॥ एवं च तमसाऽभिभूते सत्त्वरजसी यदा ऽहंकारे भवतस्तदा सोहंकारस्तामसः–तस्य संज्ञा कृता ‘भूतादिः’ इति॥ एवमेव यदा ऽहंकारे सत्त्वतमसी रजसाऽभिभूते तदा सोऽहंकारो राजसः ‘तैजस’ इति संज्ञां लभते––इति

सात्त्विकमेकादशमाख्यातुं बाह्येन्द्रियदशकं तावदाह--

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्यानि ।
वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थानि कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥

"बुद्धीन्द्रि[1]याणि" इति । सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वमिन्द्रियत्वम् । तच्च द्विविधम् बुद्धीन्द्रियं कर्मेन्द्रियं च । उभयमप्येतदिन्द्रस्यात्मनश्चिह्नत्वादिन्द्रियमुच्यते । तानि च स्वसंज्ञाभिश्चक्षुरादिभिरुक्तानि । तत्र रूपग्रहणलिङ्गं चक्षुः, शब्दग्रहणलिङ्गं श्रोत्रम्, गन्धग्रहणलिङ्गं घ्राणम्, रसग्रहणलिङ्गं रसनम्, स्पर्शग्रहणलिङ्गं त्वक्, इति ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणां संज्ञा । एवं वागादीनां कार्यं वक्ष्यति (कारिका २८) ॥ २६ ॥

(१५३) बाह्येन्द्रियदशकम् इन्द्रियलक्षणम् पदव्युत्पत्तिश्च ॥

एकादशमिन्द्रियमाह—

उभयात्मकमत्र मनः, सङ्कल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् ।
गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च ॥ २७ ॥

"उभयात्मकम्" इति । एकादशस्विन्द्रियेषु मध्ये मन उभयात्मकम्, बुद्धीन्द्रियं कर्मेन्द्रियं च, चक्षुरादीनां वागादीनां च मनोऽधिष्ठितानामेव स्वस्वविषयेषु प्रवृत्तेः ॥

(१५४) मनसो बुद्धिकर्मोभयात्मकत्वसाधनम् ॥

तदसाधारणेन रूपेण लक्षयति–"सङ्कल्पकमत्र मनः" इति । सङ्कल्पेन रूपेण मनो लक्ष्यते । 'आलोचितमिन्द्रियेण वस्त्विदम्' इति सम्मुग्धम् 'इदमेवम्, नैवम्' इति सम्यक्कल्पयति विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन विवेचयतीति यावत् । यदाहुः–

(१५५) मनसो लक्षणम्–सङ्कल्पकम्, लक्षणसमन्वयश्च ॥

सम्मुग्धं वस्तुमात्रं तु प्राग्गृह्णन्त्यविकल्पितम् ।
तत् सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां कल्पयन्ति मनीषिणः' ॥ इति ॥ तथाहि,

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१. 'इं' विषयाः, तान् प्रति द्रवन्तीति 'इन्द्रिय' शब्दव्युत्पत्तिः कैश्चित् क्रियते ।

अस्ति ह्यालोचितज्ञानं प्रथमन्निर्विकल्पकम् ।
बालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशम् मुग्धवस्तुजमिति ॥
ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जात्यादिभिर्यया ।
बुद्ध्या ऽवसीयते सा ऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन सम्मता ॥

सो ऽयं सङ्कल्पलक्षणो व्यापारो मनसः समानासमानजातीयाभ्यां व्यवच्छिन्दन् मनो लक्षयति ॥

स्यादेतत्—असाधारणव्यापारयोगिनौ यथा महदहङ्कारौ नेन्द्रियम्, एवम्मनो ऽप्यसाधारणव्यापारयोगि नेन्द्रियं भवितुमर्हतीत्यत आह—"इन्द्रियं च" इति । कुतः?—"साधर्म्यात्"। इन्द्रियान्तरैः सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वं च साधर्म्यम् नत्विन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम्, महदहङ्कारयोरप्यात्मलिङ्गत्वेनेन्द्रियत्वप्रसङ्गात्, तस्माद्व्युत्पत्तिमात्रमिन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम् न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ॥

(१५६) मनस इन्द्रियत्वसाधनम्—इन्द्रियैः सह सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वरूपसाधर्म्यात् ॥

अथ कथं सात्त्विकाहङ्कारादेकस्मादेकादशेन्द्रियाणीत्यत आह–"गुणपरिणामविशेषात् नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च" इति शब्दाद्युपभोगसम्प्रवर्तकादृष्टसहकारिभेदात्कार्यभेदः । अदृष्टभेदो ऽपि गुणपरिणाम एव ।

(१५७) एकस्याहङ्कारस्य गुणपरिणामविशेषात्कार्यभेदः ॥

'बाह्यभेदाश्च' इति दृष्टान्तार्थम्–यथा बाह्यभेदास्तथैतदपीत्यर्थः ॥ २७ ॥

(१५८) बाह्यभेदाश्चेति दृष्टान्तार्थम् ॥

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(१५९) दशेन्द्रियवृत्तिकथनम् ॥

तदेवमेकादशेन्द्रियाणि स्वरूपत उक्त्वा दशानामप्यसाधारणीर्वृत्तीराह—

शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।
वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां सम्मुग्धवस्तुदर्शनमालोचनमुक्तम् । "वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम्" कर्मेन्द्रियाणाम् । कण्ठताल्वादिस्थानमिन्द्रियं वाक्, तस्या वृत्तिर्वचनम् । ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणां वृत्तयः स्पष्टाः ॥ २८ ॥

अन्तःकरणत्रयस्य वृत्तिमाह—

स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।
सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २९ ॥

" स्वालक्षण्यम् " इति । स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य । स्वमसाधारणं लक्षणं येषां तानि स्वलक्षणानि महदहङ्कारमनांसि, तेषां भावःस्वालक्षण्यम्, तच्च स्वानि स्वानि लक्षणान्येव । तद्यथा—महतो ऽध्यवसायो ऽहङ्कारस्याभिमानः सङ्कल्पो मनसो वृत्तिर्व्यापारः ॥

(१६०) अन्तःकरणत्रयस्य स्वस्वलक्षणरूपमेवासाधारणं वृत्तित्रयम् ॥

वृत्तिद्वैविध्यं साधारणासाधारणत्वाभ्यामाह–" सैषा भवत्यसामान्या " असाधारणी । " सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च " । सामान्या चासौ करणवृत्तिश्चेति । त्रयाणामपि करणानां पञ्च वायवो जीवनं वृत्तिः, तद्भावे भावात् तदभावे चाभावात् । तत्र प्राणो नासाग्रहन्नाभिपादाङ्गुष्ठवृत्तिः, अपानः कृकाटिकापृष्ठपादपायूपस्थपार्श्ववृत्तिः, समानो हृन्नाभिसर्वसन्धिवृत्तिः, उदानो हृत्कण्ठतालुमूर्धभ्रूमध्यवृत्तिः, व्यानस्त्वग्वृत्तिरिति पञ्च वायवः ॥ २९ ॥

(१६१) पञ्चवायुरूपा साधारणी वृत्तिः ॥

चतुर्विधकरणस्यास्यासाधारणीषु वृत्तिषु क्रमाक्रमौ सप्रकारावाह—

युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा ।
दृष्टे तथा ऽप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥

" युगपत् " इति, दृष्टे यथा—यदा सन्तमसान्धकारे विद्युत्सम्पातमात्राद्व्याघ्रमभिमुखमतिसन्निहितं पश्यति तदा खल्वस्यालोचनसङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायाः युगपदेव प्रादुर्भवन्ति, यतस्तत उत्प्लुत्य तत्स्थानादेकपदे ऽपसरति ॥

(१६२) चतुर्विधकरणस्य प्रत्यक्षे युगपद्वृत्तिः ॥

" क्रमशश्च " यदा मन्दालोके प्रथमन्तावद्वस्तुमात्रं सम्मुग्धमालोचयति, अथ प्रणिहितमनाः कर्णान्ताकृष्टसशरसिञ्जिनीमण्डलीकृतकोदण्डः प्रचण्डतरः पाटच्चरोऽयमिति निश्चिनोति, अथ च माम्प्रत्येतीत्यभिमन्यते, अथाध्यवस्यत्यपसरामीतः स्थानादिति ॥

(१६३) क्रमशश्च ॥

परोक्षे त्वन्तःकरणत्रयस्य बाह्येन्द्रियवर्जं वृत्तिरित्याह–" अदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः " इति। अन्तःकरणत्रयस्य युगपत्क्रमेण वृत्तिर्दृष्टपूर्विकेति। अनुमानागमस्मृतयो हि परोक्षे ऽर्थे दर्शनपूर्वाः प्रवर्तन्ते नान्यथा। यथा दृष्टे तथा ऽदृष्टे ऽपीति योजना ॥ ३० ॥

(१६४) अन्तःकरणत्रयस्य परोक्षे वृत्तिद्वयम् दृष्टपूर्वकमेव ॥

स्यादेतत्–चतुर्णां त्रयाणां वा वृत्तयो न तावन्मात्राधीनाः, तेषां सदातनत्वेन वृत्तीनां सदोत्पादप्रसङ्गात्, आकस्मिकत्वे तु वृत्तिसङ्करप्रसङ्गो नियमहेतोरभावादित्यत आह—

(१६५) करणानां स्वतन्त्रत्वे दोषाः ॥

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूतहेतुकां वृत्तिम्।
पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित्कार्यते करणम्॥ ३१ ॥

" स्वाम् " इति। करणानीति शेषः। यथा हि बहवः पुरुषाः शाक्तीकयाष्टीकधानुष्ककार्पाणिकाः कृतसङ्केताः परावस्कन्दनाय प्रवृत्ताः, तत्रान्यतमस्याकूतमवगम्यान्यतमः प्रवर्तते, प्रवर्तमानस्तु शाक्तीकः शक्तिमेवादत्ते न तु यष्ट्यादिकम्, एवं याष्टीको ऽपि यष्टिमेव, न शक्त्यादिकम्। तथा ऽन्यतमस्य करणस्याकूतात् स्वकार्यकरणाभिमुख्यादन्यतमं करणं प्रवर्तते। तत्प्रवृत्तेश्च हेतुत्वान्न वृत्तिसङ्करप्रसङ्ग इत्युक्तम्–" स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते " इति ॥

(१६६) तन्निराकरणम्–परस्परसापेक्षाण्येव करणानि स्वस्ववृत्तिषु ॥

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१ मनस्सहकृतबाह्येन्द्रियाणाम्। अन्तःकरणत्रयाणां वा।

स्यादेतत्—याष्टीकादयश्चेतनत्वात् परस्पराकूतमवगम्य प्रवर्तन्त इति युक्तम् करणानि त्वचेतनानि, तस्मान्नैवं प्रवर्तितुमुत्सहन्ते।

(१६७) करणानामचेतनत्वेऽपि पुरुषार्थस्यैव प्रवर्तकत्वम् ॥

तेनैषामधिष्ठात्रा करणानां स्वरूपसामर्थ्योपयोगाभिज्ञेन भवितव्यमित्यत आह—"पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुः, न केनचित्कार्यते करणम्" इति। भोगापवर्गलक्षणः पुरुषार्थ एवानागतावस्थः प्रवर्तयति करणानि, कृतमत्र तत्स्वरूपाभिज्ञेन कर्त्रा। एतच्च "वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम्" (कारिका ५७) इत्यत्रोपपादयिष्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

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(१६८) करणविभागः ॥

"न केनचित् कार्यते करणम्" इत्युक्तम्। तत्र करणं विभजते—

करणं त्रयोदशविधम्, तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम्।
कार्यं च तस्य दशधा, हार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च ॥ ३२ ॥

"करणं त्रयोदशविधम्" इति। इन्द्रियाण्येकादश बुद्धिरहङ्कारश्चेति त्रयो-

(१६९) त्रयोदशविधकरणपरिगणनम्।

दशप्रकारं करणम्। कारकविशेषः करणम्। न च व्यापारावेशं विना कारकत्वमिति व्यापारावेशमाह—"तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम्" इति यथायथम्। तत्र कर्मेन्द्रियाणि वागादीन्याहरन्ति, यथास्वमुपाददते, स्वव्यापारेण व्याप्नुवन्तीति यावत्। बुद्ध्यहङ्कारमनांसि तु स्ववृत्त्या प्राणादिलक्षणया धारयन्ति। बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि प्रकाशयन्ति॥

आहरणधारणादिक्रियाणां सकर्मकतया किं कर्म कतिविधं चेत्यत आह—

(१७०) करणव्यापारपरिगणनम् ॥

"कार्यं च तस्य" इति। कार्यं तस्य त्रयोदशविधस्य करणस्य दशधा, आहार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च। आहार्यं व्याप्यम्। कर्मेन्द्रियाणां वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाः यथायथं व्याप्याः; ते च यथायथं दिव्यादिव्यतया दश—इत्याहार्यं दशधा। एवं धार्यमप्यन्तःकरणत्रयस्य प्राणादिलक्षणया वृत्त्या शरीरम्, तच्च पार्थिवादिपाञ्चभौतिकम्। शब्दादीनां पञ्चानां समूहः पृथिवी, ते च पञ्च दिव्यादिव्यतया दशेति धार्यमपि दशधा। एवं बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धा यथायथं व्याप्याः; ते च यथायथं दिव्यादिव्यतया दशेति प्रकाश्यमपि दशधेति ॥ ३२ ॥

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(१७१) त्रयोदशविधकरणे ऽवान्तरविभागः–बाह्यान्तरभेदात् ॥

त्रयोदशविधकरणे ऽवान्तरविभागं करोति–

अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दशधा बाह्यं त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् ।
साम्प्रतकालं बाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥

(१७२) अन्तःकरणस्य त्रैविध्यम् ॥

" अन्तःकरणम् " इति । अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधम्– ' बुद्धिरहङ्कारो मन ' इति; शरीराभ्यन्तरवर्तित्वादन्तःकरणम् ॥

(१७३) बाह्यकरणानां दशधात्वम् ॥

"दशधा" बाह्यकरणम् " त्रयस्य " अन्तःकरणस्य " विषयाख्यम् " । विषयमाख्याति विषयसङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायेषु कर्तव्येषु द्वारीभवति । तत्र बुद्धीन्द्रियाण्यालोचनेन, कर्मेन्द्रियाणि तु यथास्वं व्यापारेण[1] ॥

(१७४) बाह्यान्तरकरणयोर्भेदः-बाह्यकरणानां वर्तमानकालीनत्वं, अन्तःकरणानां त्रिकालीनत्वम् ॥

बाह्यान्तरयोः करणयोर्विशेषान्तरमाह–" साम्प्रतकालम् " इति । वर्तमानकालं बाह्यमिन्द्रियम् । वर्तमानसमीपमनागतमतीतमपि वर्तमानम्; अतो वागपि वर्तमानकालविषया भवति । " त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् " इति । तद्यथा–नदीपूरभेदादभूद्वृष्टिः; अस्ति धूमादग्निरिह नगनिकुञ्जे, असत्युपघातके पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चरणाद्भविष्यति वृष्टिरिति, तदनुरूपाश्च सङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्यवसाया भवन्ति ॥

(१७५) सांख्यमते कालस्य न तत्त्वान्तरत्वम् ॥

कालश्च वैशेषिकाभिमत एको न अनागतादिव्यवहारभेदं प्रवर्तयितुमर्हति । तस्मादयं यैरुपाधिभेदैरनागतादिभेदं प्रतिपद्यते सन्तु त एवोपायाः, ये ऽनागतादिव्यवहारहेतवः, कृतमत्रान्तर्गडुना कालेनेति सांख्याचार्याः, तस्मान्न कालरूपतत्त्वान्तराभ्युपगम इति ॥ ३३ ॥

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१. द्वारीभवन्तीति शेषः ।

(१७६) बाह्येन्द्रियविषयविवेचनम् ॥

साम्प्रतकालानां बाह्येन्द्रियाणां विषयं विवेचयति—

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि ।
वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥ ३४ ॥

(१७७) बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां विषयाः स्थूलसूक्ष्मरूपाः ॥

"बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि" इति । "बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि" तेषां दशानामिन्द्रियाणामध्ये "पञ्च," "विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि" विशेषा स्थूलाः शब्दादयः शान्तघोरमूढरूपाः पृथिव्यादिरूपाः, अविशेषास्तन्मात्राणि सूक्ष्माः शब्दादयः, मात्र[1]ग्रहणेन स्थूल[2]भूतमपाकरोति । विशेषाश्च अविशेषाश्च विशेषाविशेषाः, त एव विषया येषां बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां तानि तथोक्तानि । तत्रोर्ध्वस्रोतसां योगिनाञ्च श्रोत्रं शब्दतन्मात्रविषयं स्थूलशब्दविषयं च, अस्मदादीनां तु स्थूलशब्दविषयमेव । एवन्तेषु त्वक् स्थूलसूक्ष्मस्पर्शविषया, अस्मदादीनां तु स्थूलस्पर्शविषयैव । एवञ्चक्षुरादयोऽपि तेषामस्मदादीनां च रूपादिषु सूक्ष्मस्थूलेषु द्रष्टव्याः ॥

(१७८) कर्मेन्द्रियाणां विषयाः ॥

एवं कर्मेन्द्रियेषु मध्ये "वाग्भवति शब्दविषया" स्थूलशब्दविषया, तद्धेतुत्वात् । नतु शब्दतन्मात्रस्य हेतुस्तस्याहङ्कारिकत्वेन वागिन्द्रियेण सहैककारणकत्वात् । "शेषाणि तु" चत्वारि पायूपस्थपाणिपादाख्यानि "पञ्चविषयाणि" पाण्याद्याहार्याणां घटादीनां पञ्चशब्दाद्यात्मकत्वादिति ॥ ३४ ॥

साम्प्रतं त्रयोदशसु करणेषु केषाञ्चित्प्रधानभावं सहेतुकमाह—

सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।
तस्मात्त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि, द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥

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१. तन्मात्रपदे । २. 'भूतभाविनावपाकरोति' इति पाठान्तरम् ।

" सान्तःकरणा " इति । " द्वारि " प्रधानम् । " द्वाराणि " करणानि बाह्येन्द्रियाणि द्वाराणि । तैरुपनीतं सर्वं विषयं समनो ऽहङ्कारा बुद्धिः यस्मादवगाहते ऽध्यवस्यति तस्माद्बाह्येन्द्रियाणि द्वाराणि, द्वारवती च सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिरिति ॥ ३५ ॥

(१७९) सर्वविधकरणेषु अन्तःकरणानां प्राधान्यम् ॥

न केवलं बाह्यानीन्द्रियाण्यपेक्ष्य प्रधानं बुद्धिः, अपि तु ये ऽप्यहङ्कारमनसी द्वारिणी ते अप्यपेक्ष्य बुद्धिः प्रधानमित्याह--

एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।
कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ ३६ ॥

" एते " इति । यथा हि ग्रामाध्यक्षः कौटुम्बिकेभ्यः करमादाय विषयाध्यक्षाय प्रयच्छति, विषयाध्यक्षश्च सर्वाध्यक्षाय, स च भूपतये; तथा बाह्येन्द्रियाण्यालोच्य मनसे समर्पयन्ति, मनश्च सङ्कल्प्याहङ्काराय, अहङ्कारश्चाभिमत्य बुद्धौ सर्वाध्यक्षभूतायां,-तदिदमुक्तम्-" पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति " इति ॥

(१८०) अन्तःकरणेष्वपि बुद्धेः प्राधान्यम् ॥

बाह्येन्द्रियमनोऽहङ्काराश्च " गुणविशेषाः " गुणानां सत्त्वरजस्तमसां विकाराः, ते तु परस्परविरोधशीला अपि पुरुषार्थेन भोगापवर्गरूपेणैकवाक्यतां नीताः, यथा वर्तितैलवह्नयः सन्तमसापनयेन रूपप्रकाशाय मिलिताः प्रदीपः, एवमेते गुणविशेषाः इति योजना ॥ ३६ ॥

(१८१) परस्परविरोधशीलानामपि गुणानां पुरुषार्थरूप एककार्ये प्रवृत्तिः प्रदीपवत् ॥

कस्मात्पुनर्बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति, न तु बुद्धिरहङ्काराय द्वारिणे मनसे चेत्यत आह—

सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात्पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः ।
सैव च विशिनष्टि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥ ३७ ॥

"सर्वम्" इति । पुरुषार्थस्य प्रयोजकत्वात् तस्य यत्साक्षात्साधनं तत्

(१८२) बुद्धेः प्राधान्यसाधनम्-साक्षात्पुरुषार्थसाधनत्वात् ॥

प्रधानम्। बुद्धिश्चास्य साक्षात्साधनम्, तस्मात्सैव प्रधानम्। यथा सर्वाध्यक्षः साक्षाद्राजार्थसाधनतया प्रधानमितरे तु ग्रामाध्यक्षादयस्तम्प्रति गुणभूताः। बुद्धिर्हि पुरुषसन्निधानात् तच्छायापत्त्या तद्रूपेव सर्वविषयोपभोगं पुरुषस्य साधयति। सुखदुःखानुभवो हि भोगः, स च बुद्धौ, बुद्धिश्च पुरुषरूपैवेति, सा च पुरुषमुपभोजयति। यथा ऽर्थालोचनसङ्कल्पाभिमानाश्च तत्तद्रूपपरिणामेन बुद्धावुपसंक्रांताः तथेन्द्रियव्यापारा अपि बुद्धेरेव स्वव्यापारेणाध्यवसायेन सहैकव्यापारीभवन्ति, यथा स्वसैन्येन सह ग्रामाध्यक्षादिसैन्यं सर्वाध्यक्षस्य भवति। "सर्वं" शब्दादिकं "प्रति" य "उपभोगः" "पुरुषस्य" तं साधयति ॥

ननु पुरुषस्य सर्वविषयोपभोगसम्पादिका यदि बुद्धिः तर्हिनिर्मोक्ष इत्यत आह—पश्चात् "प्रधानपुरुषयोरन्तरं" विशेषं "विशिनष्टि" करोति–यथौदनपाकं पचतीति,–करणं च प्रतिपादनम्। ननु प्रधानपुरुषयोरन्तरस्य कृतकत्वादनित्यत्वम्, तत्कृतस्य मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वं स्यादित्यत आह—"विशिनष्टि"–'प्रधानं सविकारमन्यदहमन्य' इति विद्यमानमेवान्तरमविवेकेनाविद्यमानमिव बुद्धिर्बोधयति, न तु करोति, येनानित्यत्वमित्यर्थः। अनेनापवर्गः पुरुषार्थो दर्शितः, "सूक्ष्मम्" दुर्लक्ष्यम् तदन्तरमित्यर्थः ॥ ३७ ॥

(१८३) पुरुषार्थस्यापवर्गस्य कृतकत्वादपि नानित्यत्वम्-करणस्यात्र बाधनार्थत्वात् ॥

तदेवं करणानि विभज्य विशेषाविशेषान् विभजते—

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः।
एते स्मृता विशेषाः, शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

"तन्मात्राणि" इति। शब्दादितन्मात्राणि सूक्ष्माणि। न चैष शान्तत्वादिरस्ति उपभोगयोग्यो विशेष इति मात्रशब्दार्थः ॥

(१८४) अविशेष–(सूक्ष्म) कथनम् ॥

अविशेषानुक्त्वा विशेषान्वक्तुमुत्पत्तिमेषामाह–" तेभ्यो भूतानि " इति ।

(१८५) विशेष(स्थूल) कथनम्–तदुत्पत्तिप्रदर्शनपूर्वकम् ॥

तेभ्यस्तन्मात्रेभ्यो यथासंख्यमेकद्वित्रिचतुःपञ्चभ्यो भूतान्याकाशानिलानलसलिलावनिरूपाणि " पञ्च " " पञ्चभ्यः " तन्मात्रेभ्यः ॥

अस्त्वेतेषामुत्पत्तिः, विशेषत्वे किमायातमित्यत आह–" एते स्मृता विशेषाः " इति । कुतः–" शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च " । चकार एको हेतौ द्वितीयः समुच्चये । यस्मादाकाशादिषु स्थूलेषु सत्त्वप्रधानतया केचिच्छान्ताः सुखाः, प्रकाशा लघवः, केचिद्रजःप्रधानतया घोराः दुःखाः अनवस्थिताः, केचित्तमःप्रधानतया मूढा विषण्णा गुरवः । ते ऽमी परस्परव्यावृत्त्या ऽनुभूयमाना ' विशेषाः '। इति च ' स्थूलाः ' इति चोच्यन्ते । तन्मात्राणि त्वस्मदादिभिः परस्परव्यावृत्तानि नानुभूयन्ते, इत्यविशेषाः सूक्ष्मा इति चोच्यन्ते ॥ ३८ ॥

(१८६) भूतानां स्थूलत्वे हेतुकथनम् ॥

विशेषाणामवान्तरविशेषमाह—

सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सहप्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।
सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता, मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥ ३९ ॥

" सूक्ष्मा " इति । " त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः " इति, तान् विशेषप्रकारानाह–" सूक्ष्माः " सूक्ष्मदेहाः परिकल्पिताः, " मातापितृजाः " षाट्कौशिकाः । तत्र मातृतो लोमलोहितमांसानि, पितृतस्तु स्नाय्वस्थिमज्जान इति षट् कोशाः। प्रकृष्टानि महान्ति भूतानि " प्रभूतानि "–तैस्सह । सूक्ष्मं शरीरमेको विशेषः, मातापितृजो द्वितीयः, महाभूतानि तृतीयः; महाभूतवर्गे च घटादीनां निवेश इति ॥

(१८७) अवान्तरविशेषकथनम्-सूक्ष्ममातृपितृजभेदेन ॥

सूक्ष्ममातापितृजयोर्देहयोर्विशेषमाह— " सूक्ष्मास्तेषाम् " इति । विशेषाणां मध्ये ये ते " नियताः[1] "। " मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते[2] " इति, रसान्ता वा भस्मान्ता वा विडन्ता वेति ॥ ३९ ॥

(१८८) सूक्ष्ममातापितृजयोर्भेदः नित्यत्वानित्यत्वनिबन्धनः ॥

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१. नित्याः । २. अनित्याः ।

सूक्ष्मशरीरं विभजते—

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतम्महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम्।
संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥

'पूर्वोत्पन्नम्' इति। "पूर्वोत्पन्नम्" प्रधानेनादिसर्गे प्रतिपुरुषमेकैकमुत्पादितम्। "असक्तम्" अव्याहतम् शिलामप्यनुविशति। "नियतम्[1]" आ चादिसर्गादा च महाप्रलयादवतिष्ठते, —"महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम्" महदहङ्कारैकादशेन्द्रियपञ्चतन्मात्रपर्यन्तम्। एषां समुदायः सूक्ष्मं शरीरम्, शान्तघोरमूढैरिन्द्रियैरन्वितत्वाद्विशेषः॥

(१८९) सूक्ष्मशरीरोपपादनम्—तस्य लक्षणानि—(१) असक्तत्वम्—(२) नित्यत्वम्॥

नन्वस्त्वेतदेव शरीरं भोगायतनं पुरुषस्य, कृतं दृश्यमानेन षाट्कौशिकेन शरीरेणेत्यत आह—"संसरति" इति। उपात्तमुपात्तं षाट्कौशिकं शरीरं जहाति हायं हायं चोपादत्ते—कस्मात् इति "निरुपभोगम्" यतः, षाट्कौशिकं शरीरं भोगायतनं विना सूक्ष्मं शरीरं निरुपभोगं यस्मात्तस्मात्सूक्ष्मं शरीरं संसरति॥

(१९०) (१) संसरणम् निरुपभोगत्वं च ततश्च षाट्कौशिकशरीरस्यावश्यकत्वम्॥

ननु धर्माधर्मनिमित्तः संसारः, न च सूक्ष्मशरीरस्यास्ति तद्योगः, तत्कथं संसरतीत्यत आह—"भावैरधिवासितम्" इति। धर्माधर्मज्ञानाज्ञानवैराग्यावैराग्यैश्वर्यानैश्वर्याणि भावाः-तदन्विता बुद्धिः, तदन्वितञ्च सूक्ष्मं शरीरमिति तदपि भावैरधिवासितम्, यथा सुरभिचम्पककुसुमसम्पर्काद्वस्त्रं तदामोदवासितम्भवति। तस्माद्भावैरेवाधिवासितत्वात्संसरति॥

(१९१) धर्माधर्मादिभावैरधिवासितत्वमूलकं तत्संसरणम्॥

कस्मात् पुनः प्रधानमिव महाप्रलयेऽपि तच्छरीरन्न तिष्ठतीत्यत आह—"लिङ्गम्" इति। लयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गम्—हेतुमत्त्वेन चास्य लिङ्गत्वमिति भावः॥ ४०॥

(१९२) महाप्रलये तस्य लयं गमितत्वाल्लिङ्गत्वम्॥

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१. प्रत्यात्मभिन्नमिति केचित्।

स्यादेतत्–बुद्धिरेव साहङ्कारेन्द्रिया कस्मान्न संसरति? कृतं सूक्ष्मशरीरेणाप्रामाणिकेनेत्यत आह—

[1]चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो विना यथा च्छाया ।
तद्वद्विना विशेषैर्न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥

"चित्रम्" इति । लिङ्गनात् ज्ञापनात् बुद्ध्यादयो 'लिङ्गम्', तत् अनाश्रयन्न तिष्ठति । जन्ममरणान्तराले बुद्ध्यादयः प्रत्युत्पन्नशरीराश्रयाः, –प्रत्युत्पन्नपञ्चतन्मात्रवत्त्वे सति बुद्ध्यादित्वात् — दृश्यमानशरीरवृत्तिबुद्ध्यादिवत् । "विना विशेषैः" इति, सूक्ष्मैः शरीरैरित्यर्थः ।

(१९३) सूक्ष्मशरीरस्यावश्यकत्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥

आगमश्चात्र भवति—

"ततः सत्यवतः कायात् पाशबद्धं वशङ्गतम् ।
अङ्गुष्ठमात्रं पुरुषं निश्चकर्ष बलाद्यमः" (महाभारत वनपर्व–अध्याय २९६.) इत्यङ्गुष्ठमात्रत्वेन सूक्ष्मशरीरत्वमुपलक्षयति । आत्मनो निष्कर्षासम्भवात् सूक्ष्ममेव शरीरम् 'पुरुषः', तदपि पुरि स्थूलशरीरे शेते इति ॥ ४१ ॥

एवं सूक्ष्मशरीरास्तित्वमुपपाद्य यथा संसरति, येन हेतुना च–तदुभयमाह—

पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन ।
प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगान्नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम् ॥ ४२ ॥

"पुरुषार्थहेतुकम्" इति । पुरुषार्थेन हेतुना प्रयुक्तम् । "निमित्तम्" धर्माधर्मादि, "नैमित्तिकम्" तेषु तेषु निकायेषु यथायथं पाट्कौशिकशरीरग्रहः, स हि धर्मादिनिमित्तप्रभवः । निमित्तञ्च नैमित्तिकञ्च–तत्र यः प्रसङ्गः प्रसक्तिस्तया "नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम्" सूक्ष्मशरीरम् । यथा हि नटस्तां तां भूमिकां विधाय परशुरामो वाऽजातशत्रुर्वा

(१९४) सूक्ष्मशरीरसंसरणप्रकारः ॥

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१. केचिदिमां कारिकां स्थूलशरीरपरतया व्याख्याय 'लिङ्गम्' लिङ्गशरीरं 'विशेषैः' स्थूलशरीरैरित्याहुः ॥ अन्ये तु 'लिङ्गम्' लिङ्गशरीरं 'विशेषैः' लिङ्गशरीराधिष्ठानभूतैः सूक्ष्मशरीरैरिति । एतन्मते शरीरत्रयम्–लिङ्गशरीरम्, तदधिष्ठानभूतं सूक्ष्मशरीरम्, तदधिष्ठानभूतं च स्थूलशरीरमिति ।

वत्सराजो वा भवति, एवन्तत्तत्स्थूलशरीरपरिग्रहणाद्देवो वा मनुष्यो वा पशुर्वा वनस्पतिर्वा भवति सूक्ष्मं शरीरमित्यर्थः ॥

कुतस्त्यः पुनरस्येदृशो महिमेत्यत आह–“प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगात्” इति । तथा च पुराणम्—

(१९५) सूक्ष्मशरीरसंसरणे हेतुः–प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वम् ॥

“वैश्वरूप्यात् प्रधानस्य परिणामो ऽयमद्भुत” इति ॥ ४२ ॥

“निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन” इत्युक्तम्–तत्र निमित्तनैमित्तिके विभजते—

सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च धर्माद्याः ।
दृष्टाः [1]करणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः ॥ ४३ ॥

“सांसिद्धिकाश्च” इति । “वैकृतिकाः” नैमित्तिकाः, पुरुषस्य जातस्योत्तरकालदेवताराधनादिनोत्पन्नाः । “प्राकृतिकाः” स्वाभाविका भावाः सांसिद्धिकाः[2] । तथा हि–सर्गादावादिविद्वानत्रभगवान् कपिलो महामुनिर्धर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यसम्पन्नः प्रादुर्बभूवेति स्मरन्ति । वैकृताश्च भावा असांसिद्धिकाः, ये उपायानुष्ठानेनोत्पन्नाः, यथा प्राचेतसप्रभृतीनाम्महर्षीणाम् । एवमधर्माज्ञानावैराग्यानैश्वर्याण्यपि ॥

(१९६) निमित्तनैमित्तिकविभागः-धर्मादिरूपनिमित्तस्य प्राकृतिकवैकृतिकभावकथनम्, तस्य च करणाश्रयित्ववर्णनम् ॥

कार्यं शरीरं तदाश्रयिणः, तस्यावस्थाः, कललबुद्बुदमांसपेशीकरण्डाद्यङ्गप्रत्यङ्गव्यूहाः गर्भस्थस्य, ततो निर्गतस्य बालस्य बाल्यकौमारयौवनवार्धकानीति ॥ ४३ ॥

(१९७) शरीरग्रहरूपनैमित्तिकस्य कार्याश्रयित्वकथनम् ॥

अवगतानि निमित्तनैमित्तिकानि । कतमस्य तु निमित्तस्य कतमन्नैमित्तिकमित्यत आह—

(१९८) निमित्तविशेषाणां कार्यविशेषनिरूपणम् ॥

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१. करणमत्र बुद्धिः । २. ‘स्वाभाविकाः’ यावद्वस्तुभाविनः, ‘वैकृतिकाः’ कादाचित्कवृत्तयः॥ गौडपादभाष्ये तु–‘भावास्त्रिधा चिन्त्यन्ते–सांसिद्धिकाः, प्राकृताः, वैकृताश्चेत्युक्तम् ।

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं, गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण ।
ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो, विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ॥ ४४ ॥

" धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वम् " द्युप्रभृतिषु लोकेषु। " गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण " सुतलादिषु[1] लोकेषु। " ज्ञानेन चापवर्गः । " तावदेव प्रकृतिर्भोगमारभते न यावद्विवेकख्यातिं करोति; अथ विवेकख्यातौ सत्यां कृतकृत्यतया विवेकख्यातिमन्तम्पुरुषम्प्रति निवर्तते । यथाहुः—

(१९९) धर्मस्य ऊर्ध्वगमनं प्रति अधर्मस्याधोगमनम्प्रति, ज्ञानस्यापवर्गम्प्रति, अज्ञानस्य च बन्धनम्प्रति–कारणत्वम् ॥

" विवेकख्यातिपर्यन्तं ज्ञेयम् प्रकृतिचेष्टितम् " इति ॥

" विपर्ययात् " अतत्त्वज्ञानात् " इष्यते बन्धः " ॥

स च त्रिविधः––प्राकृतिको वैकृतिको दाक्षिणकश्चेति । तत्र प्रकृतावात्मज्ञानाद्ये प्रकृतिमुपासते तेषां प्राकृतिको बन्धः, यः पुराणे प्रकृतिलयान् प्रत्युच्यते ।

(२००) बन्धत्रैविध्यनिरूपणम् प्राकृतिक-वैकृतिक-दाक्षिणकरूपम् ॥

" पूर्णं शतसहस्रं हि तिष्ठन्त्यव्यक्तचिन्तकाः " इति ॥

वैकारिको बन्धस्तेषां ये विकारानेव भूतेन्द्रियाहङ्कारबुद्धीः पुरुषधियोपासते, तान् प्रतीदमुच्यते—

" दश मन्वन्तराणीह तिष्ठन्तीन्द्रियचिन्तकाः ।
भौतिकास्तु[2] शतम्पूर्णं, सहस्रन्त्वाभिमानिकाः ॥
बौद्धा दश सहस्राणि तिष्ठन्ति विगतज्वराः ।
ते खल्वमी विदेहा[3] येषां वैकृतिको बन्धः " इति ॥

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१. भूतलेति पाठान्तरम् । २. ' भौतिकाः '–ये भूतान्येव पुरुषधियोपासते ' आभिमानिकाः '–ये ऽहङ्कारमेव पुरुषधियोपासते । ' बौद्धाः '–ये बुद्धिमेव पुरुषधियोपासते। ३. विदेहाः–वैकृतिकबन्धवतां संज्ञान्तरमिदम् पारिभाषिकम् ।

इष्टापूर्तेन[1] दाक्षिणकः । पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञो हीष्टापूर्तकारी कामोपहतमना बध्यते इति ॥ ४४ ॥

वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः, संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात् ।
ऐश्वर्यादविघातो विपर्ययात्तद्विपर्यासः ॥ ४५ ॥

"वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः" इति–पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञस्य वैराग्यमात्रात् प्रकृतिलयः, प्रकृतिग्रहणेन प्रकृतिमहदहङ्कारभूतेन्द्रियाणि गृह्यन्ते, तेष्वात्मबुद्ध्योपास्यमानेषु लयः । कालान्तरेण च पुनराविर्भवति[2] ॥

(२०१) वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः ॥

"संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात्" इति । 'राजसात्' इत्यनेन रजसो दुःखहेतुत्वात् संसारस्य दुःखहेतुता सूचिता ॥

(२०२) राजसाद्रागात् संसारः ।

"ऐश्वर्यादविघात" इति–इच्छायाः । ईश्वरो हि यदेवेच्छति तदेव करोति । "विपर्ययात्" अनैश्वर्यात् "तद्विपर्यासः" सर्वत्रेच्छाविघात इत्यर्थः ॥ ४५ ॥

(२०३) ऐश्वर्यादिच्छानभिघातः, अनैश्वर्याच्चेच्छाभिघातः ॥

बुद्धिधर्मान् धर्मादीनष्टौ भावान् समासव्यासाभ्यां मुमुक्षूणां हेयोपादेयान् दर्शयितुं प्रथमन्तावत् समासमाह—

एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः ।
गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात्, तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥ ४६ ॥

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१. वापीकूपतडागादि देवतायतनानि च । अन्नप्रदानमारामाः पूतमर्थ्याः प्रचक्षते ॥ एकाग्निकर्महवनं त्रेतायां यच्च हूयते । अन्तर्वेद्यां च यद्दानमिष्टन्तदभिधीयते । २. यः प्रकृतिलयं गच्छति ।

"एषः" इति । प्रतीयतेऽनेनेति प्रत्ययो बुद्धिः, तस्य सर्गः । तत्र "विपर्ययः" अज्ञानमविद्या, सा ऽपि बुद्धिधर्मः, "अशक्तिः" अपि करणवैकल्यहेतुका बुद्धिधर्म एव । "तुष्टिसिद्धी" अपि वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणे बुद्धिधर्मावेव । तत्र विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिषु यथायोगं सप्तानाञ्च धर्मादीनां ज्ञानवर्जमन्तर्भावः; सिद्धौ च ज्ञानस्येति ॥

(२०४) विपर्ययादिबुद्धिसर्गस्य समासेन कथनम् ॥

व्यासमाह–"तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत्" इति । कस्मात्? "गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात्" इति । गुणानां वैषम्यमेकैकस्याधिकबलता द्वयोर्द्वयोर्वा, एकैकस्य न्यूनबलता द्वयोर्द्वयोर्वा, ते च न्यूनाधिक्ये मन्दमध्याधिक्यमात्रतया यथाकार्यमुन्नीयेते । तदिदं गुणानां वैषम्यम् तेनोपमर्दः एकैकस्य न्यूनस्य द्वयोर्वा ऽभिभवः । तस्मात्तस्य भेदाः पञ्चाशदिति ॥ ४६ ॥

(२०५) तस्यैव व्यासेन कथनम्-पञ्चाशद्भेदाः ॥

तानेव पञ्चाशद्भेदान् गणयति—

पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणवैकल्यात् ।
अष्टाविंशतिभेदा तुष्टिर्नवधा ऽष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥

"पञ्च" इति । अविद्याऽस्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशा यथासंख्यं तमोमोहमहामोहतामिस्रान्धतामिस्रसंज्ञकाः पञ्च विपर्ययविशेषाः, विपर्ययप्रभवानामप्यस्मितादीनां विपर्ययस्वभावत्वात् । यद्वा–यदविद्यया विपर्ययेणावधार्यते वस्तु, अस्मितादयस्तत्स्वभावाः सन्तस्तदभिनिविशन्ते । अत एव पञ्चपर्वाविद्येत्याह भगवान् वार्षगण्यः ॥ ४७ ॥

(२०६) विपर्ययादीनां पञ्चाशद्भेदपरिगणनम् ॥

सम्प्रति पञ्चानां विपर्ययभेदानामवान्तरभेदमाह—

(२०७) विपर्ययादीनां प्रत्येकमवान्तरभेदकथनम्–तत्र प्रथमं विपर्ययस्य द्वाषष्टिः ॥

भेदस्तमसो ऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च, दशविधो महामोहः ।
तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा, तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥ ४८ ॥

" भेदः " इति । भेदस्तमसो ऽविद्याया अष्टविधः । अष्टस्वव्यक्तमहदहङ्कारपञ्चतन्मात्रेष्वनात्मस्वात्मबुद्धिरविद्या तमः, अष्टविधविषयत्वात्तस्याष्टविधत्वम् ॥

(२०८) अविद्यारूपविपर्ययस्याष्टविधत्वम् ॥

" मोहस्य च " इति, अत्राप्यष्टविधो भेदश्चकारेणानुषज्यते । देवा ह्यष्टविधमैश्वर्यमासाद्यामृतत्वाभिमानिनो ऽणिमादिकमात्मीयं शाश्वतिकमभिमन्यन्ते, सेयमस्मिता मोहो ऽष्टविधैश्वर्यविषयत्वादष्टविधः

(२०९) अस्मितारूपविपर्ययस्याष्टविधत्वम् ॥

" दशविधो महामोहः " इति । शब्दादिषु पञ्चसु दिव्यादिव्यतया दशविधविषयेषु रञ्जनीयेषु राग आसक्तिर्महामोहः, स च दशविधविषयत्वाद्दशविधः ॥

(२१०) रागरूपविपर्ययस्य दशविधत्वम् ॥

" तामिस्रो " द्वेषो " ऽष्टादशधा " । शब्दादयो दशविषया रञ्जनीयाः स्वरूपतः, ऐश्वर्यन्त्वणिमादिकन्न स्वरूपतो रञ्जनीयम् । किं तु रञ्जनीयशब्दाद्युपायाः । ते च शब्दादय उपस्थिताः परस्परेणोपहन्यमानास्तदुपायाश्चाणिमादयः स्वरूपेणैव कोपनीया भवन्तीति शब्दादिभिर्दशभिः सहाणिमाद्यष्टकमष्टादशधेति, तद्विषयो द्वेषस्तामिस्रो ऽष्टादशविषयत्वादष्टादशधेति ।

(२११) द्वेषरूपविपर्ययस्याष्टादशविधत्वम् ॥

" तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः " । अभिनिवेशो ऽन्धतामिस्रः । तथेत्यनेनाष्टादशधेत्यनुषज्यते । देवाः खल्वणिमादिकमष्टविधमैश्वर्यमासाद्य दश शब्दादीन् विषयान् भुञ्जानाः— ' शब्दादयो भोग्यास्तदुपायाश्चाणिमादयो ऽस्माकमसुरादिभिर्मोपघानिषत ' इति—बिभ्यति । तदिदं भयमभिनिवेशो ऽन्धतामिस्रो ऽष्टादशविषयत्वादष्टादशधेति ॥

(२१२) अभिनिवेशरूपविपर्ययस्याष्टादशविधत्वम् ॥

(२१३) विपर्ययावान्तरभेदसमष्टिसंख्या द्वांषष्टिः ॥

सोऽयं पञ्चविधो विकल्पो विपर्ययोऽवान्तरभेदाद् द्वाषष्टिरिति ॥ ४८ ॥

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(२१४) अष्टाविंशतिप्रकारकाशक्तिकथनम् ॥

तदेवं पञ्चविपर्ययभेदानुक्त्वा ऽष्टाविंशतिभेदामशक्तिमाह--

एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।
सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥ ४९ ॥

(२१५) एकादशेन्द्रियबधजन्यैकादशविधाऽशक्तिः ॥

" एकादश "–इति । इन्द्रियबधस्य ग्रहो बुद्धिबधहेतुत्वेन, न त्वशक्तिभेदपूर्णत्वेन " एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः "--

बाधिर्यं कुष्ठिता ऽन्धत्वं जडता ऽजिघ्रता तथा ।
मूकताकौण्यपङ्गुत्वक्लैब्योदावर्तमन्दताः ॥

यथासंख्यं श्रोत्रादीनामिन्द्रियाणां बधाः । एतावत्येव तु तद्धेतुका बुद्धेरशक्तिः स्वव्यापारे भवति । तथा चैकादशहेतुकत्वादेकादशधा बुद्धेरशक्तिरुच्यते । हेतुहेतुमतोरभेदविवक्षया च सामानाधिकरण्यम् ॥

(२१६) बुद्धेः साक्षादशक्तिः सप्तदशविधा ॥

तदेवमिन्द्रियबधद्वारेण बुद्धेरशक्तिमुक्त्वा स्वरूपतो ऽशक्तीराह—" सहबुद्धिबधैः" इति । कति बुद्धेः स्वरूपतो बधा इत्यत आह—" सप्तदश बधा बुद्धेः" । कुतः ? " विपर्ययात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् । " तुष्टयो नवधेति तद्विपर्ययास्तन्निरूपणान्नवधा भवन्ति, एवं सिद्धयो ऽष्टाविति तद्विपर्ययास्तन्निरूपणादष्टौ भवन्तीति ॥ ४९ ॥

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(२१७) नवविधतुष्टिकथनम् ॥

तुष्टिर्नवधेत्युक्तम्, ताः परिगणयति—

आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः ।
बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च,—नव तुष्टयो ऽभिमताः ॥ ५० ॥

(२१८) चतुर्विधाध्यात्मिकतुष्टिकथनम् ॥

"आध्यात्मिकाः" इति । आध्यात्मिकाः—'प्रकृतिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा ऽस्ति' इति प्रतिपद्य, ततो ऽस्य श्रवणमननादिना विवेकसाक्षात्काराय त्वसदुपदेशतुष्टो यो न प्रयतते तस्याध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रस्तुष्टयो भवन्ति, प्रकृतिव्यतिरिक्तमात्मानमधिकृत्य यस्मात्तास्तुष्टयस्तस्मादाध्यात्मिकाः । कास्ता इत्यत आह—"प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः", प्रकृत्यादिराख्या यासां तास्तथोक्ताः ॥

(२१९) आध्यात्मिकतुष्टिषु प्रथमा प्रकृत्याख्या अम्भः ॥

[1]तत्र प्रकृत्याख्या तुष्टिर्यथा कस्यचिदुपदेशे,—'विवेकसाक्षात्कारो हि प्रकृतिपरिणामभेदस्तञ्च प्रकृतिरेव करोतीति कृतन्तद्ध्यानाभ्यासेन, तस्मादेवमेवास्तु वत्स,'—इति सेयमुपदेष्टव्यस्य तुष्टिः प्रकृतौ, सा तुष्टिः प्रकृत्याख्या अम्भ उच्यते ॥

(२२०) द्वितीया उपादानाख्या सलिलम् ॥

या तु,—'प्राकृत्यपि[2] विवेकख्यातिर्न, सा प्रकृतिमात्राद्भवति,[3] माभूत्सर्वस्य सर्वदा, तन्मात्रस्य सर्वान् प्रत्यविशेषात्; प्रव्रज्यायास्तु सा भवति, तस्मात् प्रव्रज्यामुपाददीथाः, कृतन्ते ध्यानाभ्यासेनायुष्मन्'—इति उपदेशे या तुष्टिः सोपादानाख्या 'सलिलम्' उच्यते ॥

(२२१) तृतीया कालाख्या मेघः ॥

या तु,—'प्रव्रज्या ऽपि न सद्योनिर्वाणदेति सैव कालपरिपाकमपेक्ष्य सिद्धिन्ते विधास्यति, अलमुत्तप्ततया तव'—इति उपदेशे या तुष्टिः सा कालाख्या 'मेघ[4]' उच्यते ॥

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१. अत्रायं सङ्ग्रहश्लोकः—अम्भः सलिलं मेघो वृष्टिः पारं तथा सुपारं च । अन्यच्च पारापारमनुत्तमाम्भ उत्तमाम्भश्च' इति । २. प्रकृत्या निवृत्ता । ३. प्रकृतिमात्राद्विवेकख्यातौ सत्यां प्रकृतेः सर्वं प्रति तुल्यसम्बन्धत्वात् सकलजनस्य विवेकख्यातिः स्यादिति हृदयम् । ४. 'ओघ' इति पाठान्तरम् ।

या तु,–'न प्रकृतेर्न कालान्नाप्युपादानाद्विवेकख्यातिः, अपि तु भाग्यादेव। अत एव मदालसापत्यान्यतिबालानि मातुरुपदेशादेव विवेकख्यातिमन्ति मुक्तानि बभूवुः, तस्माद्भाग्यमेव हेतुर्नान्यत्'–इति उपदेशे या तुष्टिः सा भाग्याख्या 'वृष्टिः' उच्यते ॥

(२२२) चतुर्थी भाग्याख्या वृष्टिः ॥

बाह्या दर्शयति–"बाह्याः" तुष्टयः "विषयोपरमात्, पञ्च"। याः खल्वनात्मनः प्रकृतिमहदहङ्कारादीनात्मेत्यभिमन्यमानस्य वैराग्ये सति तुष्टयस्ता बाह्याः, आत्मज्ञानाभावे सत्यनात्मानमधिकृत्य प्रवृत्तेरिति। ताश्च वैराग्ये सति तुष्टय इति वैराग्यहेतुपञ्चत्वाद्वैराग्याण्यपि पञ्च, तत्पञ्चत्वात् तुष्टयः पञ्चेति। उपरम्यते ऽनेनेत्युपरमो वैराग्यम्, विषयादुपरमो विषयोपरमः। विषया भोग्याः शब्दादयः पञ्च, उपरमा अपि पञ्च ॥

(२२३) पञ्चविधबाह्यतुष्टिकथनम् ॥

तथा हि–अर्जनरक्षणक्षयभोगहिंसादोषदर्शनहेतुजन्मानः पञ्चोपरमा भवन्ति। तथा हि–सेवादयो धनार्जनोपायाः, ते च सेवकादीन् दुःखाकुर्वन्ति,

(२२४) बाह्यतुष्टिषु प्रथमा, पारम् ॥

"दृप्यद्दुरीश्वरद्वाःस्थदण्डिचण्डार्धचन्द्रजाम् ।
वेदनां भावयन् प्राज्ञः कः सेवास्वनुषज्जते" ॥

एवमन्ये ऽप्यर्जनोपायाः दुःखा इति विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सैषा 'पारम्' उच्यते ॥

तथा ऽर्जितन्धनम् [1]राजैकागारिकाग्निजलौघादिभ्यो विनङ्क्ष्यतीति तद्रक्षणे महद्दुःखमिति भावयतो विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सा द्वितीया 'सुपारम्' उच्यते ॥

(२२५) द्वितीया सुपारम् ॥

तथा महता ऽऽयासेनार्जितन्धनं भुज्यमानं क्षीयते इति तत्प्रक्षयम्भावयतो विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सा तृतीया 'पारापारम्' उच्यते ॥

(२२६) तृतीया पारापारम् ॥

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१. एकागारिकः–चौरः ।

एवं शब्दादिभोगाभ्यासात् प्रवर्धन्ते कामाः, ते च विषयाप्राप्तौ कामिनं
(२२७) चतुर्थी, अनुत्तमाम्भः॥ दुःखाकुर्वन्तीति भोगदोषम् भावयतो विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सा चतुर्थी 'अनुत्तमाम्भ' उच्यते॥

एवन्नानुपहत्य भूतानि विषयोपभोगः सम्भवतीति हिंसादोषदर्शनाद्विषयो-
(२२८) पञ्चमी उत्तमाम्भः॥ परमे या तुष्टि. सा पञ्चमी 'उत्तमाम्भ' उच्यते॥

एवमाध्यात्मिकीभिश्चतसृभिः बाह्याभिश्च पञ्चभिः 'नव तुष्टयो ऽभिमताः'॥ ५०॥

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(२२९) सिद्धिभेदकथनम्॥ गौणमुख्यभेदैः सिद्धीराह—

ऊहः शब्दो ऽध्ययनं दुःखविघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः।
दानं च सिद्धयो ऽष्टौ, सिद्धेः पूर्वो ऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः॥ ५१॥

"ऊह" इति। विहन्यमानस्य दुःखस्य त्रित्वात्तद्विघातास्त्रय इतीमा
(२३०) सिद्धिभेदकथनम्॥ मुख्यास्तिस्रः सिद्धयः, तदुपायतया त्वितरा गौण्यः पञ्च सिद्धयः, ता अपि हेतुहेतुमत्तया व्यवस्थिताः। तत्राद्या ऽध्ययनलक्षणा सिद्धिर्हेतुरेव। मुख्यास्तु सिद्धयो हेतुमत्य एव। मध्यमास्तु हेतुहेतुमत्यः॥

विधिवद्गुरुमुखादध्यात्मविद्यानामक्षरस्वरूपग्रहणमध्ययनम् प्रथमा सिद्धि-
(२३१) अध्ययनरूपा प्रथमा सिद्धिः, तारम्॥ स्तारमुच्यते॥

तत्कार्यम् शब्दः; 'शब्दः' इति पदम् शब्दजनितमर्थज्ञानमुपलक्षयति,
(२३२) शब्दरूपा द्वितीया, सुतारम्॥ कार्ये कारणोपचारात्। सा द्वितीया सिद्धिः सुतारमुच्यते। पाठार्थाभ्यान्तदिदन्द्विधा श्रवणम्॥

" ऊहः " तर्कः आगमाविरोधिन्यायेनागमार्थपरीक्षणम्। परीक्षणञ्च संशयपूर्वपक्षनिराकरणेनोत्तरपक्षव्यवस्थापनम्। तदिदम्मननमाचक्षते आगमिनः। सा तृतीया सिद्धिस्तारतारमुच्यते॥

(२३३) ऊहरूपा-तृतीया तारतारम्॥

" [1]सुहृत्प्राप्तिः "। न्यायेन स्वयम्परीक्षितमप्यर्थं न श्रद्धते, न यावद्गुरुशिष्यसब्रह्मचारिभिस्सह संवाद्यते। अतः सुहृदां गुरुशिष्यसब्रह्मचारिणां संवादकानां प्राप्तिः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः सा सिद्धिश्चतुर्थी ' रम्यक ' उच्यते॥

(२३४) सुहृत्प्राप्तिरूपा चँतुर्थी—रम्यकः॥

" दानं " च शुद्धिर्विवेकज्ञानस्य, ' दैप् शोधने ' [पाणिनि ६।४।६८] इत्यस्माद्धातोर्दानपदव्युत्पत्तेः। यथाह भगवान् पतञ्जलिः—" विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवो दुःखत्रयस्य हानोपायः " इति [योगसूत्र २।२६]। ' अविप्लवः ' शुद्धिः, सा च सवासनसंशयविपर्यासानां परिहारेण विवेकसाक्षात्कारस्य स्वच्छप्रवाहे ऽवस्थापनम। सा च न[2] विना ऽऽदरनैरन्तर्यदीर्घकालसेविताभ्यासपरिपाकाद्भवतीति दानेन (विवेकख्यात्याः कार्येण) सो[3] ऽपि संगृहीतः। सेयम्पञ्चमी सिद्धिस्सदामुदितमुच्यते॥

(२३५) दानरूपा पञ्चमी, सदामुदितम्॥

तिस्रश्च मुख्याः सिद्धयः प्रमोदमुदितमोदमाना, इत्यष्टौ सिद्धयः॥

(२३६) दुःखविघातत्रयरूपास्तिस्रो मुख्याः- प्रमोदमुदितमोदमानाः॥

अन्ये व्याचक्षते—विनोपदेशादिना प्राग्भावीयाभ्यासवशात्तत्त्वस्य स्वयमूहनं यत् सा सिद्धिरूहः। यस्य सांख्यशास्त्रपाठमन्यदीयमाकर्ण्य तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा सिद्धिः शब्दः, शब्दपाठादनन्तरम्भावात्। यस्य शिष्याचार्यसम्बन्धेन सांख्यशास्त्रं ग्रन्थतो ऽर्थतश्चाधीत्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा ऽध्ययनहेतुका सिद्धिरध्ययनम्। सुहृत्प्राप्तिरिति

(२३७) गौणसिद्धिपञ्चकस्य प्रकारान्तरेण व्याख्यानम्॥

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१. " मननम् अमननमेवासुहृत्सम्मतम्. इति द्वितीयं मननमाह सुहृत्प्राप्तिरिति " इति पाठान्तरम्।

२. " निबिडादेव नैरन्तर्यम् " इति पाठान्तरम्। ३. अभ्यासो ऽपि।

यस्याधिगततत्त्वं सुहृदं प्राप्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा ज्ञानलक्षणा सिद्धिस्तस्य सुहृत्प्राप्तिः। दानञ्च सिद्धिहेतुः, धनादिदानेनाराधितो ज्ञानी ज्ञानम्प्रयच्छति। अस्य च युक्तायुक्तत्वे सूरिभिरेवावगन्तव्ये इति कृतम्परदोषोद्भावनेन नः सिद्धान्तमात्रव्याख्यानप्रवृत्तानामिति ॥

सिद्धितुष्टिविपर्ययेणाशक्तिर्बुद्धिबधस्सप्तदशधा द्रष्टव्यः। अत्र प्रत्ययसर्गे सिद्धिरुपादेयेति प्रसिद्धमेव। तन्निवारणहेतवस्तु विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टयो हेया इत्याह—"सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः" इति। 'पूर्व' इति विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टीः परामृशति। ताः सिद्धिकरिणीनामङ्कुशो, निवारकत्वात्। अतः सिद्धिपरिपन्थित्वात् विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टयो हेया इत्यर्थः ॥ ५१ ॥

(२३८) प्रत्ययसर्गे विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टीनां सिद्धेरङ्कुशत्वम् ततश्च तासां हेयत्वम् सिद्धेश्चोपादेयत्वम् ॥

स्यादेतत्—पुरुषार्थप्रयुक्ता सृष्टिः। स च पुरुषार्थः प्रत्ययसर्गाद्वा तन्मात्रसर्गाद्वा सिध्यतीति कृतमुभयसर्गेणेत्यत आह—

(२३९) उभयसर्गावश्यकत्वशङ्का ॥

न विना भावैर्लिङ्गं, न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः।
लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ॥ ५२ ॥

"न विना" इति।[1] "लिङ्गम्" इति तन्मात्रसर्गमुपलक्षयति, "भावैः" इति च प्रत्ययसर्गम्। एतदुक्तम्भवति—तन्मात्रसर्गस्य पुरुषार्थसाधनत्वं स्वरूपञ्च न प्रत्ययसर्गाद्विना भवति, एवं प्रत्ययसर्गस्य स्वरूपं पुरुषार्थसाधनत्वञ्च न तन्मात्रसर्गादृते, इत्युभयथा सर्गप्रवृत्तिः। भोगः पुरुषार्थो न भोग्यान् शब्दादीन् भोगायतनं शरीरद्वयञ्चान्तरेण सम्भवतीत्युपपन्नस्तन्मात्रसर्गः। एवं स एव भोगो भोगसाधनानीन्द्रियाण्यन्तःकरणानि चान्तरेण

(२४०) उभयविधसर्गावश्यकत्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥

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१. चन्द्रिकायामन्यथा वर्णनम्—। 'लिङ्गाख्यः' लिङ्ग्यते अनुमीयत एव न साक्षात् क्रियते—स महदाद्यतीन्द्रियवर्गः। 'भावाख्यः' भूयते प्राप्यते इन्द्रियेणेति विषयवर्गः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धः ॥

न सम्भवति । न च तानि धर्मादीन् भावान् विना सम्भवन्ति । न चापवर्गहेतुर्विवेकख्यातिरुभयसर्गं विना । इत्युपपन्न उभयविधः सर्गः ॥

अनादित्वाच्च बीजाङ्कुरवन्नान्योन्याश्रयदोषमावहति, कल्पादावपि प्राचीनकल्पोत्पन्नभावलिङ्गसंस्कारवशाद्भावलिङ्गयोरुत्पत्तिर्नानुपपन्नेति सर्वमवदातम् ॥ ५२ ॥

(२४१) उभयविधसर्गे अन्योन्याश्रयदोषपरिहारः ॥

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(२४२) भूतसर्गविभागः ॥

विभक्तः प्रत्यसर्गः । भूतादिसर्गं विभजते—

अष्टविकल्पो दैवस्तैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति ।
मानुषश्चैकविधः, समासतो भौतिकः सर्गः ॥ ५३ ॥

"अष्टविकल्प" इति । ब्राह्मः, प्राजापत्यः, ऐन्द्रः, पैत्रो, गान्धर्वो, याक्षो, राक्षसः, पैशाचः, इत्यष्टविधो "दैवः" सर्गः ॥

(२४३) तत्र-(१) दैवो ऽष्टविधः ॥

"तैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति," पशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृपस्थावराः ॥

(२४४) (२) तैर्यग्योनःपञ्चधा ॥

"मानुषश्चैकविधः" इति, ब्राह्मणत्वाद्यवान्तरजातिभेदाविवक्षया, संस्थानस्य चतुर्ष्वपि वर्णेष्वविशेषात् । इति "समासतः" संक्षेपतः "भौतिकः सर्गः" । घटादयस्त्वशरीरत्वेऽपि स्थावरा एवेति ॥ ५३ ॥

(२४५) (३) मानुष एकविधः ॥

भौतिकस्यास्य सर्गस्य चैतन्योत्कर्षनिकर्षतारतम्याभ्यामूर्ध्वाधोमध्यभावेन त्रैविध्यमाह—

(२४६) भौतिकसर्गे गुणभेदादूर्ध्वाधोमध्यभावकथनम् ॥

ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालस्तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः ।
मध्ये रजोविशालो, ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः ॥ ५४ ॥

"ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालः" इति। द्युप्रभृतिसत्यान्तो लोकः सत्त्वबहुलः। "तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः", पश्वादिस्थावरान्तः सोऽयम्मोहमयत्वात्तमोबहुलः। भूर्लोकस्तु सप्तद्वीपसमुद्रसन्निवेशो "मध्ये रजोविशालो" धर्माधर्मानुष्ठानपरत्वाद्दुःखबहुलत्वाच्च। तामिमां लोकसंस्थितिं संक्षिपति "ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः", स्तम्बग्रहणेन वृक्षादयः संगृहीताः॥ ५४॥

(२४७) ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वप्रधानाः-मध्ये रजःप्रधानाः-अन्ते तमःप्रधानाः॥

तदेवं सर्गं दर्शयित्वा तस्यापवर्गसाधनवैराग्योपयोगिनीं दुःखहेतुतामाह—

(२४८) सर्गस्य दुःखहेतुता॥

तत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखम्प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः।
लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेस्तस्माद्दुःखं स्वभावेन॥ ५५॥

"तत्र" इति। 'तत्र' शरीरादौ। यद्यपि विविधा विचित्रानन्दभोगभागिनः प्राणभृद्देहाः, तथाऽपि सर्वेषां जरामरणकृतं दुःखमविशिष्टम्। सर्वस्य खलु कृमरेपि मरणत्रासो—'मा न भूवम्' 'भूयासम्' इत्येवमात्मकोऽस्ति। दुःखं च भयहेतुरिति दुःखम्मरणम्॥

स्यादेतत्—दुःखादयः प्राकृता बुद्धिगुणाः, तत्कथमेते चेतनसम्बन्धिनो भवन्तीत्यत आह—"पुरुष" इति। पुरि लिङ्गे शेते इति पुरुषः, लिङ्गञ्च तत्सम्बन्धीति चेतनोऽपि तत्सम्बन्धी भवतीत्यर्थः॥

(२४९) प्राकृतगुणभूतदुःखादीनां पुरुषेण सह सम्बन्धप्रदर्शनम्॥

कुतः पुनर्लिङ्गसम्बन्धि दुःखम्पुरुषस्य चेतनस्येत्यत आह—"लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेः" — पुरुषाद्भेदाग्रहाल्लिङ्गधर्मानात्मन्यध्यवस्यति पुरुषः। अथवा दुःखप्राप्ताववधिराङा[1] कथ्यते लिङ्गम् यावन्न निवर्तते तावदिति॥ ५५॥

(२५०) पुरुषप्रकृतिभेदाग्रहनिबन्धनः पुरुषे दुःखाध्यवसायः॥

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१. आविनिवृत्तेरित्यत्र 'आङ्'—उपसर्गेणेत्यर्थः।

(२५१) सृष्टिकारणविप्रतिपत्तिनिराकरणम् ॥

उक्तस्य सर्गस्य कारणविप्रतिपत्तीर्निराकरोति—

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।
प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थ इव परार्थ आरम्भः ॥ ५६ ॥

"इत्येष" इति । आरभ्यते इति "आरम्भः" सर्गः महदादिभूतः प्रकृत्यैव कृतो नेश्वरेण, न ब्रह्मोपादानो, नाप्यकारणः । अकारणत्वे ह्यत्यन्ताभावो ऽत्यन्तभावो वा स्यात् । न ब्रह्मोपादानः, चितिशक्तेरपरिणामात् । नेश्वराधिष्ठितप्रकृतिकृतो, निर्व्यापारस्याधिष्ठातृत्वासम्भवात् । न हि निर्व्यापारस्तक्षा वास्याद्यधितिष्ठति ॥

(२५२) चार्वाकवेदान्तन्यायमतदूषणम् ॥

ननु प्रकृतिकृतश्चेत्, तस्या नित्यायाः प्रवृत्तिशीलाया अनुपरमात् सदैव सर्गः स्यादिति न कश्चिन्मुच्येतेत्यत आह—"प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थ इव परार्थ आरम्भः" इति । यथौदनकाम ओदनाय पाके प्रवृत्तः ओदनसिद्धौ निवर्तते,—एवं प्रत्येकम्पुरुषान् मोचयितुम्प्रवृत्ता प्रकृतिर्यं पुरुषम्मोचयति तम्प्रति पुनर्न प्रवर्तते—तदिदमाह—'स्वार्थ इव,' स्वार्थे यथा तथा परार्थे आरम्भ इत्यर्थः ॥ ५६ ॥

(२५३) नित्यप्रवृत्तिशीलप्रकृतिकृतसृष्टिपक्षे संसृतिनित्यत्वस्यानिर्मोक्षस्य च प्रसङ्गशङ्का-तन्निरासश्च ॥

स्यादेतत्—'स्वार्थं परार्थं वा चेतनः प्रवर्तते । न च प्रकृतिरचेतनैवं भवितुमर्हति तस्मादस्ति प्रकृतेरधिष्ठाता चेतनः । न च क्षेत्रज्ञाश्चेतना अपि प्रकृतिमधिष्ठातुमर्हन्ति, तेषां प्रकृतिस्वरूपानभिज्ञत्वात् । तस्मादस्ति सर्वार्थदर्शी प्रकृतेरधिष्ठाता, स चेश्वर'—इत्यत आह—

(२५४) अचेतनप्रधानप्रवृत्तिशङ्का ।

वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।
पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥

"वत्सविवृद्धिनिमितम्" इति । दृष्टमचेतनमपि प्रयोजनम्प्रवर्तमानम्, यथा वत्सविवृद्ध्यर्थं क्षीरमचेतनम् प्रवर्तते । एवम्प्रकृतिरचेतना ऽपि पुरुषविमोक्षणाय प्रवर्तिष्यते ॥

(२५५) तत्परिहारः–क्षीरप्रवृत्तिवत्तस्याः प्रवृत्तिः ॥

न च–'क्षीरप्रवृत्तेरपीश्वराधिष्ठाननिबन्धनत्वेन साध्यत्वान्न साध्यव्यभिचार' इति, साम्प्रतम्प्रेक्षावतः प्रवृत्तेः स्वार्थकारुण्याभ्यां व्याप्तत्वात्। ते च जगत्सर्गाद्व्यावर्तमाने प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्तिपूर्वकत्वमपि व्यावर्तयतः । न ह्यवाप्तसकलेप्सितस्य भगवतो जगत् सृजतः किमप्यभिलषितम्भवति। नापि कारुण्यादस्य सर्गे प्रवृत्तिः, प्राक् सर्गाज्जीवानामिन्द्रियशरीरविषयानुत्पत्तौ दुःखाभावेन कस्य प्रहाणेच्छा कारुण्यम् ? सर्गोत्तरकालं दुःखिनो ऽवलोक्य कारुण्याभ्युपगमे दुरुत्तरमितरेतराश्रयत्वन्दूषणम्,–कारुण्येन सृष्टिः सृष्ट्या च कारुण्यमिति। अपि च करुणया प्रेरित ईश्वरः सुखिन एव जन्तून् सृजेन्न विचित्रान्। 'कर्मवैचित्र्याद्वैचित्र्यम्' इति चेत्–कृतमस्य प्रेक्षावतः कर्माधिष्ठानेन, तदनधिष्ठानमात्रादेवाचेतनस्यापि कर्मणः प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेस्तत्कार्यशरीरेन्द्रियविषयानुत्पत्तौ दुःखानुत्पत्तेरपि सुकरत्वात् ॥

(२५६) ईश्वराधिष्ठितप्रधानसृष्टौ दोषाः ॥

प्रकृतेस्त्वचेतनायाः प्रवृत्तेर्न स्वार्थानुग्रहो न वा कारुण्यम्प्रयोजकमिति नोक्तदोषप्रसङ्गावतारः । पारार्थ्यमात्रन्तु प्रयोजकमुपपद्यते । तस्मात् सुष्ठूक्तम्–"वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम्' इति ॥ ५७ ॥

(२५७) प्रकृतिसृष्टौ तद्दोषाभावः ॥

"स्वार्थ इव" इति दृष्टान्तितम् [कारिका. ५६] तद्विभजते—

(२५८) पुरुषविमोक्षार्थम् प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिः ॥

औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥ ५८ ॥

"औत्सुक्य–" इति । औत्सुक्यमिच्छा, सा खल्विष्यमाणप्राप्तौ निवर्तते । इष्यमाणश्च स्वार्थः, इष्टलक्षणत्वात् फलस्य । दार्ष्टान्तिके योजयति– "पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थम्प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम्" इति ॥ ५८ ॥

ननु भवतु पुरुषार्थः प्रकृतेः प्रवर्तकः, निवृत्तिस्तु कुतस्त्या प्रकृतेः इत्यत आह––

(२५९) विवेकख्यात्यनन्तरम् प्रधाननिवृत्तिः ॥

रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।
पुरुषस्य तथाऽऽत्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ ५९ ॥

"रङ्गस्य" इति, स्थानेन स्थानिनः पारिषदानुपलक्षयति । 'आत्मानम्' शब्दाद्यात्मना पुरुषाद्भेदेन च प्रकाश्येत्यर्थः ॥ ५९ ॥

स्यादेतत्–'प्रवर्तताम्प्रकृतिः पुरुषार्थम् । पुरुषादुपकृतात्प्रकृतिर्लप्स्यते कञ्चिदुपकारम्, आज्ञासम्पादनाराधितादिवाज्ञापयितुर्भुजिष्या । तथा च न परार्थोऽस्या आरम्भः'–इत्यत आह—

(२६०) गुणवत्याः प्रकृतेः प्रत्युपकारं विनैव पुरुषोपकारः ॥

नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिण्यनुपाकरिणः पुंसः ।
गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थकञ्चरति ॥ ६० ॥

"नाना–" इति । यथा गुणवानुपकार्यपि भृत्यो निर्गुणेऽत एवानुपकारिणि स्वामिनि निष्फलाराधनः, एवमियम्प्रकृतिस्तपस्विनी गुणवत्युपकारिण्यनुपकारिणि पुरुषे व्यर्थपरिश्रमेति पुरुषार्थमेव यतते न स्वार्थमिति सिद्धम् ॥ ६० ॥

स्यादेतत्—'नर्तकी नृत्यम्परिषद्भ्यो दर्शयित्वा निवृत्ताऽपि पुनस्तद्दृष्टिकौतूहलात् प्रवर्तते यथा, तथा प्रकृतिरपि पुरुषार्थायात्मानं दर्शयित्वा निवृत्ता ऽपि पुनः प्रवर्त्स्यति'—इत्यत आह—

(२६१) विवेकख्यात्यनन्तरम् प्रधानस्यात्यन्तिकी निवृत्तिः ॥

प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरन्न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।
या दृष्टा ऽस्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥[1]

"प्रकृतेः" इति । सुकुमारतरता ऽतिपेशलता, परपुरुषदर्शनासहिष्णुतेति यावत् । असूर्यम्पश्या हि कुलवधूरतिमन्दाक्षमन्थरा प्रमादाद्विगलितसिचयाञ्चला चेदालोक्यते परपुरुषेण, तदा ऽसौ यथा प्रयतते, अप्रमत्ता यथैनां पर-

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१.—अस्याः कारिकाया अनन्तरमेवान्ययैकया कारिकया भवितव्यमिति स्वर्गतस्य तिलकान्वयजस्य बालगङ्गाधरपण्डितस्य सिद्धान्तः । तत्संक्षेपस्तु—

" 'सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थाः' इतीश्वरकृष्णवचनानुरोधेनार्याणां सप्तत्या भाव्यम् । किन्तु गौडपादभाष्ये त्वेकोनसप्ततिरेवोपलभ्यते । भाष्यं चैकषष्टितमाया उपरि नैकस्या अपि तु कारिकयोः । अत एकषष्टितमाया अनन्तरमेवानया लुप्तया कारिकया भाव्यम् । भाष्यगतप्रतीकानुरोधेन चैषा कारिकैवं निर्मातुं शक्यते—

कारणमीश्वरमेके ब्रुवते कालं परे स्वभावं वा ।
प्रजाः कथं निर्गुणतो व्यक्तः कालः स्वभावश्च ॥

अस्ति चास्याः कारिकायाः पूर्वापरसन्दर्भसङ्गतिः । निरीश्वरत्वप्रतिपादकत्वाच्च केनचिदसहिष्णुना च्यावितेयम् । किन्तु भाष्यच्यावनमसौ विस्मृतवान् । पूर्वेषां मते स्वभावस्य, कालस्य, ईश्वरस्य वा जगन्मूलत्वमिति श्वेताश्वतरमन्त्रेण द्योत्यते—

स्वभावमेके कवयो वदन्ति कालं तथान्ये परिमुह्यमानाः ।
देवस्यैष महिमा तु लोके येनेदं भ्राम्यते ब्रह्मचक्रम् ॥ " इति

अस्या नष्टायाः कारिकायाः पूर्वार्द्धमस्मन्मतानुसारेण त्वेवं पठनीयम् ।—

'कारणमीश्वरमेके पुरुषं कालं परे स्वभावं वा ।'

सूर्यनारायणशास्त्रिणा च कृतमेतत्कारिकाखण्डनं न सयुक्तिकम् । तन्मतानुरोधेनैकषष्टितमकारिकाया भाष्यस्यान्तिमे कृतः, वृत्तौ च माठरेण कृतः सुकुमारतरमितिशब्दस्य परामर्शः, प्रकृतकारिकां विहायान्यस्याः कारिकाया भाष्यवृत्त्योः सम्भावनां निराकरोति । एतदत्र विचारणीयम्—

पुरुषान्तराणि न पुनः पश्यन्ति,-एवम्प्रकृतिरपि कुलवधूतो ऽप्यधिका दृष्टा विवेकेन न पुनर्दृश्यत इत्यर्थः ।। ६१ ॥

भाष्यस्यादिमे भाग एवं पठयते—' अहमनेन पुरुषेण दृष्टाऽस्मीत्यस्य पुंसः पुनर्दर्शनं नायेति, पुरुषस्यादर्शनमुपयातीत्यर्थः । तत्र सुकुमारतरं वर्णयति—'एतदनन्तरं भाष्यचरमभागः—'न पुनर्दर्शनमुपयाति पुरुषस्य' इति पठनीयः । 'सुकुमारतरं वर्णयति' इत्यनन्तरं ' केचिदीश्वरं कारणं ब्रुवते ' इत्यादिपाठस्तु नितरामसङ्गत एव। नहीश्वरादीनां कारणत्वं प्रकृतेःसुकुमारतरत्ववर्णनम् । अतो ध्रुवं केनचिदीश्वरनिरासासहिष्णुना कारिकेयं लोपिता । अन्येन च केनचिद्वराकेण भाष्यमेतन्मूलकारिकाविहीनमिति मत्वा तथैकषष्टितमकारिकाभाष्यान्तर्निवेशितं यथा स्थूलदर्शनैरपि विभाव्यते । अत एव ' न पुनर्दर्शनमुपयाति पुरुषस्य ' इत्येतदनन्तरं तेन ' अत प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं सुभोग्यतरं न किञ्चिदीश्वरादिकारणमस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ' इति सङ्गत्यर्थं प्रक्षिप्तम् । यथा च नैतत्सङ्गच्छते तथा स्फुटमेव । परं च, ईश्वरादीनां सुभोग्यत्वादिकथनमपि भृशमनर्थकम् । एवं माठरवृत्तावपि यथाकथञ्चित् संग्रन्थनमेव । अतो वाचस्पत्या॰ दीनां पुरत एव लुप्तेयं कारिका ।

यस्तु ' ननु ईश्वरनिरासासहिष्णुत्वं कारिकाविलोपे प्रयोजकं चेत्, कथं नाम तद्भाष्यविलोपे प्रयोजकं न स्यात् ' इति सूर्यनारायणशास्त्र्यभिप्रायस्तत्र ब्रूमः—यस्य खलु कुटिलमतेः स्वानभिमतेयं कारिका दृष्टिपथं याता, न तस्य भाष्यं दृग्गोचरीभूतमिति सम्भाव्यते । न खलु भाष्यकारिकयोरव्यभिचारि सहावस्थानं, येन कारिकां निस्सारयन् भाष्यमपि बहिः कुर्यात् । भाष्यं चास्मद्भाग्यवशान्न तद्धस्ते पतितम् । अतस्तादृशकुटिलमत्यनन्तरभाविभिर्लेखकैर्लेखकेन वा मूलकारिकाविहीनं भाष्यमेतद्विलोक्य यथाकथञ्चिदेकषष्टितमकारिकाभाष्ये नियोजितमिति राद्धान्तः ॥

अधुनापि प्राचीनहस्तलिखितपुस्तकेषु मूलग्रंथः टीकाग्रंथश्च पृथक् पृथक् लेखनावस्थितित्वेन दृश्येते । तेन मूलग्रंथस्थिता कारिका च्याविर्तेव । भाष्यग्रंथस्य तत्समये अप्राप्तत्वात् भाष्यस्य अद्यापि स्थितिरस्ति । [हरदत्तशर्मा]

स्यादेतत्–" पुरुषश्चेदगुणोऽपरिणामी, कथमस्य मोक्षः ? मुचेर्बन्धनविश्लेषार्थत्वात्, सवासनक्लेशकर्माशयानाञ्च बन्धनसमाख्यानां पुरुषेऽपरिणामिन्यसम्भवात्। अत एवास्य च पुरुषस्य न संसारः प्रेत्यभावापरनामाऽस्ति, निष्क्रियत्वात्। तस्मात् 'पुरुषविमोक्षार्थम्' इति रिक्तं वचः "–इतीमां शङ्कामुपसंहारव्याजेनाभ्युपगच्छन्नपाकरोति ॥

(२६२) निर्गुणपुरुषमोक्षसंसाराद्यसम्भवशङ्का ॥

तस्मान्न बध्यतेऽद्धा न मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित्।
संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥ ६२ ॥

" तस्मात् " इति। अद्धा न कश्चित् पुरुषो बध्यते, न कश्चित् संसरति; न कश्चिन्मुच्यते। प्रकृतिरेव तु नानाश्रया सती बध्यते संसरति मुच्यते चेति। बन्धमोक्षसंसाराः पुरुषेषूपचर्यन्ते। यथा जयपराजयौ भृत्यगतावपि स्वामिन्युपचर्येते, तदाश्रयेण भृत्यानान्तद्भागित्वात्, तत्फलस्य च शोकलाभादेः स्वामिनि सम्भवात्। भोगापवर्गयोः प्रकृतिगतयोरपि विवेकाग्रहात् पुरुषसम्बन्ध उपपादित इति सर्वम्पुष्कलम् ॥ ६२ ॥

(२६३) तत्परिहारः- प्रकृतिगतानां संसारादीनां पुरुषे उपचारः ॥

नन्ववगतम् 'प्रकृतिगता बन्धसंसारापवर्गाः पुरुषे उपचर्यन्ते' इति। किंसाधनाः पुनरेते प्रकृतेः? इत्यत आह—

(२६४) प्रकृत्या धर्मादिसप्तरूपैर्बन्धनमेकरूपेण तत्त्वज्ञानरूपेण च मोक्षणम् ॥

रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः।
सैव च पुरुषार्थम्प्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥

" रूपैः " इति। तत्त्वज्ञानवर्जं बध्नाति धर्मादिभिस्सप्तभी रूपैर्भावैरिति। " पुरुषार्थम्प्रति " भोगापवर्गम्प्रति " आत्मनाऽऽत्मानम्[1] " एकरूपेण तत्त्वज्ञानेन विवेकख्यात्या विमोचयति, पुनर्भोगापवर्गौ न करोतीत्यर्थः ॥ ६३ ॥

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१. 'आत्मना' बुद्धिरूपेण, 'आत्मानम्' पुरुषमिति चन्द्रिका।

अवगतमीदृशं तत्त्वम्,ततः किमित्यत आह—

एवन्तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम्।
अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम्॥ ६४॥

(२६५) अभ्यासात्तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पत्तिः॥

"एवम्" इति। तत्त्वेन विषयेण तत्त्वज्ञानमुपलक्षयति। उक्तरूपप्रकारतत्त्वविषयज्ञानाभ्यासादादरनैरन्तर्यदीर्घकालसेवितात् सत्त्वपुरुषान्यतासाक्षात्कारिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते। यद्विषयश्चाभ्यासस्तद्विषयकमेव साक्षात्कारमुपजनयति,—तत्त्वविषयश्चाभ्यास इति तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारं जनयति। अत उक्तम्—"विशुद्धम्" इति॥

(२६६) तत्त्वज्ञानस्य विशुद्धिहेतुः अविपर्ययत्वम्॥

कुतो विशुद्धमित्यत आह—"अविपर्ययात" इति। संशयविपर्ययौ हि ज्ञानस्याविशुद्धी, तद्रहितम् विशुद्धन्तदिदमुक्तम्—"अविपर्ययात्" इति। नियतमनियततया गृह्णन् संशयो ऽपि विपर्ययः, तेन 'अविपर्ययात्' इति संशयविपर्ययाभावो दर्शितः। तत्त्वविषयत्वाच्च संशयविपर्ययाभावः॥

(२६७) अनादेर्मिथ्याज्ञानसंस्कारस्यादिमता तत्त्वज्ञानसंस्कारेण समुच्छेदः॥

स्यादेतत्—'उत्पद्यतामीदृशाभ्यासात् तत्त्वज्ञानम्, तथा ऽप्यनादिना मिथ्याज्ञानसंस्कारेण मिथ्याज्ञानं जनयितव्यम्, तथा च तन्निबन्धनस्य संसारस्यानुच्छेदप्रसङ्ग इत्यत उक्तम्—"केवलम्" इति=विपर्ययेणासम्भिन्नम्। यद्यप्यानादिर्विपर्ययवासना तथा ऽपि तत्त्वज्ञानवासनयतत्त्वविषयसाक्षात्कारमादधत्या ऽऽदिमत्या ऽपि शक्या समुच्छेत्तुम्। तत्त्वपक्षपातो हि धियां स्वभावः, यदाहुर्बाह्या अपि—

"निरुपद्रवभूतार्थस्वभावस्य विपर्ययैः।
न बाधो ऽयत्नवत्त्वे ऽपि बुद्धेस्तत्पक्षपाततः" इति॥

ज्ञानस्वरूपमुक्तम्-"नास्मि, न मे, नाहम्" इति। 'नास्मि' इत्यात्मनि क्रियामात्रन्निषेधति। यथाहुः 'कृभ्वस्तयः क्रियासामान्यवचनाः' इति [सिद्धान्तकौमुदी.]। तथा चाध्यवसायाभिमानसङ्कल्पालोचनानि चान्तराणि बाह्याश्च सर्वे व्यापारा आत्मनि प्रतिबद्धानि बोद्धव्यानि। यतश्चात्मनि व्यापारावेशो नास्त्यतो 'नाहम्'[1]। अहमिति कर्तृपदम्, 'अहञ्जानाम्यहं जुहोम्यहन्ददे' इति सर्वत्र कर्तुः परामर्शात्। निष्क्रियत्वे च सर्वत्र कर्तृत्वाभावः। ततः सुष्ठूक्तम्-"नाहम्" इति। अत एव "न मे"। कर्ता हि स्वामितां लभते, तस्मात् कुतः स्वाभाविकी स्वामितेत्यर्थः। अथवा "नास्मि" इति "पुरुषो ऽस्मि, न प्रसवधर्मा"। अप्रसवधर्मित्वाच्चाकर्तृत्वमाह-"नाहम्" इति। अकर्तृत्वाच्च न स्वामितेत्यत आह-"न मे" इति॥

(२६८) तत्त्वज्ञानस्वरूपप्रदर्शनम्-सर्वविपर्याहङ्कारनिवृत्तिः॥

ननु 'एतावत्सु ज्ञातेष्वपि कश्चित् कदाचिदज्ञातो विषयो ऽस्ति, तदज्ञानं जन्तून् बन्धयिष्यति' इत्यत आह-"अपरिशेषम्" इति। नास्ति किञ्चिदस्मिन् परिशिष्टम् ज्ञातव्यम् यदज्ञानं बन्धयिष्यतीत्यर्थः॥ ६४॥

(२६९) तत्त्वज्ञानस्यापरिशेषत्वम्॥

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(२७०) तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारफलम्॥

किं पुनरीदृशेन तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारेण सिध्यतीत्यत आह—

तेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशात् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम्।
प्रकृतिम् पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः [2]स्वच्छः॥६५॥

"तेन[3]" इति। भोगविवेकसाक्षात्कारौ हि प्रकृतेः प्रसोतव्यौ। तौ च प्रसूताविति नास्याः प्रसोतव्यमवशिष्यत इति निवृत्तप्रसवा प्रकृतिः। विवेकज्ञानरूपो यो ऽर्थस्तस्य वशः सामर्थ्यम् तस्मात्। अतत्त्वज्ञानपूर्वकाणि खलु धर्माधर्माज्ञानवैराग्यावैराग्यैश्वर्यानैश्वर्याणि। वैराग्यमपि केवलतौष्टिकानामतत्त्वज्ञानपूर्वकमेव। तत्र तत्त्वज्ञानं विरोधित्वेनातत्त्वज्ञानमुच्छिनत्ति। कारण-

१. 'नाहमिति' तादात्म्यनिषेध इति केचित् २. "सुस्थ" इति पाठान्तरम्। ३. विशुद्धकेवलज्ञानेनेति यावत्।

निवृत्त्या च सप्तरूपाणि निवर्तन्त इति "सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ता प्रकृतिः" "अवस्थित" इति निष्क्रियः, "स्वच्छः" इति रजस्तमोवृत्तिकलुषया बुद्ध्या ऽसम्भिन्नः। सात्त्विक्या तु बुद्ध्या तदा ऽप्यस्य मनाक् सम्भेदो ऽस्त्येव, अन्यथैवम्भूतप्रकृतिदर्शनानुपपत्तेरिति ॥ ६५ ॥

स्यादेतत्–' निवृत्तप्रसवामिति न मृष्यामहे। संयोगकृतो हि सर्ग इत्युक्तम्, योग्यता च संयोगः, भोक्तृत्वयोग्यता च पुरुषस्य चैतन्यम्, भोग्यत्वयोग्यता च प्रकृतेर्जडत्वम् विषयत्वञ्च । न चैतयोरस्ति निवृत्तिः। न च करणीयाभावान्निवृत्तिः, तज्जातीयस्यान्यस्य करणीयत्वात् पुनः पुनः शब्दाद्युपभोगवत् '–इत्यत आह—

(२७१) एकविषयमपेक्ष्य निवृत्ताया अपि प्रकृतेर्विषयान्तरं प्रति प्रवृत्तिशङ्का ॥

दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षक एको, दृष्टा ऽहमित्युपरमत्यन्या ।
सति संयोगे ऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनन्नास्ति सर्गस्य ॥ ६६ ॥

"दृष्टा" इति। करोतु नाम पौनःपुन्येन शब्दाद्युपभोगम्प्रकृतिर्यया विवेकख्यातिर्न कृता, कृतविवेकख्यातिस्तु शब्दाद्युपभोगन्न जनयति। अविवेकख्यातिनिबन्धनो हि तदुपभोगो, निबन्धनाभावे न तद्भवितुमर्हति, अंकुर इव बीजाभावे। प्राकृतान् हि सुखदुःखमोहात्मनः शब्दादींस्तदविवेकात् 'ममैतत्' इत्यभिमन्यमान आत्मा भुञ्जीत । एवं विवेकख्यातिमपि प्राकृतीमविवेकादेवात्मा 'मदर्थेयम्' इति मन्यते। उत्पन्नविवेकख्यातिस्तु तदसंसर्गाच्छब्दादीन्नोपभोक्तुमर्हति नापि विवेकख्यातिम्प्राकृतीमपि कर्तुम्। ततो विविक्त[1] आत्मा न स्वार्थमभिमन्तुमर्हति पुरुषार्थौ च भोगविवेकौ प्रकृत्यारम्भप्रयोजकावित्यपुरुषार्थौ सन्तौ न प्रकृतिं प्रयोजयतः। तदिदमुक्तम्–" प्रयोजनन्नास्ति सर्गस्य" इति। अथ प्रयुज्यते सर्गे प्रकृतिरनेनेति प्रयोजनम्, तदपुरुषार्थे नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥ ६६ ॥

(२७२) तन्निरासः ॥

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१. उत्पन्नविवेकख्यातिः

(२७३) विविक्तस्यात्मनो देहपातात्प्रकृतिदर्शनासम्भवशङ्का ॥

स्यादेतत्–"उत्पन्नतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारश्चेत्तदनन्तरमेव मुक्तस्य तस्य देहपातः स्यादिति कथमदेहः प्रकृतिम्पश्येत् । अथ तत्त्वज्ञाने ऽपि न मुच्यते कर्मणामप्रक्षीणत्वात्? तेषां कुतः प्रक्षयः? 'भोगात्' इति चेत्, हन्त भोस्तत्त्वज्ञानन्न मोक्षसाधनम्–इति 'व्यक्ताव्यक्तविज्ञानजन्मना तत्त्वज्ञानेनापवर्ग' इति रिक्तं वचः । 'भोगेन चापरिसंख्येयः कर्माशयप्रचयो ऽनियतविपाककालः क्षेतव्यः, ततश्चापवर्गप्राप्तिः' इत्यपि मनोरथमात्रम्" इत्यत आह—

सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमात् धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ ।
तिष्ठति संस्कारवशात्, चक्रभ्रमिवद्धृतशरीरः ॥ ६७ ॥

(२७४) तन्निरासः- विविक्तस्यापि संस्कारवशाच्छरीरधारणम् ॥

"सम्यक्" इति । तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारोदयादेवानादिरप्यनियतविपाककालो ऽपि कर्माशयप्रचयो दग्धबीजभावतया न जात्यायुर्भोगलक्षणाय फलाय कल्पते । क्लेशसलिलावसिक्तायां हि बुद्धिभूमौ कर्मबीजान्यङ्कुरं प्रसुवते । तत्त्वज्ञाननिदाघनिपीतसकलक्लेशसलिलायामूषरायां कुतः कर्मबीजानामङ्कुरप्रसवः? तदिदमुक्तम्–"धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ" इति, अकारणत्वप्राप्तावित्यर्थः । उत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानो ऽपि च संस्कारवशात् तिष्ठति, यथोपरते ऽपि कुलालव्यापारे चक्रं वेगाख्यसंस्कारवशात् भ्रमत् तिष्ठति । कालपरिपाकवशात्तूपरते संस्कारे निष्क्रियम्भवति । शरीरस्थितौ च प्रारब्धपरिपाकौ धर्माधर्मौ संस्कारौ । तथा चानुश्रूयते–"भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वा ऽथ सम्पद्यते" इति "तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्ये ऽथ सम्पत्स्ये" इति च [छान्दोग्य, ६।१४।२]। प्रक्षीयमाणाविद्यासंस्कारावशेषश्च संस्कारस्तद्वशात् तत्सामर्थ्यात् धृतशरीरस्तिष्ठति ॥ ६७ ॥

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(२७५) शरीरनाशे ऐकान्तिकात्यन्तिकमुक्तिः ॥

स्यादेतत्–"यदि संस्कारशेषादपि धृतशरीरस्तथा ऽपि कदा ऽस्य मोक्षो भविष्यति?" इत्यत आह—

प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ ।
ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥

" प्राप्ते " इति । अनारब्धविपाकानान्तावत् कर्माशयानां तत्त्वज्ञानाग्निना बीजभावो दग्धः । प्रारब्धविपाकानान्तूपभोगेन क्षये सति, " प्राप्ते, शरीरभेदे " इति=विनाशे–" चरितार्थत्वात् " इति=कृतप्रयोजनत्वात् । प्रधानस्य तम्पुरुषम्प्रति विनिवृत्तौ–" ऐकान्तिकम् "=अवश्यम्भावि " आत्यन्तिकम् "=अविनाशि-इत्युभयं " कैवल्यम् " दुःखत्रयविगमम्प्राप्नोति पुरुषः ॥ ६८ ॥

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(२७६) सांख्यशास्त्रस्य परमर्षिप्रणीतत्वम्

प्रमाणेनोपपादितेऽप्यत्यन्तश्रद्धोत्पादनाय परमर्षिपूर्वकत्वमाह—

पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यम्परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम् ।
स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥ ६९ ॥

" पुरुष " इति । " गुह्यम् " गुहानिवासि, स्थूलधियां दुर्बोधमिति यावत् । " परमर्षिणा " कपिलेन तामेव श्रद्धामागमिकत्वेन द्रढयति– " स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् " इति । ' यत्र ' ज्ञाने=यदर्थम्, यथा ' चर्मणि द्वीपिनं हन्ति ' इति । " भूतानाम् "= प्राणिनां " स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाः " आगमैः " चिन्त्यन्ते " ॥ ६९ ॥

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(२७७) सांख्यशास्त्रस्य गुरुशिष्यपरम्परा कपिलादारभ्य पञ्चशिखपर्यन्तम् ॥

स्यादेतत्–" यत् परमर्षिणा साक्षात्कथितम् तच्छ्रद्धीमहि, यत्पुनरीश्वरकृष्णेन कथितम् तत्र कुतः श्रद्धा ? "—इत्यत आह—

एतत् पवित्रमग्र्यं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।
आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय, तेन च बहुधा कृतन्तन्त्रम् ॥ ७० ॥

" एतत् " इति । " एतत् पवित्रम् "=पावनम्–दुःखत्रयहेतोः पाप्मनः पुनातीति–" अग्र्यम् "=सर्वेभ्यः पवित्रेभ्यो मुख्यम्, " मुनिः " कपिलः

आसुरये ऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ, आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय, तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम्" ॥ ७० ॥

शिष्यपरम्परया ऽऽगतमीश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ।
संक्षिप्तमार्यमतिना सम्यग्विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ ७१ ॥

(२७८) ईश्वरकृष्णस्य गुरुशिष्यपरम्परा ॥

"शिष्य" इति । आरात् याता तत्त्वेभ्य इत्यार्या, आर्या मतिर्यस्य सो ऽयम् "आर्यमतिः" इति ॥७१॥

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(२७९) सप्ततिकारिकाणां शास्त्रत्वम् ॥

एतच्च शास्त्रम्, सकलशास्त्रार्थसूचकत्वात्, न तु प्रकरणमित्याह—

सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य ।
आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि ॥ ७२ ॥

"सप्तत्याम्" इति । तथा च राजवार्तिकम् ॥

"प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता ।
पारार्थ्यं च तथाऽनैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ॥
शेषवृत्तिरकर्तृत्वं मौलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ।
विपर्ययः पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः ॥
करणानामसामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।
इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टभिः सह सिद्धिभिः" ॥ इति ॥

सेयं षष्टिपदार्थी कथितेति सकलशास्त्रार्थकथनान्नेदम्प्रकरणमपि तु शास्त्रमेवेदमिति सिद्धम् । एकत्वमर्थवत्त्वम् पारार्थ्यञ्च प्रधानमधिकृत्योक्तम् । अन्यत्वमकर्तृत्वम् बहुत्वञ्चेति पुरुषमधिकृत्य । अस्तित्वम् वियोगो योगश्चेत्युभयमधिकृत्य । वृत्तिः स्थितिरिति स्थूलसूक्ष्ममधिकृत्य ॥ ७२ ॥

मनांसि कुमुदानीव बोधयन्ती सतां सदा ।
श्रीवाचस्पतिमिश्राणां कृतिः स्तात् तत्त्वकौमुदी ॥

इत्यखिलतन्त्रापरतन्त्रप्रतिभद्वादशदर्शनटीकाकृच्छ्री-
मद्वाचस्पतिमिश्रकृता सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुदी ॥

THE TATTVA—KAUMUDĪ

[SĀṀKHYA]

An English Translation.*

(1) We bow to the One Unborn, Red, White and Black, producing many offsprings; we bow also to those Unborn Ones Who have recourse to Her while She is active, and renounce Her on having undergone the experiences afforded by her.

To the Great Sage Kapila, and to his disciple Āsuri, as also to Pañcas'ikha and Īs'varakṛṣṇa—to these we bow in reverence.

Introduction to Kārikā I

(2) In this world, that expounder is listened to by the audience, who offers expositions of facts whose knowledge is desired by them. On the other hand, one who expounds doctrines which no one cares for is regarded to be ignorant of worldly affairs as also devoid of the critical faculty; and such an expounder would be disregarded. The doctrine that people care to understand is just that which, on being understood, leads to the fulfilment of the highest aim of man. Consequently, as the science to be (hereafter) explained supplies the means to that final goal, the author introduces the inquiry into its subject-matter :—

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* The translation of the Tattvakaumudī was done by me as a class-exercise when I was a student of the M. A. Class at the Queen's College, Benares. The revising of it, therefore, is a debt that I owe to the world of Scholarship. This revising I have done now. Though, having been done during the busiest part of my life, it may not be much of an improvement upon its predecessor, yet I am sending it out for what it is worth, and leave it to the mercy of competent critics. [Ganganath Jha.]

Kārikā I

There being (in this world) an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain (there arises) a desire for enquiry into the means of alleviating them. And if (it be urged that) the enquiry is superfluous on account of (the existence of) obvious means,—(we reply that it is) not so: because these (latter) are neither absolute nor final.

Necessity of scientific enquiry

(3) The subject-matter of a science would not be enquired into—(1) if there existed no pain in this world; or (2) if, though extant, its removal were not desired; or (3) even if desired, its removal were impossible—such impossibility arising either from the fact of the pain being everlasting in its nature, or from the ignorance of the means of alleviating it; or (4) notwithstanding the possibility of removing it, if the subject-matter of the science did not afford the adequate means; or (5) lastly, if there were other and easier means elsewhere available.

The three-fold division of pain

(4) Now, that there is no pain and that its removal is not universally desired, are opposed to facts. This is what is meant by the words: *There being an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain.* The three kinds of pain constitute (what is ordinarily called) the "triad of pain." These are: (1) the intrinsic (*Ādhyātmika*), (2) the extrinsic (*Ādhibhautika*) and (3) the divine or superhuman (*Ādhidaivika*). Of these the *intrinsic* is two-fold, *bodily* and *mental*. *Bodily* pain is caused by the disorder of the several humours, wind, bile and phlegm; and *mental* pain is due to desire, wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, grief, and the non-perception of particular objects. All these are called *intrinsic* on account of their being amenable to internal remedies. Pains amenable to external remedies are two-fold: *extrinsic* and *superhuman*. The *extrinsic* are caused by men, beasts, birds, reptiles, and inanimate things; and the *superhuman* ones are due to the evil influence of

planets and the various elementals (Yakṣa etc.). Thus the fact that pain, which is a particular modification of the attribute of Rajas—is experienced by each soul, cannot be gainsaid. *Impediment* (*Abhighāta*) is the connection of the sentient faculty with the three kinds of pain subsisting in the internal organ, which are felt to be disagreeable. It is this idea of disagreeableness which has been mentioned as the incentive to the alleviation of pain. Though pain cannot be absolutely prevented, yet it is possible to alleviate it—as will be explained later on. This is what is meant by (enquiry to be made) *into the means of alleviating* the three kinds of pain. In the compound *tadapaghātake*, the pronoun *tat* refers to the three kinds of pain; and though this forms the subordinate factor in the preceding compound (*duḥkhatraya* etc.), yet in the mental conception it is the more proximate (and hence the following pronoun refers to it in preference to the other and primary factor of the compound).—What is meant by all this is that the means of alleviation, too, is only that which is set forth in the sciences,—none other.

Objection :**Inquiry superfluous in presence of obvious means**

(5) *An objection is raised*: " *On account of obvious remedies, such enquiry is superfluous.* That is to say: We grant that the triad of pain is there, and also that its removal is desirable; as also that the removal is possible; we go further, and grant that the means set forth in the sciences are adequate to the removal. With all this, however, the present enquiry becomes superfluous, because we have easier and obvious means for the removal of pain ; and further because of the difficult character of the means prescribed in the sciences,—which consists of a full knowledge of abstruse philosophical principles, attainable only by a long course of traditional study extending over many lives. Says a popular maxim : 'When a man can find honey in a much-frequented place, wherefore should he go to the mountains ? So, when

the object of desire has been attained, which wise man will make any further attempt?' Hundreds of remedies for *bodily* pain are laid down by eminent physicians; for *mental* pains also we have easy remedies in the shape of the attainment of the objects of enjoyment—such as women, desirable food and drink, unguents, dress, ornaments and the like. Similarly, of *extrinsic* pains we have easy remedies—such as expert knowledge of moral and political science, residence in safe places, etc. In the same manner, of *superhuman* troubles we have remedies in the shape of charms, incantations and the rest."

Reply: **Obvious means are not absolute nor final**

(6) This objection is answered as follows—*Not so*—why ?—*Because these are neither absolute nor final. Absoluteness* of the means consists in the certainty of its effect; and its *finality* consists in the non-recurrence of the pain once removed. The absence of these two properties is denoted by the expression, "*Ekāntātyantatobhāvaḥ.*" The universal affix *tasi* has a genitive force here. The upshot of the whole is this: As a matter of fact, we find that even on the employment in the prescribed manner of the remedies mentioned above, such as medicines, women, moral and political science, incantations and the rest—the various kinds of pain are not actually alleviated; hence we predicate the want of certainty of the cure effected thereby; and similarly from the recurrence of pain once cured, we infer non-permanence of the cure. Thus though easily available, the obvious means do not effect absolute and final removal of pain. Consequently, the present enquiry is not superfluous.

Auspiciousness of the beginning word

(7) Though the mention of the word *pain* in the very beginning is inauspicious, yet that of the extirpatory means as leading to its removal is auspicious; and as such quite appropriate at the commencement of a treatise.

(8) The following argument might be put forward:—

Objection: **Vedic means adequate to removal of pain**

"We grant the inadequacy of the obvious remedies; but we have others prescribed in the Vedas—in the shape of a host of such acts as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* etc., which extend over the whole year; these will certainly remove the three kinds of pain absolutely and finally. Says the *S'ruti*: 'Desiring heaven one must perform sacrifices,' and *Heaven* is thus described: 'Happiness, unmixed and uninterspersed with unhappiness and attainable by pure longing for it is what is denoted by the word Heaven.' Heaven thus consists in such happiness as is diametrically opposed to unhappiness or pain and which by its inherent capacity extirpates pain from its very roots; nor is this happiness short-lived,—for, declares the *S'ruti*: "We drank the *Soma* and became immortal." [Atharvaśiras III]. And if the celestial happiness were short-lived how could there be 'immortality'? Hence the Vedic remedies for the removal of pain, which can be gone through in a moment, a few hours, a day, a month, or a year,—are far easier than discriminative knowledge, which can be attained only by a continuous effort extending over many lives. Thus again, the proposed enquiry remains superfluous."

The answer to this is suggested in the following Kārikā.

Kārikā II

The revealed is like the obvious, since it is connected with impurity, decay and inequality. That which is contrary to that is better, proceeding from the right cognition of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser (Spirit).*

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* This Kārikā embodies, as Davies rightly remarks, the leading principle of Kapila's philosophy according to which final emancipation is attainable not by religious rites, but by discriminative knowledge, as explained by Kapila.

(9) *Anus'rava* is Veda, that which is *heard* during the tutorial lectures of a qualified teacher—and not *done* (written). *Ānus'ravika* is that which is related to *Anus'rava* or *Veda*, *i. e.* which is derived or known therefrom. The host of religious rites laid down in the Veda is equal to the obvious (remedies mentioned before);—both being equally inefficient in the *absolute* and *final* removal of the three kinds of pain. Though the text uses the generic term "*Vedic*" (*Ānus'rvaika*), yet it ought to be taken as implying only the ritualistic section of it; because discriminative knowledge also forms part of the Veda (which of course is not what the author means). Says the S'ruti: "The Spirit should be known and discriminated from Primordial Matter." (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, 2–4–5); (by so doing) "the agent does not return, yea, he does not return (into this world)". (*Chāndogya*, 8–15).

Reply: The Vedic is like the obvious

(10) Reasons for the above assertion are given: *since it is connected with impurity, decay and excess.* The *impurity* lies in the fact of the *Soma* and other sacrifices being accompanied by the killing of animals and the destruction of grains and seeds. Says the revered Pañcas'ikhācārya: "It (the sin attendant upon slaughter) is slightly mixed, remediable and bearable." The 'slight mixture' meant here is that of the principle effect (*Apūrva i. e.* merit) of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other sacrifices, with the minor *apūrva* due to animal-slaughter which is the source of sin. The epithet '*remediable*' implies that the sin is removable by certain expiatory rites; but if somehow these are neglected, then at the time of the fruition of the principal karma (merit), the evil element (demerit caused by the slaughter) also bears its fruits; and as long as these latter are being experienced, they are borne with patience; hence the qualification '*bearable*'. Experts (in rituals) dangling in the nectar-tanks of heaven

Because impure, decaying and excessive

attained by a mass of righteous deeds, have to bear the spark of the fire of pain brought about by the element of sin (involved in the rituals).

The impurity of animal slaughter in a sacrifice established

(11) It will not be right to argue that the generic law —" Kill not any animal, " is set aside by the specific one, " Kill the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma* "—because they do not contradict each other; and it is only when two laws are mutually contradictory, that the stronger sets aside the weaker. In the present instance, however, there is no contradiction, the two laws treating of two entirely different subjects. For the negative law " Kill not etc.," only declares that killing is productive of sin or evil (and hence pain); but it does not deny the fact of its being necessary for the performance of sacrifices; and in the same manner, the injunction " Kill the animal etc., " declares that the killing of animal helps in the performance of sacrifice, but does not negative the fact of its being productive of sin. If it did so, there would be a syntactical split [*i. e.* the sentence " Kill the animal etc., " would bear two predicates—(1) 'The killing is helpful in the performance of sacrifice,' (2) and that 'it is not conducive to sin']. Nor is there any contradiction between the *productivity of sin* and the capability of *helping the performance* of a sacrifice. Animal-slaughter can produce sin in the man, and at the same time quite consistently help the performance of the sacrifice.

Decay and excess shown to apply to the results of Vedic action

(12) The properties—'*decay*' and '*inequality*'—belong really to the effect; but are here attributed to the means. This *liability to decay* is inferred from the fact of Heaven being a positive entity and a product. Further, the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other sacrifices are the means to the attainment of *Heaven* only, whereas the *Vājapeya* and others lead to the attainment of the *kingdom of Heaven* (or 'self-

sovereignty'). This is what constitutes the *inequality* spoken of. The greatness of the magnificence of one man is a source of pain to another of lesser magnificence.

Immortality as a result of Vedic action is only long-durability

(13) In the passage "Drinking *Soma*, we became immortal"—*immortality* stands for *long-duration*,—as is declared elsewhere: "Immortality is duration till the final dissolution of all finite existence." Hence the S'ruti: "Neither by deeds, nor by children nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone they got immortality." [Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad X—5], and again "Heaven shines in a remote and secluded valley, which the ascetics alone enter; by actions did the ascetics with children, desiring wealth, come by death; while those other wise sages, who were above all action, got immortality."

The only means is discriminative wisdom

(14) With all this in view it is declared: *That which is contrary to that is preferable—proceeding from discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser.* The term *that* stands for the Vedic remedy of removing pain. A method—contrary to the impure Soma sacrifice etc. bringing about unequal and short-lived results,—is pure *i. e.* unmixed with the evils due to animal-slaughter and leading to results not unequal. This is clear from the *S'ruti* precluding all return to metempsychosis for people possessing discriminative knowledge. The argument based on the said result being a caused entity cannot be urged as a ground for its non-permanence, because this holds only in the case of the effect being a positive entity; in the present case, however, the effect—the removal of pain—though a product, is a negative entity. And when the productivity of the cause (ignorance) has been destroyed (by discriminative knowledge) there can be no further effect, in the shape of more pain. For it is a fact admitted on all hands that the efficiency of the

cause lasts only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge. This will be explained later on (under Kārikā LXVI).

Literal meaning of the Kārikā

(15) The literal meaning of the words of the *Kārikā* is as follows : The means of removing pain, consisting in the direct discriminative knowledge of the Spirit as apart from Matter, is contrary to the Vedic means, and hence is better. The Vedic remedy is *good* inasmuch as it is authorised by the Veda and as such capable of removing pain to a certain extent; the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit as distinct from Matter is also *good*; and of these two, the latter is *better*, superior.

Source of discriminative knowledge

(16) *Question* :—" Whence does such discriminative knowledge arise ?

Answer—From the right cognition of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser. Cognition of the Manifested precedes that of its cause, the Unmanifested; and from the fact of both of these (Manifested and Unmanifested) being for another's purpose, we infer the existence of the Spirit. Thus we find that these three are mentioned in the order of precedence of the cognition thereof. The upshot of the whole then is this : The knowledge of the distinction of Spirit from Matter arises from right cognition—consisting in meditation and contemplation uninterruptedly and patiently carried on for a long time, of the Manifested, etc., the character of these latter having been previously learnt from the *Veda*, the *Smṛtis* and the *Itihāsas*, and duly strengthened by scientific reasoning. This will be explained in detail later on in Kārikā LXIV.

Fourfold division of categories.

(17) Having thus established the fact of the undertaking of scientific enquiry being useful for the enquirer, the author, with a view to commence the work, sets down, in brief, the import of the system, in order to focus the attention of the enquirer.

Kārikā III

Root-matter is not a product; the group of seven consisting of the Great Principle and the rest are both product and productive; and the Spirit is neither a product nor productive.

Briefly, the objects treated of in the system are of four kinds: some of them are merely *productive*, some merely *products*, others *both productive and products*, and others, *neither the one nor the other*.

The Productive

(18) To the question—What is the *productive*?— the answer is—Primordial Root-matter is not a *product*; 'Root-matter' (*Prakṛti*)* is that which *produces* (*prakaroti*); it is also called '*Pradhāna*' (Primordial), which represents the three Attributes of *Sattvas, Rajas and Tamas* in the state of equilibrium; — that is purely *productive*. Why it is so is explained by the term '*Mūla*', 'Root'; *i. e.* it is that 'Matter' which is the 'Root'; it is the root of the Universe which is an aggregate product; of this Matter itself there can be no root; or else we would be landed in an unwarranted *regresus ad infinitum*.

The Productive-Products

(19) How many are the objects that are *both proauctive and products*, and which are these? The answer is—The group of seven consisting of the Great Principle and the rest are both; *i. e.* they are *products* as well as *productive*. The Great Principle (Buddhi) is the root of Egoism (Ahaṅkāra), and the product of Root-matter; so is Principle of Egoism the root of the

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* What the term 'prakṛti' stands for has been made clear here. Henceforth, the term shall be rendered either as 'Root-matter' or simply as 'Nature.'

five subtle Primary Substances together with the eleven sense-organs, and it is also the product of the Great Principle; and so are the five subtle Primary Substances the root of the grosser elements, Ākāśa and the rest, and, at the same time, the product of Egoism.

The Products

(20) How many are the *products*, pure and simple, and what are they? Answer:—*The products are sixteen—i. e.*, sixteen in number; the five gross substances (earth etc.,) and the eleven sense-organs,—these are mere products or modifications, not productive; this is what is emphasised by the particle 'tu', which should be taken as coming after '*vikārah*' (in the text). Though the cow, the jar, the trees and the rest are products of the earth, and so are curd and sprout, of milk and seed respectively, which latter are the products of the cow and the tree, yet these facts do not touch our position; since trees etc., do not differ from earth, in their *essence*, and it is the productiveness of something different in *essence*, for which the term Root, "*Prakṛti*" stands; and that the cow, the tree etc., do not differ from each other in their essence, is proved by the fact that they have, in common, the properties of grossness and perceptibility.

The non-product-productive

(21) That which is *neither productive nor product*, is now described :—*the Spirit is neither a product nor productive.* All this will be explained later on.

Three kinds of proofs

(22) In order to prove the above statement, the different kinds of proof (Means of Right Cognition) have to be described. Nor can there be a particular definition without a general one. Hence the definition of Means of Right Cognition in general follows:—

Kārikā IV

Perception, Inference, and Valid Assertion are accepted as the three kinds of Means of Right Cognition; because these include all forms of Means of Cognition. It is through the Means of Cognition that the objects of Cognition are properly cognised.

Proof defined

(23) *Means of Cognition are accepted*:—here the term 'Means of Cognition' only states the thing to be defined; and the explanation of the term would constitute the definition of 'Means of Cognition;' this explanation being that the *Means of Cognition is that through which things are cognised.* Thus the said Means comes to be recognised as the *Instrument* of Right Cognition. This represents a mental condition free from the contact of all that is either doubtful or wrong or unknown; what is brought about by this instrument is Right Cognition in the form of an apprehension by the human agent; and that which leads to such right notion is the 'Means of Cognition.' Thus the 'Means of Cognition' become differentiated from all that leads to wrong notion, *viz.* doubt, misconception, remembrance, and the like, which (on that account) are not the 'Means of Right Cognition.'

The three-foldness of proof

(24) The author now rejects the different views with regard to the number of Pramāṇas: "*Of three kinds*;"—that is, of the Means of Right Cognition in general there are three kinds,—neither more nor less. This we shall explain in detail after the particular definitions of the various Means of Right Cognition.

Only three kinds of proof

(25) Now, there arises the question—which are the three kinds of Means of Right Cognition? The answer is—*Perception*, *Inference* and *Valid Assertion*. The above is an exposition of what are popular forms of Cognition; as a philosophical

system is expounded for the benefit of the ordinary people, who alone are capable of benefitting by it. The *intuition* or supernatural forms of Cognitions which appear in the great sages and adepts,—though realities,—do not in any way help the ordinary people, and as such are not treated of here.

The inclusion of all other proofs in the above-mentioned

(26) *Objection*:—"We grant that the number of *Pramāṇas* is not less than three; but wherefore should it not be more than three? The different schools do lay down others, such as Analogy (Upamāna) and the rest". *Reply—Because these three include all forms of Means of Right Cognition.* That is, all forms of Right Cognition are included—*i. e.* comprehended—under these three, Perception, Inference and Valid Assertion. This is going to be explained later on, as said above.

Necessity of enquiry into the different kinds of proof

(27) *Question*:—"Why should the philosophic system proceed with general and special definitions of the Means of Right Cognition, when it is launched forth with the express purpose of defining the *Prameyas*, *i. e.* the *objects* of Right Cognition?" Answer—*It is by the Means of Right Cognition that objects of Cognition can be rightly cognised. Siddhi* means *apprehension*—Cognition.

The order of explanation.

(28) The explanation of the Kārikā follows the sense, not the order of words.

The specific definition of the proofs

(29) Now on the occasion of the definition of the special Means of Cognition, the author of the Kārikā, first of all, defines Perception, since it precedes and is superior to other Means of Cognition, and because these latter, Inference and the rest, are dependent upon it; and lastly, because with regard to it all parties are agreed.

Karika V

'Perception' is definite Cognition of particular objects through the contact of the senses; 'Inference' has been declared to be of three kinds; and it is led up to by (based upon) the (Cognition of the) Middle Term and the Major Term; and 'Valid Assertion' is Right Revelation.

'*Perception is definite sense-cognition.*'—The term 'Perception' means what is defined; the remainder of the sentence is the *definition*; by which word is meant the differentiation (of the thing defined) from things of the same class, as well as from those of other classes.

Perception defined as the definite cognition of particular objects obtained through senses

(30) The literal meaning (of the definition of Perception —'*prativiṣayādhyavasāyaḥ*') may be thus explained: *Viṣaya* (object) stands for that which bears upon the *Viṣayin* (cognition); that which impresses its own form upon the Cognition.

The Earth and other substances, as also Pleasure, Pain and the rest are 'objects' for us; but things in the form of the *Elemental Substances* are not 'objects' for us; though these also are 'objects' for the *Yogin* and the divine beings.—The term '*prativiṣaya*' denotes *that which bears upon each particular objcct, i. e.* the *sense-organ*;—'bearing upon' means *contact* so that what the term '*prativiṣaya*' stands for is the *sense-organ in contact with the object*—.'*Prativisayādhyavasāya*' ('sense-cognition') is the *adhyavasāya, definite cognition in i. e. through, the sense-organ in contact with the object*; '*adhyavasāya*' is *Cognition*, the function of *Buddhi* (Will); in fact *adhyavasāya* stands for that exuberance of the attribute of Sattva which results from the suppression in the Will of the attribute of '*Tamas*' due to the contact of the sense-organs with their respective objects;—this is what is called *vṛtti* and also '*jñāna*,'—*i.e.* 'Cognition'.—This *sense-cognition* is a *means*

of cognition and what is brought about by this *means* is the *Right Cognition* which is a form of assistance rendered to the Sentient *Faculty*.

Cognitions are insentient

(31) In its essence the *Buddhi* is insentient, being, as it is, a product of Root Matter; consequently the Cognition which is a function of the Buddhi is also insentient, just like the Jar and such things. Similarly such other products of *Buddhi* also as pleasure and the rest are insentient. The Spirit, however, not being radically affected by pleasure and the rest, is sentient; this Spirit appears as if having the *Cognition* and the *Pleasure* and such other things by virtue of the image cast therein by the reflection of the Cognition and the Pleasure which really subsist in *Buddhi*; also it is in this manner that the Sentient Being (Spirit) comes to be favoured (by Buddhi); and *Buddhi* as also its *Cognition*, though in themselves insentient, appear as if sentient by virtue of being reflected in the Sentience (of the Spirit). This is what is going to be described under *Kārikā* 20, below.

Differentiation of terms in the definition of Perception

(32) The use of the term '*adhyavasāya*,' 'Definite Cognition,' in the text excludes *Doubtful Cognition*, as Doubt, being of the nature of uncertainty, is never positive; and 'definite' is the same as 'positive'.—The use of the term '*viṣāya*,' 'object,' excludes *Wrong Cognition*, the object of which is non-existent.—The use of the particle '*prati*' indicates the contact of the sense-organ with the object and as such excludes Inference, Remembrance and other forms of Cognition.

Final Definition of Perception

(33) Thus it follows that '*prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam*,' 'Perception is definite cognition of objects through the contact of the sense-organs,' is the complete definition of Perception,—

excluding, as it does, all other things, those of the same kind as well as others. Other definitions provided by philosophers have not been either defended, or criticised for fear of prolixity.

Inference, a distinct Means of Cognition

(34) The *Lokāyatika* (materialist) says that Inference is not a Means of Cognition; if so, how could he know whether the person he was addressing was ignorant or in doubt or perverse? Certainly the ignorance, doubt and perverseness of another person cannot be cognised through Sense-perception, by a person with ordinary powers of perception. Nor can they be said to be cognised by any other Means of Cognition; as the Materialist does not admit of any such means except Sense-perception.—Under the circumstances, if, without knowing whether the person addressed is ignorant or in doubt or perverse, the Materialist were to go about addressing any and every person at random—he would be despised by all intelligent persons as mad and as one whose words should not be listened to. In fact, the ignorance, doubt and perverseness of a person could only be *inferred* from such signs as the man's intention or words. Thus, however much he may dislike it, the Materialist has to admit of Inference as a Means of Cognition.

Definition of Inference general

(35) Inasmuch as Inference follows from Perception, it is only right that it should be defined after Perception; then again, inasmuch as a definition of Inference in general must precede that of particular forms of it, the author provides the definition of Inference in general.—*It is led up to by the (Cognition of the) Middle Term and the Major Term*;—the Middle Term is that which is less extensive, and the Major Term is that which is more extensive; the 'less extensive' Middle Term is that whose natural concomitance (with the Major Term) has been duly recognised after all suspected and assumed adventitious

accidents have been eliminated; and that with which the Middle Term is so concomitant is the 'more extensive' Major Term. The terms 'Middle Term' and 'Major Term' which are really denotative of the *objects* (of Cognition) stand for the *Cognition* of those objects. Thus then, taking the case of the Inference, of Fire on the hill from the presence of Smoke, this Inference is led up to by the Cognition of the fact that the Smoke is 'less extensive' than the Fire which is 'more extensive;'—*i. e.* 'Wherever there is Smoke there is Fire [*i. e.* Smoke is invariably concomitant with Fire]'—The term '*liṅgi*' (which has been taken above as standing for the *Major Term*) has to be repeated and taken in the sense of that in which the '*Liṅga*' (Middle Term) is present; that is, the cognition that the *Middle Term* (*Smoke*) is present in the *Minor Term* (*Hill*).—Thus then the definition of Inference in general comes to this—Inference is that Cognition which is led up to by (a) the Cognition of invariable concomitance between the Major Term and the Middle Term (*i. e.* the *Major Premiss*) and (b) the Cognition of the Presence of the Middle Term in the Minor Term (*i. e. the Minor Premiss*).

Definition of particular forms of Inference

(36) The author recalls the particular forms of Inference described under another philosophical system (*Nyāya*)—'*Inference has been declared to be of three kinds*'; *i. e.* Inference that has been just defined in its general form has three special forms, called (1) '*Pūrvavat,*' *A priori*, (2) '*S'eṣavat,*' *A posteriori*, and (3) '*Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa,*' *based on general observation.*

First division of Inference into *Vīta* and *Avīta*

(37) First of all, Inference is of two kinds—*Vīta* and *Avīta*;—that which functions through an affirmation is the *Vīta-affirmative*; and that which functions through negation is the *Avīta, Negative.*

Avīta, **the negative Inference defined**

(38) Of these two, the *Avīta* is also called '*S'eṣavat,*' *Inference, A posteriori.*—'*S'eṣa*' is that which *remains*, the *residue*; hence that Inference is '*S'eṣavat*' which has this residue for its object. This has been thus described (in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* on 1, 1. 5)—'The *S'eṣavat* Inference is that in which, with regard to an object, some of the likely properties being denied and eliminated, and there being no likelihood of their belonging to some others, we have the Cognition of *that which remains* (undenied and uneliminated)'. An example of this negative *Avīta* will be cited later on (under *Kārikā 9*, Para 70).

Two kinds of *Vīta*

(39) The *Vīta* Inference is of two kinds—(1) The *Pūrvavat*, *A Priori*, and (2) the *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, 'Based on general observation.' Of these the first '*Pūrvavat*,' has for its object that 'universal' of which a specific 'individual' has been perceived; the term '*Pūrvavat*' (contained in the name '*Pūrvavat*') means *well-known*,—*i. e.* that 'universal' of which the 'specific individual' has been perceived;—and that Inferential Cognition of which such a 'universal' is the object is called '*Pūrvavat*'; *e. g.* when, from the presence of *Smoke*, we infer the presence of *the particular 'Universal' Fire* in the *Hill*; and in this case this 'Universal' *Fire* is one of which a 'specific individual', in the shape of a particular Fire, has been previously perceived in the kitchen.—The second form of *Vīta* Inference is the *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, which is the inferential Cognition having for its object a 'universal' of which a 'specific individual' has *not* been perceived; *e. g.* when we have an Inferential Cognition of the *sense-organ*; what is inferred in this case is the fact of the Cognition of colour and such things being brought about by the instrumentality of an organ [*i. e.* 'there must be an organ by the instrumentality whereof the Cognition of Colour, or of Touch, has been brought about'];—though of

the 'Universal', 'Instrument', we have seen the 'specific individuals' in the form of the Axe etc.; yet that particular form of 'instrument' which is referred in relation to the Cognition of Colour and such things has never been *perceived*; that particular form of 'instrument' is that which is regarded as belonging to the 'Universal' 'sense-organ,' and any 'specific individual' of that *Universal* sense-organ cannot be perceptible to us, persons of ordinary vision,—in the way in which the particular 'individual' of the *Universal* 'Fire' is seen.—This is what distinguishes the *Pūrvavat* from the *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, though both are equally '*Vīta*'.—In the term '*Sāmānyato*' *dṛṣṭa*, '*dṛṣṭa*' stands for '*dars'ana*,' *Cognition*—'*Sāmānyataḥ*' stands for '*Sāmānyasya*', of the '*Universal*',—the affix 'tasil' being capable of signifying the sense of all case-endings;—thus the term '*Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa—anumāna*' stands for the '*Anumāna*,' Inferential Cognition, of that particular 'universal' of which a 'specific individual' has not been perceived.—All this has been fully explained by us in the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*, and we do not repeat it here for fear of being too prolix.

Definition of Valid Assertion

(40) When an experienced person, directing another experienced person, utters a few words (such as 'Bring the Cow'),—and the latter, thus directed, acts in a certain manner (*i. e.* brings the cow),—the person watching all this infers that the action of the directed person was due to his understanding the sense of the words uttered by the directing person,—and therefrom he comes to recognise the connection between the words used and the action performed;—further, a word is found to express its meaning only when there is recognition of the connection between that word and its meaning;—from these two facts it follows that Verbal Cognition is led up to by Inference;—consequently, after having defined Inference, the author de-

fines Valid Assertion—'*Valid Assertion is right revelation*'; 'Valid Assertion' '*āptavacana*' is the term to be *defined*, and the rest of the sentence is its *definition*; the term '*āpta-s'ruti*' means that '*S'ruti*', revelation, which is '*āpta*': 'right'; the term 'revelation' stands for that Cognition of the meaning of a sentence which is brought about by that sentence.

'Valid Assertion' is self-sufficient in its authority

(41) This *Valid Assertion* is self-sufficient in its authority; *i. e.* it is always right, in as much as it is brought about by the words of the *Veda* which being independent of human authorship, is free from all defects (that make words unreliable). It is for this same reason that the knowledge derived from the *Itihāsa* and the *Smṛti*, which are based upon the Veda, is regarded as right.

Reliability of the words of Kapila

(42) As regards the primeval sage *Kapila* (the founder of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy), it is possible that he remembered the revealed texts that he had studied during previous time-cycles; ust as things known on the previous day are remembered on the next day, after waking from sleep. That such remembrance is possible is indicated by the conversation between *Āvaṭya*, and *Jaigīṣavya*, where the revered *Jaigīṣavya* speaks of his remembering things that occurred in past lives, extending over ten Time-cycles—in the text—'while I was evolving during ten Time-cycles etc., etc.'

Pseudo-Revelations

(43) The introduction of the epithet '*āpta*' 'Right', in the term 'Right Revelation' ('*āptavacanam*') serves to exclude all *pseudo-revelations*, such as the scriptures of the '*S'ākya-Bhikṣu*' (Buddhist) the '*Nirgranthaka*' (Jaina), the '*Saṁsāramocaka*' (Materialist who regards killing an animal virtuous because it frees it from the pains of existence) and others. That these scriptures are *not right* is to be inferred from (*a*) internal

contradictions, (*b*) being devoid of any sound basis, (*c*) containing assertions unsupported by proofs and (*d*) being accepted by only a few low and beast-like persons *Mlecchas* and others.

'Valid Assertion' distinct from 'Inference'

(44) The particle '*tu*' ('and') distinguishes 'Valid Assertion' from 'Inference'. *What the Sentence expresses* (the meaning) is an *object cognised* (by means of that Sentence); but the *Sentence* is not a 'property' (characteristic) of that *object*, and hence it could not serve as its *inferential indication* (as the *Smoke* is of the *Fire*). Further, when the *Sentence* expresses its meaning it does not stand in need of a previous connection (concomitance) between itself and the meaning; as we find that in the case of the work of a new poet, the sentence is one never heard before and it, therefore, expresses a meaning that has never before been cognised as expressed by that sentence. [So that there has been no previous cognition of the invariable concomitance between the Sentence and the Meaning, and without the cognition of such concomitance, there can be no Inference].

'Means of Cognition' posited in other Systems included in these three

(45) Thus then, the nature of 'Means of Cognition' in general and of that of the particular means of cognition being as described above,—it follows that all the other means of cognition,—such as 'Analogy' and the rest,—which have been posited in the other philosophical systems, are all included among those that have been described above.

'Analogy' included under 'Valid Assertion', and 'Inference and Perception'

(46) For instance, 'Analogy' has been illustrated by means of the assertion 'As the *Cow* so the '*gavaya*'; and (in as much as this is a verbal assertion), the cognition brought about by its means must be regarded as purely *Verbal*.—As for the notion that 'the term *gavaya* is

denotative of the animal similar to the cow' [which has been regarded as the cognition resulting from Analogy],—this is purely *inferential*; the inference being in the following form—

'When experienced persons use a certain term in reference to a particular thing, it should be regarded as *denoting* it,—specially, when there is no function other than *Direct Denotation*, (through which the term could be applicable to that thing)'; —as is found in the well-known case of the term 'cow' applied to the animal genus '*cow*'; (*Major Premiss*).

'The term *gavaya* is used (by experienced persons) in reference to *the animal similar to the cow*';—(*Minor Premiss*).

'Therefore, the term *gavaya* must be regarded as denotative of that animal.' (*Conclusion*)

This cognition is purely *inferential*.

Lastly, the notion that 'the animal before our eyes is similar to the cow',—this is purely perceptional. Thus then, when the cow is remembered, and its remembrance is seen in the *gavaya*, this is perception pure and simple; certainly the *resemblance* or *similarity* in the *cow* is not something different from that in the *gavaya*; for it is regarded to be a case of 'Resemblance' only when the conglomeration of the component parts of the body of one animal is found to be almost the same as that in the body of another; and this *same conglomeration* can be one only; so that when it has been *perceived* in the *gavaya*, it must be the same in the *cow* also.—Thus then, (every notion involved in what has been regarded as *Analogical Cognition* being found to be either *verbal* or *inferential* or *perceptional*), there is nothing left which could be regarded as the objective of a fourth means of cognition in the shape of 'Analogy'. We conclude therefrom, that 'Analogy' is not a distinct means of Cognition

'Presumption' included under 'Inference'

(47) Similarly 'Presumption' also is not a distinct Means of Cognition. For instance, the example of 'Presumption' that has been cited by the Ancients is the case where on finding that *Caitra*, who is alive, is not in the house, there is presumption of his being somewhere outside. As a matter of fact, however, this also is a case of Inference. In the case of our own body we easily recognise the premiss that 'when a finite object is not present in one place, it is present in another place,—and also that when a finite object is present in one place, it is not present in another place';—when, therefore, we find that 'the living *Caitra* is not in the house,'—and from this Minor Premiss (taken along with the former Premiss) we deduce the conclusion that he must be somewhere outside the house,—this is a clear case of Inference. The presence of *Caitra* somewhere in the world cannot set aside his *absence in the house*; and when it is not so set aside this *absence in the house* cannot fail to be a valid reason for *his presence outside the house*. [So that the Inference would not be open to the Fallacy of the 'Unknown']. Nor again does *Caitra's absence in the house* set aside his *existence* entirely; and only if it were so set aside would this *existence* be unable to establish itself *outside the house*. [So on this ground also the Inference is not fallacious]. To explain—Is Caitra's *non-existence in the house* inconsistant with his *existence* itself? Or only with *his existence in the house*?—It cannot be the former, because there can be no inconsistency between *existence somewhere* and *non-existence in the house*; for the simple reason that the two things are entirely different.—It might be argued that—"When it is asserted that *he must be somewhere*, his existence in *some place in general* being asserted (without any particular place being specified),—in as much as the *House* also would be included under 'place in general', the assertion might imply *existence*

in the house also; and in this manner the subject-matter being the same, there would be an inconsistency between *existence somewhere* and *non-existence in the House.*"—This, however, cannot be right. *Non-existence in the house* is known definitely and for certain, while (even in the manner shown) the notion of *existence in the house* (as implied by *existence somewhere*) would be only doubtful and implied, and as such this could never set aside the former definite cognition.—And though the definitely ascertained *non-existence in the House* sets aside the implied and doubtful *existence in the House*, it cannot set aside the man's *existence*; nor can it remove the doubt (regarding the possibility of *existence in the house* implied in the general notion of *existence somewhere*). What is set aside by the *Caitra's non-existence in relation to the House* is his *existence in the House*; as the latter is incompatible with it; but it cannot set aside his *existence in general*; because there is no incompatibility with this. From all this it follows that, when on the basis of *non-existence in the House*, as the only ascertained reason (Middle term), we deduce the man's *existence outside*,—it is a case of *Inference*.

This same reason disposes of also another definition of 'Presumption' as consisting in 'the removal of the inconsistency between two valid cognitions by relegating them to distinct spheres;' because, as a matter fact, there is no inconsistency between *what is restricted* (non-existence *in the House*) and *what is not restricted* (existence *somewhere*).

Other examples of Presumption may be shown, as above, to be included under Inference.

From all this it follows that as a means of cognition, Presumption is not distinct from Inference.

(48) Similarly, *Abhāva*, 'Absence', is only a form of Perception. *The absence of the Jar*, at a certain place is not anything distinct from a particular modification of the place itself in the form of *vacancy*; all entities—with the sole exception of the Sentient Faculty,—are consequently undergoing modifications; and all these diverse modifications are perceptible by the senses; hence there can be no object, not already covered by these modifications, which could form the subject-matter of a distinct means of cognition in the form of 'Absence'.

'Absence' included under 'Perception'

(49) 'Probability' has been regarded as a distinct means of cognition, as leading to such cognitions as that of the presence of the lesser weights—such as the '*Droṇa*' the '*Āḍhaka*' the '*Prastha*'—in the heavier weight the '*Khārī*'—This also is a case of Inference only. As a matter of fact, the heavier weight of the *Khārī* has been found to be invariably concomitant with the lesser weights of the Droṇa etc.; and it is this concomitance that leads to cognition of the presence of these lesser weights in the heavier weights.

'Probability' included under Inference

(50) As for 'Rumour' it is a mere continuity of a vague assertion of which the original source cannot be traced; it generally appears in the form 'the old people have said so and so'; such assertions for instance as 'there is a ghost living on this banyan tree'.—This is not a distinct means of cognition; because, its original source being undetermined, it must remain open to doubt; and if the original source is known and known to be trustworthy, then, it is a case of 'Verbal Cognition' pure and simple.

'Rumour' is not a valid means of cognition

Thus it becomes established that *there are three Means of Cognition*.

The 'Sphere' of the Means of Cognition

(51) Thus have been defined the Means of Cognition or Proofs, necessary for the demonstration of the existence of the 'Manifest', the 'Unmanifest' and the 'Knowing' (Spirit). As for the 'Manifest', in the shape of Earth and the rest,— even the dusty—footed ploughman knows it directly through Perception; he knows also such (invisible) things as the Fire (in the mountain-cave) by means of *a priori* Inference based upon the perception of such indicative marks as the Smoke and the like. Under the circumstances, if a philosophical system were to deal with such things, it would not be of much use. It follows, therefore, that what should be dealt with by Philosophy is what is difficult to know by the ordinary means of Knowledge.— Hence the author proceeds to show what Means of Cognition among those above described are capable of providing the knowledge of what things.—

Kārika VI

The knowledge of supersensuous things is obtained through 'Inference, based on general observation;' that imperceptible thing which cannot be known even through that is known through Trust-worthy Revelation.

Knowledge of supersensuous things

(52) The particle '*tu*' (in the text) distinguishes the 'Inference based on general observation from 'Perception' and from the '*A priori* Inference'.—'The knowledge of supersensuous things,'—such as Primordial Matter, Spirit and the rest—'is obtained through Inference based on general observation;' what is meant by this 'knowledge' is the definitive operation of the *Buddhi* in the form of its reflection in the Cognitive Spirit.—The mention of this particular form of Inference is only illustrative; it should be taken to include the *A posteriori Inference* also.

(53) *Question*—"Is it only the *Inference based on general observation* that is effective in bringing about the cognition of all supersensuous things? If that were so, then it would mean that no such things exist as Heaven, Unseen Force, Divinities, or the order of evolution of the *Mahat* and the other Principles,—in regard to which the said Inference is not applicable."—In answer to this it is added–'*That inperceptible thing etc.*;' what was intended to be said would have been secured by the use of the term '*Tasmāt*' only; hence the presence of the particle '*ca*' is to be taken as meant to include the *A Posteriori* Inference also.

Things known through Revelation

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(54) "Granted all this. But the non-perception of such objects as 'sky-flowers,' 'tortoises' hair,' 'hare's horns' and the like leads to their being regarded as non-existent; in the same way we might infer the non-existence of Nature and the rest (which are, like sky-flowers, not amenable to perception). This being the case, why should the existence of them be sought to be proved by a recourse to the various kinds of Inference?"

Objection

The answer to this is as follows—

Kārikā VII

(Non-perception of things arises) from excessive distance, proximity, destruction of the sense-organs, absence of mind, subtlety, intervention, suppression, (of other objects), and intermixture with other like objects.

(55) '*From excessive distance*'—The "non-perception" of the following Kārikā is to be construed along with this, in accordance with the maxim of the 'Lion's back-ward glance'*—

The different causes of the non-perception of objects, explained

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* "The maxim of 'the lion's back-ward glance' is generally used to mark the connection of a thing with what precedes and follows."

A bird soaring high, though existing, is yet not perceived by the eye, on account of its *extreme remoteness.* 'Excessive' (*ati*) must also be taken with 'proximity' (*sāmīpya*)—*e. g.* the collyrium applied to the eye is not seen, because of extreme nearness.

" *Destruction of organs* "—*e. g.*, blindness, deafness, etc.

" *From absence of mind* "—*e. g.*, a person, under the influence of love or some other strong emotion does not perceive things, even in bright day-light, though quite within the range of his senses.

" *From subtlety* "—*e. g.*, however much one may concentrate one's mind (*i. e.*, however attentively one may look) one can never perceive atoms and such other things, though they may be under one's very eyes.

" *From Intervention* "—*e. g.*, one cannot see the Queen and other persons hidden behind the walls.

" *From suppression* "—*e. g.*, the planets and stars are not seen during the day, because they are suppressed by the brighter rays of the sun.

" *From intermixture* "—*e. g.*, one does not perceive drops of rain-water, disappearing in a tank.

(56) The particle '*ca*' in the Kārikā has a collective force, and it includes even those not here mentioned ; such as '*non-manifestation*' also becomes included (among the causes of non-perception)—as one cannot perceive, in the milk, the curd, because the latter has not become manifested.

(57) The upshot of the whole then is this :—The non-existence of a certain object cannot be inferred merely from the fact of its not being perceived; for there is danger of such a principle being unwarrantably stretched too far. For instance, a certain individual, getting out of his house, would in that case, conclude that the people in the house are non-existent, simply because he does not see them. As a matter of fact, however, it is not so. The fact is that it is only

with reference to objects capable of being perceived at the time, that their non-perception leads to the inference of their non-existence. And this *capability of being perceived* can never belong to such things as Nature, Spirit and the rest (which are by their nature imperceptible); and as such it cannot be right for intelligent men to infer their non-existence merely from their non-perception.

Question—Which of the above mentioned causes (of non-perception) applies in the case of Nature etc. ?

The answer is—

Kārikā VIII

The non-apprehension of Nature due to subtelty and not to non-existence. Its existence verified by its effects

The non-perception of these (Nature and the rest) is due to its subtlety, not to its non-existence; since it is actually apprehended through its effects. These effects are the Great Principle, and the rest—effects (some of) which are similar, and (some) dissimilar to Nature.

(58) "Why should we not," continues the objector, "attribute the non-apprehension of Nature to its non-existence, as we do in the case of the seventh kind of Rasa (in eatables) ?"

The Author replies.—"*Not due to its non-existence*". Why? "*Because it is apprehended through its effects.*" '*It*' refers to Nature. The proofs of the apprehension of the Spirit will be adduced later on, in Kārikā XVII. If we find direct sense-perception inapplicable in the case of objects whose existence is ascertained by sound and valid means of knowledge, what this proves is the incapacity of sense-perception (and not the non-existence of the object itself).* The seventh

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* This statement is with reference to Nature, the existence of which is proved through its effects—the proof being based on the general proposition "Every effect must have a cause." The effects, Mahat etc., are perceptible; these must have a cause and this cause is Nature.

Rasa, however, has not its existence ascertained by any valid means of knowledge; and hence the *incapacity* of sense-perception cannot be urged in its case. Such is the sense of the text.

(59) *Question.*—"What are the effects from whose existence, you infer that of Nature?"

Answer.—"*The Great Principle, and the rest are the effects.*" This will be explained later on (Kārikā XXII):

Next are mentioned the similarity and dissimilarity in forms, of these effects, with Nature—the comprehension of both of which is helpful to discriminative wisdom:—"*Similar and dissimilar to Nature.*"

This will be further explained in Kārikā XXIII *et. seq.*

Different views with regard to the nature of the effect. (1) The Bauddha view of the effect being an entity arising from non-entity. (2) The Vedānta view of the whole series of effects being a mere evolution from a single real entity. (3) The Nyāya and Vais'esika view of the effect being a non-entity arising from entity. (4) The Sāṁkhya view of the effect being an entity arising from an entity

(60) All that (the existence of) the effect indicates is that there is a Cause; in regard to this subject (of cause and effect) there is a difference of opinion among philosophers. (1) Some people assert that the 'existent' (effect) emanates from the 'non-existent' (cause); (2) others represent all effects as mere illusory evolutions from out of a single entity, and not real entities in themselves; (3) others again hold that the 'non-existent' (effect) emanates from the existent (cause); (4) lastly, the revered ones declare that the 'existent' (effect) emanates from the 'existent' (cause).

The impossibility of the existence of Nature being proved in accordance with the first three views

(61) Under the first three of these theories, the existence of Nature (Primordial Root-Matter) cannot be proved. As a matter of fact, the world is found to consist of Sound and other Elements which are only different forms and modifications of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion; and it is this fact which goes to prove that the cause of the world is the Primordial Matter (Nature) whose 'primordiality' must consist in its being of the nature of the three Attributes, *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* (which alone are the essence of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion). Such being the case, if the 'existent' effect were the product of the 'non-existent' cause (the first view above),—then, how could the *non-existent Cause* which must be characterless, be of the nature of Sound and other Elements consisting of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion? As, certainly the non-existent can never be of the nature of the existent:—If (as under the *second* view) the entire phenomenon of Sound and the rest were the illusory evolution out of a single 'existent' Being,—then also it cannot be proved that the 'existent effect emanates from the existent cause'; and the second view is open to the further objection that the *One* Being could never constitute what is *phenomenal*; in fact the conception of the *non-phenomenal* as constituting the *phenomenal* must be wrong.—Even under the theory of Kaṇāda and Gautama,–that 'the non-existent effect is born out of the existent cause,'–as there could be no identity between the 'existent' and the 'non-existent,' the effect could not be regarded as constituted entirely by (being of the same nature as) the cause; and hence, under this theory also, there could be no proof for the existence of Primordial Matter (Nature).

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(62) Hence, in order to establish the existence of Primordial Matter (Nature), the author at the outset declares that the effect is 'existent', (even before the causal operation).

Kārikā IX

The five proofs of the effect being an entity

The effect is existent; (1) because what is 'non-existent' cannot be produced; (2) because there is a definite relation of the cause (with the effect); (3) because all is not possible; (4) because the efficient can do only that for which it is efficient; (5) (lastly), because the effect is of the same essence as the cause.

(63) *Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc.* '*The effect is existent,*'—*even before the operation of the cause,*—this is what is meant. The followers of *Nyāya* cannot urge against this doctrine the objection that it involves the absurdity of 'doing what is already done' (*i. e.*, if the Effect is already existent, the operation of the Cause must be superfluous);—such an objection cannot be raised [for reasons to be explained later on].

[As regards the theory that 'the Existent effect emanates from the Non-existent cause'] though it is true that products like the *sprout* and the *jar* are found to be produced after the *destruction* of the *seed* and *clay-lump* [so that it would appear as if the products were the outcome of this *Destruction*, which is *non-existent*],—yet the causal efficiency cannot be attributed to *Destruction*, which is a pure negation; it can belong only to the positive entities in the shape of the constituent particles of the *seed* and the *clay-lump*. If a positive entity were produced out of mere negation, then, in as much as such *negation* (of things) would be easily available everywhere, it would involve the absurd contingency of all things being produced at all places and at all times. All this has been fully explained by us in the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*.

(64) [As regards the Vedānta theory] the belief in the existence of the phenomenal world cannot be said to be illusory unless we have some proof invalidating its existence.* [Hence the effect cannot be regarded as a mere 'illusory evolution'].

The Vedānta view met

(65) Now remains the theory of Gautama and Kaṇāda, with reference to which the author asserts—"*The effect is existent.*" In support of this assertion, the following proofs are adduced:—(1) "*What is non-existent cannot be produced.*" If the effect were 'non-existent' before the operation of the cause, it could never be brought into existence by anybody; by even a thousand artists *blue* can never be made *yellow*. If it be held that "'existence' and 'non-existence' are mere properties belonging to the jar," even so, if the *object to which the property* belongs is 'non-existent', there can be no property belonging to that object; so that the question of the 'existence' of the jar remains as it was (and is not affected by your assertion). Nor can 'non-existence' (be the property of the jar); because if the 'non-existence' is unconnected and non-coalescent with the jar (as it must be, the jar being now existent, *ex-hypothesis*), how could the jar be regarded as 'non-existent'?—Hence it follows that, as *after* the causal operation so also before it, the effect must be 'existent'.

The Nyāya and Vais'esika view criticised; and the Sāmkhya view established

Such being the case, all that remains to be done by the cause is the manifestation or unfolding of the pre-existing effect [*i. e.*, its emanation from the cause wherein it has been lying latent]. The manifestation of something already existing is a fact quite compatible with experience; *e. g.* there

* This is urged against the Vedānta theory of the effect being an evolution from a single real entity.

is the manifestation of oil from sesamum, by pressure,—of rice from paddy by thumping,—and of milk from cows, by milking. On the other hand, we have no instance of the manifestation of what is 'non-existent'; in fact what is 'non-existent' is never found to be either manifested or produced.

(66) (2) For the following reason also should the effect be regarded as subsisting even before the operation of the cause: "*Because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect.*" The term '*Upādāna*' (in the text) stands for *Cause*,—and the '*Grahaṇa*' of the cause stands for its *relation to the effect*; so that the compound '*Upādānagrahaṇāt*' means 'because there is a definite relation of the cause with the effect'. What is meant is that the cause produces the effect only when in relation with it; and there could be no such relation with the effect if the latter were 'non-existent'; hence [the effect must be regarded as 'existent'].

(67) *Objection*: "Granted all this; but why should not the effect be produced by causes without being related to them? In that case it could be a 'non-existent' effect that would be produced."

In answer to this we have the next clause—

(3) "*Because all is not possible.*"—If the effect could be produced without being related to the cause, then every effect would arise from every cause (without restriction), as all would be equally unrelated to the cause.—But such is not the case. Hence a related effect only can be produced by a related cause, and not an unrelated effect by an unrelated cause. This is thus asserted by the teachers of Sāṁkhyas—'Causes being always related to existent things, can have no connection with non-existent; for one who would have an unrelated effect produced, there would be no restriction at all'.

(68) *Objection*: "Be it so: But the Cause, even though unrelated, will always produce that effect only for which it is efficient; and this efficiency could always be inferred from

actually seeing the effect brought about; so that there would be no absence of restriction (such as has been argued above)".

Answer : (4) "*Because the efficient Cause can do only that for which it is efficient.* "—Now then, asks our author, does this 'efficiency' subsist in the efficient cause operative on all things—or upon that effect only which is amenable to that efficiency? If the former, then the same confusion arises; if the latter, then it has to be explained how it can operate upon what is 'non-existent'. On this point if it be asserted that "the (causal) efficiency itself is so constituted as to produce only certain effects, not all",—then we ask—Is this peculiarly constituted efficiency of yours connected with the particular effect or not ? In the former case, no relation being possible with what is 'non-existent', the effect will have to be regarded as 'existent'; in the latter, you have the same confusion remaining.—Thus it is rightly argued that '*because the efficient cause can do only that for which it is efficient*' [the effect cannot be 'non-existent'].

(69) (5) For the following reason also the effect should be regarded as existent :—"*Because the effect is of the same essence as the cause.*"—The effect is not different from the cause; and the cause is existent; then how can the effect, non-separate from this latter, be 'non-existent' ?

(70) The proofs establishing the non-difference of the effect from the cause are the following : (*a*) The cloth (an effect) is not different from the yarns (constituting it),—because it subsists in the yarns;—an object differing in its essence from another, can never subsist in it ; as the cow in the horse; but the cloth does subsist in the yarns;—hence it follows that it is not different from the cause.

Proofs of the non-difference of cause and effect

(*b*) The *Cloth* and the *Yarns* cannot be different things, because the latter is the constituent cause of the former ;—where any two things are entirely different, one is never found

to be the constituent cause of the other, *e.g.*, in the case of the *Jar* and the *Cloth*; as between the *Cloth* and the *Yarns*, however, the *Yarns* are the constituent cause of the *Cloth* ;—hence it follows that the two are not different.—(*c*) For the following reason also, there is no difference between the *Cloth* and *Yarns* : because there is no conjunction between them and because there is no separation between them ;—'conjunction' is found to take place in objects different from one another, as between the well and the bucket; the same with regard to 'separation', as between the Himavān and the Vindhya;—in the case of the *Cloth* and the *Yarns*, however, there is neither 'conjunction' nor 'separation',—hence it follows that they are not different.—(*d*) For the following reason too, the *Cloth* and the *Yarns* are not different things: because the *Cloth* does not contain in itself any product which makes its weight different from the weight of the *Yarns* constituting it;—as a matter of fact, an object differing in essence from another always has a weight different from that of the latter—*e. g.*, the lowering of the balance caused by a bracelet weighing two *palas* is more than that caused by the bracelet weighing a single *pala* ;—but we find no such difference between the effect of the weight of the *Cloth* and that of the weight of the *Yarns* constituting it;–hence the *Cloth* is not different from the *Yarns*. These are the proofs afforded by a process of negative inference—[*Avītānumāna*—see, Kārikā V] establishing the non-difference (of the *Cloth* and the *Yarns* in particular, and of *cause* and *effect* in general).

(71) The non-difference between the cloth and the yarns having been thus established, it follows that the *cloth* is only the yarns arranged in a particular shape and that the two do not differ from each other in essence. Nor can the two be proved to be entirely different by such arguments as —(*a*) "If the cause and effect were not different, it would involve self-contradictory actions [that is, when the 'cloth' is

torn and reduced to 'threads', it involves the action of being *destroyed* on the part of the *cloth* and that of being *produced* on the part of the *threads* or yarns; the identity of the *cloth* and the *yarns* would thus mean that the same thing is both *destroyed* and *produced* at the same time];—(*b*) there is notion and assertion of the cause and the effect being *related* [which means that the two members of the relationship are different]; (*c*) the function of the useful purpose served by the cause is different from that served by the effect [*e. g.*, the *cloth* serves the useful purpose of *covering* things, which purpose cannot be served by the yarns]." These arguments, we say, cannot prove the difference between cause and effect; because all the said differences can be explained and reconciled by attributing the notions to the *appearance* and *disappearance* of certain factors: (*a*) For instance, the limbs of the tortoise *disappear* on entering its body and *appear* again on emerging from it; but for this, we cannot say that the limbs are either *produced* from, or *destroyed* by, the tortoise; in the same manner, the jar, the crown, and other things, which are only particular modifications of clay, gold and so forth, are said to be *produced* on emanating and appearing from these latter, and to be *destroyed* on entering them again (*i. e.*, being formed into clay, etc.,) and disappearing. As a matter of fact, however, there can be no 'production' or birth for what is 'non-existent', nor 'destruction' for what is 'existent';—as has been declared by the revered Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana (Vyāsa in the Bhagavadgītā, 2. 16)—'There is no *being* for the non-existent, nor *non-being* for the *existent*.' —In the instance cited, the *Tortoise* is not different from its *appearing* and *disappearing* limbs; and similarly the jar, the crown and other products are not different from clay, gold and so forth.—(*b*) The 'assertion' (of difference between the cloth and the yarns) implicit in such notions as 'This cloth is in (made up of) these yarns' is explicable, as being

analogous to the assertion 'There are *Tilaka* trees in the forest'.—(*c*) As for the *difference in the useful purpose served*, that also does not establish the difference between the cause and the effect; because one and the same thing is found to serve several useful purposes; for instance, the single thing, Fire, serves the purposes of *burning*, *cooking* and *lighting*. As a matter of fact, any variation of functions cannot be a ground of difference; because we find that the functions of the same things vary with their operating collectively or severally; for instance, each individual Bearer performs the function of indicating the path, but not that of carrying the palanquin, while collectively, they carry the palanquin; in the same manner, even though the yarns severally do not serve the purpose of *covering*, yet on combining and thereby appearing in the form of the *cloth*, they can serve the purpose of *covering*.

An objection based on the nature of the *manifestation* of the effect

(72) *Opponent.*—"[You say that the cloth is already existent in the cause, the yarns; and when it is supposed to be *produced*, it is only *manifested.*]—Now, was this *manifestation* of the cloth existent, before the operation of the cause? Or was it non-existent? If the latter, then the production of what was *non-existent* becomes admitted. If the former, then the causal operation is superfluous. When the effect (in the shape of the *manifestation of the cloth*) is already there, we see no use for the operation of the cause. If it be said that 'though the *manifestation* is 'existent', yet it is the manifestation of this manifestation (for which the operation of the cause is needed),'—then this would involve an endless series of 'manifestations'. Thus we conclude that there is no sense in the assertion that when the cloth is produced what happens is that the yarns become manifested in the form of cloth."

Reply—The objection set aside as common to both theories

(73) This is not so, we reply. Even under your own theory that the *non-existent* effect is produced, what is this 'production'? Is it *existent* or *non-existent*? If it is *existent*, then there is no need for the causes. If it is *non-existent*, then there should be *production* of that 'production' also,—so that there would be an endless series of 'productions'.

(74) If, in order to avoid the endless series of 'productions', you hold that the 'production' is nothing more or less than the 'cloth' itself,—then the term 'cloth' would be synonymous with 'production'; so that, when the term 'cloth' has been uttered, one should not utter the term 'is produced' (because it would be a useless repetition); nor could one say '*the cloth is destroyed*'; because *destruction* and *production* (denoted by *cloth*) can never co-exist.

(75) Thus, [Even under the Nyāya theory] the 'production of the cloth' must consist either in 'the inherence of the cloth in its cause', or in 'the inherence of the cloth in its *Being*'; in either case, the said 'Production' cannot be *produced* (as *Inherence* is eternal); and yet for the purposes of that 'production' several causes have to be set into operation. And (just as you need the causes for the bringing about of the 'production' which is eternal), so would there be need for causes for the *manifestation* of the already existent products like the *cloth*.—The causes cannot be related to the *form* of the cloth; because the *form* is not an *operation*, and it is only to an *operation* that causes are directly related; as otherwise (without being related to operation) they would not be 'causes' (active) at all.

(76) Thus, it has been fully established that the Effect is ever *existent*.

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(77) Having thus proved the effect to be 'existent', a fact favourable to the proof of the existence of Nature, the author next states the similarity and dissimilarity between the

Manifest and the Unmanifest, a right comprehension of which is conducive to discriminative wisdom; and this is done in order to show the character of Nature, whose existence is going to be proved.

Kārikā X

Points of dissimilarity between the Manifest and the Unmanifest

The Manifest is 'with cause', 'not eternal', 'not pervasive', 'active', 'multiform', 'component', 'soluble', 'conjunct' and 'dependent'.—The Unmanifest is the reverse of this.

All the qualifications explained

(78) '*With cause*' (Product). The question as to what is the cause of what, will be dealt with later on (Kārikā XXII).

(79) '*Not eternal*'—destructible, *i. e.*, evanescent [being absorbed in its material cause.*]

(80) '*Not pervasive*',—that is to say, the Manifest does not pervade over all evolutes. It is the effect that is pervaded over by the cause,—not the cause by the effect; *e. g.*, the Sentient Faculty (Buddhi) and other products can never pervade Nature and as such they are 'non-pervasive'.

(81) '*Active*'—*i. e.*, mobile. The Sentient Faculty (Buddhi), and the other evolutes are regarded as 'mobile', inasmuch as they are found to renounce a body they have hitherto occupied, and to occupy another; as for the mobility of earth and such other substances, it is too well-known (to need an explanation).

(82) '*Multiform*';—as the Sentient Faculty and other evolutes vary with each person; earth and other substances also are 'multiform' in the forms of the jars and other things.

(83) '*Component*',—of its cause; though the Products like the Sentient Faculty and the rest are non-different from their cause, yet the assertion that they stand to their cause in

* Since the Sāṁkhyas do not admit of an utter annihilation of a substance.

the relation of 'composite and component' has been made on the basis of some sort of assumed difference; just as in the case of such assertions as 'There are *Tilaka* trees in this *forest*' (when the *trees* have no existence apart from the *forest*).

(84) '*Soluble*',—into Nature. The Sentient Faculty and the rest are soluble into Nature, as is going to be explained later on.—Nature cannot be soluble in itself though it may be so regarded in its relation to the Spirit.

(85) '*Conjunct*'.—Bearing within itself the relation of whole and parts. [Unsatisfied with this explanation on the the ground of the relationship between the *whole* and its *parts* being eternal,—the author offers another explanation].—Or, the term '*avayava*' (in the compound '*Sāvayavam*') may be explained as equivalent to '*avayavana*', *i. e.*, the mutual adhesion, contact,—*i. e.*, *Conjunction*,—between *wholes* and *parts*. '*Conjunction*' consists in *union* following on *disunion*; and that which has such union or contact is what is expressed by the word '*Sāvayavam*'. For instance, there is such mutual *conjunction* among earth, water and other substances; there can be no such *conjunction* between *Nature* on the one hand and (its products) Sentient Faculty and the rest; because these latter are essentially the same as Nature. Nor can there be any *conjunction* between the three Attributes of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, because there is no *disunion* (absence of contact) among these.

(86) '*Dependent*',—the Sentient Faculty and the rest are such. In the producing of its product, in the shape of the *I-principle*, the Sentient Faculty requires the assistance of Nature: without such assistance it would be too weak to produce the *I-principle*. Similarly, the *I-principle* and other things also require assistance in the producing of their representative products.—Thus, in the producing of its product, everything requires the assistance of Nature. Therefore, even though efficient as a cause in the producing of its product, the *Mani-*

fest is *dependent*, requiring, as it does, the assistance of the Supreme Nature.

(87) '*The Unmanifest is the reverse*,'—of the Manifest. That is to say—the Unmanifest is *without cause*, *eternal*, *pervasive*, and *inactive*—[though to Nature does belong the *action* of evolution, yet it can have no *mobility*]—*one*, *not-component*, *not-soluble*, *unconjunct* and *independent*.

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(88) Having thus explained the dissimilarities between the Manifest and the Unmanifest, the author now mentions the similarities between these, and the dissimilarity of both of these again from the Spirit:

Kārikā XI

The points of similarity between the Manifest and the Unmanifest and those of dissimilarity of these from the soul

The Manifest is 'with the three Attributes' (Guṇas), 'undistinguishable' (or 'non-separative'), 'objective', 'common', 'insentient' and 'productive'. So also is Nature. The Spirit is the reverse, and yet also (in some respects) similar.

(89) '*With the three Attributes*.'—That is to say, the Manifest has the three attributes of pleasure, pain and delusion. By this assertion are set aside all those theories that attribute pleasure and pain to the Spirit.

(90) '*Undistinguishable*';—just as Nature cannot be distinguished from itself, so also the Great Principle (Buddhi), being connate with Nature, cannot be distinguished from Nature. Or '*aviveki*' may stand for '*non-separativeness*', *i.e.*, for the character of being co-operative; among the 'manifest' things, there is no one thing that is adequate by itself to produce its effect; it can do so only when in co-operation with other things; and hence it is not possible for anything to be produced out of anything taken singly by itself.

An objection based on the Idealism of the Bauddhas

(91) Some people have held that it is *Idea* (Vijñāna) alone that constitutes pleasure, pain and delusion, and that there exists nothing besides this *Idea* that could possess these (pleasure, etc.,) as its attributes.

The Idealistic objection set aside

In opposition to this view it is asserted that the Manifest is '*objective*'; '*objective*' here stands for '*what can be apprehended*'. That is, it is exterior to the Idea.—And because it is 'objective', therefore, '*common*'—*i. e.*, apprehended (simultaneously) by several persons. If it were nothing more or less than the *Idea*, then in that case,—in as much as *Ideas*, being in the form of 'functions', belong specially to particular individuals, all that is 'manifest' would have to belong specially to particular individuals. That is to say, as a matter of fact, the *Idea* of one person is not apprehended by another, the cognition of another person being always uncognisable. In the case of [Manifest substance such as the] glance of a dancing girl, it is found that many persons continue to stare at it at the same time. This could not be the case if it were otherwise (*i. e.*, if the *glance* were a mere *Idea*).

(92) '*Insentient*'—Nature (Prakṛti), Sentient Faculty (Buddhi) and the rest, are all insentient. That is, 'sentience' cannot belong to the *Buddhi* as held by the *Vaināsʹika* (Buddhist).

(93) '*Productive*'—*i. e.*, possessed of the faculty of producing. The form of the word to be used would have been '*prasavadharmā*', but the author has used the particular possessive affix (*ṇini*), in order to indicate the constant character of the property of *productiveness* as belonging to the Manifest; the sense being that the Manifest is never devoid of similar as well as dissimilar products.

(94) The author attributes the properties of the *Manifest* to the *Unmanifest*—'*So also is Nature*';—*i. e.*, as the Manifest, so the Unmanifest (Nature). [That is, the properties of the *Manifest*, just enumerated, belong to Nature also].

(95) The dissimilarity of these from the Spirit is next stated—'*The spirit is the reverse.*'

Objection—There are points of similarity also beween the soul and the Manifest as well as the Unmanifest

(96) '*Objection*':—"How can you assert the Spirit to be the '*reverse*' *of the Manifest and the Unmanifest*; when we see that there are points of similarity between the Spirit and the Unmanifest—such as being 'without cause', 'eternal' and so on—as also between the Spirit and the Manifest—such as being 'multiform'?"

The objection conceded to—there are points of similarity as well as of dissimilarity

Answer: '*Yet also similar*';—that is to say, though there are points of *similarity*, such as being '*without cause*' and the rest, yet there are points of *dissimilarity* also, in the form of being devoid of the three Attributes and the rest.

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(97) The Manifest and the Unmanifest have been described as having 'three Attributes'.* Now the question arises—What are these three Attributes, and what is their characteristic. The author answers this question in the following text:—

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* This word 'Attribute' requires some explanation. It stands for the *Guṇas* of the Sāṁkhyas—a term denoting the constituent elements of Nature or Primordial Matter;–as says Colebrooke—"These three qualities are not mere accidents of Nature, but are of its essence and enter into its composition." On this Davies remarks—"Nature or Primordial Matter is described, in the system of Kapila as formed by the Guṇas, which were primarily in equilibrium, and so long as this state existed, there was no emanation into separate forms of matter." And, as we shall see later on, this inert condition of Nature is disturbed by the subsequent predominance of the Attribute of Rajas. Davies has rendered this important word—'*Guṇa*'—by 'Mode'. This is apt to mislead. For *Mode*, as understood by Western philosophers, is an affection of a substance, "a quality which it *may have or not, without effecting its essence* or existence." The *Guṇa* of the Sāṁkhyas, however, is almost the reverse of this—it belongs to a substance as constituting its very essence. I have preferred to translate '*Guṇa*' as '*Attribute*'—using the latter term in the sense imparted to it specially, by Spinoza, who thus distinguishes between *Attribute* and *Mode*: "By *Attribute*, I understand that which the mind perceives of substance *as constituting its essence*; by *Mode*, I understand the affections of substances, etc."

Kārikā XII

The Attributes are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion; they serve the purpose of illumination, action and restraint; and they are mutually subjugative, and supporting, and productive and co-operative.

The Character of the three Attributes (Gunas)

(98) These are called *Guṇas* (literally, subsidiary or secondary) because they exist for the sake of others (the Spirits). The three Attributes will be named in order in the next Kārikā. And according to the maxim of presight, or in allowance with a convention among writers of treatises, the 'pleasure' ('pain' and 'delusion') of this Kārikā are to be taken in the same order (as '*Sattva*, etc.,' in the next).

(99) Thus then, the meaning is that '*Prīti*' being *Pleasure*, the *Sattva* attribute is of the nature of *pleasure*; '*Aprīti*' being *Pain*, the *Rajas* attribute is of the nature of *pain*; and, lastly, '*Viṣāda*' being *Delusion*, the *Tamas* attribute is of the nature of *delusion*. The word '*Ātman*', 'nature' has been added with a view to discard the theory that "*pleasure* is nothing more than mere *negation of pain* and *vice versa*." As a matter of fact, Pleasure and Pain are not mere negations of one another; on the contrary, they are positive entities, and the term '*ātman*' 'nature' connotes positive reality, so that those things are '*prītyātman*', whose nature, *i. e.*, *Existence*, is in the form of *pleasure*; similarly with the other terms ('*aprītyātman*' and '*viṣādātman*'). The idea of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion being positive entities, and not mere negations of one another, is vouched for by common experience. If they were mere mutual negations, they would be mutually dependent; and thus the non-fulfilment of one would lead to the non-fulfilment of the other.

(100) Having thus described the nature of the Attributes, the author next describes their several functions:—"*They serve the purpose of illumi-*

Their functions

nation, action and restraint."—Here, too, the three members of the compound are to be construed in the same order as before. The *Rajas*-attribute, in accordance with its mobile nature, would always and everywhere be urging the buoyant *Sattva*-attribute to action, if it were not *restrained* by the sluggish *Tamas*-attribute—by which restraint it operates only at intervals; thus the *Tamas*-attribute becomes a restraining force.

The method of their operation

(101) Having thus described their functions, the author proceeds to describe the method of their operation—"*They are mutually subjugative and supporting and productive and co-operative.*" The term '*vṛtti*' at the end of the compound is to be construed with each member of the compound [thus the compound is to be resolved into the four terms (1) *anyonyābhibhavavṛttayaḥ*, (2) *anyonyās'rayavṛttayaḥ*, (3) *anyonyajananavṛttayaḥ and* (4) *anyonyamithunavṛttayaḥ*].

Now to explain, (1) "*Mutually subjugative*"—The Attributes are so constituted that when one is brought into play for some purpose, it subjugates the other; *e. g.*, the *Sattva* attribute attains its calm state only after having subdued the *Rajas* and *Tamas* attributes. Similarly the *Rajas* attribute, in its turn, attains its agitated state after having subdued the *Sattva* and *Tamas* attributes; and the *Tamas* attribute attains its sluggish state only after having subdued the *Sattva* and *Rajas* attributes.—(2) "*Mutually supporting.*" —Though this epithet is not applicable here, in the sense of *the container and the contained*, yet what is meant by 'support' (*Ās'raya*) here is that the operation of one is dependent upon the other. For instance, the *Sattva* attribute helps the *Rajas* and *Tamas* attributes through the help of *activity* and *restraint* (which are the functions of the *Rajas* and *Tamas* attributes). [Or else, the *Sattva* attribute by itself, without the help of *Rajas*, would remain inert, and never be moved to action].

Similarly the *Rajas* attribute helps the other two by its activity (or mobility) through the help of *illumination* and *restraint*,—and the *Tamas* attribute helps the other two by its restraint, through the help of *illumination* and *activity*. (3) "*Mutually productive.*" That is to say, one can produce (its effects) only when resting on the other two. By *production* here is meant *modification*, and this is always of the same character as the parent Attribute. This is the reason why this 'modification' is not regarded as 'caused' (*produced*), what brings it about not being essentially different from itself; nor is it *non-eternal*, transient,—there being no merging of it into anything essentially different from itself. (4) "*Mutually co-operative.*" That is to say, they are mutual concomitants not existing apart from one another. The particle *ca* has the cumulative force.

In support of the above, we have the following Smṛti text: "All the attributes are mutual consorts; all omnipresent; *Sattva* is the consort of *Rajas*, *Rajas* of *Sattva*, both of these again of *Tamas*, which latter again of both, *Sattva* and *Rajas*. The first conjunction or separation of these has never been perceived." (*Devī-Bhāgavata*, 3. 8).

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(102) It has been said that the Attributes "*serve the purpose of illumination, activity and restraint.*" Now it is going to be explained what those Attributes are, and wherefore are they so :—

Kārikā XIII

The three Attributes named and their nature explained

The *Sattva-attribute* **is held to be buoyant and illuminating; the** *Rajas-attribute* **exciting and mobile; and the** *Tamas-attribute* **sluggish and enveloping. Their functioning is for a (single) purpose, like that of the Lamp.**

The Properties of Goodness (Sattva)

(103) *The Sattva-attribute, etc.*—The Sattva-attribute alone has been held by the teachers of Sāṁkhya, to be *buoyant* and *illuminating*. *Buoyancy*—as opposed to *sluggishness*—is that which enables things to shoot up; it is to this that the up-rising of the flame of fire is due. In some cases, it is conducive to lateral motion also, as in the case of air. Thus, generally, *buoyancy* may be said to be that which is conducive to the efficient functioning of all instruments (causes); *sluggishness*, on the other hand, would make the instruments inefficient. The *illuminative character* of the Sattva-attribute has been already explained (under Kārikā XII).

Buoyancy

Illuminativeness

Necessity of the properties of Foulness (Rajas)—activity and excitingness

(104) *Sattva* and *Tamas*, being by themselves inert, are unable to produce their effects; the driving force is supplied by *Rajas*, which excites them and rouses them from their natural inertia, and urges them on to the accomplishment of their respective effects. It is for this reason that *Rajas* is said to be *exciting*. This exciting character of *Rajas* is next accounted for—"(*it is also*) *mobile*." This shows that the operation of *Rajas* is necessary for all activity.

Necessity of the properties of Darkness (Tamas), sluggishness and envelopingness

(105) On account of its 'mobility', *Rajas* would keep the triad of Attributes in a continuous whirl of activity, but for its being restrained by the "sluggish and enveloping" *Tamas*, which obstructs its activity, which is operative in certain cases only. Thus, in order to be distinguished from the active *Rajas*, *Tamas* has been said to be the *restrainer*—"*Darkness is sluggish and enveloping.*" The particle '*eva*' is to be construed—not only with '*Tamas*' but with '*Sattva*' and '*Rajas*' also.

Objection—The Attributes of contradictory natures cannot co-operate

(106) The enquirer objects: "Instead of co-operating for a single purpose, the Attributes, being endowed as they are with contradictory properties, would counteract each other, like Sunda and Upsunda (two wrestling champions); there can be no possibility of their combining for a single purpose." The author replies—

Reply—they can, like wick and oil, in giving light

"Their functioning is for a single purpose, like that of the lamp." We have all observed how the *wick* and the *oil*—each, by itself, opposed to the action of fire—co-operate, when in contact with fire, for the single purpose of giving light; similarly, the three humours of the body—wind, bile, and phlegm—though possessed of contradictory properties, co-operate for the single purpose of sustaining the body. Precisely in the same manner, do the three Attributes, though possessed of mutually contradictory properties, co-operate towards a single end;—'for the single purpose', of the emancipation of the Spirit. This will be further explained in Kārikā XXXI.

Necessity of postulating the three Attributes as causes of pleasure, pain and delusion respectively

(107) Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, being mutual contradictions, lead to the assumption of three different causes connate with themselves respectively, (and it is these causes that we have postulated the three Attributes). These three causes also must be multiform, since, by their very nature, they are mutually suppressive. As an example (of the multiform character of these various causes of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion), we have the following: A single girl, young, beautiful, gentle and virtuous, is a source of delight to her husband,—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Pleasure; she pains her co-wives—why?—because for them, she appears in the form of Pain; and lastly the same girl deludes or

stupefies another man who is unable to get at her—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Delusion. The case of this woman illustrates the nature of all things. In the above case, that which is the cause of pleasure is the *Attribute of Sattva*, the essence of which is Pleasure; the cause of pain is the *Attribute of Rajas*, the essence of which is Pain; and lastly, the cause of delusion is the *Attribute of Tamas*, the essence of which is Delusion.

Goodness the cause of Pleasure; Foulness of Pain, and Darkness of Delusion

As regards Pleasure, Illuminativeness and Buoyancy (which are the properties attributed to *Sattva*), these are not mutually contradictory, and as such, not incapable of co-existing in a single substratum; in fact, they are actually found together (subsisting in *Sattva*). Hence, Pleasure, Illuminativeness and Buoyancy, being mutually not contradictory, do not necessitate the assumption of three different causes (one for each of them severally)—as is done by Pleasure, Pain and Delusion which are mutually contradictory (and as such unable to cohere in a single substratum). In the same manner, Pain, Mobility and Activity (the properties of *Rajas*),—as also Delusion, Sluggishness, and Envelopingness (the properties of *Tamas*), [do not necessitate the assumption of several causes]. Thus it is established that there are *three*—and only *three*—Attributes.

The Properties of each of the Attributes are not contradictory, and so they do not necessitate the assumption of different causes for each of them

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(108) *Objection*:—"As regards earth, and other things known to us, we actually perceive the properties of 'undistinguishableness' and the rest (described in Kārikā XI) as belonging to them, and we admit them so far. But the *Sattva* and other Attributes can never come within the range of perceptible experience; how then, can we attri-

Question—Indiscreetness, etc., of the Attributes, how proved?

bute to these latter, the said properties of being 'undistinguishable,' 'objective,' 'insentient' and 'productive' (as described under Kārikā XI above)?"

Answer :

Kārikā XIV

Two reasons for the above given. Existence of Nature proved

The properties of being 'undistinguishable' and the rest are proved by the existence of the three Attributes, and by the non-existence of these (the three Attributes) in their absence. And the existence of the Unmanifest (Nature) too is establised on the ground of the properties of the effect being of the same nature as those of the cause.

First Proof: *From the existence of the three Attributes*

(109) By "*aviveki*" in the Kārikā is to be understood the abstract form '*avivekitva*'; just as '*dvi*' and '*eka*'—in the Sūtra "*Dvyekayordvivacanaikavacane*" (Pāṇini I-IV-22) —stand for '*dvitva*' and '*ekatva*' respectively; if it were not so, then the form of the compound would be "*dvyekeṣu*" (and not "*dvyekayoḥ*").* *Question*:—How do you prove the properties of "undistinguishableness" and the rest ?—*Answer*:—"*By the existence of the three Attributes.*" That is, in the case of *manifested* entities known to us, it has been found that 'whatever is of the nature of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, is endowed with the properties of *being undistinguishable* and the rest';—this affirmative universal proposition, implied by the text, has not been stated in so many words because it is clearly known,—It proceeds to state the negative premiss in the next term—'*by the non-existence of these in their absence*'; that is, where the said properties of

* For if the compound were analysed into '*dvi*' and '*eka*', the sum would be three, and would thus require a plural ending, and not the dual,—which is explained by making '*dvi*' and '*eka*' stand for '*dvitva*' and '*ekatva*' making only two nouns, and thus having a dual ending.

'being undistinguishable' and the rest are absent,—as in the *Spirit*,—the three Attributes of *Sattva* etc., are non-existent. Or, we may have the *Manifest and the Unmanifest* (both together) as the subject (minor term) of the syllogism, and then we shall have the reasoning—"*By the existence of the three Attributes*"—as a purely negative inference* (*Avīta*), there being no other case (besides the minor term) where there could be an affirmation (of the reason, Middle term--*existence of the Attributes*).

Question--How is Nature proved to exist?

(110) *Objection*:—"The existence of the properties of 'being undistinguishable' and the rest, cannot be proved before the object possessing these properties (the Unmanifest) has been proved to exist. The existence of the *Unmanifest* itself has not yet been proved; how then can the existence of the said properties be proved?"

Reply: *From the properties of the effect being due to those of the cause.*

Answer:—*The existence of the Unmanifest is established on the ground of the properties of the effect being of the same nature as those of the cause.* The sense of the argument is as follows: All effects are found to possess properties similar to those of their respective

* The syllogism has been previously explained as—"Whatever has pleasure etc., is undistinguishable, as the perceptible, material substences:"—and here we have the affirmation (*Anvaya*) of the reason in the "perceptible substances" whose connotation is different from that of the subject of the syllogism, "*All things having pleasure etc.*" Now, what our author proposes is that we might explain the reasoning thus: "All things besides the Spirit (the Manifest and the Unmanifest) are undistinguishable, since they have the three Attributes, and whatever is not undistinguishable does not have the three Attributes." Thus in the latter syllogism, we have for the minor term *The Manifest and the Unmanifest* which comprehend all cases where reason (the presence of the three Attributes) could be found; for nothing besides the Manifest and the Unmanifest can be said to have the three Attributes.

causes; *e. g.*, the cloth possesses properties of the same nature as those of the yarns; similarly, we find that all products, like the Great Principle and the rest are endowed with Pleasure, Pain and Delusion; from which it follows that this must be due to the presence of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion subsisting in their cause;—it is thus that the existence of this cause, in the shape of the *Unmanifest*, Primordial Matter (Nature) is established.*

Why not accept the atomic theory which discards the necessity of an Unmanifested Entity ?

(111) Says the enquirer, "the followers of Kaṇāda (the Vais'eṣikas) and Gautama (the Naiyāyikas) assert that Manifest is produced out of the *Manifest* ; According to them Atoms are manifest, and these produce the *manifest* product, from the binary compound onwards to the Earth, Water and other substances ; and the qualities of the latter, Earth and the rest, are produced in accordance with the similar qualities in the

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* And consequently *Nature* too is proved to have the properties in question, in accordance with the proposition laid down before—"Whatever has pleasure etc., has the said properties etc., also." The reasoning may be rendered clearer by reducing it to the form of two Aristotelian syllogisms :—

Properties of the effect (Intellect) are properties of the cause (Nature).

Pleasure etc., are properties of the effect (Intellect)

∴ Pleasure, etc., are properties of the cause (Nature).

And again :—

Whatever has pleasure, etc., has indiscreetness, etc.

Nature has pleasure, etc., (as first proved).

∴ Nature has indiscreetness, etc.

(constituent) atoms.* And in as much as all the Manifest along with its properties, being produced out of the *Manifest* what is the use of postulating an Unmanifest, an imperceptible Entity (in the form of Nature ?) "

We reply——

Kārikā XV

Reply—we must postulate an Unmanifested Reality—reasons given

(i) **Because of the finite nature of specific objects, (ii) because of homogeneity, (iii) because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause, (iv) because of separation between cause and its product, and because of the merging of the whole world (of effects), —there is the Unmanifest as the cause (next Kārikā).**

First proof of the existence of Prakṛti "*Since there is separation of cause and effect, and reunion of the whole Universe*"

(112) "*Of specific objects*" *i. e.*, of the products in the shape of the Great Principle and the rest—the cause, root-cause is the *Unmanifest* (Nature). Why so ?—(iv) "*because of the separation between the cause and effect and because of the merging of the whole Universe*";—It has been established that the effect is already existent in its cause ; the

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* The atomic theory of Kaṇāda and Gautama may be thus summed up—In the beginning there existed only atoms of various substances (Earth, Water, Fire and Air) besides, of course, Ākās'a, etc., which are in themselves eternal. These various atoms were respectively endued with four different sets of properties, latter'y perceived in their compounds. By some agency or other—mainly that of Adṛṣṭa, the Unseen (Fate)—all homogeneous atoms combine, one with one, into couples and thus form binary compounds, which latter again combining in the same manner, but three at a time, give rise to tertiary compounds, and so on to the various objects of perception. These atoms are declared to be without extension in space, or else, they could not be permanent. But as far as I know, no Naiyāyika has even yet tried to show how two things devoid of extension, can combine—a point which affords the strongest handle to S'aṅkarācārya in his refutation of the atomic theory. See *S'ārīraka-Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-Sūtras* II—11-12-17.

already existing limbs of the Tortoise emerging out of its body, become distinguished from it—' this is the *Body* of the Tortoise and these are its limbs ' and on again entering the body, they become unmanifest, hidden; similarly, the already existing products, in the shape of the Jar or the Crown, on emerging out of the cause, in the shape of the Clay or the Gold, come to be distinguished from this cause;—similarly, the already existing products in the shape of the Earth and other subtances, emerging out of their cause in the shape of the Primary Elements (Tanmātras) become distinguished from them ; the already existing Primary Elements on emerging out of their cause, the 'I-principle', come to be distinguished from it; the already existing 'I-principle', emerging from its cause, the Great Principle, becomes distinguished from it; and lastly, the already existing Great Principle, emerging from its cause, the Highest Unmanifest (Nature), becomes distinguished from it. This ' distinguishing ' or separation from the final cause, the Highest Unmanifest, of the whole world of effects—related to it either mediately (as with Earth, etc.) or immediately (as with Great Principle)—is what is meant by the " distinction between the cause and its product". Similarly, at counter-evolution or dissolution, the product, in the shape of the Jar or the Crown, merges into its cause, in the shape of the Clay or the Gold, and thereby disappears, *i. e.*, becomes *Unmanifest* ; which means that it is a form of the cause itself which becomes *unmanifest*, so far as the particular product is concerned. Thus also when the Earth and the other substances merge into the Primary Elements, they render these latter ' unmanifest ' in so far as the forms of those substances themselves are concerned ;—similarly, when the Primary Elments merge into the I-principle, they render these latter 'unmanifest' in so far as their own form is concerned; —when the I-principle merges into the Great Principle, it renders the latter unmanifest in so far as its own form is

concerned;—and finally when the Great Principle merges into its cause, Nature, it renders this latter unmanifest. In as much as there is no merging of Nature itself into anything else, it is unmanifest pure and simple. This is what is meant by *'the non-separation or merging of the whole world of effects'*, of all kinds. The term '*Vais'varūpya*' is formed by the adding of the reflexive affix '*syañ*' (to the term '*vis'varūpa*'). From all this it follows that, in as much as there is 'distinction' and also 'merging' of the already existing product in the cause, there must be *Unmanifest* as the cause.

Second proof: Because Evolution is due to Energy

(113) From the following reason also the Unmanifest is the cause— '*Because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause*;"—It is a well-known fact that the evolution of the effect is due to the efficiency of the cause; for certainly, no effect can arise from an inefficient cause. This latent 'efficiency' in the cause is no other than the existence therein of the effect in its unmanifested state; since, on the hypothesis of the effect being existent, there can be no other form of causal efficiency, apart from the fact of the effect being latent in the cause. The difference of *sand* from *sesamum*—the material cause of oil—lies only in the fact that it is only in the latter, not in the former, that oil exists in its unmanifested condition.

Objection: These two reasons might rest with *Intellect*

(114) *Objection*: "The above two reasons that you have urged—the fact of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause and that the separation and merging of the cause and effect—, might be taken as proving the supreme 'Unmanifest' character of the Great Principle itself. Why should we have one more Unmanifest entity beyond that?"

Reply—Third proof—"*From finiteness*" (of all manifested existence)

Answer: "*Because of the finite nature of specific objects*";—'*parimāṇāt*' stands for '*parimitatvāt*', 'because of being measured, *i. e*., finite'. [The reasoning is stated in the syllogistic form]—The specific objects in question, the

Great Principle and the rest, have an Unmanifested Entity for their cause (*i. e.*, they have a cause in which they exist in their unmanifested state),—because, they are finite,—like the jar and other things:—the jar and other things are found to have, for their cause, clay and other things, (in which inhere) the unmanifested (state of the effects); we have already shown that the cause is that wherein the effect already exists in the unmanifested state. Under these circumstances, the cause of the Great Principle must be that highest Unmanifest which must be the *final* cause, for there is no ground for postulating a further Unmanifested Reality.*

Fourth proof— *"Because of homogeneity"*

(115) For the following reason also the specific objects in question must have causes wherein they lie unmanifested:—"*Because of homogeneity*".—'Homogeneity' consists in the similarity of the different objects. The Great Principle and the rest—manifesting themselves as 'volition' and the rest—are found to be 'homogeneous' in the sense that they consist in Pleasure Pain and Delusion. And whatever is invariably connected with a certain form must have, for its cause (wherein it inheres), something which has that form for its constituent element. Thus it becomes established that of the specific objects, the Unmanifested (Nature) is the cause.**

Having proved the existence of the Unmanifest, the author next states the manner of its operation:—

* Because the Unmanifested Nature (the cause of the Great Principle) is not finite, as its effects, 'I-principle' and the rest are. And further, because, by so doing we would have to postulate causes *ad infinitum.*

**Thus we have in the present case: The Great Principle and the rest are invariably connected, with Pleasure, Pain and Delusion; and as such, must have, for their cause, Nature wherein they all lie unmanifested prior to their Evolution; and this Nature has, for its constituent elements, the three Attributes which respectively consist in Pleasure, Pain and Delusion.

Kārikā XVI

There is the Unmanifest as the cause (gone before); it operates through the three Attributes, by blending and modification, like water, on account of the difference arising from the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes.

The method of Nature's operation

(116) "*Operates through the three Attributes*".—At the time of the cosmic dissolution, each of the three Attributes, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, continues its homogeneous modifications. Modification forms the very nature of the Attributes; and as such, they can never, for a moment, remain unmodified. Hence even at the time of dissolution, each of the Attributes, Sattva and the rest, operates through its own particular form* [This is at the period of dissolution].

Through the Attributes

(117) Another method of operation (which comes in at the creative period) is next stated—"*By blending*". The term '*samudaya*' signifies '*sametya udaya*', *appearing in combination, i. e., blending*. This blending of the Attributes is not possible without some sort of relative subserviency among them; and this relative subserviency again is not possible without some diversity among the Attributes;—this diversity again is not possible without one being suppressive of the other (*i. e.*, unless the Attributes are so constituted that they suppress one another).—This is the second method of operation which brings about the Great Principle and other products.**

By a blending of the Attributes

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* This is the state of equilibrium of the Attributes, during which no evolution is possible.

** The various evolutions from Nature are due to the disturbance of equilibrium among the Attributes, which rouses the hitherto dormant, evolving energy of Nature, whence issue forth the various manifestations —Intellect and the rest.

Objection—How can an Attribute of uniform nature bring about diverse actions

(118) The enquirer objects—"How can diverse methods of operation belong to the Attributes, when each of them is of one uniform nature?" We reply—"*By modification like water*;"—we all know how the water falling from the clouds, though naturally of itself, having one taste,* becomes sweet, sour, saline, bitter, pungent and hot, according as it comes into contact with different modifications of earth and becomes transformed into the juice of fruits such as cocoanut, palm, wood-apples and so forth; in the same manner, (owing to the *blending* and the *mutual suppression* of the Attributes), the Attributes of Nature come to be predominant one by one and thereby bring about various modifications (in the state of various products). This is what is meant by the phrase: "*on account of the difference arising from the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes.*" That is, by the peculiarities due to the predominance of one or the other of the Attributes.

Reply:—"*By modification as water.*"

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(119) There are some self-contented (Materialists) who accept, as 'Spirit', either the Unmanifest (Nature) or the Great Principle or the 'I-principle' or the Sense-organs, or the elemental substances. As against these, the Author makes the following declaration.

Kārikā XVII

Reason for the existence of Spirit

(*a*) **Because all composite objects are for another's use, (*b*) because there must be absence of the three Attributes and other properties, (*c*) because there must be control, (*d*) because there must be some one to experience and (*e*) because there is a tendency towards**

* 'Sweet' according to the Naiyāyikas.

'Isolation' or final beatitude, therefore, the Spirit must be there.

The Spirit exists: because all compound objects are for another

(120) The Spirit must be there, apart from the Unmanifest (Nature) and other things. (*a*) "*Because all composite objects are for another's use*"—This reason, when reduced to the syllogistic form, would stand thus—Nature, the Great Principle, the 'I-principle', and other things must exist for another's use, because they are composite like the bedstead, the chair, the unguent and other things.—Nature and the rest are all 'composite', being composed as they are, of pleasure, pain and delusion.* (represented by the three Attributes of *Sattva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*).

Objection: The above reasoning would only lead to another set of compounds, not to an Elementary Spirit

(121) "But", says the objector, "the bedstead, the chair, and other composite things are found to exist for the Body which is itself a composite thing, and not for the Spirit as apart from Nature etc; so that the fact of Nature &c., being composite, should only lead to the inference of another composite thing—(for whose use they exist) and not to that of a non-composite Spirit.

Reply—*Since the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes must exist*

We reply—"*Because there must be absence of the three Attributes and other properties.*"—That is to say, if from the fact of Nature, &c., 'being for another's use', we were to infer only another composite object, then in that case, we would have to assume such composite

* This sounds rather absurd. But we must not forget that the whole set of material objects are mere emanations from Nature, whose constituent elements are the three Attributes, which latter consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, respectively.

objects *ad infinitum*; for even this latter compound would lead to the influence of another for whose use it will exist and this again to another, and so on *ad infinitum*. And when we can escape this *regressus ad infinitum* by postulating a reasonable terminus, it is not proper to multiply unnecessary assumptions (in the shape of an infinite series of composites). Nor can it be urged that "Multiplication of assumptions becomes excusable when supported by evidence" because when the 'composite character (of the bedstead) etc., is put forward in the inferential argument, it is only in so far as it is concomitant with 'being for another's use' (and it is not meant to include all the properties of the said composite objects); in fact if one were to insist upon the Inference to be in accord with all the properties of the corroborative instance (in this case, the bedstead &c.),—then there would be an end to all Inference (no Inference being possible).* We have explained this in our *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*.** Thus then, in order to escape the *regressus ad infinitum*, if we accept the non-composite nature of Spirit, we find ourselves constrained to attribute to it the properties of being "without the three Attributes", "distinguishable", "non-objective",

The view of the objector would lead to compounds *ad infinitum*

* Because there can scarcely be found any two occurrences in nature which could be quite identical. Even in the stock example of the Naiyāyikas—"Fiery, because smoking, as the culinary hearth"—we have a dissimilarity between the subject-matter of the syllogism and the instance cited. Thus, in the culinary hearth the fire is for cooking food, and proceeding from a house made by men, &c. &c., whereas such is not the case with the fire in the mountain.

** This is a commentary on Udyotakara's Nyāyavārtika (a gloss on the Vātsyāyanbhāṣya on the Nyāyasūtras of Gautama). This work with the Paris'uddhi of Udayanācārya is generally counted as closing the epoch of ancient Nyāya,— latterly supplanted by the modern system, introduced and most extensively expounded by Ganges'a Upādhyāya, in his Tattva-Cintāmaṇi.

(subjective), "uncommon (specific)", "sentient", and "not productive". Because 'being with three Attributes' and other properties are always accompanied by that of 'being composite', which latter being absent in the Spirit, must lead to the inference of the *absense of the three Attributes*, &c., just as when a certain individual is not a 'Brāhmaṇa; he cannot be a 'kaṭha' (a special class of Brāhmaṇas). Hence when he laid down that "there must be absence of the three Attributes etc.," he means that there must be something which is not composite, and this is the Spirit.

Because there must be superintendence

(122) For the following reason also there must be a Spirit apart from Matter: "*Because there must be control*"; that is to say, because the objects constituted by the three Attributes are such as 'are always controlled';—as a matter of fact it is found that everything *consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion*, (*i. e.* in the three Attributes) is controlled by something else—*e. g.*, the chariot by the charioteer; and the Great Principle and the rest have been proved to 'consist in pleasure, pain and delusion'; therefore, they must have a 'controller'—and this 'controller' must be beyond* the three Attributes and independent;—and this is the Spirit.

Because there must be one to feel

(123) Again there must be the Spirit "because there must be some one to experience". The term 'some one to experience' indicates the *objects* of experience in the shape of pleasure and pain. *The objects of experience* are pleasure and pain, which are felt by everyone as agreeable and disagreeable respectively. That is to say, there must

* Otherwise the Controller also will stand in need of another, for the presence of the Attributes in the former will necessarily lead to that of pleasure, &c. which again will necessitate its control by something beyond itself. And so we shall be landed in a *regressus ad infinitum*.

be something other than the feelings themselves, to which they (feelings) can be agreeable or otherwise. Feelings cannot be agreeable or disagreeable to the Great Principle and other products; as that would involve the anomaly of things operating upon themselves; as the Great Principle and the rest are all themselves integrally composed of pleasure, pain and delusion.* Thus, then, something else, which does not consist of pleasure, etc., must be the one to whom things are agreeable or disagreeable; and this something else must be the Spirit.

A different interpretation of the above reason

(124) Others, however, interpret the above reasoning of the Kārikā thus: The term '*Bhogya*' stands for *visible*; and the *visibility* of the Great Principle and the rest not being possible without an *observer*, there must be one outside of, and beyond them; and this is the Spirit. What the word '*bhoktṛbhāvāt*' of the text means is 'because the *observer* is to be inferred from the *visible*'. The *visibility* of the Great Principle and the rest is to be inferred from the fact of their consisting,—like the Earth and other substances,—of pleasure, pain and delusion.

Because of the tendency of writers and sages towards beatitude

(125) Lastly, the Spirit must be there—"*because there is tendency towards Isolation.*"—The 'Isolation' which is found in all scriptures and is recognised by great sages and others possessed of divine insight—as the absolute and final cessation of the three kinds of pain—can never belong to the Great Principle and other products; because, by their very nature, the pain as one of their integral components, from which, therefore, they can never be absolved,

* That is to say—the Great Principle, as made up of pleasure, pain and dulness, cannot be properly said to *feel* pleasure etc., for that would imply the feeling of *pleasure* by pleasure;—or worse still—by pain; and *vice versa*, which is absurd.

since a substance cannot be absolved of something that forms its constituting element.—It is only when one is distinct from the Great Principle etc., and does not consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, that the said Isolation can be possible. Thus, the conclusion is that in as much as there is a tendency in all the scriptures and among all intelligent persons towards 'Isolation', there must be something beyond (pleasure, etc., and hence) the Great Principle and the rest,—and this is the Spirit.

(126) Having thus proved the existence of the Spirit, the author next raises the question—Is this Spirit one* (manifesting itself) in all bodies, or many, being different in each body ? And in reply, he lays down the theory of the plurality of Spirits.

Kārikā XVIII

Plurality of Spirits—reasons

(1) Because there is definite adjustment of birth, death, and the organs, (2) because there is non-simultaneity of activity and (3) because there is diversity due to the three Attributes—the plurality of Spirits is established.

From allotment of birth, death and the organs

(127) "*Because etc.*"—The plurality of Spirits is established;—why ? "Because there is definite *adjustment of birth, death and the organs*. The 'Birth' of the Spirit consists in its connection with a new set of body, sense-organs, mind, 'I-principle', Great Principle and feeling** (*Vedanā*)—all these latter forming a composite

* As the Vedāntin asserts.

** "*Vedanā* might be taken severally with 'body' etc., In that case the passage would be translated thus: 'bodily' sensuous, mental egoistic and intellectual cognitions ; but the translation given above is preferable, for certainly there can be no cognition through body etc., taken singly. No cognition is possible in the body alone without the aid of (the sense-organs) mind etc., and so on with the rest.

of a particular character; it does *not* mean *modification*; since the Spirit is essentially unmodifiable (unchangeable). *Death* also consists in the giving up of the body and the rest; it cannot mean destruction, as the Spirit is unchangeably eternal. The '*organs*' are thirteen, beginning with the Great Principle. The *definite adjustment* of these—birth and the rest, stands for the fact that one set of these—Body etc., are connected with only one Spirit,—and this cannot be explained on the hypothesis of there being only one Spirit; for, if the Spirit were one and the same in all bodies, then on the *birth* of one, all would be *born*,—on the *death* of one, all would *die*,—on one becoming blind or deaf, all would become blind or deaf,—on one becoming unsound of mind, all would become unsound of mind,—so that there would be no adjustment. On the other hand, if there is a distinct Spirit, belonging to each set of Body etc., the adjustment becomes secured. Nor can one explain the above adjustment by attributing it to the single Spirit, as diversely conditioned by contact with different bodies, etc. For in that case he would land himself on another absurdity—that of attributing (on analogous ground, the birth or death of the Spirit), in connection with the hands, the wrists and others. This, however, can never be right, for a girl does not become 'dead' by the derangement of her hands, or 'born' on the appearance of her breasts or other parts of her body.

"Since activity is not simultaneous"

(128) For the following reason also, the Spirit must be different with different bodies: "*Because activity is not simultaneous.*" Though 'Activity' in the form of effort, is a function of the internal organs, yet it is here attributed to the Spirit. If the Spirit were one, the activity of one man would lead to similar activity in all other men—as the Spirit would be the same; so that the moving of one man would

lead to the moving of all others at the same time—a palpable absurdity, which is avoided on the hypothisis of *plurality*.

Because the modifications of the Attributes are different

(129) Again, the Spirits must be many—" *because there is diversity due to the three Attributes.*" The particle 'eva' should be constructed with '*siddham*', not with '*viparyayāt*'; the sense being that 'the plurality of Spirits must be taken as *proved, not as unproved.*' The term '*traiguṇya*' stands for the 'three Attributes';—by the 'diversity' of these is meant 'differentiation.' Some persons abounding in the Sattva—attribute, represent aggregates of that attribute—*e. g.* the deities and saints; others abound in the Rajas-attribute,—such as men; others again in the Tamas-attribute,—such as beasts. This 'diversity' or 'differentiation' due to the distribution of the Attributes in the various entities, could not be explained if the Spirit were one and the same in all. On the hypothesis of plurality, however, there is no difficulty.

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(130) Having thus established the plurality of Spirits the author now states the properties of the Spirit—as a knowledge of these is conducive to discriminative wisdom:—

Kārikā XIX

The properties of the Soul

And from that contrast, it follows that the Spirit is 'Witness,' and has 'Isolation,' 'Neutrality,' and is the 'Seer,' and 'Inactive.'

'*From that* &c.'—The particle 'Ca,' "*And*" connects the following properties of the Spirit with its plurality.

Why *that* contrast?

(131) If it were said—" And from *this* contrast," then it would refer to '*the aiversity due to the three Attributes*', of the last Kārikā. In order to avoid this, it is said—" and from *that*, etc."

A subject, immediately preceding, is referred to by the pronoun *this*; whereas one not so immediate is denoted by *that*; hence the *that* here refers to Kārikā XI.

The necessity of so many properties. Their Inter-dependence

(132) Thus, the '*contrast*' of the character of "having the three Attributes, etc.", and the rest (which have been set forth in Kārikā XI as belonging to the *Unmanifest*, Nature, as also to the Manifest, Products.)—connotes the Spirit's property of *being without the three Attributes* and being 'distinguishable', 'non-objective', 'not common', 'sentient' and 'non-productive'. Now the characters being 'sentient' and 'non-objective' also indicate the characters of being 'witness', and 'seer'. Since it is only a 'sentient' being that can be a 'seer', and one can be 'seer', and one can be a 'witness' only when the things have been shown to him; as in daily life we find the two parties of a dispute *showing* the object of their dispute to the *witness*; similarly does the Nature exhibit its creations before the Spirit, which latter, therefore, becomes the *witness*. And again, no object can be shown to one who is himself an *object* and insentient; and since the Spirit is both sentient and non-objective, it becomes the *witness*. For the same reasons, the Spirit is also the 'seer'.

(133) Further, from *the absence of the three Attributes* in the Spirit follows its *Isolation*—by which is meant the final and absolute removal of the three kinds of pain; and this property, as belonging to the Spirit, is a necessary deduction from the fact of the Spirit being by its very nature *without the three Attributes*, and hence without *Pleasure, Pain* or *Delusion*.

(134) From the *absence of the Attributes*, again, follows *neutrality*; since this latter property is such as cannot belong either to the happy and satisfied, or to the sad and grumbling. It is only one who is devoid of both pleasure

and pain, who can be called *neutral*—also called *Udāsīna* (indifferent). Lastly, the *inactivity* of the Spirit follows from its being 'distinguishable' and 'non-productive.'

Objection-Intelligence and activity always found co-existent

(135) *Objection.* "We grant all this; but in ordinary experience, we first decide, what is to be done by us and then think in the following strain—'I, who am a sentient being, wishing to do a certain act, am going to do it;' so that, we find by our experience that 'sentience.' and 'activity' are co-existent in the same person. And this goes against the Sāṅkhya tenets which make the 'Sentient' being 'inactive' and the 'active' agent 'insentient.'

Answer :—

Kārikā XX

Reply :—The apparent activity of the soul due to union with Buddhi and the apparent intelligence of the latter due to union with Puruṣa

Thus from this union, the insentient 'Evolute' appears as if 'sentient'; and similarly, from the activity really belonging to the Attributes, the Spirit, which is neutral appears as if it were active.

(136) The sense is that in as much as 'sentience' and 'activity' have been proved by reasons to be differently located, therefore, the feeling referred to by the objector must be a mistake. The word 'Liṅga' 'Evolute', here stands for everything from the Great Principle down to the primary elements to be described later on. The cause of the mistake is said to be the 'union' *i. e.,* proximity of the Spirit with the 'Evolute.' The rest is clear enough.

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(137) *Objection*:—"You say that the feeling is due to *Union*, etc. But no union between two distinct things is possible, without some need, which again is not possible without the relation (between the two things) of the helper and helped. [How is this possible in accordance with your tenets, with regard to the union of the Spirit with the Evolute?]"

Objection :— What is the need of the Union ?

In reply, the author explains the 'help' or 'benefit' which forms the basis of the need.

Kārikā XXI

For the perception of Nature by the Spirit and for the Isolation of the Spirit, there is union of both,—like that of the halt and the blind; and from this union proceeds evolution.

Reply :—The need is that of final Emancipation

(138) In the term "*Pradhānasya*" the genitive affix has the accusative force, the meaning being—"for the perception by Spirit of Nature, the source of all things,"—thus implying the fact of Nature being an *object—something to be enjoyed.* This *enjoyability*, however, is not possible without an *enjoyer*, whose existence thus becomes needed by Nature.

(139) The author next explains the need of the Spirit (for Nature)—"*For the Isolation of the Spirit*"—The Spirit, while in union with the 'enjoyable' Nature, believes the three kinds of pain—the constituents of Nature—to be his own; and from this (self-imposed bond) he seeks liberation, Isolation; this Isolation is dependent upon due discrimination between the Spirit and the three Attributes; thus discrimination is not possible without the Nature (and its evolutes in the shape of Buddhi and the rest, without which no knowledge

The need explained

of any kind is possible);—thus it is that for his own Isolation the Spirit needs Nature. In as much as this series of unions (between the Spirit and Nature) is eternal, it is only right and proper that the Spirit, though he had been already united for the purposes of 'enjoyment', should be united with it again, for the purpose of ' Isolation '.

The necessity of the creation of Buddhi etc.

(140) " Granted that there is this *union* between these two ; but whence the evolution of the Great Principle and the rest ? " *Answer* " *From this union proceeds evolution.* " The said ' union ' (of Spirit with Nature) cannot by itself suffice either for ' enjoyment ' or ' Isolation ' if the Great Principle and the rest be not there; hence the *union* itself brings about the Evolution for the sake of ' enjoyment ' and ' Isolation. '

The process of Evolution is now explained.

Kārikā XXII

The process of Evolution from Prakṛti downwards

From the (Parkṛti Primordial Matter, Nature) issues Mahat (Buddhi, the Great Princiele) ; from this issues Ahaṅkāra (I–principle); from which proceed the ' set of sixteen ' from five of this ' set of sixteen ' proceed the five elementary substances.

(141) *From Prakṛti*, etc.,—*Prakṛti* is the Unmanifest (Nature); *Mahat* (Great Principle) and *Ahaṅkāra* (I—Principle) will be described later. The ' set of sixteen ' is made up of the eleven sense-organs, to be described later on, and the five *primary elements*. Out of these sixteen, from the five primary elements, proceed respectively the five elementary substances (Ākās'a, Earth, Water, Air and Fire).

The process of the production of the elements

(142) Thus, (*a*) from the primary element of 'sound' proceeds Ākās'a, having sound as its characteristic property; (*b*) from the primary element of 'touch' as combined with that of 'sound' proceeds Air, with sound and touch as its characteristic properties; (*c*) from the primary element of 'colour' combined with those of 'sound' and 'touch' proceeds Fire, with sound, touch and colour for its characteristic properties; (*d*) from the primary element 'taste' combined with those of 'sound', 'touch' and 'colour' proceeds Water, with sound, touch, colour, and taste as its characteristic properties; and lastly, (*e*) from the primary element of 'odour' combined with those of 'sound', 'touch', 'colour' and 'taste' proceeds Earth with all sound, touch, colour, taste and odour as its characteristic properties.

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(143) The Unmanifest Nature has been already defined in general terms in Kārikā X, and specifically in Kārikā XIII; the Manifest also has been generally defined in Kārikā X; now the author defines *Buddhi*, a particular form of the Manifest, the *Buddhi*—the knowledge of which is helpfu towards discriminative wisdom.

Kārikā XXIII

Buddhi defined. Its properties stated

Buddhi, the Great Principle, 'is determination' (*i. e.* **determining Principle, Will)***; **Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power, constitute its form when abounding in the Sattva-attribute,—and the reverse of these when abounding in the Tamas-Principle.**

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*Though there is some difference of opinion on this point, yet I am inclined to think that *Adhyavasāya* means 'determining' and of all the faculties *will* appears to be the only determining principle in Man.

(144) *Buddhi is described as "determination"*—on the principle that there is no difference between the action (*of determining*) and the active agent (that which determines). It is well known that when a man has to do anything, what he does is to review the situation; he ponders over it, regards himself as entitled to do it and then makes up his mind (determines) that he should do it and then does it. Now 'determination' consists in the notion that 'this should be done,' and it belongs to, and forms the characteristic function of *Buddhi* (the 'Great Principle' Will), which acquires sentience from its proximity to the Sentient Faculty (of the Spirit); and 'Buddhi' is regarded as *not different* from the said 'determination' (on the principle that the *action* is not different from the *active agent*); this also constitutes the 'definition' (differentia) of Buddhi, in as much as it distinguishes it from all like and unlike things.

The properties of Buddhi-Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power, and the reverse of these

(145) Having thus defined *Buddhi*, the author, in order to help the attainment of discriminative wisdom states the properties of Buddhi, as abounding in the Sattva and Tamas attributes: "*Virtue*, etc., etc.". 'Virtue' leads to prosperity and the Highest Good,—that brought about by the performance of sacrifices, charity and the like lead to the former, and that due to the practice of eight-fold *Yoga* lead to the latter. Wisdom consists in the knowledge of the difference between the Attributes (as constituting Nature) and the Spirit. Dispassion is absence of Attachment (Love).

The four kinds of dispassion

(146) Of this Dispassion there are four stages named (1) '*Yatamāna-Saṁjñā*,' (2) *Vyatireka-Saṁjñā* (3) *Ekendriya-Saṁjñā and* (4) *Vas'īkāra-Saṁjñā*. (1) Love (Attachment) and other emotions are so many impurities residing in the mind, and

they incite the sense-organs to activity towards their respective objects; in order that the sense-organs may not turn towards their objects, it is necessary that the said impurities should be cured; the effort made to effect this cure constitutes the first form of Dispassion, '*Yatamāna-Saṁjñā*', the 'Endeavour-stage.' (2) After this process of cure has commenced, it may be found that while some are already cured, others have still got to be cured; this sequence being there, those got to be cured have to be discriminated from those already cured; this discrimination constitutes the second stage of Dispassion, the '*Vyatireka-Saṁjñā*,' the 'Discrimination-stage.' (3) After the sense-organs have been rendered incapable of action, the impurities that have been cured continue to lie there in the mind in the form of a mere 'longing' (or eagerness); this is the third stage of Dispassion, the '*Ekendriya-Saṁjñā*', the 'One-organ stage.' (4) The supression of even this longing towards all perceptible objects—sensuous as well as super-sensuous—is the fourth stage called '*Vas'īkāra-Saṁjñā*.' the 'control-stage'; this is superior to the first three stages; this has been thus discribed by the revered Patañjali: "The dispassion named '*Vas'īkara-Saṁjñā*' belongs to one who has no desire for either sensuous or super-sensuous objects." [Yoga-Sūtra I·15].—Such is Dispassion, a property of *Buddhi*.

The eight kinds of power

(147) *Power* also is a property of Buddhi, and it is to this that the perfections, Attenuation and the rest (*Aṇimā* etc.) are due.* Of these (1) *Aṇimā* (*Lit.* Atomic character), 'Attenuation' is the power by which one can enter the densest substances, such as stones. (2) *Laghimā*, 'Buoyancy' is that to which

* There is some confusion as to the number of these perfections. As enumerated here, they appear *nine*; but they ought to be *eight* only; hence I have taken *Vas'itva* and *Is'itva* as one.

is due the ability to traverse the solar regions by means of the sun's rays. (3) *Garimā*, 'Gravity' leads to heaviness; and (4) *Mahimā*, 'Grandeur' brings greatness. (5) *Prāpti*, 'Approach' is the ability to touch the moon with the fingers. (6) *Prākāmya*, *Fulfilment of desires*, is such as can enable one to dip into the earth and rise again as in water. (7) *Vas'itva*, 'supremacy'—by this all matter and material things come under one's control; this differs from '*Īs'itva*' 'sovereignity', which consits in the power to create and maintain matter and material things. (8) *Kāmāvasāyitā*, *Infallibility of purpose* is that by which all objects follow the course dictated by the will of the person. The decisions of ordinary mortals follow the course of events, where as those of the trained devotee precede them and dictate their course.

(148) These four are the properties of Buddhi, abounding in the Sattva-Attribute. Those abounding in the Tamas-attribute are the reverse of these—*viz.*, Vice, Ignorance, Passion and Weakness.

The author next defines Ahankāra—the 'I-Principle'—

Kārikā XXIV

The principle of Ahankāra defined. Its effects

The 'I-Principle' is self-consciousness; from that proceeds a two-fold evolution—the set of eleven and the five rudimentary substances.

(149) "*The I-principle is egotism*" and this 'I-principle' is perceptible in such ideas as— "To what I have observed and thought of I am entitled,—' I am able to do this'—'all these things are for my use'—'there is no one else entitled to it'—'hence I am;"—the egotism involved in all such notions forms the characteristic function of the 'I-principle':—it is through this principle that the Will performs its deter-

minative function appearing in such decisions as "this is to be done by *me.*"

(150) The different products of this Principle are next mentioned—"*From that proceeds a two-fold evolution.*" The two forms of this evolution are next mentioned—"*The set of eleven*" *consisting of the sense organs, and "the five rudimentary substances,*"—only these two forms of evolution proceed from the I-principle;—this is what has been emphasised by the particle '*eva*'.

Objetion—How can two diverse kinds of creation prcceed from a uniform Egotism?

Objection :—" The I-principle itself being of one uniform nature, how can two different kinds of evolution the dull and inert (elements) and the illuminative (the sense organs) proceed from it ?"

Answer.

Kārikā XXV

Reply—The difference due to the diversity of the operating Attributes.

The 'set of eleven' abounding in Sattva attribute, evolves out of the 'Vaikṛta' form of the 'I–principle'; the set of Rudimentary substances from the 'Bhūtādi' form of the 'I–principle'; and both of them from the 'Taijasa' form of the 'I–principle.'*

(151) 'The set of eleven', sense-organs, being illuminative and boyant is said to abound in the Sattva-attribute;

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* (*a*) '*Vaikṛta,*' (*b*) *Bhūtādi* and (*c*) *Taijasa* are purely technical terms-names applied to the three forms or states of the 'I-principle' When the 'I-principle' is dominated by the *Sattva-attribute*, it is called '*Vaikṛta*', when it is dominated by the *Tamas-attribute*, it is called '*Bhutādi*' and when it is dominated by the *Rajas-attribute*, it is called '*Taijasa*'. These are mere technical names, and do not connote anything—Gauḍapāda.

and it proceeds from the '*Vaikṛta*' 'I-principle'. From the 'I-principle' as dominated by the Tamas-attribute proceeds the set of Rudimentary substances. How so? Because these substances abound in Sattva-attribute. That is to say—though the I-principle is one and uniform, yet by reason of the domination or suppression of one or other of these Attributes it evolves products of diverse kinds.

Objection: **The purposelessness of Passions**

(152) *Objection*:—When all the necessary products are brought about by the action of the attributes of *Sattva* and *Tamas* only, have done with the attribute of *Rajas*, which serves no useful purpose.

Reply–Passion necessary for urging the other Attributes to action

Answer:—"*And both of these from the 'Taijasa' form of the I-principle*" *i. e.*, from the '*Taijasa* Form', that is from the form abounding in the *Rajas-attribute*, proceed both, the 'set of eleven' as also the 'set of rudimentary substances.' Even though there is no separate product from the *Rajas-attribute* exclusively by itself, yet (it is a necessary factor. as) the *Sattva* and *Tamas* attributes are, by themselves, absolutely inert and as such do not perform their functions at all; it is only when they are energised and moved by the *Rajas-attribute*, that they perform their functions; thus the *Rajas-attribute* is instrumental in the evolving of both the sets of products mentioned above, through the exciting of activity of the other two attributes, *Sattva* and *Tamas*. Thus it is not true that the *Rajas-attribute* serves no useful purpose.

In order to describe the 'set of eleven' abounding in the Sattva-Attribute, the author first describes the ten external sense-organs.

Kārika XXVI

The 'organs of sensation' are, the Eye, the Ear, the Nose, the Tongue and the Skin; those 'of action' are, speech, hand, feet, the arms and the generative organ.

The ten External Organs

(153) 'Sense-organ' has been defined as that which has, for its constituent cause, the 'I-principle' abounding in the Sattva-attribute. The organs are of two kinds 'of sensation (sensory)' and 'of action (motor)'. Both of these are called '*Indriya*', in the sense that they are characteristics of '*Indra*' (the Spirit).

Sense defined

The Sense-organs are named. "*The eye* etc."—Of these, the eye is the organ for perceiving colour, the ear for perceiving sound, the nose for perceiving odour, the tongue for perceiving taste, and the skin for feeling touch. These are the names of the 'Sensory' sense-organs. The function of the organs of speech and the rest will be spoken of later on (Kārikā XXVIII.)

Named. Functions

The eleventh sense-organ is next described—

Kārikā XXVII

Of these (sense-organs) Mind partakes of the nature of both (*Sensory and Motor*): it is the 'Observing' principle; and is called a 'sense-organ' since it has properties common to sense-organs. Its multifariousness, as also its diverse external forms, are due to the particular modifications of the Attributes.

The eleventh sense *Mind* defined

(154) "*Partakes*, etc."—Among the eleven sense-organs the mind partakes of the nature of both—*i. e.*, it is an *organ of sensation*, as well as *one of action*; Since the eye and the other *sensory*

The double nature of mind

organs, as well as speech and other *motor* organs are able to operate on their respective objects only when influenced by the Mind.

Mind defined

(155) The author next gives specific definition of the *Mind*—"*It is the observing principle*"—That is to say Mind is defined by *observation*; when a certain object has been just vaguely apprehended by a sense-organ as 'a thing', there follows the definite cognition in the form 'it is such and such a thing, not that'; and it is this *observing* *i. e.*, the perception of definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended,—that is done through the *Mind*. This has been thus described by an ancient writer—"At first, one apprehends a certain object vaguely as a *thing* and then the *mindful* people *observe*—cognise—it definitely as belonging to a certain *genus* and possessing certain well-defined properties".—Again (says another writer) —"It is a well-known fact that on the first apprehending an object, the first idea that one has of it is that *it is a thing*, this idea being inderterminate and vague, like the idea in the Mind of the infant, the dumb and other people; after this the thing comes to be cognised as possessing certain properties and belonging to a certain genus; the cognition that observes and apprehends all this has also been regarded as *sense-perception*"—This function of *observing* belongs to the Mind, and as it serves to differentiate the Mind from all other like and unlike things, it serves as its *differentia*.

The reflecting character of Mind explained

Objection:—Why make *Mind* a sense when it has distinct function of its own ?

(156) *Objection*:—"Granted all this : But we have seen that the I-principle and the Will, having distinct functions of their own, are not classed among 'sense-organs'; in the same manner, the Mind also, having a distinct function of its own, should not be classed among 'sense-organs.'

The author replies—' *It is a sense-organ* '. Why? "*Because it has properties common to sense-organs.*" The property meant is that consisting in its having for its constituent cause, the 'I-principle' abounding in the Sattva-attribute, and not in its *being a characteristic of Indra (Spirit)*: for this latter property belongs to the Will and the 'I-principle' also; and as such these two also would have to be classed among 'sense-organs'. Thus then "being the characteristic of the Spirit" should be regarded only as an explanation of the derivation of the term *Indriya*; it cannot be said to form its connotation.

Reply—It is a sense in as much as it is an immediate effect of the principle of Egoism, as effected by Goodness which is the difinition of a *Sense*

(157) *Question*—"How can the eleven sense-organs proceed out of the single entity in the shape of the 'I-principle' abounding in the "*Sattva-attribute*?" Answer:—"*Its multifariousness as well as its diverse external forms are due to the particular modifications of the Attributes*"—The diversity in the products is due to the diversity of auxiliaries in the shape of the 'Unseen Force' which brings about the experiences due to the perception of sound and other objects of sense; and the 'Unseen Force' also is only a 'modification' of the Attributes.

Whence the Multifarious effects from Egoism

(158) The 'diverse external forms' has been added by way of illustration, the sense being that *just as the diverse external forms*, so the multifariousness also is due to the modification of the Attributes.

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(159) Having thus described the forms of the eleven sense-organs, the specific functions of the first ten are next described.

Kārikā XXVIII

The functions of the external organs

The function of the five senses, in respect to Sound, etc., is said to be mere 'perceiving'; 'speaking,' 'handling', 'walking', 'excretion' and 'gratification' are (the functions of) the other five.

Observation:—**the function of the five intellectual senses.** *Speech, handling, walking, excretion* **pertain to the senses of action.**

By "*Perception*" here is meant the primary abstract apprehension (Nirvikalpa) through the sensory sense-organs. "Speaking, Handling, Walking, Excretion and Gratification are the functions of the other five," *i. e.*, of the five motor organs (of action). The vocal organ is located in the throat, the palate, etc., and the function of this organ is 'Speaking'. The functions of the sensory organs are quite clear.*

The functions of the three 'Internal organs' are next described:—

Kārikā XXIX

Function of the internal organs

Of the three (the internal organs), the functions consist of their respective characteristics; this is peculiar to each. The function common to the organs consists in the five Prāṇa and the rest.

Reflection **of Manas,** *Self-Consciousness* **of Ahṅkara and** *determination* **of Buddhi**

(160) "*The functions of the three consist of their respective characteristics.*" In the compound term '*Svālakṣaṇyam*', the term '*Svalakṣaṇa*' stands for 'those that have their own distinctive characteristics',—that is, the Will, the I-principle and the Mind; '*Svālakṣaṇya*' (formed with the reflexive affix '*ṣyañ*')

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* That is to say they are denoted by their very names or by their definitions *e. g.*, the ear is defined as the sense for perceving (or comprehending) sound—and thus the function of the ear is perception of sound, and so with the others.

stands for those *distinctive characteristics* themselves; the sense, therefore, is that the property which serves as the distinguishing feature of each of the three internal organs, also denotes their respective functions; thus 'determination' of the Will, 'egoism' of the I-principle and 'observation' of the Mind.

The five vital airs, the common function of the three internal organs

(161) The next sentence describes the dual character of these fuctions based on the fact of their being *specific* or *common*—"*These are peculiar*," *etc.* "*The five Breaths* constitute *the common function*". The five 'vital airs' *i.e.*, the *Life* itself—forms the common function of the three internal organs; since the latter exists while the former do and ceases to exist when these are absent. Of these five, the 'Air' called '*Prāṇa*', is located in the nape of the neck, the back, the arms and the generative organ; that called '*Samāna*' in the heart, the naval and all joints; that called '*Udāna*', in the heart, the throat, the palate, the head and between the eye-brows; and that called '*Vyāna*', in the skin.—These are the 'five vital airs.'

The author now describes the order of the functions of these fourfold organs (*the external organs* and the *three internal organs*).

Kārikā XXX

The instantaneous and the gradual character of these functions

With regard to perceptible things, the functions of the whole set of the four organs are said to be simultaneous, as well as gradual; with regard to imperceptible (as well as perceptible) things, the functions of the three (internal organs) are preceded by that:(*i. e.*, **the cognition of some perceptible object.)**

(162) "*Simultaneous,*"—"*With regard to perceptible things*"; *e. g.,* when one sees in the dark by means of a flash of lightning, a tiger facing him, his *perception* (by the Eye), *observation* (by the Mind), *Egoism* or *self-consciousness* (by the I-principle) and *determination* (by the Will) are instantaneous and accordingly he runs away from the place at once.

Instantaneous with regard to visible objects

(163) "*Gradual*"; *e. g.*, in dim-light, a person has at first only a vague perception of a certain object; then fixing his Mind intently he *observes* that it is a robber with his drawn bow and arrow levelled at him; then follows the *self-consciousness* that '*the robber is advancing against me*'; and lastly follows the *determination* to run away from the place.

Gradual with regard to visible objects

(164) With regard to inperceptible things, on the other hand, the (three) internal organs operate without the aid of the external organs–"*The function of the three is preceded by that,*" *i. e.*, the *instantaneous* as well as the *gradual* functions of the three internal organs are preceded by some perception of a visible object; since Inference, Testimony and Remembrance—which are the means of cognising imperceptible things,—operate only when they have for their background some sort of perception (of perceptible things). The sense is that in regard to 'perceptible' as well as 'imperceptible' things the functioning of the internal organs is always preceded by the perception of some external object.

With regard to invisible objects, the operation of the internal organs independent of the external organs

The functions of internal organs preceded by those of the external ones

Objection : Functions permanent or otherwise ?

(165) *Objection* : "The functions, either of the four or of the three (organs), cannot depend on themselves alone; for in that case, as these organs are everlasting their functions also would be everlasting; if, on the other hand, the organs were transient, adventitious, then their functions also would be transient and adventitious, and this would lead to a commingling of the functions, as there would be nothing to regulate them."

Answer :—

Kārikā XXXI

Reply—Functions of the organs due to mutual impluse. Soul purposes the incentive

They (the organs) betake themselves to their respective functions, through mutual impulse. The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive; by nothing (else) is an organ made to act.

The word '*Karaṇāni*,' 'organs', has to be supplied (as the subject of the sentence).

(166) When a number of persons wielding different weapons,—lances, sticks, bows and arrows, swords etc.,—combine for suppressing a common enemy, and proceed to act, they do so only after knowing each other's 'impluse' (motive),—and in so doing the man with the lance takes up the lance only, not the stick or other weapons,—similarly the man with the stick takes up the stick only, not the lance and the other weapons. In the same manner each of the organs operates only by the reason of the 'impluse'—*i. e.*, proneness to action—of the other; since this impulse is the cause (and hence the regulating motive power) of the action of the organs, there cannot arise any commingling of the functions.

(167) Another objection—"The lancers, etc., being sentient beings, it is only right that they should comprehend each other's 'impluse' (motive) and act towards the fulfilment thereof. The organs, on the contrary, are all in-sentient, and as such can never act in the said manner (and hence your analogy does not apply to the case in question). Consequently the insentient organs must have an intelligent controller who is cognisant of their nature, capacity and uses."

Objection—How can the non-intelligent organs understand each other's motives?

Answer :—"*The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive, by nothing (else) is an organ made to act.*" What urges the organs to act is the 'Spirit's purpose'–in the shape of 'Experience' and 'Isolation',—prior to its fulfilment; so that there is no need for the postulating of a 'Controller' cognisant of their nature. This point will be further elucidated in Kārikā LVII.

Reply—Soul's purpose urging them to action

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(168) It has been declared that "by nothing is an organ made to act." The author next proceeds to classify the organs :—

Kārikā XXXII

Organs are of thirteen kinds, having the functions of 'seizing', 'sustaining' and 'illuminating.' The objects of these are of ten kinds,—the 'seized', the 'sustained' and the 'illumined.'

The organs divided—their functions—seizing, retaining and manifesting

The thirteen organs—the ten external organs, *Manas, Ahaṅkāra* and *Buddhi*.

***Seizing*—the function of the senses of action.**

***Retention*—the fuction of *Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra* and *Manas*.**

***Manifestation*—of the intellectual organs**

(169) The 'thirteen organs' consist of the eleven sense-organs, the I-principle and the Will. An organ is a particular kind of active agent, and nothing can be an 'active agent' unless it has a function; hence the author next states the functions of the organs—" Having the functions of seizing, sustaining and illuminating,"—respectively; that is to say, the *Motor* organs have the fuction of *seizing*; that is, they *take up* their respective objects; *i. e.*, extend their activities over them;—the Will, the I-principle and the Mind 'sustain' things through their function in the shape of the Vital Airs and the rest (mentioned before); and lastly, the *sensory* organs 'illumine' (render perceptible) their respective objects.

The objects of these functions, tenfold

(170) Since every action must have an object, the objects of the above-mentioned functions are next named and classified—"*The seized*" etc. These objects to be acted upon by the thirteen organs are those that are to be *seized, to be sustained* and *to be illumined*. By '*seizure*' here is meant *pervasion* (extension). The five motor sense-organs 'extend' over *Speaking, Handling, Walking, Excretion* and *Gratification*; and each of these being both 'celestial' and 'non-celestial', these objects become *tenfold*. Similarly the object 'to be sustained' by the three internal organs through their functions in the shape of the 'Vital Airs' etc., is the *body*, which is *fivefold*, being an aggregate of the five elementary substances; of these the Earth being an aggregate of *sound, touch, colour, taste* and *odour*. Each of these five being both 'celestial' and 'non-celestial', these objects 'to be sustained' also come to be *tenfold*. Similarly the objects affected by the five sensory organs are five—sound, touch,

colour, taste, and odour; and each of these being both 'celestial' and 'non-celestial,' the objects 'to be illumined' also become *tenfold*.

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(171) A further subdivision of the thirteen organs is next stated :—

Kārikā XXXIII

The organs numbered and the difference between the external and internal in point of time noted

The *internal* organs are three; and the *external*, ten, exhibiting objects to the former three. The 'external' organs act at the present time and the 'internal' at all the three points of time.

(172) "*The internal-organs are three*:" (1) Mind, (2) I-principle and (3) Will; these are called *internal* because located *inside* the body.

(173) *The external-organs are ten*; *viz.*, the ten sense-organs. These latter *exhibit objects to the three* internal organs; *i. e.*, they supply the means for *observation*, *self-consciousness* and *determination* regarding objects:—the sense-organs doing this through perception, and the motor-organs, through their respective fuctions.

(174) The author next states a further point of difference between the *internal* and *external* organs. "*The external organs act at the present time.*" The "present" here includes also the time closely preceding and following the immediate present; so that, Speech* also pertains to the present. "*The internal*

The external senses acting at time present: the internal with reference to all three divisions of time

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* The special qualification is necessary for the case of Speech, because no two letters can be pronounced at the same moment, and, as such, no word could be uttered at the *present* if by this were meant the present *moment* only. This difficulty, however, is avoided by counting a few moments before and after the present moment as 'present.'

organs at all the three points of time." *e. g.*, the idea that "there has been rain, because the river has risen–" (for the past); "there is fire in the mountain, since there is smoke"—(for the present); and lastly, "unless there is something to prevent it, we shall have rain, since we see ants carrying their eggs"—(for the future).

Time—not a distinct principal according to Sāṅkhyas

(175) According to the Vais'eṣikas, Time is one (indivisible) and hence it cannot admit of such divisions as 'past,' 'present' and 'future'. They attribute these divisions to certain 'accidents' (adventitious conditions): but what the Teachers of Sāṅkhya hold is that these same 'accidents' themselves may be regarded as the basis of the notions of 'future,' 'present' and 'past,' and there is no need for the postulating of an intervening entity as 'Time'. This is the reason why we do not accept Time as a distinct Entity.

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(176) The author next discusses the objects of the external senses operating at time present :—

Kārikā XXXIV

The *intellectual* sense touching specific as well as unspecific objects; speech touching sound; the rest regarding the five objects of sense

Of these, the five sensory organs are concerned with objects specific as well as non-specific. Speech is concerned with sound ; the rest are concerned with five objects.

(177) Of the ten external organs, the five sensory ones are concerned with 'specific' as well as 'non-specific' objects:—The term '*specific*' here stands for the *gross* Sound (Touch, Colour, Taste, and Odour) in their 'calm,' 'turbulent' and 'deluding' forms, as manifested in the form of *Earth* (Water, Air, Fire and Ākāśa);—and

'*non-specific*' stands for the subtile forms of Sound etc., manifested as the *Rudimentary Elements.* (*Tanmātrās*);' in this name '*tanmātra,*' the particle '*mātra*' serves to exclude the *Gross* forms of the Elements. Thus the sensory organs are those that have for their objects the *gross* and *subtile* things. For instance, the Ear of deities and sages can perceive the *subtile* Rudimentary-Sound as also the *gross* Sound; but the Ear of the people like ourselves can perceive only the *gross* Sound; similarly the Tactile organ of those beings can perceive *gross* as well as *subtile* Touch, while our organ can perceive *gross* Touch only; similarly, the Eye and other organs of those beings can perceive Colour and other things in their *gross* as well as *subtile* forms, while our organs can perceive these in their *gross* forms only.

(178) Among the Motor-organs, Speech is concerned with sound, in its gross form, because organ of Speech is the producer of such sound. The organ of Speech, however, cannot produce Rudimentary Element of sound, which is the direct effect of the I-principle (*Ahaṅkāra*); and as such has the same cause as the organ of speech itself (which also being one of the sense-organs, proceeds directly from the I-principle).

"*The rest*" *i. e.,* the four other motor-organs—the Arms, the Generative organ, the Hands and the Feet are '*concerned with five objects*"; because the jar and such other objects—which are what are dealt with by those organs, are all made up of the *five* primary elements of Sound, Colour, Touch, Taste and Odour.

Among the thirteen organs, some are described as superior to others, reasons for which are given :

Kārikā XXXV

The superiority of internal over external organs

Since the Will along with the other internal organs extends over all things, these three are the 'warders', and the others are the gates.

(179) '*Warders*' *i. e.*, most important, superior, '*Gates*', *i. e.*, mere instruments ; the external organs are mere instruments. Since the Will along with the 'I-principle' and the Mind 'extends over', (*i. e.*, determines)—all objects exhibited by the external organs, therefore, these latter are mere 'gates' (secondary organs), and the Will along with the other internal organs, is the 'warder' (chief).

The superiority accounted for

The Will, Buddhi is superior, not only to the external organs, but also to the other internal organs, the I-principle, and the Mind. To this effect it is said:—

Kārikā XXXVI

The superiority of Buddhi over all others accounted for

The (external organs together with the Mind and the I-principle) characteristically different from one another and being different modifications of the Atributes, resemble a lamp in action; (and as such) having first illumined (rendered manifest) the whole of the Spirit's purpose, present it to the Will.

(180) As the village-officer collects the rent from the different heads of families and delivers the collection to the Governor of the District, who again, in his turn, delivers it to thc Governor of the country, who finally makes it over to the king : so, in the same manner, the external organs, having 'perceived' an object, present it to the Mind, which 'observes' it (and thereby imparts thereto its qualifications) and pre-

sents it to the 'I-principle,' which takes personal cognizance of them, and finally delivers it to the chief officer, Will. Hence it is said: "*These having illumined the whole of the Spirit's purpose present it to the Will.*"

In spite of diverse combination of the Attributes, yet the internal organs co-operate towards a single purpose like a lamp

(181) The external organs, the Mind and the I-principle are various modifications of the Attributes *i. e.*, phases of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Even though these are mutually nugatory yet they are led to co-operate for the supreme purpose of Spirit; just as the wick, oil and fire (though variously opposed to the action of one another,) yet combine, in the form of the lamp, in removing darkness, and thus illumine (manifest) the different colours. The same is the case with the *modifications of the Attributes*; such is the connection.

Objection—Why not make Buddhi sub-ordinate to the others?

Objection :—"Why should it be said that the other organs present their impressions to the *Will*? Why should not we make it the other way: the Will presents its impressions to the I-principle and the Mind, which latter being 'superior'?"

Answer :—

Kārikā XXXVII

Reply: the superiority of Buddhi accounted for, because it directly fulfils the soul-purpose, and bridges the gap between Spirit and Matter

In as much as it is the Will that accomplishes the Spirit's experiences, and again it is Will that discriminates the subtle difference between Nature and Spirit [it is Will that is regarded as superior to the other two].

(182) In as much as the 'purpose of the Spirit' is the only incentive to the action of the organs, that organ is supreme over others which accomplishes that purpose directly; and since it is the Will alone that does this, it is supreme. Just as the Governor of the Country is the immediate and direct agent of the king, is supreme over the village officer and other officials who are subordinate to him. By reason of its proximity to the Spirit, the Spirit becomes reflected in the Will, whereby the Will assumes the form of the Spirit and thus accomplishes the Spirit's experiencing of all things. 'Experiencing' consists in the feeling of Pleasure and Pain,—this feeling takes place in the Will,—the Will has assumed the form of the Spirit ;—it is thus that the Will makes the Spirit go through the experience. Just as the Perception, Observation and 'Self-consciousness' of things take the form of the things and become transferred to the Will, in the same manner the functions of sense-organs also become mingled with the 'determining' which is the function of the Will. Just as the army of the village-officer is joined with the army of the Governor,—it is thus that the Will 'accomplishes' '*Sādhayati*'—The Spirit's 'experience' '*Upa—bhoga*' of '*prati*'—'all things'—*Sarvam*—in the shape of Sound and the rest,

Objection—Buddhi supplying the soul with pleasure, no Mukti is possible

(183) *Objection*—" If the Will serves to accomplish the Spirit's experience of all things then no emancipation (Isolation) is possible."*

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* For Buddhi would continue to help the Spirit to its enjoyment of pleasure, and hence this latter could never attain to final beatitude which consists in the total extinction of both pleasure and pain.

Reply—It latterly shows to the soul its distinction from Matter

Answer—" *It afterwards discriminates the difference between Spirit and Nature.*"—' Descriminates ' '*Viṣinaṣṭi*' here stands for 'bringing about' the construction of clause '*Antaram Viṣinaṣṭi*'—' discriminates the difference'; and is similar to that of '*Odanpākam pacati*'* (cooks the cooking of rice); and 'bringing about' in this context stands for 'showing' or 'expressing'.

The difference being caused, will end and thus would emancipation cease with it

The objector retorts: "*The difference between Spirit and Nature* being thus, according to yourself, something that is produced, it must have an end in time; and hence the Isolation or Emancipation brought about by that difference would also be transitory."

Reply—the difference is permanent, Buddhi only serving to expose it to the soul's view

The answer to this is contained in the word 'discriminates'; the meaning is that the idea that 'I am one thing and Nature with its evolutes is different thing' is always there.

What the Will does is to make known this already existing *difference*, which through non-discrimination, has appeared to be non-existent; the Will does not *produce* the difference, whereby it would be transitory. This shows that *Emancipation* (Isolation) is the end or purpose of the Spirit.

'*Subtile*—the said difference is' subtile *i. e.*, 'hard to perceive.'

The organs having been described, the author next describes the specific as well as non-specific (objects):—

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* *Viṣinaṣṭi* itself has been explained as "expresses the difference", then the mention of *Antaram* would seem superfluous. But it is not so; it helps to intensify the meaning of the sentence.

Kārikā XXXVIII

The Rudimentary Elements are 'non-specific;' from these five proceed the five gross elements; these latter are said to be 'specific,' becauee they are calm, turbulent and deluding.

The division of objects into specific and non-specific

(184) The Rudimentary Elements *i. e.*, Sound and the rest in their subtle form; what the particle '*Mātra*' (in the term '*tanmātra*,' which is the name of the Rudimentary Elements,') connotes is that these subtle elements are devoid of that 'specific character' consisting of the 'calmness, turbulence and delusiveness' which would make them objects of direct experience.

(185) Having thus described the 'non-specific' things, the author, with a view to describing the 'specific' objects, mentions the manner of their production: "*From these* etc.," from the five Rudimentary Elements of Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste and Odour proceed respectively the five gross Elements—Ākās'a, Air, Fire, Water and Earth—these 'five' proceeding from the aforesaid 'five' Rudimentary Elements.

Specific because soothing terrific and deluding

(186) *Objection* :—" We grant that these are thus produced; but what about their being 'specific'". *Answer* : "*These are said to be specific;*"—why ? because "*they are calm, turbulent and deluding.* The first च indicates the reason (meaning *because*) and the second च has the cumulative force (meaning that the things have *all* the three characteristics). The sense is that, in as much as among the gross elements, Ākās'a and the rest, some abounding in the Sattva attribute, are calm, pleasing, illuminating and buoyant; others abounding in the Rajas-attribute are turbulent, painful and unstable; the rest abounding in the Tamas-attribute are deluded, confounded and sluggish. These gross elements, thus

perceived to be distinguished from one another are said to be *specific* and *gross*. The Rudimentary Elements on the contrary cannot be similarly distinguished by ordinary people; and as such they are said to be *non-specific* and *subtle*.

A further sub-division among the 'specific' objects is next stated :—

Kārikā XXXIX

Specific objects divided into (1) subtle bodies, (2) bodies produced of parents and (3) the great elements

(1) The 'subtle' bodies, (2) 'those born of parents', and (3) the 'gross' elements,—these are the three kinds of the 'specific'. Of these the 'subtle' bodies are everlasting, and 'those born of parents' are perishable.

(187) "*The specific objects are of three kinds*": these three forms are mentioned : (1) *subtle bodies* which (are not visible, but) are postulated (in order to explain certain phenomena); (2) *Those born of parents, i. e.,* those consisting of the six 'sheaths' (Kośas). Among these six, hair, blood and flesh are from the mother; and the arteries, bones and marrow from the father; these six are the six 'sheaths' (of the physical body): (3) The last are the '*prabhūta*' *i. e.,* the '*prakṛṣṭa*', Great, '*bhūta*', Elements; along with these, the other two constitute the 'specific'. Thus subtle bodies form the first kind of 'specific' objects, 'bodies born of parents,' the second kind and the 'gross elements' the third kind. Ordinary things like the jar, are included in this last.

The subtle bodies are permanent, those produced of parents perishable

(188) The difference between the 'subtle' body and the body 'born of parents' is next explained— "*The subtle bodies are permanent and those born of parents, perishable*"; that is to say, among the specific things, those that are *subtle* are lasting, while those 'born of

parents', are *perishable, i. e.*, ending in (dissolving into) either fluids or ash or dirt.

The subtle body is described—

Kārikā XL

The Body is unconfined, permanent and migrating, invested with dispositions

The 'mergent' (subtle) body formed primevally, unconfined, lasting, composed of Will and the rest down to Rudimentary Elements,—migrates, is devoid of experiences, and is invested with dispositions.

Unconfined and Permanent

(189) '*Formed primevally*';—when the emanations from Nature began, the first object to evolve therefrom, was the subtle Body, one for each Spirit. This body is "*unconfined*" untrammeled; as such, it can enter even a solid piece of stone. It is "*lasting*"*: since it continues to exist all the time from the first Evolution to the Final Dissolution. This Body is "*composed of the Will and the rest, down to the Rudimentary Elements*". That is to say, it is an aggregate consisting of the Will, I-principle, the eleven sense-organs and the five Rudimentary Elements; it is also *specific*, equipped with sense-organs which are 'calm, turbulent and delusive'.

Objection:—unnecessariness of postulating two bodies, subtle and gross

(190) *Objection:*—"This Subtle body might be the only vehicle of experience for the Spirit;—what is need of the Physical Body comprised of the six 'sheaths'"?

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* The word *niyata* is differently interpreted by Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha (in his Sāṅkhya-Candrikā). He takes it in the sense of "restricted" *i. e.*, the Subtle Body is restricted to one particular Spirit; and so there is a distinct subtle body for each Spirit. The interpretation of Gauḍapāda closely resembles that of the Kaumudī.

Necessity of the physical body, because the subtle body migrates

Answer:—"It migrates" *i. e.* the Subtle Body goes on deserting and occupying one six-sheathed (physical) body after the other.—"But why?" —Because it is "*devoid of experience*", that is to say, because the subtle body by itself-without a corresponding physical body of six sheaths to afford the vehicle of experience—would be devoid of experience; that is why it migrates.

Objection:—How can the subtle Body migrate, being without dispositions?

(191) *Objection*:—"As a matter of fact, transmigration is due to Virtue and Vice; and these have no connection with the Subtle Body (belonging as they do primarily to the Will, and then, by reflection, to the Spirit); then how can this Subtle Body migrate?"

Reply—It has dispositions ?

Answer:—(Because) "*it is invested with dispositions.*" The 'dispositions' are Virtue and Vice, Wisdom and Ignorance, Passion and Dispassion, Power and Weakness; and it is the *Will* which is endowed, that is, directly connected with them; and the Subtle Body is connected with the Will; hence the Subtle Body becomes invested with those dispositions : just as a piece of cloth becomes perfumed with the fragrance of the *Campaka* flowers by coming into contact with them. Thus then, it is because it is *invested with dispositions*, that the Subtle Body migrates.

The subtle Body dissolving at each pralaya

(192) *Question*:—"Why should not the Subtle Body—like Nature—last even after the Final Dissolution ?"

Answer :—(Because it is) "*mergent*," that is to say, because it dissolves (into Nature). This mergent character of the Subtle Body is inferred from the fact of its being a product; *i. e.*, having a cause it must merge into it.

Objection :—" We grant all this. But why not attribute *migration* to the Will itself as equipped with the I-principle and sense-organs? There is no need for the postulating of the Subtle Body, for which there is no authority."

Objection–Why not attribute migration to Buddhi etc. ?

Answer :—

Kārikā XLI

As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a solid object like the pillar,—so neither does the '*Liṅga*' (Will etc.) subsist supportless, without 'Specific Bodies'.

Reply–the Buddhi cannot rest without substrate

(193) The term '*Liṅga*' here stands for the Will, the I-principle and the Rudimentary Elements, *because they are the means of knowing* (liṅganāt) and these cannot subsist without a substrate.* In support of this the author puts forth a syllogism—During the time intervening between death and re-birth, Will and the rest must have some sort of evolved body for their receptacle, because they are such Will and the rest as are equipped with the five Rudimentary Elements; like the Will etc., found in the ordinary physical body.

"*Without specific bodies*" *i. e.*, without Subtle Bodies. In support of this assertion, we have the following scriptural text (from the Mahābhārata). "Then Yama extracted from Satyavān's body the thumb-sized body which he had entrapped and under his control." Here the mention of the extracted body as "thumb-sized" implies the fact of its having been the Subtle Body, since it is impossible that the Spirit

The existence of the Subtle Body corroborated by the Mahābhārata

* Cf. The **Pañcikaraṇa-vivaraṇa-Tattvacandrika** — where a similar explanation of the word is given.

could have been so extracted. 'Puruṣa' in the above extract, stands for the Subtle Body, in the sense that *it sleeps* (*lies—s'ete*) *in the body* (*puri*).

Having thus proved the existence of the Subtle Body, the author states the reason and method of its migration.—

Kārikā XLII

Reasons and manner of the migration of the Subtle Body

Formed for the sake of Spirit's purpose the Subtle Body acts like a dramatic actor, on account of the connection of 'causes and effects' and by union with the all-embracing power of Nature.

(194) "*Formed for the Spirit's purpose*", the Subtle Body acts like a *dramatic actor*, on account of its connection with the '*causes*' in the shape of Virtue, Vice, etc.,—and '*effects*' in the shape of the taking up of different kinds of physical bodies, the latter being the effects of Virtue, etc. That is to say, just as a dramatic actor, playing different parts, acts like Paras'urāma or Yudhiṣṭhira or Vatsarāja, so does the subtle body, occupying various physical bodies, act like a man or a brute or a tree.

The capacity of the Subtle Body is due to the Power of Nature

(195) *Question*:—"Whence this capacity of the Subtle Body?" *Answer*:—"*By union with the all-embracing Power of Nature.*" As is declared in the Purāṇa:—"All this wonderful evolution is the all-embracing Power of Nature."

It has just been said that the Subtle Body acts "on account of connection with *causes* and *effects*"; the author next describes the *causes* and *effects*:—

Kārikā XLIII

The means and consequences Dharma, etc.

Virtue and other dispositions are—(*a*) natural, which are innate and (*b*) incidental; and these are related to the 'cause'; and the ovum etc., related to the 'effect.'*

I. Incidental dispositions

(196) 'Incidental,' adventitious; *i. e.*, brought about after the man's birth, by the subsequent propitiating of the deities and such other causes.

II. Essential, innate

"*The natural dispositions are innate,*" *e. g.*, it is declared that at the beginning of the Evolution the revered primeval sage Kapila emerged into existence fully equipped with Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power. The '*incidental*' dispositions, on the other hand, are not innate; that is to say, they are brought about by the personal effort of the man; such Virtue etc. are those belonging to Vālmīki and other great sages.

The opposites of Dharma etc., similarly explained

The same is to be understood with regard to Vice, Ignorance, Passion and Weakness.

Flesh, blood, etc., related to the Gross Body

(197) The aggregate formed of the ovum, foetus, flesh, blood, etc., of the child in the mother's womb is related to the gross physical body; that is to say, they are particular states of the latter; so also are the childhood, youth and old age of the person after the birth.**

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* It may be pointed out that Davies has quite misunderstood this Kārikā. In the first place he renders *Sāṁsiddhikāḥ* by "transcendental" the very reverse of what it does mean. Secondly, he renders *Karaṇās'rayiṇaḥ* by "including cause," though in reality the compound means "located in organs"—as explained by the *Kaumudī* as well as the *Candrikā*.

** Gauḍapāda has taken the kārikā as setting forth *three* kinds of dispositions—(1) '*Sāṁsiddhika*' innate, (2) '*Prākṛtika*' natural due to the operation of Nature, Primordial Matter and (3) '*Vaikṛtika*' incidental.

(198) *Question* :—"We have understood what are 'causes' and 'effects' in general; what are the particular *effects* of particular *causes*?"

Answer :—

Kārikā XLIV

Consequences of the various means

By virtue (is obtained) ascent to higher planes, by vice, descent to the lower; from wisdom (results) the Highest Good; and bondage from the reverse.

Virtue leads to higher planes

(199) "*By virtue etc.*" *i. e.*, to the Heaven and other regions.

Vice to lower

"*By vice, etc.*," *i. e.*, to the nether regions known as *Sutala* etc.

Wisdom brings about beatitude

"*From wisdom, the Highest Good.*" Nature ministers to the experience of the Spirit only so long as discriminative wisdom is not brought about; after, however, this has been accomplished, Nature finds its work in connection with that particular Spirit entirely fulfilled, and accordingly retires from activity so far as that Spirit is concerned. As is declared, "The Operations of Nature continue only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge." "*From the reverse, etc.*", *i. e.*, from wrong knowledge, results *bondage*.

From the reverse of the above, respectively, contradictory results. The three kinds of bondage

(200) This bondage is of three kinds: 'Natural', 'Evolutional' and 'Personal', (1) The 'Natural' bondage is that of those who worship Nature as the Spirit; with reference to such men, who are called 'Prākṛtika' ('Merged into Nature'), it is said in the Purāṇas: "The contemplators of the Un-

manifest (Nature) continue (in the chain of metempsychosis) till a hundred thousand years"; (2) The 'Evolutional' bondage is of those who worship the various evolutes of Nature,—the elements, the sense-organs, the I-principle, and the Will—as Spirit. With regard to these it is said: "The contemplators of the sense-organs continue till ten Manvantaras; those of the elements, till a hundred Manvantaras; those of the I-principle till thousand; and lastly, those of the Will, do away with all feverish excitement, and continue till ten thousand Manvantaras. Those labouring under this incidental bondage are *Videhas*. (3) The 'Personal' bondage is due to *Iṣṭāpūrta* (actions like charities, sacrifices, digging of tanks etc., done with the sole motive of personal gains hereafter). Those performing such actions, having their minds influenced by desire, are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, and as such undergo bondage.

Kārikā XLV

Consequences of various means:

From Dispassion results 'mergence* into Nature'; from Attachment which abounds in the Rajas-attribute, transmigration; from Power, non-impediment; and from the reverse, the contrary.

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* Davies takes the Hindu commentators to task, and remarks: "It (the Sāṁkhya) does not recognise any absorption of the subtle body into Nature, until the soul is entirely free.. ...Hence the meaning is that by the destruction of passion, the influence of the material world is destroyed, and the soul is independent, though not yet finally liberated." All this is quite true; but it is not clear how this affects the position of the 'Hindu Commentators,' who, at least Vācaspati Miś́ra, do not assert the final absorption of the bodies into Nature; all that they mean is that by dispassion, the soul—or more properly, its seat, the subtle body—is absorbed into Nature and rests there till it is born again.

(201) "*From Dispassion results Mergence into Nature.*" Those who are free from passion, but are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, become merged into nature. 'Nature' here stands for the whole set consisting of Nature, Will, I-principle, the elements, and the sense-organs. Those who worship these as 'Spirit', become absorbed into these (*i. e.*, those mistaking the senses for the Spirit become absorbed in the senses, and so on); that is to say, they rest there till, in the course of time, they are born again.

I. Absorption into Prakṛti from dispassion

(202) "*From attachment which abounas in the Rajas-attribute, results transmigration.*" The epithet "Rājasa" implies the painful character of transmigration; because (as has been previously described) the Rajas attribute is the source of pain.

II. Transmigration from passionate attachment

(203) "*From power, non-impediment*", *i. e.*, the non-obstruction of desires. A man with power can do whatever he likes.

III. Non-impediment from power

"*From the reverse*", *i. e.*, from absence of Power "*the contrary*" *i. e.*, the obstruction of one's desires everywhere.

IV. Obstruction of desires from weakness

With a view to describe collectively as well as severally the eight dispositions of the Will—Virtue, Vice etc.,—in order to show which of these are to be adopted, and which relinquished, by those desiring Isolation—the author first describes them collectively :—

Kārikā XLVI

Such is the 'volitional' (Subjective) Evolution distinguished by Error, Disability, Contentment and Success. By reason of the mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities, the different forms of this Evolution become *fifty*.

The intellectual creation described

(204) '*Pratyaya*' *is that by which anything is known* *i. e., Will*; and '*pratyayasarga*' is the '*sarga*' 'evolution' proceeding from the *Will i. e.*, the volitional or 'Subjective' evolution.

I. Error
II. Disability
III. Contentment
IV. Success

"*Error*" *i. e.*, ignorance, illusion, is a property of the Will; so is also "*disability*" which results from the incapacity of the sense-organs;—"*contentment*" and "*success*" also are properties of the Will, as will be described later on.

Of these, the three former,—"*error*," *disability* and "*contentment*"—include Virtue and the other six dispositions leaving aside Wisdom which is included in "*success*".

Virtue &c., included in the above four

(205) These properties are next described severally. "*The forms of these are fifty.*" How so? "*By reason of the mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities.*" This 'inequality' may consist either in the individual *strength* of the one in comparison with the other two, or of two conjointly with that of the third, or in the individual *weakness* of the one in comparison with the other two, or of the two conjointly with that of the third. The various grades of this 'inequality' are assumed in accordance with the requirements of particular cases; and it leads to the suppression of Attributes by one another or by one of them of the other two—thus giving rise to the *fifty forms* of 'Subjective Evolution.'

Subdivisions of the above are fifty

The 'fifty forms' are next enumerated:

Kārikā XLVII

There are five forms of Error; twenty eight of Disability, arising from the imperfection of the organs; Contentment has nine forms; and Success eight.

5 forms of Error.
28 of Disability,
9 of Contentment,
8 of Perfection

(206) The five forms of Error are *ignorance, egotism, love, hate* and *clinging*, respectively named '*obscurity*' (*Tamas*), '*delusion*' (*Moha*), '*extreme delusion*' (*Mahāmoha*) '*gloom*' (*Tāmisra*) '*blind gloom*' (*Andhatāmisra*). Egotism and the rest partake of the nature of 'Error'; though, as a matter of fact, they are the products of Error. Or, the idea may be that it is only after a certain thing has become the object of *Error* that *Egotism* and the rest also, partaking of the nature of Error, come to bear upon that same thing. It is for this reason that the revered Vārṣagaṇya has declared that 'Ignorance is five-jointed.'

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(207) The author next describes the sub-divisions of the five forms of Error:—

Kārikā XLVIII

Of Error there are eight forms; as also of Delusion; Extreme Delusion is ten-fold; Gloom is eighteen-fold, and so is also 'Blind Gloom'.

Sixty-two subdivisions of Error

(208) "*Of Error*"; *i. e.*, of Ignorance. "*there are eight forms*".

of Ignorance eight forms

Of 'Darkness' *i. e.*, Ignorance, there are eight forms; it consists in the notion of 'Spirit' with regard to (1) Nature, (2) Will, (3) I-principle, (4–8) the Five Rudimentary Elements,—all eight of which are *not-Spirit*, it is this eight-fold notion that constitutes 'Darkness' or Ignorance.

Eight of Delusion

(209) The particle '*ca*' connects 'eight forms' with Delusion also. The Deities having attained the eight occult powers, regard themselves as immortal, and their several powers—'*aṇimā*' and the rest—also to be everlasting; this is the error of *Egotism*, and since this appertains to the *eight* Powers it is said to be *eight-fold*.

(210) "*Extreme Delusion is ten-fold*". By *Extreme Delusion* is meant the *attachment* to the objects of sense, sound, odour and the rest—which are ten-fold, each of the five being earthly and heavenly; and having these ten for its object, Extreme Delusion is said to be *ten-fold*.

Ten of Extreme Delusion

(211) "*Gloom*", *i. e.*, Hatred, "*is eighteen-fold.*" The ten objects of sense, sound, &c. are loveable by themselves; the eight occult 'powers'—Attenuation &c., however are not loveable, by themselves, but only as means to the attainment, of the various objects of sense. And the objects of sense, being mutually suppressive, the means to the attainment,—in the shape of Attenuation and the other Powers also become obstructed. So that the eight Powers together with the ten objects of sense become *eighteen*, and these being the objects of Gloom or *Hatred*, make it *eighteen-fold*.

Eighteen of Gloom

(212) "*So is Blind Gloom*"—['*Blind Gloom*' stands for *Clinging*]. The word "*tathā*" applies *eighteen-fold-ness* to Blind Gloom. The deities having attained the eight occult powers—Attenuation and the rest—and enjoying in consequence, the ten objects of sense,—Sound and the rest—live in continual dread of these (powers and objects) being wrested away from them by the Rākṣasas; and this dread constitutes the 'Clinging' or solicitude which is 'Blind Gloom'; and this latter having for its objects the aforesaid eighteen things—the eight powers and the ten objects—is said to be *eighteen-fold*.

Eighteen of Utter Darkness

(213) Thus the five forms of Error—which is a sort of Fancy,—with their sub-divisions become sixty two.

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(214) Having thus described the five forms of Error, the author next describes the twenty-eight forms of Disability.

Kārikā XLIX

The injuries of the eleven-organs, together with those of the Will are pronounced to constitute Disability; the injuries of the Will (itself) are seventeen—due to the reversion of 'contentment' and 'success'.

Twenty-eight forms of Disability

The eleven caused by injuries to the sense-organs

(215) The 'injuries of the organs' are mentioned only as causes of so many injuries of the Will, and not as, by themselves. independent forms of Disability. These injuries—Deafness, insensibility to touch, blindness, numbness of tongue, insensibility of the olfactory nerves, dumbness, palsy of hands, lameness, impotency, intestinal paralysis and idiocy,—consequent on the failure of the several sense-organs—auditory and the rest—are the eleven forms of disability. The *disability* of the Will in regard to its own function also due to the said injuries of the senses, is of eleven kinds, as it is due to *eleven* causes. These two have been mentioned together with those of *Buddhi* (itself) in accordance with the theory of non-difference of cause and effect.

Seventeen caused by the reversion of contentment and success

(216) Having thus described the disabilities of the Will, arising from the injury of the sense-organs, the disabilities of the Will by itself are next described.—"*With injuries of the Will.*" *Question*—"How many Disabilities are there of the *Will* itself?" Answer—"*Seventeen are the injuries of the Will*;" why? "*due to the reversion of contentment and success.*" Contentment being nine-fold, the disabilities caused by its reversion are also nine-fold; and similarly success being eight-fold,–the disability caused by its reversion is eight-fold,–thus making the seventeen disabilities proper of the *Will.*

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(217) The author next enumerates the nine forms of Contentment:—

Kārikā L

The nine forms of Contentment have been held to be the following:—Four internal named 'Prakṛti' (Nature), (2) 'Upādāna' (Means), (3) 'Kāla', (Time) and (4) 'Bhāgya' (Luck); and five external due to the abstinence from objects.

Nine forms of Acquiescence

(218) The four 'internal' forms of Contentment belong to those who have understood that the Spirit is different from Nature, but being illadvised, do not make further attempts to obtain the direct apprehension of that difference by such means as 'Hearing', 'Contemplating' and the like;—these forms are called internal (Ādhyātmika) because they presuppose the difference of *Ātman* (Spirit) and *Prakṛti* (Nature). It being asked—which are these?—the reply is—those "*named 'Nature', 'Means', 'Time' and 'Luck' i. e.*, whose names are '*Nature*' and the rest.

The four internal forms

(219) The *Contentment* called "Nature" consists in that feeling of satisfaction which the disciple has on being told that 'discriminative wisdom is only a modification of Nature and, as such, would come to every one in the *natural* course of events, and there is no need of having recourse to the practice of meditation, &c. So, my child, remain as you are! This *Contentment* is called '*Ambha*'.

I. Ambha

(220) The second form of *Contentment* arises from the following instruction; 'wisdom cannot be attained in the ordinary course of *nature*; because, if it were so, then everybody would attain to wisdom at all times as the course of nature functions equally for all individuals; such wisdom can only be attained through

II. Salila

Renunciation, and so, O long living one, thou must have recourse to Renunciation and give up all practice of meditation. The satisfaction arising from this instruction is named '*Upādāna*' (Means), also called '*Salila.*'

III. Ogha

(221) The *Contentment* that follows upon the feeling of satisfaction arising from the instruction that "'Renunciation' also cannot bring about Emancipation at once; Renunciation also will bring you success only when the time is ripe for it; there is no need for undergoing the troubles of 'Renunciation.'" This is the *Contentment* named 'Time', also called '*Ogha.*'

IV. *Vṛṣṭi*

(222) The fourth form of *Contentment* is the feeling of satisfaction arising from the following; "Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither from *nature* nor from any other *means* (such as Renunciation) nor does it depend solely upon *time*, but it comes only by *luck*; thus it was through mere *luck* that the children of Madālasā obtained wisdom in their infancy through their mother's instructions and thereby attained Emancipation. This form of contentment is named 'Luck' also called '*Vṛṣṭi*'.

The five external forms

(223) The *external* forms of Contentment are next described: The *external* forms are five, arising from abstinence from sound, odour, etc.,—the five objects of sense. These belong to those who are free from all attachment, but regard the non-Spirits—Nature, Will, I-principle and the rest—to be Spirit. These forms are called *external* because they presuppose the existence of Spirit, without knowing what it is; and appertain to what is not-Spirit. In as much as these forms of Contentment appear only when there is absence of attachment,—and as the sources of such absence are five,—the absence also is *five-fold*; and as the absence of attach-

ment is *five-fold*, the forms of Contentment in question also are *five* in number.—The term '*Uparama*' here stands for *absence of attachment*; and the compound '*Viṣayoparama*' means 'absence of attachment to objects'. So that the objects of sense being five, the 'abstinence' from these must also be five-fold. These five Abstinences are due to the preception of defects in the process of sense-enjoyment—involving as it does the trouble of earning, saving, wasting, pleasures and killing.

(224) To explain :—The means of acquiring wealth consist of service etc., and these are sources of pain to the servants;—as is declared in the following words:—"who would ever be attracted towards service, when one thinks of the pain caused by the insults suffered at the hands of the wardens of a haughty and wicked master?" Similar is the case with other means of acquiring wealth. The contentment resulting from the abstinence from objects of sense due to the consideration of such troubles, is called '*Pāra*.'

I. *Pāra*

(225) And then, the wealth having been acquired, it brings with it further trouble of saving it from the ravages of the king, thieves, floods and fire;—the contentment due to abstinence arising from such considerations is the second one called '*Supāra*'.

II. *Supāra*

(226) Thirdly, the wealth having been acquired with great effort (and safely hoarded), there arises the fear of its being spent up,—this consideration gives rise to the third form of abstinence leading to contentment called '*Pārāpāra*'.

III. *Pārapāra*

(227) Fourthly, when one becomes addicted to sense objects, one's desires for Pleasure increase; the non-fulfilment of these desires brings about the abstinence that leads to the fourth form of contentment called '*Anuttamāmbha*'.

IV. *Anuttamāmbha*

(228) Lastly, there arises the notion that there can be no enjoyment of things without the cruel process of killing animals; and contentment due to the abstinence arising from this perception of cruelty of the process, is the fifth one, called '*Uttamāmbha*'.

V. *Uttamāmbha*

Thus the five *external* forms of Contentment, along with the four internal ones, make up the nine forms mentioned above.

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(229) The author next describes the primary and secondary forms of *success*:—

Kārikā LI

The eight forms of success are—(1) reasoning, (2) oral instruction, (3) study, (4–6) three-fold suppression of pain, (7) acquisition of friends, and (8) purity. The three before-mentioned are checks to success.

The eight powers

(230) The most important 'Success' among those enumerated above is the *three-fold suppression of pain—three fold*, on account of the three kinds of the pains to be suppressed.

The other 'successes' mentioned are only the means to said *suppression of pain*, and as such are regarded as *secondary* in relation to it. And these five are both causes and effects; *e. g.*, of these *study* is only a *cause*; those of the more important kind are only effects; while the rest, of the middle class are both cause and effect.

(231) The first *study* consists in reading in due form with the teacher, of the philosophical texts; this is also called '*Tāra*'.

(1) **Tāra**

(232) Following from this last is *oral instruction*, which term implies the comprehension of the meaning of the texts studied—the cause (distinction) standing for the effect (comprehension of the meaning). This constitutes the second *success* also called '*Sutāra*'. —These two—reading of the text and comprehension of the meaning together constitute the 'Śravaṇa' (Hearing) [which along with *manana* and *nididhyāsana* is the means of realising the highest Truth.]

(2) Sutāra

(233) *Reasoning* consists in the investigating of the meaning of the scriptures by a process of reasoning not inconsistent with the scriptures themselves. This 'investigation' consists in establishing the ultimate Truth by setting aside all doubts and objections with regard to it. This process is also called '*Manana*' (meditation) by writers on the Vedas. This success is called '*Tāratāra*'.

(3) Tāratāra

(234) The fourth is the *acquisition of friends*. Even though one has arrived at the truth by the right process of reasoning, yet one has no confidence in his conclusions until he has discussed them with, and won the agreement of, his teacher and fellow-students. Hence the 'acquisition' of such 'friends' as the teacher and fellow-students is said to be the fourth success called '*Ramyaka*'.

(4) Ramyaka

(235) By *dāna* here is meant *purity*, of discriminative wisdom—the word being derived from the root '*Daip*', to purify. This 'purity' has been thus described by the revered Patañjali: "An unimpeded discriminative knowledge is the means to the suppression of pain" (*Yoga-Sūtra* II—26). By *unimpededness* in the Sūtra is meant *purity*, by which again is meant the process of placing discriminative wisdom on a clear basis, after having destroyed all doubts and mistaken notions mixed with

(5) Sadāmudita

different kinds of cravings or desires. This *purity* is not obtainable without the refinement arising from a long, careful and uninterrupted course of practice; hence the word *Dāna* 'purity' includes (as a means to success) this *practice* also. This the fifth success called '*Sadā-mudita*'.

(236) The aforesaid three primary 'successes' (three suppressions of Pain) are called, '*Pramoda*', '*Mudita*' and '*Modamāna*'. And these three with last five are eight forms of *Success*.

Another explanation of the Powers

(237) Other people explain the text as follows :—(1) the perception of truth, without the instruction of others, brought about purely by means of practices during past lives, is what is the *first* 'success' meant by *ūha*, (2) And that which is obtained by listening to another person reading the texts of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy, is the 'second *success* called '*S'abda*', because it follows solely from the verbal text. (3) Where the truth is learnt from the study of the words and meaning of the Sāṁkhya texts in the course of regular residence at the Teacher's,—it is the third form of success, due to study, and is called '*adhyayana*'. (4) The fourth consists in the attainment of wisdom by coming in contact with a friend who has already got at it. This form of *Success* distinguished by knowledge, is called '*Suhṛtprāpti*'. (5) Fifthly, *Dāna* (*Generosity*) is said to be means to 'Success' because true wisdom is imparted by the teacher duly propitiated with gifts.

The propriety of either interpretation we leave to the learned to judge; and we desist from pointing out the faults of others, because our business lies only in elucidating the cardinal doctrines of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy.

(238) The Disabilities of the Will arising from the 'reversion of Contentment and Success' thus become seventeen

in number. It is well known that in the whole range of 'Subjective Evolution', Success is the most desired by all; and *Error, Disability,* and *Contentment* are impediments to *Success*; this is what is said in the words: "*The aforesaid three are checks to Success.*" '*The aforesaid three*' are Error, Disability and Contentment. And these act as curbs on the various forms of Success,—because they retard their progress: the Success being likened to so many elephants whose movement is curbed by the *goad*, '*Aṅkus'a,*' and thus being opposed to success the latter three are ever to be abandoned.

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(239) *Objection* :—" Granted all this. But it has been said that Evolution is for the Spirit's purpose. This purpose can be fulfilled either by the 'Subjective Evolution' or by 'Objective Evolution' alone. Why have both the Evolutions ? "

Answer :—

Kārikā LII

Necessity of two-fold creation

Without the 'Subjective', there would be no 'Objective', and without the 'Objective' there would be no 'Subjective.' Therefore, there proceeds two-fold evolution, the 'Objective' and the 'Subjective'.

(240) The term '*Liṅga*' 'Objective' stands for the Evolution out of the Rudimentary elements, and 'Bhāva' 'Subjective' for the evolution out of the Will.

The meaning of the Kārikā is that the 'Objective' Evolution cannot manifest itself or accomplish the purpose of the Spirit without the 'Subjective Evolution'; nor conversely can the latter manifest itself or serve the Spirit's purpose without the objective. Hence the necessity of a two-fold evolution.

Necessity of the elemental creation

That is to say, *Experience*, which is the purpose of the Spirit, is not possible unless there are the objects of experience and also the vehicle of experience in the form of the two bodies (Subtle and Physical). Hence the necessity of the *objective* evolution;—conversely that same *Experience* is not possible without the *organs of experience*, in the shape of the Sense-organs and the Internal organs; and these are not possible without Virtue and the other Dispositions. Lastly, the Discriminative wisdom, which leads to the final End (Emancipation), is not possible without both these forms of Evolution. Thus is the need for both forms of Evolution established.

Necessity of the intellectual creation

The fault of reciprocal causality explained as due to the eternality of creation

(241) The possible objection of 'mutual interdependence' is explained away on the analogy of the seed and sprout, due to the fact of Evolution having had no beginning in time; the 'subjective' and 'objective' evolutions at the beginning of the present cycle are due to the impluse of residual tendencies left by the corresponding evolutions of the previous cycle.—Thus the whole theory is free from difficulties.

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(242) The various forms of the 'subjective evolution' have been described; the author next describes those of the elemental (objective, material) evolution:—

Kārikā LIII

The force of elemental creation

The 'celestial' evolution has eight forms, the 'animal' has five; the 'human' has only one form; thus in brief is the 'material' evolution.

(243) The eight 'celestial' forms are those pertaining to (1) the Brahmā, (2) the Prajāpati, (3) the Indra, (4) Pitṛ, (5) Gandharva, (6) Yakṣa, (7) Rākṣasa and (8) Pis'āca.

The eight divine sorts

(244) The five animal forms are cattle, deer, bird, reptile, and the immobile things.

Five of the lower animals

(245) *Mankind is single,* not counting its sub-divisions—Brāhmaṇas &c. as separate; as the bodily form is the same in all classes of men.

Mankind single

Such, in brief, is the *material* evolution. Such objects as the *Jar* and the like,—though not having a 'body' in the ordinary sense,—are all included under the category of the 'Immobile'.

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(246) The author next describes the three-foldness of this 'material evolution', based on the higher and lower degrees of intelligence,—in the form of the 'higher', the 'middle' and the 'lower'.

Kārikā LIV

The 'higher' evolution abounds in the Sattva-attribute; the 'lower' evolution abounds in the Tamas-attribute; and the 'Middle' evolution abounds in the Rajas-attribute;—all these comprising the entire Universe, from Brahmā down to the tuft of grass.

The different divisions of beings based on the predominance of the Attributes

(247) All the Heavenly regions—Bhuvaḥ, Svaḥ, Mahaḥ, Jana, Tapas and Satya—abound in the Sattva-attribute.—*The 'lower' evolution abounds in the Tamas-attribute*; that all

The six Heavenly Regions

things from the cattle down to the *Immobile* things, abound in the Tamas-attribute, as full of 'Delusion'. The regions of the earth—consisting of the seven Dvīpas (continents) and Oceans—form the 'middle' evolution abounding in the Rajas-attribute, as it is full of pain and because in it actions, righteous and unrighteous, are performed.

The entire Universe is summed up in the phrase "*from Brahmā to the tuft of grass*"—the 'tuft of grass' including the trees and such other things.

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(248) Having thus described the evolution, the author proceeds to show that it is the source of pain,—a fact the knowledge of which would be conducive to that 'Dispassion' (Freedom from attachment) which is helpful in attaining the Final Goal.

Kārikā LV

The sources of pain

Therein does the Sentient Spirit experience pain arising from decay and death, due to the non-discrimination of the Spirit from the body [or, until the dissolution of the subtle body]; thus Pain is in the very nature of things.

Pain of decay and death. the common lot of all creatures

'*Therein*'—in the body. Among corporeal beings the body is the vehicle of various forms of Pleasure; and yet the pain of 'decay and death' is the common lot of all. The fear of death,—"may I not cease to be; may I continue to be" &c.,—being common to man as well as to the smallest insect; and the cause of fear constituting pain, death is a source of pain.*

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* It may be worth noting here that Death in itself is not pain. It is only the fear (the fear of the unknown) that makes the thought of death so painful.

(249) *Objection* :—"Pleasure and pain, (according to the Sāṁkhya) are material and are the properties of the Will; as such how can these be said to belong to the Sentient Spirit?"

Explanation of the word *Puruṣa*

Answer :—The term "Puruṣa," literally means "one who lies in the subtle body;" and this latter being connected with the Will and its properties, leads to the idea of the Spirit being connected with them.

(250) *Question* :—How can pain which is related to the *body* be said to belong to the Spirit?

Limit of the pain

Reply:—"*Due to the non-discrimination of the Spirit from the body*;" the Spirit cognising its distinction from the body, mistakes the fluctuations of the latter for its own. Or the आ in आविनिवृत्तेः may be taken as pointing to the limit of the Spirit's pain—the meaning being, "*Until the subtle body has ceased to be*, the Spirit suffers pain."

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(251) The author next deals with the different views that have been held regarding the cause of 'Evolution' or 'Creation'.

Kārikā LVI

The question as to the Maker of the Universe decided

This evolution from the Will down to the specific elements, is brought about by the (modifications of) Prakṛti. This work is done for the emancipation of each Spirit, and thus is for another's sake, though appearing as if it were for the sake of Nature herself.

(252) The term '*ārambha*' stands for *what is brought about, i. e.* evolution; '*this*' *evolution*—from the Will onwards down to the elements—is brought about by Nature itself; it is neither produced by a God (as held by the Naiyāyika) nor it is an evolution from Brahman (as held by the Vedāntin); nor is it without cause (as held by the Atheist). If it were the latter, there would never be any evolution at all or it would be eternally going on;—nor can it be said to be evolved from Brahman (the Vedānta view), for there can be no modification of what is pure intelligence, (which is Brahman, as postulated by Vedānta). Nor, again can evolution be brought about by Nature, as controlled by God; as no controlling can be done by one who is not active; *e. g.* an inactive carpenter does not manipulate his tools.

The different views of the cause of creation set aside

(253) *Objection*:—"Granted that the evolution is due to Nature alone. But Nature is eternally active, and as such, her operations should never cease; so that there would be no emancipation for the Spirit."

Objection:—Nature being eternally active, no emancipation possible

Answer:—"*The evolution is for the emancipation of each Spirit, and appearing as if it were for Nature's own sake is really for the sake of another.*" A cook having finished the cooking in which he was engaged retires from the work; similarly Nature, being urged to action for the emancipation of the Spirit, brings about this emancipation and thereafter stops her operations with regard to that Spirit whom she has already liberated (and, thus emancipation is not impossible). This action for another's sake is just like the action for one's own benefit.

Reply—**The creation is for the Spirit's end and ceases with the purification of these**

(254) *Objection* : "Granted all this. But it is only a sentient being that acts either for its own or for another's purpose; and Nature, being insentient, cannot act in the manner described; and, as such, she requires a sentient controller (over her blind force); the Spirits residing in the body cannot be such controllers, because such conditioned Spirits are ignorant of the true character of Nature; consequently there must be some other omniscient sentient being who controls *ab extra* the operations of Nature,—and to this Being we give the name God."

Objection :—An insentient Nature cannot act towards a definite end

Answer :—

Kārikā LVII

As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the calf, so does Nature act towards the emancipation of the Spirit.

Instance of an insentient object acting towards a definite end

(255) It is a fact of observation that insentient objects also act towards definite ends; *e. g.*, the milk which is insentient, flows for the nourishment of the calf. Similarly Nature, though insentient, could act towards the emancipation of the Spirit.

(256) It would not be right to urge that "the flow of the milk being due to the superintending care of God, its action does not afford an instance vitiating the general proposition that the action of insentient things are due to the control of sentient beings";—the activity of every sentient being is always found to be due either to *selfishness*, or to *benevolence*; neither of these is applicable to the case of the 'creation of the Universe', and therefore, it follows that the said creation cannot be due to the action of a sentient agent.

The view of a Personal, Universal Lord overthrown

Further, God, being the Lord of the Universe, has all that He requires and, as such, in the creating of the world, He can have no selfish motive; nor can His action be said to be due solely to benevolence or pity; for *pity* consists in a desire for the removal of others' pains; but before creation, the Spirits would be without bodies, organs and objects as such, without pain; for the removal of what then would God's compassion be roused? And if the pain subsequent to creation be held to be the cause of creation, then we should be in the inextricable nooze of 'interdependence': creation due to pity, and pity due to creation! and again, if God were moved to creation by pity, then He would create only happy mortals, not mortals with variegated experiences. And if the diversity of men's experiences be attributed to their past deeds, then what is the necessity of postulating intelligent controller of such deeds? The mere absence of the control of an intelligent agent would mean (according to the opponent) that the *deeds* of men could not have any activity, which would mean that their effects, in the shape of men's bodies, organs and objects could not be produced,—and the result of this would be that there would be no *pain*; so that the *removal of pains* would be very easy! [and there would be no ground for *God's* compassion].

None of the above objections apply to the case of Nature

(257) As regards the action of the insentient Nature, on the other hand, it is due neither to selfishness nor to pity; and thus in this case, none of the above incongruities arise; the only motive of Nature is the *fulfilment of another's purpose.* Thus, therefore, the instance cited in the Kārikā is quite appropriate.

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(258) It has been said—"*as if for its own purpose*;" The author proceeds to explain this:"—

Kārikā LVIII

The Spirit's end—the motive of Nature

As people engage in acts to satisfy desires, so does the Unmanifest (Nature) act for the emancipation of the Spirit.

'*Autsukya*' is '*icchā*,' desire. Desire is satisfied and ceases on the attainment of the desired object; the object is the purpose of the agent; because the end of an action is that which is desired.

The analogy is pointed out: "*So does the Unmanifest (Nature) act for the Emancipation of the Spirit.*"

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(259) *Objection*:—"We grant that the purpose of the Spirit is the motive for the action of Nature, but whence the cessation of her operations?"

Answer:—

Kārikā LIX

The cause of the cessation of Nature's operations

As a dancing girl, having exhibited herself to the spectators of the stage, ceases to dance, so does Nature cease to operate when she has made herself mainfest to the Spirit.

The word "Stage",—the place—implies the spectators—the occupiers of the place. Having *manifested herself*, *i. e.*, having shown that her different modifications, sound, &c., are different from the Spirit.

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(260) *Objection*:—"We grant that the action of Nature is for the Spirit's purpose. But she could surely expect some recompense for her pains, from the Spirit,—just as a servant does from his gratified master; and as such the action of Nature cannot be said to be entirely for *another's purpose*."

Answer:—

Kārikā LX

Nature excepts no compensation

Generous Nature, endowed with Attributes, brings about by manifold means, without benefit to herself, the good of the Spirit, who is devoid of Attributes, and confers no benefit in return.

As a qualified servant accomplishes the good of his unqualified master—who is devoid of good qualities and confers no benefits,—through purely unselfish motives, without any benefit to himself; so does poor generous Nature, endowed with the three Attributes, benefit the Spirit without any good in return to herself. Thus the pure unselfishness of Nature's motives is established.

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(261) *Objection* :—" We grant all this : But a dancing girl having retired from the stage after her exhibition, returns to it again, if so desired by the spectators; similarly would Nature act even after having manifested herself to the Spirit."

Answer:—

Kārika LXI

The reason why Nature does not revert to her actions

Nothing is more modest than Nature, such is my conviction ; once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the view of the Spirit.

By *modesty* here is meant extreme delicacy (of manners), the unbearability to suffer exposure to the *Puruṣa's* view. If a well-bred lady who is not to be seen even by the Sun, with her eyes cast down, happen to have her body uncovered by chance and thus seen by a stranger, she tries to hide herself in such a way as not to be seen again ; so Nature also—even more modest than such a lady—having once been seen by the Puruṣa (Spirit) will in no case show herself again.

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(262) *Objection* :—"This may be so. But *Puruṣa* (Spirit), being devoid of Attributes and Modifications, how is any emancipation possible for him? For *emancipation* consists in the removal of bondage; and bondage being only another name for the Karmic residua imbued with dispositions and troubles, it is not possible for the unmodifying *Puruṣa*. And as the *Puruṣa* is devoid of action, it can have no migration—which latter is only another name for *Rebirth*. Hence it is meaningless assertion that 'Evolution' is for the purpose of the '*Puruṣa*'."

The author meets the above objection by accepting it in the course of winding up his disquisition.

Kārikā LXII

Bondage and release in reality apply to Nature

Thus verily no Spirit is bound, or emancipated; nor does he migrate; it is Nature alone that having many vehicles is bound, or is released, or migrates.

(263) Verily no Spirit is bound; nor does any migrate; nor is any emancipated. Nature alone, having many vehicles, is bound, migrates and is released. *Bondage*, *migration* and *release* are ascribed to the Spirit, in the same manner as defeat and victory are attributed to the king, though actually occurring to his soldiers; because it is the servants that take part in the undertaking, the effects of which—grief or profit—accrue to the king. In the same manner, experience and emancipation, though really belonging to Nature, are attributed to the Spirit, on account of the non-discrimination of Spirit from Nature, as has been already explained. So our doctrine is entirely sound.

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(264) *Objection* :—"We understand that bondage, migration and emancipation, though really belonging to Nature, are ascribed to the Spirit; but of what good are these to Nature herself?"

Answer :—

Kārikā LXIII

Nature binds and releases herself by means of her own developments

Nature by herself binds herself by means of seven forms; and by means of one form, she causes deliverance for the benefit of the Spirit.

"*Nature binds herself by means of seven forms*"; *i. e.* by Virtue and other dispositions (all properties of the Will) except wisdom. For the benefit of the Spirit in the shape of Experience and Final Release, she releases herself by herself, '*by means of one form*', *i. e.* by wisdom—by discrimination. That is to say, she does not again bring about the experience or emancipation of that same Spirit.

Objection:—"We have understood all this; what then?"

Kārikā LXIV

The form and character of discriminative wisdom

Thus it is that from the practice of truth follows wisdom in the form,—"I am not, naught is mine, and not—I"—which is complete, pure on account of the absence of error, and absolute.

(265) The term "truth" stands for the knowledge of Truth.—From the practice of the knowledge of truth, in the formal manner described, through a long course of repeated, uninterrupted and devoted exercise,—there follows the *wisdom*, manifesting the distinction of Spirit from Matter. All practice brings about the knowledge of the same object to which the practice pertains; so in the present case practice pertaining to Truth results in the direct perception of Truth. It is for this reason of its leading to Truth that the wisdom is called '*pure*.'

(266) "Why *pure*"?—"*On account of the absence of Error.*" *Doubt* and *Error* are the two impurities of wisdom; and as the above wisdom is free from these, it is called *pure*. This is what is meant by the term '*aviparyayāt*'. *Doubt* consists in thinking as uncertain what is certain, and hence doubt also is a form of *Error*. Thus '*absence of Error*' means the absence of both Doubt and Error (mistake); this 'absence of Error' also is due to the fact of the wisdom relating to Truth.

The purity of the wisdom explained

(267) *Objection*:—" It may be that the knowledge of Truth follows from the said Practice, but the eternal tendency towards false knowledge is sure to bring about its results in the shape of false knowledge, which will lead to its inevitable effect, the miseries of birth and rebirth of which thus there would be no end."

In reply to this, it is added that the knowledge is '*Absolute*', *i. e.*, unmixed with error. Though tendency towards error is eternal, yet it is capable of being removed by the tendency towards the knowledge of Truth, culminating in that knowledge, even though it has a beginning in time. For, partiality towards *truth* is natural to the Will, *buddhi*, as declared by outsiders also (here, the Bauddhas): "No amount of contradiction can set aside the flawless knowledge of the true character of objects, for such is the partiality of the Will.

Absoluteness explained

(268) The form of the said knowledge is stated:—*I am not, naught is mine, and Not—I.* '*I am not*' merely precludes all action from the Spirit; as is declared (by grammarians), "The root *as* (as in '*asmi*') together with *bhū* and *kṛ* signify *action* in general." Hence all actions, external as well as internal,—such as determination, self-consciousness, observation and apprehension—all become precluded from the

The form of the knowledge

Spirit. And since there is no action of the Spirit, there arises the idea of 'Not-I;' "I" here stands for *active agency* in general, such as in "I give", "I eat", "I offer libations", in all of which the active agent is represented by "I"; because wherein there is no action, there can be no *active agent*; hence it is rightly expressed as '*Not—I.*' From this follows the idea that "*Naught is mine*;" for it is only an active agent that can be a *possessor*; and hence the preclusion of action implies the *preclusion of possession* also.

Or we may interpret the three forms in another way. The sentence "I am not," means that "I am the Spirit, *not productive*;" and because non-productive, "I have no action"—'Not I;' and since without action, "I can have no possessions," hence "naught is mine."

(269) *Objection*:—"Even after the knowledge of all this, there might be left something yet unknown, which would lead to Bondage."

Answer:—"*It is complete*," *i. e.* there is nothing left unknown after the attainment of such knowledge as the above, which want of knowledge could lead to Bondage.

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(270) *Question*:—"What is it that is acccomplished by the said *knowledge of truth*?"

Answer:—

Kārikā LXV

The cause of the cessation of Nature's operation

Thus (possessed of this knowledge) the Spirit, as a spectator, pure, at ease, beholds Nature, which has ceased to be productive and has turned back from the seven forms of evolution, under the influence of the purpose (of the Spirit).

The two things for the production of which Nature had begun her action were *experience* and the *perception* of *truth*; so

that when these two have been produced there is nothing left to be produced by her; hence, Nature "*ceases to be productive*".

"Under *the influence of purpose*"; *i. e.*, by the force of discriminative Wisdom. The seven forms of Evolution,—Virtue, Vice, Error, Dispassion, Passion, Power and Weakness—are all due to erroneous knowledge. Dispassion also as of those who have it through mere contentment is due to erroneous knowledge. And this erroneous knowledge is removed by its opposite—true knowledge. And thus the cause, erroneous knowledge, being removed, its effects in the shape of the 'seven forms' are also removed, and thus is Nature '*turned back from the seven forms of evolution.*'

"*At ease*", *i. e.* inactive; "*Pure*", *i. e.*, unmixed with the impurities of the Will due to *Rajas* and *Tamas* Attributes,—though to the last moment the Spirit continues to be in slight touch with the Will abounding in the *Sattva* Attribute;—as otherwise no vision of the Nature in the said condition would be possible.

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(271) *Objection*:—"This may be so. We have nothing to say against your statement as to Nature *ceasing to be productive.* But Evolution has been said to be due to the connection (of Spirit and Nature); and this connection is only a form of capability; and the capability to experience constitutes the 'sentience' of the Spirit, as the capacity of being the object of experience constitutes the 'insentience' and 'objectivity' of Nature; and these two capabilities can never be said to cease; it cannot be said that they cease because there is nothing left to be done; because though one set of objects may have been experienced by the Spirit, there might be others of the same kind still to be experienced; as is found to be the case with the perception of sound and other objects of sense". (Thus no emancipation is possible).

Answer:—

Kārikā LXVI

No birth after attainment of wisdom for want of motive

"She has been seen by me", thinks the one and hence loses all interest; "I have been seen," thinks the other, and ceases (to act). Hence though their connection is still there, there is no motive for further evolution.

(272) So long as Nature has not brought about discriminative wisdom, she might continue to bring about the enjoyment of sound and other objects of sense; but she cannot do this after she has once brought about discriminative wisdom. Because experience (enjoyment) is due to erroneous knowledge, and when this latter, the cause, has ceased under the force of wisdom, there can be no enjoyment; just as the sprout is not possible in the absence of the seed. It is only on account of the want of discrimination, that the Spirit regards as his own and enjoys the pleasing, displeasing and deluding modifications of Nature, the objects of sense,—the sound and the rest. Similarly discriminative wisdom also, which is a modification of Nature, is regarded by the Spirit as 'for himself'—only by reason of the want of discrimination. When however, right discrimination has been brought about, the connection of the Spirit with Nature ceases, and so he ceases to enjoy the things; nor is the Spirit by himself capable of bringing about discriminative wisdom, which is a modification* of Nature. Thus the Spirit who has attained to wisdom, cannot regard any purpose as his own. Further, experience and emancipation being the 'purpose of the Spirit', supply the only motive to the operations of Nature; but when these two have ceased to be the 'purpose of the Spirit', there is no motive for the operation. This is what is

* Because wisdom is a property of Buddhi which is an emanation from Nature.

meant by the words—"*There is no motive for evolution.*" A 'Motive' is that which moves Nature to act towards evolution; and no such motive is possible, when there is no 'purpose of the Spirit.'

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(273) *Objection* :—"We grant all this. But no sooner would wisdom be attained than the body would fall off; and then how could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature (as distinct from himself)? If it be asserted that "emancipation does not follow immediately on the attainment of wisdom, on account of the unspent residuum of past deeds"—then, we ask,—how is this residuum destroyed? If by mere fruition (*i. e.* by experience), then you tacitly imply the inability of wisdom alone to bring about emancipation; and hence the assertion that "emancipation follows from a knowledge of the distinction between the Manifest, the Unmanifest, and the Spirit," becomes meaningless. The hope too—that "emancipation would be obtained on the destruction of the residua of *Karma*, by means of experience extending to an uncertain period of time"—is too sanguine ever to be realised."

Answer :—

Kārikā LXVII

Reason why the body does not dissolve immediately on the attainment of wisdom

By the attainment of perfect wisdom, Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy; yet the Spirit remains awhile invested with the body, just as a potter's wheel continues to revolve through the momentum of the impluse previously imparted to it.

(274) When true knowledge appears, the 'Karmic residuum'—even though it is beginningless and its time of fruition is uncertain,—has its productivity destroyed and is unable to produce any 'fruit' in the shape of 'birth, life and life's experiences'. It is only when the 'soil of the Will' is watered with the waters of the '*Kles'as*' (*i. e.* Ignorance, Egotism, Love, Hate and Clinging), that the 'Karmic seeds' give out sprouts; so that when the said soil is rendered barren by reason of the waters of Ignorance and the rest having been sucked up by the heat of the 'knowledge of Truth',—how could there be any possibility of the 'Karmic seeds' sprouting up? With this view it is said—"*Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy*;"—*i. e.*, they cease to be causes. Even so, when wisdom has been attained, the body continues for a while, on account of the previous impulse; just as, even after the action of the potter has ceased, the wheel continues to revolve on account of the momentum imparted to it. In due time, however, when the impulse becomes exhausted, it becomes *inactive.* In the continuance of the body, the impulse is supplied by such virtue and vice whose fruition has already commenced; as is declared in *S'ruti*—"Having exhausted the others by means of experience, the soul attains beatitude" and "The delay is only so long as beatitude is not attained" [*Chāndogya* VI, i, 2]. The 'impulse' (to which the continuance of the Body is due) is in the remnant of that impulse which had been imparted by the Disappearing Ignorance; it is true that on account of the momentum of this impulse the Spirit continues to be invested with the body for a time.

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(275) *Question*:—"This may be so; but if the Spirit remains invested with the body by some sort of impulse, when will his Emancipation come about?"

Answer:—

Kārikā LXVIII

Final beatitude

When the separation from the body has at length been attained, and by reason of the purpose having been fulfilled, Nature ceases to act,—then he attains eternal and absolute Isolation.

The productivity of those actions, whose fruition has not commenced, having been destroyed, and those also whose fruition has commenced having been exhausted by experience,—the purpose having been fulfilled, Nature desists from her activity with respect to that particular Spirit, who thus obtains eternal and absolute 'Isolation,' *i. e.* cessation of the three kinds of pain.

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(276) Though the Philosophy has been established by reasoning, yet in order to inspire respect towards it, the precedence of the great Sage is stated:

Kārikā LXIX

The precedence of Kapila

This abstruse knowledge adapted to the fulfilment of the purpose of the Spirit, wherein (wherefore) the origin, duration, and dissolution of beings are considered, has been expounded by the great sage.

"*Abstruse*",—'*guhya*' (lit. *in a case*) *i. e.* hard to be grasped by dull-brained persons.

"*By the great sage*" *i. e.* by Kapila. The feeling of reverence, thus aroused is strengthened by declaring that the doctrine is scriptural. "*Wherein are considered, etc.*; '*in which knowledge*' means *for the sake of which knowledge*; as in the expression '*Carmaṇi dvīpinam hanti*', the word '*carmaṇi*' (lit. *in the skin*) is taken to mean '*for the sake of the skin*, one

kills the tiger',—'*Bhūtānām*;' of living beings,—'*the origin, duration and dissolution*' are considered;—which is done in the scriptures.

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(277) *Objection*:—"Let this be so: We shall respect the direct sayings of the great sage (Kapila); wherefore should we have every regard for the assertion made by Īśvarakṛṣṇa ?" *Answer*:—

Kārikā LXX—LXXI

Importance of the Science

This supreme, purifying (doctrine) the Sage imparted to Āsuri, who taught it to Pañcaśikha. by whom the philosophy was extensively propagated.

Handed down through a long tradition of pupils, it has been briefly written up in the Āryā metre by the noble-minded Īśvarakṛṣṇa who has thoroughly understood the philosophical doctrine.

Purifying, purifying the Spirit from all evils causing the three kinds of pain.

Supreme, i. e. the most important of all purifying doctrines.

'*Sage*'—Kapila—*Imparted to Āsuri* &c.

(278) "Ārya"—that which has arrived at truth, and one whose mind is such is '*noble-minded*'.

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(279) This philosophy is one organic whole in itself,—not a mere section—as it treats of all branches of knowledge:—

Kārikā LXXII

The sixty topics of science

The subjects that are treated of in the seventy distiches are those of the complete 'Philosophy of the Sixty Topics,' excluding the illustrative tales, and omitting the doctrines of other people.

The sixty topices are thus enumerated in the *Rājas Vārtika*: 1 The existence of Nature (Kārikā XIV). 2 Its singleness (XIV); 3 Objectiveness (XI); 4 Distinctiveness (of Nature from Spirit) (XI); 5 Subordination (of Nature to Spirit) (XVII); 6 Plurality (of Spirits) (XVIII); 7 Disjunction (of Spirit from Nature in the end) (XX); 8 Conjunction (of Spirit and Nature in the beginning) (XXI); 9 Duration (XIX); 10 Inactivity (of the Spirit) (XIX); these are the ten radical categories. (In addition to these) are the five kinds of Error, (XLVII), nine of Contentment (L), and twenty-eight of Disability of the organs (XLIX); these together with the eight forms of Power (LI) make up the sixty "topics". All these sixty topics are treated of in the above distiches, which therefore form a complete Philosophy and cannot be said to be only a section thereof.

Of the above (ten radical categories) *singleness, objectivity* and *subordination* relate to Nature; *distinctness, inactivity* and *plurality* to Spirit; and *existence, disjunction* and *conjunction* to both; and *duration—i. e.* continuance relates to the gross and subtle things.

May this work of Vācaspati Mis'ra, *Tattva-Kaumudī* (the Moonlight of Truth), continue to please (cause to bloom) the clear (lily-like) hearts of good men !

Thus ends the Tattva-Kaumudī of Vācaspati Mis'ra.

END

NOTES

I

The first benedictory stanza -अजामेकां etc., is taken from श्वे० (४. ५). वाच० has changed the readings as follows — (*b*) नमामः in place of सरूपाः; (*c*) अजा ह्येते जुषमाणा भजन्ते in place of अजोऽह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते; (*d*) जहत्येनां भुक्तभोगां नुमस्तान् in place of जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः। The change was, of course, necessary in view of the idea of plurality of souls in सांख्य, which is not favoured by the readings of the उपनिषद्. The वेदान्तिन्s explain this verse quite differently. शङ्कराचार्य has refuted the claim of the सांख्यs that this verse lays down the principles of the सांख्य system. For fuller discussion, see शाङ्करभाष्य on चमसवदविशेषात् (ब्र. सू. १. ४. ८). It has already been pointed in the Introduction that this verse gave rise to the idea of the three गुणs. It is, therefore, in the fitness of things that this verse should have been chosen by वाच० for मङ्गलाचरण.

About कपिल, आसुरि, पञ्चशिख and ईश्वरकृष्ण, see Introduction.

आधिभौतिक. The word भूत stands for living beings according to चन्द्रिका.

आधिदैविक, according to गौड०, includes miseries due to cold, heat, wind etc., because these are due to supernatural powers. On देवानामिदं दैवं, Davies remarks—"But in old time, gods of higher class, and not demons merely, were supposed to afflict men with disease and pain. In the Rig-Veda (ii. 33, 7), Gritsamada prays to Rudra that he may be freed from his bodily pains, which he affirms to have been sent by the Devas or gods (*daivya*)." (p. 15).

The reading adopted by गौड०, *viz.*, तदभिघातके is more expressive of the सांख्य idea of complete cessation of pain, than तदपघातके of वाच० (See, S. N. S., 1, 1n.). cf. तत्र त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः (सां. सू. १. १). The reading of जय०

viz., तदवघातके does not materially differ from तदपघातके. Compare also Wilson, pp. 6–7; Davies, pp. 13–14, note on this reading.

विष्णुपुराण describes the three दुःखs in the following verses :

अध्यात्मिकोऽपि द्विविधः शारीरो मानसस्तथा ।
शारीरो बहुभिर्भेदैर्भिद्यते श्रूयतां च सः ॥ २ ॥
शिरोरोगप्रतिश्यायज्वरशूलभगन्दरैः ।
गुल्मार्शःश्वयथुश्वासछर्द्यादिभिरनेकधा ॥ ३ ॥
तथाक्षिरोगातीसारकुष्ठांगामयसंज्ञितैः ।
भिद्यते देहजस्तापो मानसं श्रोतुमर्हसि ॥ ४ ॥
कामक्रोधभयद्वेषलोभमोहविषादजः ।
शोकासूयावमानेर्ष्यामात्सर्यादिमयस्तथा ॥ ५ ॥
मानसोऽपि द्विजश्रेष्ठ तापो भवति नैकधा ।
इत्येवमादिभिर्भेदैस्तापो ह्याध्यात्मिको मतः ॥ ६ ॥
मृगपक्षिमनुष्याद्यैः पिशाचोरगराक्षसैः ।
सरीसृपाद्यैश्च नृणां जायते चाधिभौतिकः ॥ ७ ॥
शीतवातोष्णवर्षाम्बुवैद्युतादिसमुद्भवः ।
तापो द्विजवरश्रेष्ठैः कथ्यते चाधिदैविकः ॥ ८ ॥ (६. ५)

The reading अक्के, (found in some editions), in the verse अक्के चेन्मधु etc., has अर्के as its variant. On this बालराम remarks —अक्के इति पाठे तु–समीपे–गृहकोणे, इति वार्थो बोध्यः। वस्तुतस्तु जैमिनीयसूत्रभाष्ये शबरस्वामिभिः पथि जातेऽर्के मधूत्सृज्य तेनैव पथा यथा मध्वर्थिनः पर्वतं न गच्छेयुरित्यभिधाय 'अर्के चेन्मधु विन्देत' इत्येवमुपन्यासाद् अर्के–इत्येव पाठः साधीयान् ॥ (p. 14, note 1).

II

The quotation 'यन्न दुःखेन सम्भिन्नं' etc., is ascribed to श्रुति by वाच०. On this बालराम remarks—'यन्न दुःखेन सम्भिन्नम्' इति भट्टवार्तिकमिति केचित्, स्मृतिरियमिति विज्ञानभिक्षवः, परिमलादिषु प्रामाणिकग्रन्थेषु श्रुतित्वेन व्यवहारादर्थवादरूपा श्रुतिरियमिति मादृशाः॥ (p. 16, note 3). The word स्वर्ग in this quotation has been variously

explained by different writers as temporary pleasure or heaven or salvation. See बालराम (pp. 39-40) who has dwelt exhaustively over this question.

अपाम सोमममृता अभूम etc., is from ऋग्वेद VIII. 48. 3., and is fully quoted and explained by गौड०, माठर and जय० .

With the sense of this कारिका, cf. श्रीमद्भागवत—

श्रुतं च दृष्टवद्दुष्टं स्पर्धासूयात्ययव्ययैः ।
बह्वन्तरायकामत्वात् कृषिवच्चापि निष्फलम् ॥ (११.१०.२१)
एवं लोकं परं विद्यान्नश्वरं कर्मनिर्मितम् ।
सतुल्यातिशयध्वंसं यथा मण्डलवर्तिनाम् ॥ (११.३.२०)

It is interesting to compare --जय०— अस्या आर्याया वक्ष्यमाणा याः, सर्वा एवार्थेन भाष्यस्थानीया द्रष्टव्याः (p. 4), with the remark of Davies, quoted in the foot-note in the translation (p. 5).

The quotation of पञ्चशिख, *viz.*, स्वल्पः सङ्करः etc., is found in full in व्यासभाष्य on यो० सू० २. १३. See Introduction also.

The reconciliation of वैदिकी हिंसा with the श्रुति text—मा हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि—, is an interesting topic which has taxed the ingenuity of all the orthodox systems of philosophy (See, S. N. S., p. 5, 1n. ; Sovani, p. 400). बालराम has discussed this question at length, quoting extensively from the standard authors (See pages 24–36).

न च कार्यत्वेनानित्यता फलस्य युक्ता, भावकार्यस्य तथात्वात् etc., (para 14)—Says an objector : Just as स्वर्ग has been declared to be अनित्य, because it is an effect (यद्यत्कार्यं तदनित्यम्), similarly, this दुःखध्वंस should also be अनित्य, because it is an effect, To this वाच० replies that this maxim of अनित्यत्व holds good in the case of positive effects only, and not in the case of negative effects like दुःखध्वंस. But how can दुःखध्वंस be called मोक्ष according to the सांख्य philosophy, which advocates सत्कार्यवाद ? To this बालराम replies—यद्यपि सांख्यनये सत्कार्यवादाङ्गीकारेण दुःखप्रध्वंसस्य मोक्षत्वाभिधानं व्याहतं, तथापि दुःखप्रध्वंसपदेनात्र दुःखातीतावस्थाया एव तात्पर्यविषयत्वेनाभिधानात् व्याहत्यभावोऽवसेयः ॥ (p. 43).

Compare the notion of मुक्ति according to the वैशेषिक philosophy —दुःखनिवृत्तेश्चात्यन्तिकत्वं समानाधिकरणदुःखप्रागभावासमकालीनत्वं, युगपदुत्पन्नसमानाधिकरणसर्वात्मविशेषगुणध्वंससमानकालीनत्वं वा, अशेषविशेषगुणध्वंसावधिकदुःखप्रागभावो वा ॥ (उपस्कार on वैशेषिकसूत्र १. ४).

The order of व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञान is based on the procedure of cognition. The same order is observed in the following सां. सू. —स्थूलात् पञ्चतन्मात्रस्य (१. ६२); बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां तैश्चाहङ्कारस्य (१. ६३); तेनाहङ्कारस्य (१. ६४); ततः प्रकृतेः (१. ६५); and संहतपरार्थत्वात् पुरुषस्य (१. ६६).

Sovani is quite pertinent in pointing out the confusion with regard to the meaning of the word व्यक्त. Some call the महाभूतs as व्यक्त, whileas, the author of कारिकाs seems to regard everything व्यक्त (and, therefore, प्रत्यक्षयोग्य), except the प्रधान and पुरुष. वाच० agrees with the latter explanation, in his commentary on this कारिका, but, changes his opinion in the comment on the 6th कारिका. At the latter place he says —सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानात् अतीन्द्रियाणां प्रधानपुरुषादीनाम् प्रतीतिः. He would seem to include महत्तत्त्व etc., by the word आदि (See बालराम p. 16 1n.). In order to avoid the contradiction, we should interpret the word आदि, according to वंशीधर, to mean the union between प्रकृति and पुरुष. cf. आदिना तत्संयोगग्रहः। प्रकृतिपुरुषतत्संयोगा नित्यानुमेया इत्युक्तेः (वंशीधर, p. 183) 1 See Sovani, pp. 401 and 405, and notes 36 and 37.

III

In connection with Jacobi's remark that it is very strange that intellect should be regarded as a form of matter by the Sāṁkhyas (See Ent. Gott. Ind. p. 32), it is interesting to compare Davies (p. 17, 3n)—Modern Science, like the system of Kapila, makes intellect, a mere form of matter. "Mind, used in the sense of substance or essence, and brain, used in the sense of organ of mental function are at bottom names for

the same substance." (Maudsley's Physiology of Mind, 3rd Ed., p. 38).

The nature of पुरुष is explained by चन्द्रिका as अजनकत्वे सत्यजन्य इत्यर्थः। आद्यविशेषणेन प्रकृतिनिरासः, द्वितीयेनेन्द्रियसामान्यादिनिरासः। Unlike the नैयायिकs, the सांख्यs maintain that सामान्य is a product.

On पुरुष as pure inward light, Davies quotes (p. 18, 1n.) Hegel on Thought (Das Denken), in connection with the Absolute:—"It is that light which lights; but it has no other content except that light." (Phil. der Rel., i. 117) [Translated from German by H. Sharma].

From अहङ्कार (Ego) proceed not only the इन्द्रियs, but everything material cognised by them. That is, the Ego (which is the I-principle) is the 'base of the reality of all our sense-perceptions' (Davies, p. 21, note 1), and consequently of all the existence. Davies quotes Schelling (System des Transcen. Idealismus, p. 60) in support of this idea—" If at all there exists *Something Real* as opposed to *ideal*, then that *Something Real* must be I, because it is the principle of all reality." (Translated from German by H. Sharma). This position, of course, differs from that of the वेदान्तिन्, who does not regard the reality of the I-principle (अहङ्कार) even, but that of the Pure Consciousness (शुद्धब्रह्म),—the I-principle itself being imaginary and due to माया. Distinction should be drawn from the विज्ञानवादी-बौद्ध also, who denies the existence of everything external, except consciousness. The सांख्यवादिन् does not deny the external existence, but considers it to be a modified product of consciousness, in which it lies latent. cf. न विज्ञानमात्रं बाह्यप्रतीतेः (सां सू. १. ४२.).

IV

Apart from the three Means of Right Cognition, *viz.*, प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शब्द, recognised by the सांख्यकारिका, the commentators discuss the other Means of Right Cognition, recog-

nised by other schools. The चार्वाक materialist recognises only प्रत्यक्ष, the जैन and वैशेषिक schools recognise प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान, the माध्वs also recognise only two प्रमाणs, but they are प्रत्यक्ष and शब्द according to them. The followers of रामानुज, the जरन्नैयायिकs, and the सांख्य and the योग systems recognise प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शब्द. The oldest and the most modern नैयायिकs and the followers of the महेश्वर school recognise उपमान in addition to the three named above. The मीमांसकs of प्रभाकर school add अर्थापत्ति as the fifth. The मीमांसकs of कुमारिलभट्ट school and the अद्वैतवेदान्तिन्s recognise one more, *viz.*, अनुपलब्धि or अभाव. The number of प्रमाणs reaches eight in the case of the पौराणिकs who add संभव and ऐतिह्य to the list. Some तान्त्रिकs recognise चेष्टा also in addition to the above; others add प्रतिभा to the list, and thus the total reaches ten. The commentators have tried to show that all the seven प्रमाणs, apart from the three recognised by the कारिका, fall under the latter.

1. उपमान—

   वाच॰ splits it up into प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शब्द;
   माठर regards it to be अनुमान;
   जय॰ includes it under अनुमान and शब्द;
   गौड॰ includes it under शब्द;
   and चन्द्रिका under अनुमान.

2. अर्थापत्ति—

   All the commentators include it under अनुमान.

3. अभाव—

   वाच॰ and जय॰ regard it as प्रत्यक्ष;
   माठर includes it under अनुमान. Although गौड॰'s remark—सम्भवाभावप्रतिभैतिह्योपमाश्राप्तवचने, suggests its inclusion under शब्द, yet another remark of his, *viz.*, शुष्कधान्यदर्शनाद्वृष्टेरभावो गम्यते, would lead us to infer that he will have it under अनुमान;
   चन्द्रिका regards it as a help-mate of प्रत्यक्ष, and, therefore, no independent प्रमाण.

4. **संभव**—

वाच॰, **जय॰** and **माठर** include it under **अनुमान** ;
गौड॰ and **चन्द्रिका** include it under **शब्द**.

5. **ऐतिह्य**—

वाच॰ opines that if it is pronounced by a reliable person, then it is **शब्द**, otherwise it is no **प्रमाण**;
गौड॰ and **चन्द्रिका** also include it under **शब्द**:
माठर includes it under **अनुमान**.

6. **प्रतिभा**—

वाच॰ and **चन्द्रिका** do not mention it;
जय॰ includes it under **प्रत्यक्ष** and **अनुमान**, when it is correct, otherwise it is no **प्रमाण**; **माठर** includes it under **अनुमान** ; and **गौड॰** includes it under **शब्द**.

7. **चेष्टा**—

Noticed only by **चन्द्रिका** and **माठर**, and included under **अनुमान**.

Wilson is right in remarking that although the **मीमांसक**s do recognise six **प्रमाण**s, yet **गौड॰**'s remark that they are **अर्थापत्ति**, **संभव**, **अभाव**, **प्रतिभा**, **ऐतिह्य** and **उपमान**, is not correct; for **संभव**, **ऐतिह्य** and **प्रतिभा** are nowhere recognised as **प्रमाण**s by the **मीमांसक**s; rather, "the author of **शास्त्रदीपिका** excludes expressly **संभव**, **प्रतिभा** and **ऐतिह्य** from the character of proofs." (p. 28). **जैमिनि** nowhere mentions the **प्रमाण**s, but the six **प्रमाण**s (*viz*., **प्रत्यक्ष**, **अनुमान**, **शब्द**, **उपमान**, **अर्थापत्ति** and **अभाव**) are discussed by **शबरस्वामिन्** in his **भाष्य** on **मीमांसासूत्र** I. 1. 5. **प्रभाकर** does not recognise **अभाव**, but **कुमारिल** does.

The word **समाख्या** (in para 23) is a technical term of **मीमांसा**; cf. **श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यमर्थविप्रकर्षात्** (**मी॰ सू॰ ३. ३. १४**). It means a name, the sense of which depends upon its derivation, unlike other proper names cf. **आख्या चैवं तदर्थत्वात्** (**मी॰ सू॰ ३. ३. १३**), and **शाबरभाष्य** on it—**समाख्या सति सम्बन्धे भवति, यथा पाचको लावक इति। तत्र पाचकशब्दमुपलभ्य पचतिना अस्य सम्बन्ध इति गम्यते ॥**

प्रमाण has been defined as the instrument of प्रमा. प्रमा is that state of mind which is free from doubt, mistake, indecision and memory—, and which arises from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. The result is the cognition by mind. But वाच॰ says—बोधश्च पौरुषेयः फलं प्रमा. This might mean that the result of the mental state is cognition in the Spirit. Does it mean that the cognition arises in the spirit ? No, we reply—what happens is that when the Spirit is reflected in the mind, which has assumed the shape of the object with which the sense-organs come into contact, it (the Spirit) also appears to be cognising. This is a kind of misapprehension arising from the mistaken identity between the Spirit and the mind. This is what is expressed in the योगसूत्रs—' द्रष्टा दृशिमात्रः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः ' (II. 20) and ' चितेरप्रतिसंक्रमायास्तदाकारापत्तौ स्वबुद्धिसंवेदनम् ' (IV. 22).

V

Following the न्यायसूत्र—तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोदृष्टं च । (1, 1, 5), वाच॰ first divides अनुमान into three kinds. Again he gives another classification :

- अनुमान
  - वीत
    - पूर्ववत्
    - सामान्यतोदृष्ट
  - अवीत or शेषवत्

The commentators differ in the explanation of these terms. वात्स्यायन himself proposes two alternative explanations.

(1) (*a*) पूर्ववत्—*A priori* or inference of effect from cause,—as of rain from the clouds in the sky.

(*b*) शेषवत्—*A posteriori*, or an inference of cause from effect,—as of rain from the flood in a river.

(*c*) सामान्यतोदृष्ट—*Commonly seen*, or based on Analogy,— *e. g.*, we observe that a particular man in one town now, is seen in another next day, because he has moved. Similarly, the Sun must also move, as he is seen at different places in the sky at different times.

Or

(2) (*a*) पूर्ववत्—If we have seen two things together in the past, then when we see one of them now, we infer the existence of the other also. For example, from smoke on the hill, we infer fire.

(*b*) शेषवत्—Inference by exclusion (प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधेऽन्यत्राप्रसङ्गात् शिष्यमाणे संप्रत्ययः परिशेषः). The question is—, under which of the seven categories (द्रव्य, गुण etc.) should we include शब्द (sound)? Now, शब्द cannot come under सामान्य, विशेष and the rest, and its inclusion under द्रव्य has been denied. Therefore, by the law of the residue, शब्द falls under गुण.

(*c*) सामान्यतोदृष्ट—Where the relation of the व्याप्ति is not within ordinary perception, there we take another object within ordinary perception and similar to the हेतु in question; and on this similarity or *Commonness,* we transfer the व्याप्ति from the *perceived* to the *unperceived* instance. For instance, we have got to infer the existence of the Spirit. We do so on the basis of the qualities like the desire, etc. The desire, etc., are *qualities.* Qualities always reside in objects (as we perceive in the case of form, taste and the rest). Therefore, the desire etc., must also reside in some object; and that object is the Spirit.

The two alternative explanations given by वात्स्यायन show that the meaning of these terms had become doubtful at his time. Cf. Principal A. B. Dhruva's paper—'Trividham anumānam', POC., Poona, pp. 251–280.

वाच० agrees with the second explanation of वात्स्यायन. But अवीत or शेषवत् according to वाच०, is a negative reasoning.

वात्स्यायन's instance of शेषवत्, *viz.* शब्द is a गुण, is rejected by वाच० in his तात्पर्यटीका (p. 183, काशीसंस्कृतसीरीज). According to him शेषवत् or परिशेष stands for व्यतिरेक्यनुमान. The inference of शब्द being a गुण is not a व्यतिरेक्यनुमान but अन्वयव्यतिरेकि. The correct example of शेषवत्, therefore, is that the qualities desire etc., reside in the आत्मन्. These qualities cannot reside in पृथिवी, जल, तेजस् and वायु ; nor can they reside in आकाश, because the qualities of the latter are perceived by the external sense—organ (ear). Similarly the desire etc. being विशेषगुणs cannot be the qualities of दिशा, काल and मनस्—for the qualities of the latter three द्रव्यs are साधारण. Thus ultimately the desire etc., reside in the nineth द्रव्य, *viz.*, आत्मन्. So there being no सपक्ष of आत्मन् it is an instance of व्यतिरेक्यनुमान. जय० and गौड० agree with the first explanation of वात्स्यायन. गौड० and माठर explain शेषवत् differently —समुद्रादेकं जलपलं लवणमासाद्य शेषस्याप्यस्ति लवणभाव इति (गौड०) ॥.

लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्—वाच० would read one more लिङ्गि *i. e.* लिङ्गलिङ्गिलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्. गौड० has a curious explanation to offer—तदनुमानं लिङ्गपूर्वकं यत्र लिङ्गेन लिङ्गी अनुमीयते, यथा दण्डेन यतिः । लिङ्गिपूर्वकं च यत्र लिङ्गिना लिङ्गमनुमीयते, यथा दृष्ट्वा यतिं, अस्येदं त्रिदण्डमिति । जय० agrees with it. It enumerates seven kinds of सम्बन्धs which ought to exist between the लिङ्ग and the लिङ्गिन्. They are—

(1) स्वस्वामिभाव	as	between	राजा	and	पुरुष.
(2) प्रकृतिविकार	,,	,,	यव	,,	सक्तु.
(3) कार्यकारणभाव	,,	,,	धेनु	,,	वत्स.
(4) पात्रपात्रिक	,,	,,	परिव्राट्	,,	त्रिविष्टब्ध.
(5) साहचर्य	,,	,,	चक्रवाक	,,	चक्रवाकी.
(6) प्रतिद्वन्द्वि	,,	,,	शीत	,,	उष्ण.
(7) निमित्तनैमित्तिक	,,	,,	भोज्य	,,	भोजक.

The conversation between आवट्य and जैगीषव्य, referred to by वाच०, occurs in व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. ३. १८.

The अयुक्तs mentioned by वाच० are—

(*a*) शाक्यभिक्षुs or the Buddhist monks, described in the विवेकविलास, vii 275 (as quoted in the सर्वदर्शनसंग्रह) as—

कृत्तिः कमण्डलुर्मौण्ड्यं चीरं पूर्वाह्णभोजनम् ।
संघो रक्ताम्बरत्वं च शिश्रिये बौद्धभिक्षुभिः ॥

(*b*) निर्ग्रन्थकs or the Jains, and

(*c*) संसारमोचकs or the materialists. बालराम observes—संसारमोचकाः—(संसारमोचकादेश्च हिंसा पुण्यत्वसंमता) इत्यभिहिता हिंसादिपरायणाः घटभङ्गे तदन्तर्वर्तिसलिलविलयवद् देहभङ्गे तदन्तर्गतजीवभङ्ग एव मोक्ष इत्येवं ब्रुवाणाश्चार्वाकविशेषाः ॥ (p. 82).

'तु' शब्देनानुमानाद् व्यवच्छिनत्ति—As pointed above, the Buddhists and the followers of the वैशेषिक school do not recognise शब्द as a separate प्रमाण, but include it under अनुमान. वाच० says that the relation between a वाक्य and its अर्थ is not that of लिङ्ग and लिङ्गिन्, as between धूम and वह्नि. वाक्यार्थ, being only an object of cognition cognised by the वाक्य, cannot be known by inference.

उपमान. According to the नैयायिकs (प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनमुपमानम्—न्या० सू० 1 1. 6), उपमान is that sentence which establishes a relation between a word and its sense. But, according to the सांख्यs, a वाक्य is not a प्रमाण, but the knowledge (ज्ञान) derived from the वाक्य. It is the चित्तवृत्ति alone which is प्रमाण. So, उपमान cannot be a separate प्रमाण, but is included under अनुमान. According to the मीमांसकs, उपमान is the सादृश्यज्ञान (or the cognition of similarity, as of गो residing in the directly perceived गवय). A man who saw a cow in the town, now observes a गवय in the forest. At this moment he is reminded of the cow which is qualified by the similarity of गवय directly perceived. This is the फल of उपमान. वाच० replies that this उपमान and its फल are both included under प्रत्यक्ष. For, सादृश्य is like the सामान्य. Just as we have गोत्व in गो, so we have गोसादृश्य in गो. And as we directly perceive गोत्व along with गो, so we perceive गोसादृश्य and गवयसादृश्य along with गवय. Therefore, गोसादृश्यज्ञान (उपमान) and गवयसादृश्यज्ञान (उपमानफल) both are प्रत्यक्ष. सादृश्य is not a relation (like संयोग) which should reside on two objects; it is only भूयोऽवयवसामान्ययोग, that is, *the*

existence of a large number of qualities of one object in another. This सादृश्य is, thus, one like गोत्व; and if it is perceived in गो, then it is perceived in गवय also.

अर्थापत्ति is Presumption. We presume the existence of living चैत्र outside the house, if he is not visible inside the house. But, the मीमांसक objects— देशसामान्येन गृहविशेषाक्षेपोऽपि पाक्षिक: etc. He says that when we hear जीवन् चैत्रः क्वचिदस्ति, then the substratum of the existence of चैत्र is देशसामान्य (or space in general), which includes the particular space of गृह also. Thus, चैत्र's non-existence in the गृह is opposed to his existence in देशसामान्य. And, in order to remove this opposition, we have to resort to अर्थापत्ति. वाच० replies that गृह (in which the non-existence of चैत्र has been established by means of Right Cognition) cannot be included in देशसामान्य. Similarly चैत्र's non-existence in गृह (which is opposed to his existence in गृह) cannot be a case of opposition to his existence everywhere.

अभाव is no प्रमाण, but is included under प्रत्यक्ष. For, घटाभाववद्भूतल is merely a modification of भूतल. But, says an objector, how can अभाव (a negation) be a परिणाम (something positive)? *Answer.* Under एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्याता: यो० सू० III. 13), व्यास has defined परिणाम as अवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य पूर्वधर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्ति: परिणाम इति—*i. e.* modification is the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of an object, which (object) always remains constant. So, when घट was on the भूतल, then it was सद्वितीयपरिणाम of भूतल; and when there is no घट, then it is the केवल or अद्वितीयपरिणाम of भूतल.

VI

Things directly perceived by the senses need not be taught by the शास्त्र, as they can be easily cognised by even an ordinary person. Now " things beyond the senses are not

only those which are too subtle for organs of the sense, but those which are imperceptible by accident, as the fire in a mountain that smokes " (Davies, p. 27). The latter is an instance of पूर्ववत् अनुमान, which वाच॰ regards to be as unimportant for our inquiry as the प्रत्यक्ष. The most important kind of अनुमान, from our point of view, is सामान्यतोदृष्ट (and शेषवत्, which is not mentioned by the कारिका, but added by वाच॰), which leads us to infer things which are too subtle for the organs of sense. But जय॰ rejects पूर्ववत् and शेषवत् both (p. 9).

VII

पतञ्जलि lays down six causes of अनुपलब्धि (महाभाष्य IV. I. 3). See Introduction. The eight causes of अनुपलब्धि mentioned in the कारिका are reduced to four by जय॰—

(1) देशदोष includes अतिदूर and अतिसामीप्य.

(2) इन्द्रियदोष „ इन्द्रियघात and मनोऽनवस्थान.

(3) विषयदोष = सौक्ष्म्य, and

(4) अर्थान्तरदोष includes व्यवधान, अभिभव and समानाभिहार. Sovani is right in remarking that all these can be reduced to two— इन्द्रियदोष and विषयदोष (See p. 405). माठर lays down the causes of अनुपलब्धि of असत् (non-existent) things even— इदानीमसतां चतुर्धा भवति। तत्रोच्यते-प्राक्प्रध्वंसेतरेतरात्यन्ताभावभेदात्...... एवमियं द्वादशधानुपलब्धिः। सतामष्टधा ह्यसतां चतुर्धा ॥

VIII

On the reading प्रकृतिसरूपं, Davies remarks—'Lassen has in the text स्वरूपं (having its own form), from the सांख्यकौमुदी, which must be referred to intellect (महत्). All the Mss. but one have सरूपं (like), which the sense requires. In his translation he has " dissimile et simile ".' (p. 27, 1n).

IX

वाच॰ here lays down the opinions of (1) the बौद्धs, (2) the नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs, and (3) the वेदान्तिन्s as पूर्वपक्ष.

(1) The बौद्धs maintain that *existence* comes into being from *non-existence* (असत: सज्जायते).

(2) The नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs maintain that an *existent* cause produces a *non-existent* effect (सतोऽसज्जायते).

(3) The वेदान्तिन्s maintain that the cause alone is *existent*, the effect being only an apparent change (एकस्य सतो विवर्त: न कार्यजातं वस्तु सत्). All these views are fully discussed in the Introduction.

उपादानग्रहणात्—वाच॰ interprets ग्रहणात् as सम्बन्धात्. But जय॰, गौड॰, माठर and चन्द्रिका explain it as taking or seeking. S. N. S. observes that although गौड॰'s explanation is simpler, yet apparently, the same idea is repeated in शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्. वाच॰'s explanation is also included in सर्वसम्भवाभावात्. "It is also to be noted that while उपादानग्रहणात् emphasises the adequacy of the cause to the effect, शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् looks at the adequacy of the effect to the cause; hence, the latter does not merely repeat the idea of the former." (S. N. S. p. 28, 1n).

कारणभावाच्च—जय॰ gives two explanations of this phrase—कारणस्य सत्त्वादित्यर्थ:। यद्यसत्कार्यमुत्पद्यते किमिति कारणभावेन कार्यस्य भावो भवति। भवति च। तस्माच्छक्तिरूपेणावस्थितमिति गम्यते। अथवा-कारणभावादिति कारणस्वभावात्। यत्स्वभावं कारणं तत्स्वभावं कार्यम्। यथा स्निग्धस्वभावेभ्यस्तिलेभ्य: स्निग्धमेव तैलम्, मृदो मृत्स्वभावो घट:॥ (p. 12). माठर and गौड॰ agree with the latter explanation. वाच॰, on the other hand, explains it as कार्यस्य कारणात्मकत्वात्—on account of the identity of cause and effect.

तस्मादियं पटोत्पत्ति: स्वकारणसमवायो वा स्वसत्तासमवायो वा, उभयथापि नोत्पद्यते etc. (para 75). After having disproved the नैयायिक's theory of origination of effect (उत्पत्ति), वाच॰ proceeds further —Now, what is your उत्पत्ति ? Is it the समवाय (Inherence) of the effect in its cause ? That is, is it the समवाय which is

produced ? If you say yes, then your उत्पत्ति produces only the समवाय and not the effect. Or, do you mean to say that उत्पत्ति is the समवाय of सत्ता (existence) in the effect ? That is, सत्ता is the genus presiding over the effect. It is by means of this सत्ता (genus), that we call an existing object as existent. Just as गो is गो, because she is related to गोत्व, similarly, a सत्पदार्थ is सत्, because it is related to सत्ता. So, the other alternative of the नैयायिक is that what is originated is the समवाय (Inherence) of सत्ता in the effect. Here also, as above, what is originated is समवाय and not the effect. Moreover, asks बालराम, how can you establish the समवाय relation of the non-existent पट with the existent तन्तुs ? And, how again, can there be the समवाय of सत्ता in the असत् पट, when there can be no relation between the existent and the non-existent objects ?

Thus, it will be seen that a कारण is related with the आविर्भाव of कार्य. The opponent asks—why should a कारण be not related with the रूप of कार्य ? वाच० replies.—Because आविर्भाव is a क्रिया and रूप is a गुण. A कारण can be related with क्रिया only and not with गुण; otherwise, a कारण will not be a कारण. The very derivation of the word कारण—क्रियतेऽनेनेति कारणम्—implies its relation with क्रिया.

X

हेतुमत्—, *i. e.*, caused. व्यक्त or the evolved is caused. Cause, according to माठर, is of two kinds : कारक (producer) and ज्ञापक (illuminator or indicator). प्रधान, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and पञ्चतन्मात्रा's are the कारकहेतु's, as they produce effects. That is, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and पञ्चतन्मात्राs are हेतुs and हेतुमत्s both, whileas, अव्यक्त (*i. e.* प्रधान) is only a हेतु. The ज्ञापक हेतुs are five-fold, *viz.*, विपर्यय, अशक्ति, तुष्टि, सिद्धि and अनुग्रह. Now, विपर्यय, अशक्ति तुष्टि and सिद्धि are the प्रत्ययसर्गs (*i. e.* creations of Intellect), and thus they pervade all the twenty-three तत्त्वs. (But what is this अनुग्रह ?) Thus अव्यक्त is only a कारक हेतु.

अनित्यम्—non-eternal, destructible. Destruction is the return of a product to its cause. cf.—नाश: कारणलय: (सां० सू० १. १२१). For, according to the theory of सत्कार्य, there can be no real destruction or annihilation. प्रधान is नित्य, because it has no कारण to which it could return.

अव्यापि—. The twenty-three तत्त्वs are not all-pervading, like प्रधान and पुरुष; "each of these principles (tattwa) is not found in every form." (Davies, p. 34). But, is not the महत्तत्त्व all-pervading? To this वंशीधर replies—महदादे: स्वस्वकारणाव्यापकत्वादुपचरितव्यापकत्वमित्यर्थ: (p. 201),—the pervading-ness of महत्, etc., is secondary, as they do not pervade their causes. And as प्रधान has no cause to pervade, it is व्यापि.

सक्रियम्—परिस्पन्द means the action of leaving one body and entering another. विज्ञान०, on the other hand, says—सक्रियत्वमध्यवसायादिरूपनियतकार्यकारित्वम्। प्रधानस्य तु सर्वक्रियासाधारण्येन कारणत्वान्न कार्यैकदेशमात्रकारित्वम्। न च क्रिया कर्मैव वक्तुं शक्यते। प्रकृतिक्षोभात् सृष्टिश्रवणेन प्रकृतेरपि कर्मवत्तयात्र सक्रियत्वापत्तेरिति (१. १२४). On this बालराम remarks—क्षोभादिपरिणामलक्षणक्रियाया: प्रधाने सत्त्वेऽपि गमनागमनलक्षणपरिस्पन्दात्मकक्रियाया असत्त्वान्न प्रकृतावतिव्याप्तिरिति व्यर्थोऽयं भिक्षो: प्रयास इति बोध्यम् (p. 121).

अनेकम्—*i. e*, सजातीयभेदवत्, having a variety of similar objects; as a mango-tree has सजातीयभेद, several other mango trees of the similar type. So, बुद्धि, etc., although alike, are different in different individuals. But विज्ञान० explains it otherwise—अनेकत्वं सर्गभेदेन भिन्नत्वम्—सर्गद्वयसाधारण्यमिति यावत्। न पुन: सजातीयानेकव्यक्तिकत्वम्, प्रकृतावतिव्याप्ते:। प्रकृतेरपि सत्त्वाद्यनेकरूपत्वात्. The fallacy of विज्ञान० is pointed out by बालराम—प्रकृतेरनेकरूपत्वेऽप्यनेकव्यक्तिकत्वाभावेन प्रकृतिप्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावस्य प्रकृतावसम्भवात्, किञ्च —'अजामेकाम्' इति श्रवणादप्रामाणिकं प्रकृतेरनेकव्यक्तिकत्वाभिधानमित्यस्थान एव व्यामोहो भिक्षोरिति। (pp. 121–122).

लिङ्गम्—According to गौड० and माठर, it means, that which merges into its primary cause. In addition to the above explanation, जय० and विज्ञान० give another alternative explana-

tion, *viz.*, that which indicates, or which is the characteristic of प्रधान. This is the sense taken by वाच० also. But प्रधान itself is a characteristic (लिङ्ग) of पुरुष. It is for this reason that वाच० remarks—प्रधानं तु न प्रधानस्य लिङ्गं पुरुषस्य लिङ्गं भवदपीति भावः. On this, S. N. S. remarks that it " seems hardly adequate to the contrast intended between the evolved and the unevolved. " (p. 32, 1n.)

Why can there be no अवयवावयविसंयोगः between प्रधान and बुद्धि, etc. ? Because, between these, the relation is समवाय (=identity or तादात्म्य), and not संयोग. There can be no संयोग between the तन्तुs and the पट produced out of them. But, will there be any संयोग between बुद्धि and अहङ्कार, etc. ? No commentator answers this, although, here also we can show that अहङ्कार, being a product of बुद्धि, stands in समवाय relation to बुद्धि. It is for this reason that गौड०, माठर and जय० explain the word अवयव as शब्द, रूप, स्पर्श etc., But they land themselves in another difficulty; for, the entire व्यक्त (*viz.*, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार etc.) cannot be called as शब्दस्पर्शादिसम्पन्न. If it be urged that these शब्द and the rest do reside in a latent form in बुद्धि and the rest, then it may be pointed out that शब्द and the rest do reside in a latent form in प्रधान also. Even वाच०, who tries to avoid this difficulty, has illustrated this संयोग as—तथा हि पृथिव्यादयः परस्परं संयुज्यन्ते एवमन्येऽपि ।

परतन्त्रम्—Although, each of the twenty-three तत्त्वs is subordinate to the other in the ascending order, yet, ultimately, all are subordinate to प्रकृति. Again, although बुद्धि is independent in producing अहङ्कार, and the latter in producing the इन्द्रियs and the तन्मात्राs, yet each one is ultimately dependent upon प्रकृति, the fountain-head of all energy.

XI

त्रिगुणम्—The three गुणs or Attributes are the essence of प्रकृति; प्रकृति is nothing but these three गुणs in equilibrium.

The kinds of temperaments observed in living beings may broadly be divided into three—spiritual, passionate and dull. Therefore, the सांख्य theory of three गुणs, although a mere hypothesis, is yet a very useful and appropriate hypothesis. Dayies remarks—" In the system of Valentinus the Gnostic, all men and all substances are divided into three classes : (1) spiritual, (2) the vital and (3) the material (Hylic). This corresponds to the गुणs of कपिल and is probably an importation from India. " (p. 37, 2n.)

विषय:—The view-point of the विज्ञानवादिन् बौद्ध is that there is no existence of the external objects, except in mind. That is, concept and the object denoted by the concept are identical, because both are comprehended simultaneously. Things, which are not identical, are not necessarily comprehended simultaneously; cf. ' सहोपलम्भानियमादभेदो नीलतद्धियोः। भेदश्च भ्रान्तिविज्ञानैर्दृश्येतेन्दाविवाद्वये॥' (सर्वदर्शन०, p. 32), वाचस्पति's refutation of this view has been thus illucidated by बालराम—यत्र किलैकस्मिन्नेव योषिद्रूपे वस्तुनि रक्तद्विष्टविमूढानां जनानां विभिन्नानि सुखादिज्ञानानि जायमानान्युपलभ्यन्ते तत्र प्रमातॄणां परस्परप्रतिसन्धानाद् वस्त्वैक्येऽपि ज्ञाननानात्वं दृश्यते। यदि हि वस्तु विज्ञानात्मकं भवेत् तर्हि विज्ञानस्यासाधारण्यादनेकविज्ञानालम्बनमेकं साधारणं वस्तु न सम्भवेत्। अतः वस्तुसाधारण्योपपत्तये विज्ञानातिरिक्तं तदभ्युपेयमिति। (p. 128).

अचेतनम—बुद्धि (intellect) is merely an instrument of Pure Intelligence or चैतन्य, and not identical with it, because बुद्धि is a material product of प्रकृति.

The phrase तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् means that in some respects the Spirit is similar to व्यक्त and अव्यक्त, and in other respect it is different from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त.

Difference of पुरुष from व्यक्त and अव्यक्त—

व्यक्त and अव्यक्त	पुरुष
त्रिगुण	अगुण
अविवेकि	विवेकी
विषय	अविषय

व्यक्त and अव्यक्त	पुरुष
सामान्य	असामान्य
अचेतन	चेतन
प्रसवधर्मि	अप्रसवधर्मी

Similarity of पुरुष to व्यक्त and अव्यक्त and difference of व्यक्त from अव्यक्त—

व्यक्त	अव्यक्त	पुरुष
हेतुमत्	अहेतुमत्	अहेतुमान्
अनित्य	नित्य	नित्य
अव्यापि	व्यापि	व्यापी
सक्रिय	निष्क्रिय	निष्क्रिय
अनेक	एक	अनेक
आश्रित	अनाश्रित	अनाश्रित
लिङ्ग	अलिङ्ग	अलिङ्ग
सावयव	निरवयव	निरवयव
परतन्त्र	स्वतन्त्र	स्वतन्त्र

It should be noted that गौड० and माठर say पुरुष एकः, which is opposed to the doctrine of पुरुषबहुत्व. जय० and वाच०, therefore, rightly point out that पुरुष is similar to व्यक्त with regard to अनेकत्व. After discussing this point, Wilson concludes—"'Either, therefore, Gaurapāda has made a mistake, or by his *eka* is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations; or, as Mr. Colebrooke renders it (R. A. S. Trans. Vol. I., p. 31), 'individual'. So in the Sūtras it is said, 'that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the etherial element may be confined in a variety of vessels' (I, 150). This singleness of soul applies, therefore, to that particular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage and liberation; for, as the commentator observes 'one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body)'. The singleness of soul, therefore, as asserted by Gaurapāda, is no doubt to be understood in this sense." (p. 65)

XII

गुणs do not mean qualities residing in a substance, as understood in the न्याय and वैशेषिक systems. They are of the nature of substance; they are the constituent elements of प्रकृति. Hence, वाच० says—गुणा इति परार्थाः. That is, they are called गुणs (secondary), because they exist for the Spirit and not for themselves.

तन्त्रयुक्ति literally means 'device of science', and probably refers to the device of the मीमांसकs known as स्थान (position or order). So it will mean that प्रीति, अप्रीति and विषाद stand for सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् respectively.

गौड०, माठर and जय० mention अन्योऽन्यवृत्तयः also, whileas वाच० and चन्द्रिका add अन्योऽन्य before and वृत्ति after अभिभव, आश्रय, जनन and मिथुन each. वृत्ति according to वाच०, means क्रिया (operation). जय० explains वृत्ति as सुखादिरूपेण परिणतिः. According to गौड०, अन्योऽन्यवृत्तयः means परस्परं वर्तन्ते, *i. e.* are reciprocally present. माठर, however, seems to take वृत्ति in the sense of function. In a note on this word, Davies remarks—" वृत्ति means state, condition, or manner of being, and the meaning is that each गुण may, in some circumstances, assume the nature of the others or be the same in effect." (p. 36, 1n.)

The quotation, अन्योऽन्यमिथुनाः सर्वे, etc., ascribed to आगम by वाच०, is found in the 8th chapter of the 3rd स्कन्ध of देवी-भागवत. गौड० माठर and जय० quote only one verse, *viz.*, रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं, etc., जय० ascribes this verse to विष्णुगीता, which it is difficult to identify, unless it stands for हरिगीता = भगवद्गीता. But there is no such verse in the भगवद्गीता. The verse found there is—रजस्तमश्चाभिभूय सत्त्वं भवति भारत । रजः सत्त्वं तमश्चैव तमः सत्त्वं रजस्तथा ॥ (XIV. 10). We find a similar verse in the अश्वमेध-पर्वन् of the महाभारत—तमसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं रजः । रजसश्चापि सत्त्वं स्यात् सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं तमः ॥ (३६. ६).

XIII

सांख्याचार्यैः—stands for पञ्चशिख and others. विज्ञान० quotes पञ्चशिख on प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादाद्यैर्गुणानामन्योऽन्यं वैधर्म्यम् (सां. सू. I. 127)— " सत्त्वं नाम प्रसादलाघवाभिष्वङ्गप्रीतितितिक्षासन्तोषादिरूपानन्तभेदं समासतः सुखात्मकम् । एवं रजोऽपि शोकादिनानाभेदं समासतो दुःखात्मकम् । एवं तमोऽपि निद्रादिनानाभेदं समासतो मोहात्मकम् । "

अर्थतः—जय० and वाच० explain it as पुरुषार्थतः, but गौड० takes it in the sense of साधना, and माठर explains it as कार्यवशात्.

Now, these गुणs, on account of their having the characteristics of अन्योऽन्याभिभव, etc., assume different shapes. But, how do these गुणs perform functions of so different a nature? In reply to this वाच० gives an example of a woman, who, according to him, illustrates all the different functions of the गुणs. गौड०, माठर and जय०, on the other hand, illustrate सत्त्व by a lady, रजस् by warriors and तमस् by clouds. A virtuous woman (and therefore, a सात्त्विक type) pleases her husband, pains her rivals and deludes the passionate people. The brave soldiers (and therefore, representing रजस्) of a king please their master, pain their opponents and delude the fugitives. The dark clouds covering the sky (and therefore, a तामस type) please the people suffering from heat, rouse activity among the peasants and delude the lovers in separation. But, there is one difficulty. The 3 गुणs (=प्रकृति or मूलकारण) assume various shapes by permutation and combination. This amounts to saying that the मूलकारण is not one but many. Now, how does this position differ from that of the वैशेषिकs who also assume the plurality of causes? Cf.—नन्वेवं मूलकारणस्य परिच्छिन्नासंख्यव्यक्तिकत्वे वैशेषिकमतादत्र को विशेष इति चेत्—The reply is कारणद्रव्यस्य स्पर्शादिराहित्यमेव ।। ' शब्दस्पर्शविहीनं तु रूपादिभिरसंयुतम् । त्रिगुणं तज्जगद्योनिरनादिप्रभवाप्ययम् ॥ ' इति विष्णुपुराणादिभ्यः ॥ विज्ञान० (I. 128).

But are not these गुणs opposed to one another? The reply is—yes. Still they unite for पुरुषार्थ, as wick, oil and lamp. The illustration is not a happy one, as we do not find any apparent opposition between तैल, वर्ति and दीप in spite of

the attempt of चन्द्रिका; cf.—दीपोपरि तैलपतनेन दीपनाशात् तैलमपि दीपविरोधि, एवं वर्तिरपि स्वल्पकेन दीपनाशिकेति ॥ For this reason वाच॰ gives another example of this विरोध,—*viz.*, यथा वा वात्तपित्तश्लेष्माण: etc., बालराम quotes a parallel passage from the देवीभागवत (3. 9)—" "प्रदीपश्च यथा कार्यं प्रकरोत्यर्थदर्शनम् । वर्तिस्तैलं यथार्चिश्च विरुद्धाश्च परस्परम् ॥ २९ ॥ विरुद्धं हि तथा तैलमग्निना सह सङ्गतम् । तैलं वर्तिविरोध्येव पावकोऽपि परस्परम् ॥ ३० ॥ एकत्रस्था: पदार्थानां प्रकुर्वन्ति प्रदर्शनम्॥" (pp. 139-140). Really speaking, there can be no विरोध of these गुणs in any evolved thing (say, a human body). If at all there could be any विरोध, then it would be in the साम्यावस्था *i. e.* प्रकृति. In no परिणाम of प्रकृति are the गुणs in equal quantity. On the other hand, there is predominance of one over the others. So, there is no तुल्यबलत्व in the विकारs. Cf. रूपातिशया वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च परस्परेण विरुध्यन्ते सामान्यानि त्वतिशयै: सह प्रवर्तन्ते—(व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. II. 15).

अत्र च सुखदु:खमोहा परस्परविरोधिन: etc.—Here वाच॰ has in his view the attack of the वेदान्तिन् against the सांख्य philosophy. According to the latter, all the *objects* (or evolved entities) are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. The वेदान्तिन् (वाच॰ himself) retorts—आन्तरा: खल्वमी सुखदु:खमोहविषादा बाह्येभ्यश्चन्दनादिभ्योऽतिविच्छिन्नप्रत्ययवेदनीयेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्ता अध्यक्षमीक्ष्यन्ते । यदि पुनरेत एव सुखदु:खादिस्वभावा भवेयुस्तत: स्वरूपत्वात् हेमन्तेऽपि चन्दन: सुख:स्यात् । न हि चन्दन: कदाचिदचन्दन: ।..........तस्मादसुखादिस्वभावा अपि चन्दनकुङ्कुमादयो जातिकालावस्थाद्यपेक्षया सुखदु:खादिहेतवो न तु स्वयं सुखादिस्वभावा इति रमणीयम् ॥ (भामती on ब्र. सू. II. 2. 1). To this argument वाच॰ (as an exponent and defender of सांख्य) replies —स्वस्वानुरूपाणि सुखदु:खमोहात्मकान्येव निमित्तानि कल्पयन्ति । Although सुख, दु:ख and मोह are all present in every object, yet, they are not experienced simultaneously. For the experience of one or the other of these (सुख, दु:ख and मोह), they stand in need of excitant causes, which themselves are of the nature of सुख, दु:ख and मोह. For example, सुख, for its own experience, stands in need of the predominance of धर्म, which is of the nature of सत्त्वगुण (or सुख).

XIV

The difficulty lies in the expression तद्विपर्ययाभावात्. गौड० and माठर explain it as—'on account of the absence of the contraries of त्रैगुण्य in the प्रधान, अविवेक्यादि resides in the प्रधान.' वाच० offers an alternative explanation—'on account of the absence of अविवेक्यादि in the contrary of व्यक्त, *i. e.*, पुरुष, अविवेक्यादि resides in the प्रधान and its constituents.' चन्द्रिका adopts the second explanation. जय० also agrees with it. cf. त्रैगुण्यस्याभावेऽविवेक्यादयोरभावात् (?) । न हि निर्गुणस्य पुरुषस्याविवेक्यादिः संभवति । तस्मात् त्रैगुण्यादेवाविवेक्यादिः सिद्धः ॥ (p. 20). The explanation of गौड०, as rightly pointed out by S. N. S. (See p. 41, 1n.), renders the other half of the कारिका redundant, because, it simply repeats the same argument.

XV and XVI

The term भेद stands for the diverse forms of the evolved which differ from one another. As compared with its effects, a cause is unlimited and thus unmanifest. जय० uses a curious expression, (संसर्गिन्) for cause. It seems that the word संसर्ग stands for the union or contact of different effects in their cause; cf.—तस्मादेतेषामेकेन संसर्गिणा भवितव्यम् । यत्रैतेषां संसर्गस्तदव्यक्तं कारणमस्ति (p. 21).

समन्वय = एकरूपता, similarity, or एकजात्यनुगम (*i. e.* belonging to one genus), according to जय०. गौड० understands समन्वय in the sense of 'inference—' यथा व्रतधारिणं बटुं दृष्ट्वा समन्वयति, नूनमस्य पितरौ ब्राह्मणाविति । The explanation of समन्वयात् (सां. सू. I. 131) as offered by विज्ञान०, *viz.*, उपवासादिना क्षीणं हि बुद्ध्यादितत्त्वमन्नादिभिः समन्वयेन समनुगतेन पुनरुपचीयते (*i. e.* intellect and the rest, emaciated by fast are again strengthened by food, etc.), 'does not directly fit in this Kārikā,' as rightly pointed out by Sovani (p. 411).

कारणकार्यविभागात्—वाच० understands the word विभाग as 'emergence',—just as the jar, etc., emerge from the clay, etc. जय०, माठर and गौड० explain it as 'separation' or 'distinction' between the functions of the cause and the effect; —just as you can bring water in a jar but not in clay. Thus, there is a distinction between a cause and its effect, because both serve different purposes (पृथगर्थक्रियाकरणात्). But, it is difficult to understand how one can conclude from this argument that तस्मादस्य कारणेन भवितव्यम्. जय० here quotes the explanation of some other commentary (which is not traceable) :—अस्मिन् व्याख्याने, 'कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेर्महदादि तच्च कार्यम्' इत्यनेनैवसिद्धत्वादन्यैरन्यथा व्याख्यायते—यदुपकरोति तत् कारणम्, यदुपक्रियते तत्कार्यम्, तयोर्विभागात्, उपकार्योपकारकभावादित्यर्थः। यथाध्यात्मिकानां बाह्यानां चोपकार्योपकारकभावो बुद्धिकृत इव दृश्यते तदस्य कश्चिद् व्यवस्थापिता [पयिता] स्यात्, कुतोऽयं विभाग इत्यन्यथानुपपत्तेः॥ (pp. 21-22).

अविभागात् वैश्वरूप्यस्य—According to वाच०, गौड० and माठर, the term अविभाग means 'merging';—because this diverse evolved merges into the unevolved. जय० also quotes the opinion of some unknown commentator who adopts the reading अविभागे, where अविभाग means लय. जय०'s own explanation is different. It takes अविभाग in the sense of अविभक्त, and explains the phrase as—'because this diversity is produced out of unity.' cf. इह लोकेऽविभक्तादेकस्मादिक्षुद्रव्याद्रसफाणितगुडखण्डशर्करादिवैश्वरूप्यं नानात्वं दृश्यते......एवमाध्यात्मिकानां बाह्यानां च वैश्वरूप्यम्। तस्मादेषामविभक्तेनैकेन भवितव्यम्। (p. 22).

प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च—According to वाच० and जय०, these two expressions indicate the two kinds of प्रवृत्तिs of गुणs, because गुणs are in constant modification—cf. परिणामिनित्यता गुणानाम् (व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. IV. 33). The first kind of modification is that सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् modify themselves as सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस्. Here, the साम्यावस्था is intact; there is no creation. But, when there is a विषमपरिणाम (or समुदय), we have creation. Here सत्त्व and the rest combine with one

another in different proportions, one predominating over the others. The other commentators take त्रिगुणतः and समुदयात् both, as referring only to the creative activity of प्रकृति.

XVII

तौष्टिकाः—Those who are contented or those whose aim is to get the nine kinds of तुष्टिs (dealt with in कारिका 50). But वाच० here refers to only the five external (बाह्य) तुष्टिs. The internal (आध्यात्मिक) तुष्टिs are gained after the attainment of the discriminative knowledge of the Spirit and the non-Spirit. The internal तुष्टिs are not referred to here. Therefore, वाच० says—अव्यक्तं वा महान्तं वा, etc.

The reading संहतपरार्थत्वात्, adopted by Wilson, is not supported by गौड०. who reads संघातपरार्थत्वात्. Wilson's reading of the text is an obvious mistake (based upon, perhaps, the सां. सू.—संहतपरार्थत्वात्, I. 140), as it is not supported by any commentary.

दृष्टान्तदृष्टसर्वधर्मानुरोधेन, etc. In order to prove that a संघात is परार्थ, शय्या, etc., are given as an illustration.—Just as शय्या, आसन and the rest, being संघातs, are परार्थ, so अव्यक्त and its constituents are for another person, *viz.*, पुरुष. But in this illustration, पर is शरीर, which is itself a संघात; and thus पुरुष also becomes a संघात. On this वाच० remarks that if you go to establish the similarity of all the qualities found in a दृष्टान्त with all the qualities found in a पक्ष, then there can be no inference. The point is cleared in the न्यायवार्तिक (Chowkhamba edn., pp. 344–345) and the न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका (Kāshi Sanskrit Series, No. 24, p. 600).

अधिष्ठानात्—पुरुष is the अधिष्ठाता of प्रकृति, as a charioteer is that of a chariot. *Question* :—But, a charioteer is active, and your पुरुष, being निर्गुण = निष्क्रिय, is not active, how can he become an अधिष्ठाता? *Reply* :—It is not essential that only an

active entity can move or urge anything. Sometimes mere proximity or contanct brings about activity, as we see in the case of iron and load-stone. Cf. तत्संनिधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवद् (सां. सू. I. 96). Or, mere presence also can bring about an activity, as in the case of a King. Cf.—

न च सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वं स्यात्प्रयोजककर्मणाम् ।
चलनेन ह्यसिं योद्धा प्रयुंक्ते च्छेदनं प्रति ॥ ८५ ॥
सेनापतिस्तु वाचैव भृत्यानां विनियोजकः ।
राजा सान्निध्यमात्रेण विनियुङ्क्ते कदाचन ॥ ८६ ॥
तस्मादचलतोऽपि स्याच्चलने कर्तृतात्मनः ।

(कुमारिल's श्लोकवार्तिक on मी. सू. I. 5, Chowkhamba edn., p. 710).

बालराम thinks that this argument about the अधिष्ठातृत्व of पुरुष answers all the criticisms brought forward by शङ्कराचार्य in his भाष्य on रचनानुपपत्तेश्च and प्रवृत्तेश्च (ब्र. सू. II. 2. 1 and 2).

स्वात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधात्—It is very succinctly explained by बालराम as follows—न ह्यसिधारात्मानं छिनत्ति वह्निर्वात्मानं दहतीति भावः ।

अन्ये त्वाहुः—भोग्या दृश्या बुद्ध्यादयः etc. अन्ये refers to those who cannot reconcile the निःसङ्गता of पुरुष with his भोक्तृत्व. They would, therefore, explain भोक्ता as द्रष्टा. But the same objection can be brought against these people also.—पुरुष being निःसङ्ग can be a द्रष्टा, only through बुद्धि; see व्यासभाष्य on द्रष्टा दृशिमात्रः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः (यो. सू. II. 20). Similarly, he can be a भोक्ता also through बुद्धि.—"एवं च द्रष्टृत्ववद् भोक्तृत्वस्यापि सम्भवात्प्राग्व्याख्यानमपि समीचीनमेवेति ध्येयम् ॥" (बालराम, p. 160).

कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च—माठर assigns this प्रवृत्ति to प्रधान, whileas, वाच० and others take this प्रवृत्ति as belonging to the शास्त्र and the sages—आगमानां महाधियां च ॥

XVIII

निकाय—The word is derived from नि + चि + घञ् (संघे चानौत्तराधर्ये—पाणिनि III. 3. 42), "in the sense of a multitude or assembly (of living beings possessing some common characteristics), but not merely a confused crowd of men." (S. C. Vasu's translation of सिद्धान्तकौमुदी, p. 347). 'निकाय: = देवमनुष्यतिर्यगादीनामनौत्तराधर्येणावस्थित: संघात:, तद्विशिष्टाभिरित्यर्थ:' इति तात्पर्यटीकायाम्मिश्रा: (बालराम, p. 161).

On जन्म and मरण, विज्ञान० says—जन्ममरणे चात्र नोत्पात्तिविनाशौ पुरुषनिष्ठत्वाभावात् । किन्त्वपूर्वदेहेन्द्रियादिसंघातविशेषेण संयोगश्च वियोगश्च भोगतदभावनियामकाविति (सां. सू. I. 149).

न चैकस्यापि पुरुषस्य देहोपधानभेदात् etc. The view of the वेदान्तिन् is that one and the same आत्मन् assumes plurality on account of being conditioned by the different bodies. Cf. 'उपाधिभेदेऽप्येकस्य नानायोग आकाशस्येव घटादिभि: ।" "उपाधिर्भिद्यते न तु तद्वान् ।" "एवमेकत्वेन परिवर्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्माध्यास: ।" (सां० सू० I 150–152). माठर sets the पूर्वपक्ष in the following words :—इह केचिदाचार्या वेदवादिन इति मन्यन्ते–, एकोऽयं पुरुष: सर्वशरीरेषूपलभ्यते मणिसूत्रवत् । इह रसनायां यावन्तो मणयस्तेषु सर्वेष्वेकमेव सूत्रं प्रवर्तते । एवं माणिभूतेषु शरीरेषु किमेक: सूत्रभूत: परमात्मा, आहोश्वित् जलचन्द्रवत् पुरुष इत्येक एव बहुषु नदीकूपतडागादिष्विवोपलभ्यते इति ॥ Cf. षिमानन्द (सांख्यतत्त्वविवेचन, p. 13, Chow. S. S. No. 246):— "आकृतिगर्भाशयभावसङ्गतिशरीरविभागाल्लिङ्गबहुत्वात् सांख्याचार्या: कपिलासुरिपञ्चशिखपतञ्जलिप्रभृतय: पुरुषबहुत्वं वर्णयन्ति । वेदवादिन आचार्या, हरिहरहिरण्यगर्भव्यासादय एकमात्मानं, तथा च श्रुति:........ एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थित: । एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत्॥" (This verse from ब्रह्मविन्दूपनिषद्, १. २, is quoted by विज्ञान० also on सां. सू. I. 153).

But, does not this doctrine of पुरुषबहुत्व contradict the श्रुतिs which lay down the unity of soul (*i. e.* आत्मैक्य)? The सां. सू. says, No.—"नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात् (I. 154).—These scriptures speak of one आत्मन् in the sense of class notion. वाच० also tries to reconcile the अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोध as follows—

" एकत्वश्रुतीनां च प्रमाणान्तरविरोधात् कथंचिद्देशकालविभागाभावेन भक्त्याप्युपपत्तेः। प्रकृत्येकपुरुषनानात्वयोश्च श्रुत्यैव साक्षात् प्रतिपादनात्। 'अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः। अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः॥' (तै. आ. ६. १०)॥" तत्त्ववैशारदी, on यो. सू. II. 22.

Further on, says the सांख्य, if you are going to explain away this नानात्व by उपाधिs, then you will land yourself into another absurdity. For, as शरीर is the उपाधि of आत्मन्, so the limbs (अवयवs) are the उपाधिs of a body (a संघात). And when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, will the वेदान्तिन् call these phenomena the births and deaths of the same body ?

XIX, XX and XXI

माध्यस्थ्य or औदासीन्य is of seven kinds according to जय०:— सप्तविधं चास्यौदासीन्यम्। तथा चोक्तम्—पश्यति शृणोति सर्वं करोति स्थितिं प्रसङ्गं च नापि। स्वतो न परतो...नोभयतश्चाप्युदासीनः॥ जय०, further raises the question that if पुरुष is मध्यस्थ and अकर्ता, then how is he a भोक्ता?—ननु च यद्यकर्ता तत्कथं भोक्तृभावादस्ति पुरुषः? तथा चाहुः— बालहृताशनतरवः स्वयमकृतानां यथा हि भोक्तारः। पुरुषोऽपि विषयफलानां स्वयमकृतानां तथापि भोक्ता॥ इति।

अचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् etc. Intellect and the rest, although non-intelligent, seem to be intelligent, on account of the proximity of the Spirit. Thus alone can the experience—'I know' be explained. Although the entire activity belongs to the Attributes (transformed into महत्, अहङ्कार and the rest), yet, on account of its reflection in the Intellect, the really indifferent Spirit seems to be active. Cf. उपरागात् कर्तृत्वं चित्सांनिध्यात् (सां. सू. I, 164). The Spirit in its turn transfers its intelligence to matter. This transference is thus illustrated by various commentators—'यथाग्निसंयोगात् लोहमणिरित्युच्यते। (जय०) 'अनुष्णाशीतो घटः शीताभिरद्भिः संस्पृष्टः शीतो भवति, अग्निना संयुक्त उष्णो भवति।' (माठर)॥ 'यथाग्न्ययसोः परस्परं संयोगविशेषात् परस्परधर्मव्यवहार

औपाधिको यथा वा जलसूर्ययोः संयोगात् परस्परधर्मारोपस्तथैव बुद्धिपुरुषयोरिति भावः। (विज्ञान०, सां. सू. I, 164)॥

अकर्तृत्व of पुरुष is further supported by जय० by the following quotation—प्रवर्तमानान् प्रकृतेरिमान् गुणांस्तमोऽभिभूतो विपरीतदर्शनः। अहं करोमीत्यबुधोऽभिमन्यते तृणस्य कुब्जीकरणेऽप्यनीश्वरः॥ This quotation is found in the तत्त्वसमाससूत्रवृत्ति (Chow. S. S. No. 246, p. 124) and सांख्यतत्त्वविवेचन also (ibid, p, 12) with slight variants.

वाच० connects दर्शनार्थं (in पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य) with प्रधानस्य, and कैवल्यार्थं with पुरुषस्य. The other commentators take the line as it stands, *i. e.* पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं and प्रधानस्य कैवल्यार्थम्. While explaining 'विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं वा' (सां. सू. II, 1). विज्ञान० also connects कैवल्य with प्रधान.

XXII

In the भाष्य (on यो. सू. II 19) व्यास describes the तन्मात्रs as the products of महत्तत्त्व (—एते सत्तामात्रस्यात्मनो महतःषडविशेषपरिणामाः). But there the महत् should not be taken as the immediate cause (*i. e.* producer) of these तन्मात्रs. व्यास has himself said at another place (यो. सू, I. 45) that these तन्मात्रs are the products of अहङ्कार.

माठर and गौड० hold that these तन्मात्रs singly produce the महाभूतs. The other commentators hold that the each succeeding महाभूत is produced from the combination of the preceding तन्मात्रs. For example, शब्दतन्मात्र and स्पर्शतन्मात्र produce वायु; शब्दतन्मात्र, स्पर्शतन्मात्र and रूपतन्मात्र produce तेजस् and so on. But this theory of वाच० violates the orthodox पञ्चीकरण theory of the वेदान्तिन्s. The point is noticed by कल्पतरुकार, who says—

सम्प्रदायाध्वना पञ्चीकरणं यद्यपि स्थितम्।
तथापि युक्तिदृष्टत्वाद्वाचस्पतिमतं शुभम्॥
पृथिव्यनलात्मत्वं गगने पवने ऽपि चेत्।
रूपवत्त्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां चाक्षुषत्वं प्रसज्यते॥

अर्द्धभूयस्त्वतः क्षित्याद्यविभावनकल्पने ।
व्यवहारयथाप्राप्ता मुधा पञ्चीकृतिर्भवेत् ॥
अनपेक्ष्य फलं वेदसिद्धेत्येवेष्यते यदि ।
त्रिवृत्कृतिः श्रुता पञ्चीकृतिर्न क्वचन श्रुता ॥

(quoted by वंशीधर in his comm. on तत्त्वकौमुदी, p. 293 Chow. S. S.).

माठर gives a queer and fantastic derivation of the word अहङ्कार—चतुःषष्टिवर्णैः परादिवैखरीपर्यन्ताभिधेयैर्यत्किमप्यभिधीयते बुद्धया समर्थ्य तत्सकलमाद्यन्ताकारहकारवर्णद्वयग्रहणेनोपरिस्थितपिण्डानुकारिणा बिन्दुना भूषितः प्रत्याहारन्यायेनाहङ्कार इत्यभिधीयते ॥

XXIII


गौड० and माठर curiously divide ज्ञान and वैराग्य into two kinds—internal and external. Sovani is right in criticising this classification (p. 414), as ज्ञान means only प्रधानपुरुषान्यताज्ञान in this कारिका, and not the knowledge of the वेद and the rest. Similarly, the आभ्यन्तर-वैराग्य (*viz.*, प्रधानमप्यत्र स्वप्नेन्द्रजालसदृशमिति विरक्तस्य मोक्षेप्सोर्यदुत्पद्यते) is the principal वैराग्य which leads to the बाह्यवैराग्य also. For, who will be indifferent towards the worldly objects unless he is मोक्षेप्सु ?

बालराम does not read गरिमा in his text of तत्त्वकौमुदी. Our edition of तत्त्वकौमुदी, जय०, माठर and गौड० mention nine kinds of ऐश्वर्यs although each one (except वाच०) says अष्टविधमैश्वर्यम्. It seems, therefore, that बालरामs text is the correct one. Our edition of तत्त्वकौमुदी and वंशीधर's edition, however, combine ईशित्व and वशित्व and thus make the total eight.


जय० reads यत्रकामावशायित्वम् in place of यत्रकामावसायित्वम्, and derives it as—कामेनेच्छयावशेतुं शीलं यस्य स यत्रकामावशायी । तस्य भावः यत्रकामावशायित्वम् । अनेकार्थत्वात् धातूनां ' शी ' निष्ठतौ वर्तते ।

XXV

अहङ्कार is divided into three kinds—



This is the scheme adopted by वाच० and others. But विज्ञान० (on सां. सू. II. 18) would have—



In support of his classification, विज्ञान० quotes from some स्मृति—

> वैकारिकस्तैजसश्च तामसश्चेत्यहं त्रिधा ।
> अहंतत्त्वाद्विकुर्वाणान्मनो वैकारिकादभूत् ॥
> वैकारिकाश्च ये देवा अर्थाभिव्यञ्जनं यतः ।
> तैजसादिन्द्रियाण्येव ज्ञानकर्ममयानि च ॥
> तामसो भूतसूक्ष्मादिर्यतः खं लिङ्गमात्मनः ।

But this explanation is wrong; for सत्त्व and तमस् are inactive by themselves, and cannot produce anything unless helped by the mobile रजस्. वंशीधर's explanation, *viz.*,—' समष्टीन्द्रियाणि मनोऽपेक्षयाऽल्पसत्त्वत्वेन राजसकार्यत्वेनैव स्मृतिषु निर्दिष्टान्यत्र तु व्यष्टीन्द्रियापेक्षयाऽधिकसत्त्वत्वेन सात्त्विकाहङ्कारकार्यतयोक्तानीत्यविरोधः। " is very lame (See सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुदीटीका of वंशीधर. Chow. S. S., p. 343; see further बालराम, pp. 177–178 and Sovani, p. 415).

XXVII

The first phrase उभयात्मकं, gives the general characteristic of the mind and the second phrase संकल्पकं मनः gives the proper function of the mind. गौड० interprets संकल्पकं as प्रवृत्तिं कल्पयति, *i. e.*, which determines the functioning (of the two sets of इन्द्रियs). वाच० understands संकल्पकं as विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन कल्पयति *i. e.* perceives the definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended. जय० and चन्द्रिका agree with वाच०. What वाच० means is that all the senses of perception cognise their respective objects vaguely, and this is निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष or simple-perception. But as mere simple-perception of an object is of no use in our every-day life, so the help of mind is sought to give a definite and concrete shape to that percept. This is what is called सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष or complex-perception The first is नामजात्यादियोजनाहीनं आलोचनज्ञानं, and, therefore, निर्विकल्पक; the second is नामजात्यादिसंयुक्तं ज्ञानं, and, therefore, सविकल्पक. In his support, वाच० cites अस्ति ह्यालोचितज्ञानं etc., from कुमारिल's श्लोकवार्तिक (on मी. सू. I. 4., verses 112 and 120, pp. 168 and 172, Chow. S. S.). The phrase ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जात्यादिभिर्यया । बुद्ध्यावसीयते, has been thus explained by पार्थसारथि in his commentary on the above—ततो निर्विकल्पादुत्तरकालं जात्यादिभिर्विकल्प्य वस्तु यया बुद्ध्या गृह्यते—, which is the same as विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन विवेचयति of वाच०. S. N. S. is beside the point when he says that according to वाच० " mind explicates what is indeterminate, it does not add to the given material. But the verses cited by Vācaspati would suggest that forms and qualifications are created or added to the original perception by the mind." (p. 61). For, according to the author of the श्लोकवार्तिक whose verses are quoted here, we have the knowledge of सामान्य and विशेष both in the निर्विकल्पक stage; but this knowledge is not combined into a definite concept, as in the सविकल्पक stage. We are cognisant of both, घट and घटत्व in the निर्विकल्पक stage, but separately; but we cognise

घटत्वविशिष्टो घटः in the सविकल्पक stage. So, there is no new addition or creation of anything new by the mind. That this is the sense of कुमारिल, is evident from his own verse in this context :—" निर्विकल्पकबोधेऽपि द्व्यात्मकस्यापि वस्तुनः। ग्रहणं लक्षणाख्येयं ज्ञात्रा शुद्धं तु गृह्यते ॥ ११८ ॥ " (p. 171). पार्थसारथि explains it—द्व्यात्मकस्य, सामान्यविशेषात्मकस्येत्यर्थः। सामान्यावभासोऽपि प्रतीतिसिद्ध एव। न हि निर्विकल्पकेनाऽगृहीतस्य सविकल्पकेनापि ग्रहणं सम्भवति, न वाऽगृहीते सामान्ये व्यक्त्यन्तरे प्रत्यभिज्ञा संभवति। तस्मात् सामान्यं विशेषश्च निर्विकल्पेऽपि प्रकाशत एव etc.

इन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात्—जय० remarks :—यथान्यदिन्द्रलिङ्गं तथा मनोऽपीत्यर्थः. But वाच० criticises this view :—इन्द्रियान्तरैः सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वं च साधर्म्यम्, न त्विन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम्। महदहङ्कारयोरप्यात्मलिङ्गत्वेनेन्द्रियत्वप्रसङ्गात्। तस्माद्व्युत्पत्तिमात्रमिन्द्रलिङ्गत्वं, न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम्।

माठर reads ग्राह्यभेदाच्च in place of बाह्यभेदाश्च. This is noted by चन्द्रिका also. माठर's reading is preferable, because the second line of the कारिका lays down the reasons of the नानात्व of इन्द्रियs, the two reasons being, गुणपरिणामविशेषात् and ग्राह्यभेदात्.

The question is—how can one अहङ्कार create these manifold इन्द्रियs whose functions differ? This question is raised by उद्योतकर in his न्यायवार्तिक (Chow S. S., p. 70)—यदि पुनरिन्द्रियाण्येकात्मकानि स्युः, कारणस्वभावानुविधानादैकात्म्याद्विषयव्यवस्था न स्यात्, सर्वं सर्वार्थमेकं वा सर्वार्थमति स्यात्। The reply to it is—गुणपरिणामविशेषात्. Although अहङ्कार is one, yet the three गुणs, accompanied by धर्म and अधर्म, act and react upon one another; therefore, the modified effects of अहङ्कार (*i. e.* the इन्द्रियs) differ in their functions.

XXVIII

माठर reads रूपादिषु in place of शब्दादिषु in the text. बालराम also adopts this reading and observes :—चक्षुरादिक्रमेण पूर्वमिन्द्रियाणामभिधानात् ' शब्दादिषु ' इति पाठो न सन्निवेशितः। (p. 184, 1n.)

N. 3

XXIX

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च। Does the word करण stand for त्रिविध अन्तःकरण or त्रयोदशविध करण? While वाच० adopts the former view all the other commentators agree to the latter interpretation, although माठर curiously says at one place —समस्तस्यान्तःकरणस्येत्यर्थः। विज्ञान० also explains the word करण as अन्तःकरण in his भाष्य (on सां. सू. II 31). But वाच०, while commenting on समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः प्राणादिलक्षणा जीवनम् (योगभाष्य on III 39), has given a different interpretation, *viz.*, स हि प्रयत्नभेदः शरीरोपगृहीतमारुतक्रियाभेदहेतुः सर्वकरणसाधारणः यथाहुः 'सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च' इति। बालराम correctly points out the discrepancy. He suggests that योगभाष्येऽपि समस्तेन्द्रियशब्देनान्तःकरणत्रयमेव ग्राह्यं, न तु बाह्येन्द्रियमपि, because in deep sleep when all the external sense-organs are dormant, we see the five vital airs functioning. Therefore, these vital airs cannot be said to be the function of external sense-organs.

XXX

Cognition has been divided into three kinds in the सांख्य philosophy, *viz.*, perception (प्रत्यक्ष), inference (अनुमान) and valid testimony (शब्द). Now, in प्रत्यक्ष, the three अन्तःकरणs and one of the organs of sense,—all four seem to function simultaneously and gradually. But, according to the नैयायिकs there are only gradual stages, which, however, are not observable on account of the swiftness of the different functions. Cf. ज्ञानायौगपद्योद्दकं मनः (न्या. सू. III. 2. 57), न युगपदनेकक्रियोपलब्धेः (*ibid*, III. 2. 58), अलातचक्रदर्शनवत् तदुपलब्धिराशुसञ्चारात् (*ibid*, III. 2. 59). For, according to the नैयायिकs, the mind is अणुपरिमाण. The followers of सांख्य, on the other hand, regard the mind to be of मध्यमपरिमाण, and, therefore, there can be a युगपद्वृत्ति.

In the case of अनुमान and शब्द, only the three अन्तःकरणs function. They can operate simultaneously and gradually both, but they do not depend upon the cognition of senses *at that particular moment.*

XXXI

आकूत—Davies observes :—‘ *Ākūta* is glossed in the Petersb, Lexicon by *Absicht* (= purpose), *Antrieb* (= motive). Colebrooke's translation is " incited by mutual invitation."... ......The meaning of " incitement to activity, " mentioned by Wilson, expresses more nearly the sense of *ākūta*......It is composed of *ā*, to, towards, and *kū*, to cry. Gauḍapāda says that it means *ādarasambhrama* (respectful eagerness in action). ’ (p. 68, 1n).

Davies is wrong in considering that गौड० is correct in applying this verse to the three internal organs only (See Davies, p. 68, 1n). All the other commentators apply it to all the organs, for each and every इन्द्रिय functions for पुरुषार्थ.

The spirit of the सां. सू., " स हि सर्ववित् सर्वकर्ता " (III. 56) and " ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा " (III. 57), goes directly against the theory of the कारिकाs, where no ईश्वर is mentioned. Nor is the position helped by विज्ञान०'s remark, *viz*, प्रकृतिलीनस्य जन्येश्वरस्य सिद्धिः ‘ यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद् यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः ’ इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः सर्वसम्मतैव, नित्यस्येश्वरस्यैव विवादास्पदत्वादित्यर्थः ॥........नन्वेवमीश्वरप्रतिषेधविरोधस्तत्राह—‘ ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा ’। सान्निध्यमात्रेणेश्वरस्य सिद्धिस्तु सर्वसम्मतेत्यर्थः। (सां. सू. III. 57).

XXXII

The three functions of seizing, retaining and manifesting are, as Davies rightly points outs (pp. 69-70), common to all the organs. Thus " the organ of sight seizes and holds the impression conveyed by an external object and manifests it to *manas.* " (*ibid*). According to गौड०, आहरण and धारण

belong to कर्मेन्द्रियs and प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs. माठर ascribes आहरण to इन्द्रियs in general, and धारण and प्रकाशन to अहङ्कार and बुद्धि respectively. वाच॰ followed by चन्द्रिका, would relegate आहरण to कर्मेन्द्रियs, धारण to बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and मनस्, and प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs.

The word दशधा in the second half of this verse presents a difficulty. वाच॰ takes दशधा with आहार्य, धार्य and प्रकाश्य each. The objects *seized* by the इन्द्रियs, being only five, are doubled by dividing them into दिव्य and अदिव्य. Similarly, the body which is *retained* by the अन्तःकरण, is made up of five vital airs; but these are also दिव्य and अदिव्य, and so tenfold. The objects *manifested* by the बुद्धीन्द्रियs are also tenfold because of being divided into दिव्य and अदिव्य varieties. I think there is another and better way of explaining the कारिका. The objects *seized, retained* and *manifested* are altogether ten, *viz.*, five objects of organs of action and five objects of organs of sense. These ten are supervised by the three internal organs.

XXXIII

वाच॰ explains why काल is not recognised as a separate category in the सांख्य philosophy. According to the वैशेषिकसूत्र "अपरस्मिन्नपरं युगपच्चिरं क्षिप्रमिति लिङ्गानि" (II. 2. 6), काल is *one* category which is divided into three parts-past, present and future—, according to different circumstances. प्रशस्तपाद clarifies this point—"एकत्वेऽपि सर्वकार्याणामारम्भक्रियाभिनिर्वृत्तिस्थिति-निरोधोपाधिभेदान्मणिवत्पाचकादिवद्वा नानात्वोपचारः; that is, just as one and the same man is called a पाठक or a पाचक in different circumstances, or just as one and the same piece of crystal assumes different colours according to the objects placed near it, so all the effects, though of one nature, become different under the different circumstances of beginning, ending, remaining and perishing. Thus, there is only one काल. To this वाच॰ replies—Why should we first assume one काल and then assume differ-

ent circumstances or उपाधिs to make this काल multifarious? Why should we not recognise the उपाधिs only? Cf. स खल्वयं कालो वस्तुशून्योऽपि बुद्धिनिर्माणः शब्दज्ञानानुपाती लौकिकानां व्युत्थितदर्शनानां वस्तुस्वरूप इवाभासते–योगभाष्य on III, 52.

XXXIV

अविशेष = non-specific, *i. e.*, तन्मात्राs. विशेष = specific, *i. e.*, पञ्चमहाभूतs.

पाण्याद्याहार्याणां घटादीनां पञ्चशब्दाद्यात्मकत्वात्—Here वाच० suggests that the विषयs of the कर्मेन्द्रियs (except वाच्) are endowed with all the constituents of the five elements in some measure. But this will lead to accepting the theory of पञ्चीकरण, which is opposed to वाच०'s view on कारिका XXII, where he says आपः शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगुणाः. Can a person not bring water with his hands? If so, then water must also be पञ्चशब्दाद्यात्मक. See notes on Kārika XXII and S. N. S., pp. 72–73 with footnotes.

XXXV

The word द्वारि has been translated by S. N. S., as 'principal'. The translation is based upon जय०'s phrase द्वाराण्यस्य सन्तीति. I think that 'warder' expresses the sense of द्वारि better than 'principal'. For, in spite of the fact that all the sense-organs bring their percepts to the अन्तःकरण, the latter itself receives these percepts for delivering them to पुरुष, as is clear from the next कारिका. The criticism of S. N. S. would have been right if अन्तःकरण were to retain these percepts for itself and not present them to the Spirit. Therefore, the three-fold अन्तःकरण acts as a warder for the Spirit and not as the principal (one).

XXXVII

वाच० interprets both the lines of this कारिका as the causes of the superiority of बुद्धि. गौड०, on the other hand, inter-

prets the first line as the cause of the second;—because intellect brings about the entire enjoyment of the Spirit, therefore, it brings about also the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. माठर quotes the following speech of अहङ्कार.—

अहङ्कारो धियं ब्रूते मैनं सुप्तं प्रबोधय ।
प्रबुद्धे परमानन्दे न त्वं नाहं न तज्जगत् ॥
मयि तिष्ठत्यहङ्कारे पुरुषः पञ्चविंशकः ।
तत्त्ववृन्दं परित्यज्य स कथं मोक्षमिच्छति ॥
योऽसौ सर्वेश्वरो देवः सर्वव्यापी जगद्गुरुः ।
देहीति पदमुच्चार्य हा मयात्मा लघुः कृतः ॥

माठर further remarks—न हि भगवतः कपिलस्य मते किमपि कर्तव्यमनुष्ठेयतया, किं तु सांख्यानां पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञानमेव साधर्म्येण वैधर्म्येण च निःश्रेयसहेतुः । उक्तं च—

हस पिब लल मोद नित्यं विषयानुपभुञ्ज कुरु च मा शङ्काम् । यदि विदितं ते कपिलमतं तत्प्राप्स्यसे मोक्षसौख्यं च ॥ This verse is more of tirade against the सांख्य philosophy than an exposition.

XXXVIII

In para 185, read भूतान्याकाशानिलानलसलिलावनिरूपाणि.

Why तन्मात्रs are called अविशेषs?—This has been explained by गौड० and माठर as देवानामेते सुखलक्षणा विषया दुःखमोहरहिताः, which is wrong. For, तन्मात्रs, being evolved out of त्रिगुणात्मिका प्रकृति, cannot be said to be devoid of दुःख and मोह (= रजस् and तमस्). Therefore, the explanation of वाच०, *viz.*, न चैषां शान्तत्वादिरस्त्युपभोगयोग्यो विशेष इति मात्रशब्दार्थः, is better. That is, all the Attributes are present in the तन्मात्रs, but they are not patent enough to be enjoyed.

XXXIX

The specific elements are divided into three divisions—"(1) Subtle body; (2) those which are born of father and mother; and (3) gross substances or inorganic matter.........

It (subtle body) becomes 'specific' by the aggregation of the subtle elements which in themselves are 'non-specific' or diversified." (Davies, p. 76). But, according to वाच०, सूक्ष्मशरीरं शान्तघोरमूढैरिन्द्रियैरन्वितत्वाद्विशेषः (Kār. 40);—the subtle body is called specific because it is endowed with the sense-organs possessed of the qualities of calmness, violence and delusion.

XL

पूर्वोत्पन्नम्—According to वाच०, each Spirit is endowed with a subtle-body at the beginning of the creation. But according to सां. सू. सप्तदशैकं लिङ्गम् (III. 9), there is an aggregate of subtle-bodies which is created in the beginning. Cf. विज्ञान०. लिङ्गशरीरं, तच्च सर्गादौ समष्टिरूपमेकमेव भवति, इत्यर्थः. Then, how do the subtle bodies separate? To this, the सूत्र replies —व्यक्तिभेदःकर्मविशेषात् (III. 10)—they are separated or differentiated according to particular actions. On this विज्ञान० comments—यद्यपि सर्गादौ हिरण्यगर्भोपाधिरूपमेकमेव लिङ्गम्, तथापि तस्य पश्चाद्व्यक्तिभेदो व्यक्तिरूपेणांशतो नानात्वमपि भवति। But, is not this idea of हिरण्यगर्भ foreign to सांख्य ?

According to this कारिका, the number of the constituents of लिङ्गशरीर is eighteen, but according to सूत्र, it is seventeen. विज्ञान० has ingeniously removed this discrepancy by saying—अहङ्कारस्य च बुद्धावेवान्तर्भावः।

XLI

A distinction should be made between लिङ्ग and लिङ्गशरीर The latter is the vehicle of the former, which consists of thirteen principles, *viz.*, intellect, ego, mind, five organs of sense and five organs of action, and which is referred to as अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषः in the authority quoted by वाच०.

The reading of गौड० and माठर is विना अविशेषैः, whileas वाच० has विना विशेषैः. वाच० calls the सूक्ष्मशरीर as विशेष in Kārikā XL.

So विना विशेषैः means विना सूक्ष्मैः शरीरैः. But this is confusing because, to say that the लिङ्ग (composed of thirteen principles) cannot exist without सूक्ष्मशरीर (composed of लिङ्ग and पञ्चतन्मात्राs) is not logical. गौड°'s explanation is better when he says that लिङ्ग cannot exist without अविशेषs *viz.*, the five subtle elements. चन्द्रिका gives a different opinion of some commentator :—केचित्तु स्थूलशरीरावश्यकत्वाभिप्रायकमिदमिति वर्णयन्ति । तथा हि, लिङ्गं समुदायात्मकं लिङ्गशरीरं विशेषैः स्थूलदेहैर्विना निराश्रयं सन्न तिष्ठति, किन्तु स्थूलशरीरमाश्रित्यैव तिष्ठति । अतो न लिङ्गशरीरेण स्थूलशरीरस्यान्यथासिद्धिरिति भावः ॥

XLIII

According to वाच° and जय° dispositions may be divided like this—

- भावाः
  - प्राकृताः
  - वैकृताः
    - करणाश्रयिणः
    - कार्याश्रयिणः

The प्राकृतभावs, which are innate, are of four kinds, *viz.*, धर्म, ज्ञान, वैराग्य and ऐश्वर्य. They belong to कपिल only. Those depending on the instruments (करणाश्रयिणः) are eight *viz.*, धर्म, अधर्म, ज्ञान, अज्ञान, वैराग्य, अवैराग्य, ऐश्वर्य and अनैश्वर्य. Those dispositions which depend on the effect or body (कार्याश्रयिणः) are also eight, *viz.*, five when the body is in the womb and three, *i. e.*, childhood, youth and old age, when the body is outside the womb. गौड° and माठर, however, divide the भावs into three kinds—सांसिद्धिक, प्राकृत and वैकृत. धर्म, ज्ञान, वैराग्य and ऐश्वर्य are born along with कपिल, so they are सांसिद्धिक or cognate in his case; but they come to सनक, सनन्दन, सनातन and सनत्कुमार (the four sons of ब्रह्मन्) after their birth, and are therefore, प्राकृत or natural in their case. The वैकृत or acquired dispositions reside in ordinary human beings and depend upon the instruments and the effected body.

XLIV and XLV

According to माठर, the सूक्ष्मशरीर rises to the eigh… practising virtue. The states are ब्राह्म, प्राजापत्य, ऐ… गान्धर्व, याक्ष, राक्षस and पैशाच. गौड० gives सौम्य for पित्र्य, a… has been dropped in Wilson's text and ours, but is give… the Benares edition. By practising vice, the सूक्ष्मशरीर si… to the five states of पशु, पक्षी, मृग, सरीसृप and स्थावर. Th… प्राकृतिकबन्ध, according to वाच०, is due to the identification of the Spirit with प्रकृति itself; but माठर includes the eight kinds of evolvents (प्रकृतिs) in this bondage. The वैकारिकबन्ध, according to वाच०, is the identification of the Spirit with the विकारs of प्रकृति (*i. e.* the evolutes); but according to माठर, this bondage is brought about by making the eight states, *viz.*, the ब्राह्म, प्राजापत्य and others, as the *summum bonum*. These three kinds of bondages are explained by वाच० at length in his तत्त्ववैशारदी on योगभाष्य I. 24.

The word प्रकृति in प्रकृतिलयः, stands for महदहङ्कारभूतेन्द्रियाणि, according to वाच०; but, according to गौड० and माठर. the word denotes प्रधानबुद्ध्यहङ्कारतन्मात्राः

XLVI

For the criticisun of Keith, see Sovani (p. 424). This creation of intellect or "the conduct of the human understanding" (Davies, p. 84), distinguished by Ignorance, Incapacity, Contentment and Attainment, is divided into fifty kinds.

गौड० and माठर illustrate all these four states by means of an example of post. There is विपर्यय, when you are in doubt, whether you are seeing a man or a post. There is अशक्ति, when even after seeing the post clearly, you are not entirely free from the doubt. There is तुष्टि, when you do not want to remove the doubt as to the identity of the post. There is सिद्धि when you succeed in establishing the correct identity of the

xplanation of वाच० is better. विपर्यय is that whic
he path of the Spirit to liberation. "Incapacit
ises from the imperfection of senses. Acquiescenc
entment (तुष्टि) is a passive state of intellect. Perfectio
means perfect knowledge, not completeness in mora
e." (Davies, pp. 84–85).

XLVII

विपर्यय or अविद्या is of five kinds :—अविद्या, अस्मिता, राग, द्वे
and अभिनिवेश, which are called तमस्, मोह, महामोह, तामिस्र an
अन्धतामिस्र by the कारिका.

XLVIII

तमस् or अविद्या is of eight kinds and arises on account o
identifying the Spirit with Nature, Intellect, Ego, and the fi
subtle elements.

मोह or अस्मिता is also of eight kinds. The gods and th
rest consider the eight varities of Attainment or सिद्धिs a
the *summum bonum.*

महामोह or राग is of ten kinds and arises from the attac
ment to the objects of five senses; these objects are ten, fi
belonging to gods and five to human beings.

तामिस्र or द्वेष is of eighteen kinds, and arises from t
hatred towards one or the other of the ten objects of sen
(mentioned above) and the eight varieties of Attainment
सिद्धिs.

अन्यतामिस्र or अभिनिवेश is also of eighteen kinds and aris
from the fear of losing the eight सिद्धिs or the ten objects
sense. Or it may be the fear of death which might obstru
the enjoyment of these eighteen objects. Cf. स चायमभिनिवे
क्लेशः स्वरसवाही कृमेरपि जातमात्रस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमैरसंभावितो मरणत्र
उच्छेददृष्ट्यात्मकः पूर्वजन्मानुभूतं मरणदुःखमनुमापयति (व्यासभाष्य on यो.
II. 9). "मरणत्रासोऽन्धतामिस्रं उच्यते।" (जय० p. 51).

Thus, there are 62 kinds of विपर्ययs.